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Introduction: Bordering Practices Challenging State 
Borders 
Helena Rytövuori-Apunen
The studies that have generated the present book have been sparked by a 
timely question: how does the waning of Western military presence in Af-
ghanistan impact the wider region around this country? The implications of 
this process go far beyond the immediate effects of the reduction of U.S. and 
its allies’ forces in the coalition led by NATO. The states in close geographic 
proximity to Afghanistan as well as other external powers, notably Russia, 
have interests in how the transformation of the regional security environment 
occurs. The political context is complex, because in Afghanistan’s neighbor-
hood the borders of the former Soviet republics are fused with historical af-
filiations and livelihood connections that leave these two-and-a-half-decade-
old states interpenetrated; in the entire geographic area borderlines between 
states are mostly porous and, in some cases, barely exist. Under such circum-
stances the impacts of this transformation, the changes that it brings and the 
processes that it prompts, become rather more multifarious and unpredictable 
than in situations where states are distinct entities separated by the lines be-
tween them. 
In Afghanistan’s part of the world borderlands are intertwined with the 
habitual processes of life for reasons that relate to the everyday practices of 
livelihood and family connections. While illegal border crossings simply ig-
nore the authority of the state, this authority is also systematically and inten-
tionally challenged by the transborder loyalties and networks of non-state 
agents connected with ethno-political mobilization, insurgent activity, crimi-
nal economic organization and separatist pursuits. Beyond this it is also state 
agents, especially when they are powers with security interests in the wider 
region, who engage in policies and practices that serve to fuse the boundaries 
of sovereignty. Such fusion occurs through spaces claimed for forward-
pushed defense, markets and economic resources, and cultural and ideologi-
cal influence. In most cases the presence of extra-regional powers within the 
region relates more to their interest in controlling political outcomes, i.e. to 
ensure future collaboration and access to different types of resources, than it 
does to the old proto-imperial practice of achieving domination over territo-
2ry. As a consequence of this the practices of power are subtle and persuasive 
rather than directly coercive, and they often operate through mutually condi-
tional collaborative relations. 
Due to the current stress moment created by Afghanistan for the coun-
tries in its neighborhood, borders around Afghanistan are also about region-
wide security and development and, moreover, they are connected to global 
security. The year 2014 did not mark the “pivotal year” announced by Presi-
dent Obama in May of that year, who at that time stated that the combat mis-
sion would be concluded by the end of the year and that 2015 would see less 
than 10,000 U.S. troops (from then 32,000) remain in Afghanistan with the 
limited tasks of training the local security forces and “supporting counter-
terrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qaeda.”1 In September 2014, 
U.S. and Afghan officials signed a bilateral security agreement which al-
lowed the U.S. plus a few thousand NATO troops to remain in Afghanistan 
after the NATO-led ISAF mission (International Security Assistance Force) 
and the thirteen-year-old U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom expired at the 
end of 2014. Two months later, in November, Obama announced that Opera-
tion Resolute Support, which NATO had planned as a follow-up non-combat 
mission (“training, advising and assistance”), was to extend the U.S. combat 
mission in support of the Afghan security forces for at least one more year. 
In March 2015, the 2014 plan that half of the remaining 9,800 U.S. troops 
would leave by the end of 2015 was postponed and Obama announced that 
the specific trajectory of the withdrawal in 2016 would be established later 
that year. In October 2015 this plan was abandoned, thereby rejecting the 
idea that, prior to the expiry of Obama’s presidency in January 2017, the 
U.S. military presence could be reduced to consist of only security advisers,
who would be part of the embassy staff in Kabul. Instead, President Obama 
announced that U.S. troops would continue to remain in Afghanistan 
throughout most of 2016 but that the number for 2017 would decline to 
5,500 as that year begins.2
                                                          
1 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on Afghanistan, 
May 27, 2014, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/27/statement-president-afghanistan.
2 Matthew Rosenberg and Michael D. Shear, “In Reversal, Obama Says U.S. Soldiers Will 
Stay in Afghanistan to 2017,” New York Times, October 15, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/10/16/world/asia/obama-troop-withdrawal-afghanistan.html?_r=0;
the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-Afghanistan Joint Statement,” March 
24, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/24/us-afghanistan-joint-
3Rather than outlining definite plans for withdrawal, the announced dates 
mark change and ambiguity in and around Afghanistan for many years to 
come. In contrast to the more restrictive mandate advocated by the previous 
Afghan President Hamid Karzai, his successor Ashraf Ghani welcomed the 
support of the U.S. aircraft—F-16 fighters, B-1B bombers and Predator and 
Reaper drones—to Afghan forces in direct combat. While the responsibility 
for security had been transferred to the Afghan army and security forces by
the end of 2014, these forces (350,000 in number) lacked crucial air-force 
capacity. The year 2014 saw the number of casualties amongst Afghan forces 
rise to 5,000, and twice as many Afghan civilians had been killed. Against 
the additional backdrop of the alarming advances made by the Islamic State 
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; also known as Islamic State, IS)3 in northern 
Iraq, a military solution to the endgame in Afghanistan prevailed in Wash-
ington against the argument that the U.S. should only be engaged in narrower 
counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda and thus help to generate better 
conditions for the government in Kabul to negotiate with the regional insur-
gents. The fact that the Taliban were able to occupy the city of Kunduz in 
northern Afghanistan for two weeks in September–October 2015 quickly put 
an end to the plans that a complete withdrawal of the remaining 12,500
troops that the U.S., other NATO members and NATO partners still had in 
Afghanistan in the beginning of 2015 was imminent. 
However, in spite of the uncertainty over the future of Afghanistan, the 
political momentum of 9/11 has evaporated and the mission, which in au-
tumn 2001 placed Afghanistan at the center of the Global War on Terrorism
                                                                                                                            
statement; Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “In a Shift, Obama Extends U.S. Role in 
Afghan Combat,” New York Times, November 21, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/us/politics/in-secret-obama-extends-us-role-in-afghan-
combat.html.  The U.S. spent $1 trillion in its 13 year-long military mission, and an 
additional $100 billion were spent on reconstruction. By October 2015, more than 2230
U.S. service members had been killed. On December 1, 2015, the foreign ministers of the 
NATO member states confirmed that the alliance would sustain its Resolute Support 
Mission until the end of 2016. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Foreign Ministers 
agree to sustain NATO’s presence in Afghanistan, launch funding for Afghan forces,” De-
cember 1, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_125364.htm.
3 The name Islamic State was adopted in June 2014 by a group that previously had referred to 
itself as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This last-mentioned name had indicated 
the merging together of Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and a number of other 
groups. The acronym “Da’ish” (“Daesh”) from the Arabic Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq 
wa al-Sham (the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham) is mostly used by the group’s opponents. 
4and within a decade’s time had peaked at 140,000 troops,4 is awaiting for its 
final conclusion. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in September 2001, the 
mission under the auspices of NATO and authorized by the UN grew into an 
entire state-building effort that arose from the U.S. military intervention, 
which had succeeded in toppling the Taliban from power within a few 
weeks. Infrastructure and institutions have been built, education and health 
care improved, but the mission leaves behind a state in which ethno-political 
conflict has been made more severe rather than being reduced; and security 
forces are only maintained through external financial support and military 
assistance. Tahir Amin in the present book argues (chapter 7) that the possi-
bilities of Afghanistan’s political future range from fragile power-sharing to 
yet another round in the civil war and a takeover by the Taliban. Although it 
is unlikely that Afghanistan will become a conventional threat to its neigh-
bors (denoting the aggression of this state against another state), any 
strengthening of the Taliban and the groups connected with it within Afghan-
istan will also strengthen the radical Islamist opposition and its underground 
movement in the countries in its proximity. 
The former Soviet republics, which are still in a process of transfor-
mation brought about by independence in the early 1990s, are especially sen-
sitive areas in this regard. Unlike Pakistan and Iran, they are not Islamic 
States in name but, instead, secular republics. The remark of a presidential 
adviser in Tajikistan in June 2014 voices a concern felt in all capitals: “[I]f 
there are disturbances in Tajikistan, members of the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan, Ansarullah, Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist and extremist 
organizations will appear here at once.”5 The conflict is more complex than 
can be conveyed by the concept of “asymmetric conflict” which juxtaposes 
state actors with transborder non-state agencies (typically armed insurgency 
and other criminalized activity). The conflict is not this plain anywhere here, 
but the armed insurgency also expresses and utilizes other dividing lines that 
are deeply embedded in the region’s history and suppressed by a symbolism 
                                                          
4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO and Afghanistan,” accessed December 15, 
2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm; Kenneth Katzman, “Afghani-
stan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Ser-
vice, CRS Report, April 27, 2015, 42, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf.
5 Sherali Khairulloyev, Presidential Adviser in Tajikistan, quoted in “The Main Orchestrators 
of Recent Events in Khorog are in Dushanbe, Says Presidential Adviser,”Asia-Plus, Du-
shanbe, June 7, 2014, http://news.tj/en/news/main-orchestrators-recent-events-khorog-are-
dushanbe-says-presidential-adviser.
5intended to unify the state. In such conditions the threat from Afghanistan 
prompts central governments to demonstrate the “credible security perfor-
mance” that serves internationally as well as domestically as a sign of suc-
cessful statehood. As the words of the Tajikistani adviser above already sug-
gest, the threat is less about the rule of the Taliban as such than about a tur-
bulent Afghanistan which provides opportunities for the militant insurgency 
that has been present in Central Asia since the 1990s and is increasingly con-
nected with radical Islamist forces outside of the region. 
When the momentum of 9/11 placed Afghanistan in the limelight of 
world attention, the question about the impacts and repercussions of the 
transformed security environment for the states and regions in its proximity 
was left in the shadow. Autumn 2001 started a process of pumping into Af-
ghanistan a military capacity derived from the world’s most advanced tech-
nology, and three of the surrounding former Soviet republics (Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) as well as Pakistan were drawn into major transit 
and logistics networks. The territory of the three first-mentioned states be-
came especially important after U.S.-Pakistani relations deteriorated in 2011. 
When the ISAF and U.S. mission was being wound down thirteen years after 
the autumn of 2001, the states around Afghanistan were once again affected. 
The withdrawal of troops, weapons and weapons systems reorganizes exter-
nal military presence and capacity in this geographic area, and impacts the 
security environment in which these countries negotiate their position in the 
region and organize their relations with external powers. As Western military 
forces move out, the international community has little else but “develop-
ment” to offer as a solution to security problems. Large-scale projects in-
tended to connect Afghanistan to new region-wide energy networks have 
been initiated by the U.S. and also by China, which has its own economic 
and security interests in the region. Although the success of these efforts has 
much significance for regional countries’ future, any such new interdepend-
ence can only modestly facilitate a solution to the difficult security puzzle 
that envelops the wider region. While tying countries together through joint 
efforts does indeed prompt cooperation, it also creates conflict over new eco-
nomic and political frontiers. These frontiers are zonal and expansive, and 
they fuse the lines between effective influence and formal authority. All of 
this means that the future of Afghanistan is not only about Afghanistan itself, 
but also about the wider region that surrounds this state. 
6The 2010s have shown several signs of increased insurgent activity in 
the vicinity of, and stretching across, Afghanistan’s borders. In central and 
southern Tajikistan, the country’s government has responded to the political 
opposition, both armed and unarmed, in a heavy-handed manner and with a 
massive use of force. In the Ferghana Valley, which intertwines Tajik, Kyr-
gyz and Uzbek lands, communal conflict over land, water and road construc-
tion has sparked violent clashes involving both civilians and border guards. 
The conflicts in the Ferghana have led to state-level conflict in regard to the 
transborder disputes over non-demarcated and disputed territory. Casualties 
amongst security personnel—border guards, army soldiers and paramilitary 
units—have been reported to occur frequently in the zone between Afghani-
stan and Pakistan. Furthermore, the border between Afghanistan and Turk-
menistan, which until 2014 had remained relatively quiet, has repeatedly seen
the slaying of Turkmen border guards, and these violent encounters have 
generated tensions between Ashgabat and Kabul. The year 2015 started out 
with new alarming reports on the concentration of armed militants in Afghan 
border areas near Tajikistan and the continuing hunt by the Afghan govern-
ment of the Taliban members who, weeks before, had captured four Tajik 
border guards near the Panji Poyon (Nizhny Panj) border crossing check-
point. Similarly ominous have been reports of the appearance of the black 
flags of Islamic State (IS) along the Afghan-Turkmen border, allegedly 
raised by Taliban groups and IS militants who were citizens of these Central 
Asian countries. Militant groups trained in Syria also were reported to have 
committed acts of violence in the Osh Region in the Kyrgyz part of the Fer-
ghana Valley.6 A few months later, U.S. sources and domestic experts in Af-
ghanistan both confirmed that the recruits of the Islamic State in the region 
were mostly from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia and that this intake 
was dividing the Taliban, many of whom were disgruntled with a leadership 
that was considered too moderate.7 Many of the border incidents related to 
                                                          
6 “Isil Militants Test Central Asia’s Borders for Strength,” Asia-Plus, Dushanbe, January 29, 
2015, http://news.tj/en/news/isil-militants-test-central-asia-s-borders-strength. According to 
International Crisis Group, the estimate of the participants from Central Asia among the 
ranks of the Islamic State ranges from 2,000 to 4,000. The largest ethnic group is Uzbek, 
and recruitment takes place mostly among the migrant workers in Russia (Policy Briefing, 
Europe and Central Asia Briefing, no. 72, January 20, 2015). The figures are reasoned (and 
hence speculative) rather than empirical. 
7 “IS, Taliban Pairing Up in Northern Afghanistan: Official,” Express Tribune, May 8, 2015, 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/883104/is-taliban-pairing-up-in-northern-afghanistan-official/;
“ISIS in Afghanistan a Rebrand of Militants Already in Battlefied,” Khaama Press, June 
7these developments reportedly are intertwined with the flow of drugs by 
which the insurgents can build up their resource base. However, seeing hard-
ened control of state borders as the main (or sole) response is a self-defeating 
approach because this also worsens the confrontation and deepens the con-
flict. Action is regrettably late when military confrontation already looms, 
but sustainable solutions—other than merely military solutions—require the 
same as proactive measures: an understanding of how the different flows 
across these borders, both legal and illegal, connect with the state-making 
practices and external interests that support or suppress them. 
The current moment in Afghanistan prompts questions in which several 
issues are intertwined: In which ways do the geopolitical tensions relating to 
the reorganization of external military presence and the competition brought 
about by region-wide energy projects interact with the multi-ethnic regional 
states’ ambitions? In which ways do these states seek to strengthen their po-
sition in the region and to consolidate their central powers in relation to the 
politically problematic areas at state borders which also extend to considera-
ble depth within these countries? How do these internal conflicts connect 
with the external pressures and opportunities and thereby either strengthen or 
challenge the state’s possibilities to control territory and people? Unravelling
this bundle of problems requires examining two kinds of activity. The first is 
transboundary activities ranging from livelihood practices and representa-
tions of historical affiliation to militant insurgency and separatist ambitions. 
The second is the boundaries of effective control that take shape in the inter-
actions of the regional states with external agents and powers whilst leaders 
in these states try to maintain their own line of policies and action and strive 
also to gain resources in order to strengthen their respective positions.  
The complexity of these processes continue to elude us if we remain fo-
cused merely on the borderline and the management practices expected to 
“filter” interaction between states and if we, accordingly, report events as 
“incidents” (border incidents, violent incidents) as if they occurred only spo-
radically. Such an approach gives priority to a specific concept, the concept 
of the modern, “Westphalian” state and states system, which in the region 
around Afghanistan lacks a solid historical basis and where any related tradi-
                                                                                                                            
25, 2015, http://www.khaama.com/isis-in-afghanistan-a-rebrand-of-militants-already-in-
battlefield-1238; also see U.S. Department of Defense, “Enhancing Security and Stability in 
Afghanistan,” Report to Congress, December 2015, 17–19, http://www.defense.gov/
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/1225_Report_Dec_2015_-_Final_20151210.pdf.
8tion has only shallow roots.8 The recognition that there are many temporal 
layers of borders, again, instructs us to look for an alternative in the more 
history-oriented concept of borders which finds its manifestation in the em-
pirical study of the problems of nationalism and ethnopolitics in identity con-
struction and institution-building. However, in such empirical study the en-
tire frame of discussion has mostly consisted in the development of a territo-
rially bounded state. The narrative of the state is the recurrent theme in area 
studies on political developments in Central and South Asia and it forms, in 
particular, the substance of the genre of studies approaching post-Soviet de-
velopment through questions of nation-building and transition to democra-
cy.9 In order to overcome these conceptual limitations we approach borders 
as practices that shape reality. These are practices authorized by the institu-
tion of the state, and they are also practices wherein the very concept of 
states with fixed, non-overlapping borders has little meaning and habitual 
processes take place through ignorance, evasion and active resistance of the 
implications of this institution. 
Borders may well be visible as lines but, more generally, they are things 
that mark limits and difference, inclusion and exclusion. The contributors in 
this book focus on examining those border-producing (“bordering”) practices 
which claim control of some territorial space and which have practical impli-
cations for relations between states.10 These practices may be institutional 
                                                          
8 The Westphalian state refers to the historical sources of the modern state in pre-modern 
Europe. The principle, which in 1648 concluded the Thirty Years’ War and put an end to 
the participation of the Holy See in the territorial power struggles between European rulers, 
determined that the rule in each country decides its religion (cuius regio, eius religio).
Although the principle agreed by the European rulers in 1648 was not about borders but 
about making the state entities the sovereign powers in their respective territories, it laid the 
cornerstone for the bordering practices which through a variety of institutionalizing 
mechanisms including international law became constitutive for international relations.
9 Early works in this genre include Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition: The East European 
and East German Experience (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996); among more recent 
works are Mariya Y. Omelicheva, ed., Nationalism and Identity Construction in Central 
Asia: Dimensions, Dynamics, and Directions (Maryland: Lexington Books, Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2014).
10 According to Charles Taylor, practices can be seen as more or less “stable configuration of 
shared activity” shaped by a pattern of what is regularly done and what is not. Charles 
Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), 204. Etymologically, “pragma” refers to that which is regularly 
done (Greek pragmatikos, prassein, to do). In the pragmatist sense this is the only 
“essence” of reality. Bordering practices are also ordering practices, as Henk van Houtum, 
Oliver Kramsch and Wolfgang Zierhofer argue in the Prologue of their edited book 
9and exhibit the symbolic markers of a state, or they may claim legitimacy 
based on other social conventions. Such claims can be explicit in policies or 
demonstrated through recurrent action. The symbolic markers of the agents 
performing such bordering practices thus range from state flags to private 
fences, and from letters of law to codes for clandestine action. The sustained 
control of some space—a bounded territory or a more diffuse functional 
space—is power. Rather than focusing on territory and its control as a pro-
jection of power, our interest lies in the border-related actions which, in their 
recurrence, are practices to organize control of territorial space and, in this 
way, to gain power.11 Our aim is to find out how these practices shape the 
terrain of conflicts and the political landscape around Afghanistan, and how 
they do so when the uncertainty about the future of Afghanistan becomes an 
impetus to pursue bordering practices in exchange for security and develop-
ment. 
Inner and Outer Neighborhood
In geographic terms, our main focus is the area covered by the former Soviet 
republics, which has drawn very little attention in its relation to the develop-
ments in the wider region although it constitutes the major part of the region 
around Afghanistan. Three former Soviet republics neighbor on Afghanistan: 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan con-
nect the southern parts of Central Asia with Russia, which has been the dom-
inating external power in the region north of the Amu Darya and the Panj 
rivers ever since a British-Russian border demarcation in 1885. This geo-
graphic area is all the more interesting when we take into account that Rus-
sia’s interests concerning stability in Afghanistan do not fundamentally con-
flict with those of the U.S. and NATO.12 Noticing that there is common in-
                                                                                                                            
B/ordering Space (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). The main focus of this book is identity-
construction. 
11 Our argument must not be confused with the (re)emphasis of the importance of territory 
(“territory is back”) which has received increasing articulations after the conflict in Ukraine 
unfolded and Russia annexed the Crimean area and the city of Sevastopol in spring 2014. 
From the perspective of the present book, the focus on territory suggests narrowly geopolit-
ical connotations. 
12 Jeffrey Mankoff, “The United States and Central Asia After 2014,” Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, January 2013, 1, 
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terest yet also disagreement nourished by mutual suspicions, we examine 
how the “post-Soviet” states around Afghanistan negotiate their positions in 
region-wide security and development, and what practical implications these 
processes have for bordering practices in the region. However, as soon as 
this question is raised, it also becomes clear that, due to the intermingled 
border problematique, our geographic focus must be expanded from Central 
to South-Central Asia.
On Afghanistan’s southern and eastern borders, where the approximately 
2,500-kilometer-long borderline13 has not been recognized by any Afghan 
government, Pakistan’s provincially and federally administered tribal areas 
(the PATA and FATA regions, respectively) bring together Central and 
South Asia. The 3.5 million-strong Pashtun population of the extensive un-
settled frontier zone to Afghanistan offered British imperial administrators a 
front to influence events in Afghanistan from the area of present-day Paki-
stan, and this practice was continued through the support of U.S. intelligence 
to the Pashtun militant opposition which had fled to this border region to es-
cape the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (December 1979–February 1989). 
Because security and development in Afghanistan and the entire region are 
integrally tied to the question of Pakistan’s north-western borders, our geo-
graphic focus is broadened from Central towards South Asia so as to include 
Pakistan and its troubled border relations with India. 
In addition to these areas in immediate geographic proximity to Afghani-
stan, the regional security puzzle includes an “outer” zone of external pow-
ers, both regional and global. Russia’s presence is embedded in the modern 
history of the region in multiple ways. The geographic and historical proxim-
ity of China is clearly visible in the economic sphere and, increasingly, also 
in security as Beijing tightens its grip on developments which, in Mao’s 
days, were named “splitism” and in the present time are described as “terror-
ism” and “extremism” in line with the international threat vocabulary. Iran’s 
cultural ties with Tajikistan pave the way for expanding cooperation from the 
economic sphere to regional security issues. Iran is a historical power in the 
region, a power against which the nineteenth-century Afghan Emirs needed 
the British army and which today connects Greater Central Asia with politics 
in the Middle East. Iran, today, is part of the “outer” zone because of its am-
                                                                                                                            
http://csis.org/files/publication/130122_Mankoff_USCentralAsia_Web.pdf.
13 The reported length of the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderline varies from 2,430 to 2,640
kilometers.
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bitions relating to nuclear energy that have become a source of tensions in 
the relations of the U.S. and Russia. Although its state border with Afghani-
stan draws it into the “inner” zone, Iran is not in focus in the present book 
because Soviet and Russian influence has had no major impact on the bor-
ders of this country. Instead we examine another large country, Kazakhstan, 
which is poised for regional leadership and, in its cooperation with external 
powers, is part of the “outer” zone. Simultaneously its spongy borders with 
Kyrgyzstan, which have caused discord between the two countries, pull it 
into the “inner” zone of more direct impact arising from developments in 
Afghanistan.  
The question of Russia’s influence in the region is important not only for 
historical reasons. Russia is alertly keeping an eye on signs of political and 
religious “extremism” near its own state borders and within the former Soviet 
republics, where political forms of radical Islam threaten its Eurasian integra-
tion projects.14 The threat of armed insurgency is intertwined with drug traf-
ficking that for Russia poses a demographic problem rather than only a mat-
ter of law enforcement.15 Russian foreign policy makers have repeatedly ex-
pressed concerns “about the time frame set by the USA for withdrawal of 
troops from Afghanistan, which does not correspond to the situation in the 
country.”16 Russia supported the U.S. military operation in the wake of 9/11, 
                                                          
14 The Eurasian Economic Union has been in effect since January 1, 2015. It was launched on 
the basis of the Customs Union established in 2006 between Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan within the frame of the Eurasian Economic Community (EAC, alternatively 
EurAsEC or EAEC), which was created in 2000 by these three states plus Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was created in 2002 on the 
basis of a treaty on collective security signed in Tashkent in 1992. 
15 Some 1.7 million of the drug-addicted people in Russia use opiates from Afghanistan, 
which started to flow into the country in the late 1990s. (The estimated total number of 
drug-addicted people ranges from 2.5 million in 2010 to 8.5 million in 2013, out of a total 
population of 143 million.) Afghanistan is the main source of the heroin consumed in 
Russia. “World Drug Report 2010, 1.2 The global heroin market,” United Nations Office 
on  Drugs and Crime, www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/1.2_ The_global_
heroin_market.pdf; “Russia battles Afghan heroin intoxication single-handedly,” interview 
of Viktor Ivanov, director of the Federal Drug Control Service, RT TV, October 12, 2009, 
https://www.rt.com/news/afghan-heroin-drug-trafficking; Ivan Nechepurenko, “Russia
Fights Addiction to Afghan Heroin,” Moscow Times, May 27, 2013, http://www.
themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-fights-addiction-to-afghan-heroin/480593.html.
16 “We are concerned about the time frame set by the USA for withdrawal of troops from
Afghanistan, which does not correspond to the situation in the country. The USA has been 
unable to fulfil the mandate that was approved by the UN, but is leaving the country in the 
midst of an armed conflict. The question is what the UN will have to do next.” Statement by 
Russia’s permanent representative at the UN, Vitaliy Churkin, quoted in “Churkin: Rossiia
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thereby hoping to enhance cooperation with the U.S. and to gain internation-
al support for its own struggle against terrorism and radical Islam within and 
in the proximity of its state borders. Thus, although the difficulties experi-
enced by Western countries to control Afghanistan perhaps are not bad news 
in the sense of the political competition between great powers, they also are a 
source of anxieties which increase the pressure on Russia to fortify its own 
military and political frontiers in the region. A statement from June 2014 by 
the Council of the Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) declared that Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan is currently 
“the most dangerous area of the outer CIS boundaries related to the activities 
of international terrorist organizations and cross-border crime groups, organ-
izing transit channels of militants, illegal migrants and drug trafficking.”17 A 
few months later in September, the Russian Secretary General of the Collec-
tive Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Nikolai Bordiuzha warned about 
Islamist attempts to create an “underground extremist state” in Central 
Asia.18 The gradual withdrawal of U.S. and ISAF troops has also generated 
suspicions in Moscow that the transit units will be tasked with surveillance 
and espionage, and that part of the military capacity will remain in the territo-
ries of the former Soviet republics under the banner of law enforcement 
training centers. While the U.S. rearranges its capacity to operate without 
significant ground troops, Russia responds in its own ways which reflect its 
bilateral relations and multilateral defense cooperation along its historical 
borders. In Russia’s multilateral cooperation, not only the CSTO but also the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which adds China to the cooper-
ation, has been growing in importance, all the more so since the SCO decided 
in 2014 to start a process of upgrading three of its observer-status partici-
pants—that is, India, Pakistan and Iran—to full members. Afghanistan 
gained observer status in 2012. 
Security around Afghanistan is an extremely difficult puzzle; and it is 
unsolvable insofar as the puzzle is conceived in the Westphalian frame in 
which the pieces are territorially bounded state entities. Such a conceptual 
                                                                                                                            
obespokoena planami SShA po vyvodu voisk iz Afganistana,” RIA Novosti, June 3, 
2014, http://ria.ru/world/20140603/1010555595.html.
17 “CIS to Provide Assistance to Tajikistan in Strengthening of Tajik-Afghan Border 
Protection,” AKIpress, Bishkek, June 5, 2014, http://www.akipress.com/news:542655/.
18 Nikolai Bordiuzha, Secretary General of the CSTO, quoted in Edward Lemon, “Russia Sees 
IS as Reason to Boost Control in Central Asia,” Eurasianet.org, November 11, 2014,
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70866.
13
frame is unable to put together the actual pieces which overlap or, indeed, are 
missing altogether. They overlap or do not fit together because the practices 
of states are much more multifarious than the concept of the state with clear-
ly delineated borders suggests; and pieces are missing because the activities 
of agents other than states are not recognized. In Central Asia the spaces of 
such missing pieces cut across states’ boundaries in diffuse and changing 
shapes rather than carve out any specifically defined area (such as a pseudo-
state, for example the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq). This reflects the di-
verse and country-specific circumstances in which underground opposition 
and insurgency, and in many cases also separatist ambitions, challenge cen-
tral governments. In each country the outcomes of the interactions between 
the loyalties of the population (based on geographic region, ethnicity, and
family ties) and public appeals to assume identities construed by the unifying 
symbolism of state and nation depend crucially on the historical experience 
that has accumulated in the political “periphery” of the substance of relations 
with the “center.”
The problem of state-building that typically has burdened the former So-
viet republics is that, upon their emergence after the dissolution of the USSR, 
the new, independent states have to varying degrees privileged some ethnic 
groups and their regions vis-à-vis other groups and regions. This conflict has 
deepened whenever it also recreated the distance between Soviet-era elites 
and other segments of the population. As a consequence, a mechanism for 
conflict escalation has been reactivated; and in cases where political situa-
tions polarize inside the countries and where paths of parliamentary partici-
pation for the political opposition are closed for any reason, this has brought 
the implication that different groups may join together and the underground 
movement and transborder connections for political opposition and insurgen-
cy may easily be strengthened. In this way the “puzzle” gains pieces that are 
not bounded entities but, instead, diffuse in their character and that take 
shape according to circumstances. These flickering pieces cut through state 
borders and surface in some places—“problematic zones” within countries or 
zones disputed between them. While during the Soviet decades the northern 
parts of Afghanistan in particular had become a shifting zone of bordering 
practices for politico-ideological and ethno-political inclusion and exclusion, 
after the dissolution of the USSR new and shifting frontiers erupted through-
out the terrain of the new states and created interfaces of political and cultur-
al bordering. 
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The mechanisms that produce the odd pieces of the puzzle are not very 
different outside the former Soviet republics, in South-Central Asia; but what 
makes the post-Soviet area a dramatic scene of transformations is their only a 
few decades-old Westphalia-modeled statehood to which the pressures gen-
erated by the uncertainty over the future of Afghanistan add an extra burden. 
The thrust of our argument is that we cannot grasp the dynamics of the de-
velopments in the region unless we examine borders in the sense of multiple 
types of bordering practices. The transformation sparked by the uncertain 
future of Afghanistan is the present-day context, which makes this general 
theme timely and pertinent. While it is important to bring into focus agents 
other than states, we also note that states—the central powers in the region 
and the leaderships of external states—do not only control and consolidate 
formal borders but also engage in fighting against or supporting other types 
of bordering practices and, thus, prompt collaboration, contestation or oppo-
sition among both non-state agents and other states. The patterns of these 
actions and policies in their mutual interaction and combinations are exam-
ined in their country-specific contexts in the different chapters of this book. 
Arrangement of Chapters in the Book
The chapters comprising the present book discuss the wider region around 
Afghanistan from the immediate post-Soviet transformations of the early 
1990s to projections of future processes. The thematic landscape that we ex-
amine against this temporal horizon consists of the different agents’ practices 
of borders, security and development. The introductory chapter is followed 
by Jeremy Smith’s examination of how borders in the former Soviet repub-
lics in Central Asia were established at independence and how this ran paral-
lel to setting up multilateral security cooperation. Smith also discusses how 
the issue of the rights of the ethnic Russians and the Russian-speaking popu-
lation were embedded in the transformations following the dissolution of the 
USSR; and how this issue in Kazakhstan, where the Russian minority has 
remained large, from the early 1990s onwards created uncertainty over the 
stability of the northern borderline (chapter 1). In other parts of Central Asia 
significant minorities are no longer Russian but the state borders in all cases 
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cut through ethnic affiliations and complicate neighborhood relations at state 
and communal levels. 
The uncertainty over the future of Afghanistan raises the political mo-
mentum about building up the state borders, which remain shallow as meas-
ured by the standards of the modern state: many are easy to walk across, such 
as the Panj River between Afghanistan and Tajikistan during dry periods. 
The border crossing points (BCPs), which have been established relatively 
recently, assign movement across the borderlines with the function of being 
legal interaction from the territory of one state to another state, but everyday 
livelihood practices do not always obey such institutional lines. Examining 
the Batken region in the Kyrgyz segment of the Ferghana Valley shared by 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Steven Parham illustrates how the 
linear borders that conventionally mark state sovereignty are corroborated by 
the state’s internationally assisted training and equipment while they, at the 
same time, are contested by the everyday practices of the borderland popula-
tions. Parham’s discussion shows how the memory of Soviet times is present 
in the border discourse of the local population and what it means against the 
horizon of the new reality of building a distinct state (chapter 2). 
The border zone around the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Paki-
stan is a state security problem in a very different register, and the situation 
has become ever more complicated since the U.S. military intervention in 
autumn 2001 ousted the Taliban from Kabul. In this case here no formally 
recognized borderline exists and the zone provides refuge to armed insurgen-
cy from all countries in the region. Simbal Khan discusses how this zone of 
instability and insecurity between Afghanistan and Pakistan curves up to 
Kashmir, the Himalayan region disputed by Pakistan and India, and how 
these two areas, together with the Ferghana Valley, form major hubs for very 
mobile and multifaceted movements of armed insurgency. In these areas 
formal state borders are contested and the border zones are extremely porous 
due to mutually conflated communities. These three areas, which all display 
very different characteristics, are also connecting points for the more global 
and highly mobile militant insurgency and illegal trafficking of drugs and 
other goods, and increasingly also of human beings. Khan’s discussion ex-
poses some of the main political and security threats which the regional states 
encounter at the border and inside their territories irrespective of the situation 
in Afghanistan yet critically nourished by it (chapter 3). The three chapters 
comprising this first part of the book show how border-related conflicts in 
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post-Soviet Central Asia and South-Central Asia are embedded in the history 
of external colonization and rivalries between regional powers.
The four chapters that follow in Part II discuss the policies and other 
practices through which four states directly bordering on Afghanistan—
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Pakistan—each deal with the pre-
sent challenges of security and development. The chapters examine the spe-
cific problems encountered in Afghanistan’s immediate geographic proximi-
ty and the issues which arise from a problematic relationship with Russia, 
which, for the former Soviet republics, is the historical horizon against which 
the main directions of policies must be interpreted and which, for Pakistan, 
relates to its conflict and rivalries with India. In both cases relations with 
Russia help to make sense of the deeper, not readily visible borders, which 
are part of the context of action and have practical meaning in terms of action 
consequences depending on the agents’ interpretations. 
The path chosen by independent Turkmenistan has been isolationist and 
based on its own kind of permanent neutrality. Slavomír Horák and Jan Šír 
discuss how the proximity of Afghanistan and the more recently launched 
energy cooperation shape policies in this energy-rich country and how the 
Turkmen leadership attempts to react to the new security challenges arising 
from the south (chapter 4). Tajikistan, again, is militarily Russia’s frontier 
land and allied with it.  Tajik identity is an integral part of the Afghan con-
flict and affects Tajikistan through its political underground opposition. On 
the border that runs along the Panj River history and identities are fused to 
such a degree that this geographic border, as Rytövuori-Apunen and Usmon-
ov emphasize, cannot properly be described as “Tajik-Afghan”; in ethnic 
terms it is “Tajik-Tajik” instead (chapter 5). During the Soviet era, this spe-
cific border condition made Tajikistan an ideological frontier land towards 
Afghanistan, and even today Tajikistan plays a key role in Russia’s ap-
proaches to Afghanistan.
The subtle power game and political conditionality in Moscow’s rela-
tions with the stronger of the former Soviet republics is well illustrated by 
examining Uzbekistan; a country which, as Vadim Romashov explains, has 
been in and out of the Russia-led security cooperation and has correspond-
ingly opened bases for Western use and, more recently, has welcomed the 
U.S. “train and equip” assistance for modernizing its military. Romashov 
discusses how the policy moves, which at first glance might look like a “zig-
zag” or a “pendulum,” make sense as a political game that utilizes the new 
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opportunities brought about by major changes in the security environment in 
order to help realize the country’s long-term policy goals (chapter 6). Finally, 
because the border zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan is an inseparable 
part of the region’s security problematique, the question of how Russia deals 
with conflict-ridden South-Central Asia through its bilateral relations with 
Pakistan must also be examined. Tahir Amin discusses Pakistan-Russia rela-
tions as a part of the security problematique around Afghanistan and argues 
that not only Western military presence but also its liberal world order is 
waning in the region whilst other discursive world orders gain influence 
(chapter 7).
The third part of the book examines the prospects which international 
development initiatives and cooperation present for Afghanistan and the
wider region around it. The “New Silk Roads” approaches and projects 
launched by both the U.S. and China are examined by Mika Aaltola and Juha 
Käpylä (chapter 8). These projects, together with many other supported by 
international financing institutions, offer Afghanistan and the countries 
around it new opportunities to gain resources and develop cooperation, but 
they also bring competition and conflict. Chapter 9 has two authors, each 
with their independently written sections. Dmitry Malyshev analyzes Rus-
sia’s current security interests in relation to Afghanistan and the ways in 
which the stress moment created by the uncertain future of this country is 
present in Russia’s interactions and cooperation with the Central Asian 
states. Additionally, Malyshev gives an account of Russia’s participation in 
the efforts by means of development to build stability in Afghanistan and 
explains how by cooperating with its allies in the wider region it plans to 
counter the multiple security threats and especially the possible expansion of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan’s North as the U.S. and NATO-led coalition forc-
es move out. Amongst the former Soviet republics in Central Asia it is espe-
cially Kazakhstan that is looking for a new development leadership in the 
region. Elnara Bainazarova discusses the regional role of Kazakhstan and 
especially scrutinizes the development policies which Astana has launched 
with emphasis on “Asian regionalism.” These two authors each valorize the 
question of how the role of Kazakhstan in the region is complementary or 
competes with that of Russia, and what significance this bilateral relationship 
has for the stated goal of enhancing stability in the region through multilat-
eral Eurasian cooperation. 
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Finally, chapter 10 wraps up the question of how development can con-
tribute to security and argues that there are serious limits to the force-based 
and institution-building approaches which figure so prominently in Afghani-
stan. Simbal Khan and Helena Rytövuori-Apunen return to the question of 
border spaces discussed in chapter 3 and argue that the hope of permanently 
abolishing the breeding grounds of terrorism that these spaces can enclose 
lies in applying a combination of sophisticated and patient strategies: Con-
tributing to the economic and social development of the respective popula-
tions while at the same time avoiding violent action and other extreme 
measures that amongst the local population accumulate the experience of 
injustice relating to the state. Khan and Rytövuori-Apunen argue that if the 
international emphasis on enhanced regional cooperation as a means to build 
security in the post-withdrawal situation in and around Afghanistan contin-
ues to stall over the difficult issues of the border spaces—transborder organi-
zation and its linkage to militant activity and jihadist causes—a crucial piece 
will be missing in the security puzzle.
Our discussions on borders, security and development are intended to 
contribute to the three- or four-decades-old interdisciplinary genre of border 
studies in the broader connection of the study of international relations and 
conflict. The Epilogue is a reflection on how the present book with its geo-
graphic focus relates to border studies which, as a research domain with al-
ready several signs of institutionalization (a journal, an association, regular 
conferences), has developed largely by gaining inspiration from the trends 
and developments on the U.S.-Mexico border. We conclude that because 
borders in Central Asia have a different dynamism, the use of the same the-
matic concepts as a framework of analysis and interpretation limits our un-
derstanding of the developments in the region. This is not just an empirical 
argument that two borders are mutually different (indeed, they always are); 
instead, it is to point out difference in the entire experience of the border and 
to emphasize that this makes a difference for analysis. This argument pre-
sents a critique of the subsumption of different “cases” for mutual compari-
son under the frame of defined concepts. We propose that the logic of analy-
sis starts with articulating experience instead and thereby retains its connec-
tion with life-practices. 
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Pragmatist Landmarks in the Study of Borders
In the academic study of international relations19 the criticism of approaches 
that consider states as bounded entities (that is, that treat them as homoge-
nous units confined by their territorial spaces and constituting the “interna-
tional system”) is already extensive and ranges from the behavioral focus on 
groups of individuals to the post-structuralist criticism of rationalist perspec-
tives and the constructivist emphasis on social creation. While the starting 
point in all these approaches is theory and method which pit one school or 
approach against another, our motivation in writing the present book is more 
immediately practical and concerns itself with the means that are available 
for research in preventing the polarization and escalation of violent conflicts. 
“Practical,” however, entails more than a question about the uses of 
knowledge. 
We approach the physical reality of borders as an outcome of a series of 
actions (practices) which have some interpretative unity (that is, they form a 
policy, have a common basis of legitimacy, etc.). The effect and thus the 
whole meaning20 of a border may be that it functions as a wall, literally or 
metaphorically, which may protect but also obstruct action, and which in 
both cases has a variety of “practical” (demonstrable) ramifications in the
lives of people. Similarly, borders “are” what they (with recurrence and con-
stancy of effects) “do” in the action environment of states. “Afghanistan” is a 
transboundary threat which in various ways represents the “border” and be-
comes an incentive for action and policies to strengthen present borders and 
to develop new borders of security and development. 
In Central Asia, where the formal lines of separation between states are 
only a few decades old and fused with many other dividing lines, a focus on 
the state border alone cannot help to improve our understanding of these pro-
                                                          
19 The academic study of international relations covers the varying historical and discursively 
specific concepts of International Relations (IR, historically intertwined with the rise of 
behavioral study), International Studies (the most accommodating term), International 
Politics (with its connotation of Realist approaches), World Politics (with a focus on power 
and geopolitics), Global Politics (states and other agents, processes of globalization) and 
International Affairs (with a focus on diplomatic practices).
20 This understanding of border applies the “pragmaticist maxim” of Charles S. Peirce: 
“Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our 
conception of the object.” Charles Sanders Peirce: Collected Papers (Charlottesville, VA: 
InteLex CD-ROM Databases, 1992 (“How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” 1878). 
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cesses, which have multiple consequences for the very same border. This is 
the problem that “border management,” which in the region seeks to learn 
from the “best practices” of the states with long-established borderlines, en-
counters in its operational environment. The contribution of research to help 
in solving this problem remains very limited if it, too, remains focused on the 
same policies and the problems of management at the border. From the very 
outset we identify a logical problem here: We cannot know about the pro-
cesses that transform a border by merely focusing on the characteristics or 
conditions at the border (examining whether the border is “hard-soft,” “open-
closed,” etc.). However, a broader empirical scope and the (scientific) infer-
ence which separates explanatory factors from the object of explanation can-
not solve the problem we have in mind.21 Research can do very little to fill in 
the lacuna of knowledge and understanding in so far as the study of borders 
employs predefined concepts and frameworks of analysis of which the for-
mal state border is a prime (yet not the only) example. We argue that while 
this problem must be recognized borders must be included in the analytical 
problem of studying regional conflicts. This becomes necessary when our 
aim is to contribute to resolving or settling border-related conflicts—
irrespective of whether our main interest is to control the developments at 
state borders, to gain deeper understanding of the practices that shape the 
terrain of conflicts and the political landscape in the region, or to increase 
awareness and facilitate emancipation from the dominant discourses. This 
leads us to the argument that a comprehensive understanding of borders as 
bordering practices is needed in order to track the transformations around 
state borders, and that pragmatism can help us to make sense of this complex 
reality. 
Although pragmatism has not yet influenced the study of Central Asia in 
particular, this broad orientation of research has seen a modest rise in popu-
larity amongst scholars of international relations during the past ten-to-fifteen 
years.22 The clue to pragmatist study is the focus on practices: activities that 
                                                          
21 In the frame of scientific (inductive and deductive) explanation this is a question of 
defining the explanans and keeping it logically distinct from the explanandum. In 
interpretative research the assumption of the logical distinction is problematic due to 
language (semantic connections) and the mind’s interaction with corporeality.  
22 Pragmatism is grounded in the works of C.S. Peirce, J. Dewey and W. James. Recent works 
in International Relations using pragmatist perspectives include: “Pragmatism and Interna-
tional Relations,” ed. Gunther Hellmann, the Forum, International Studies Review 11, no. 3 
(September 2009): 638–62 (contributions by Gunther Hellmann, Helena Rytövuori-
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are recurrent and demonstrate patterns which shape reality and can be antici-
pated to continue doing so in the future. In the pragmatist interpretation of 
reality (inspired by C.S. Peirce in particular) the observation of the signs of a 
given event and their subsequent interpretation so that they gain more general
significance and imply recurrence are logically bound together with a third 
dimension of experience: the initial sensation that “awakens” the interpreter 
from routine responses and requests interpretation of the things encountered. 
The sensation (questioning what “is”) and its relatedness to facts and the 
sense-making that brings it all together with social convention (the symbolic 
signs of words, concepts and discourses) are the three interrelated dimen-
sions of interpreting “reality” (sign).23 This logic of interpretation sensitizes 
us to the uses of concepts and symbols (conventional signs) in communica-
tion. It keeps us alert in respect to the predominance of convention in policies 
and in research practices by emphasizing that making sense of reality also 
includes the question of the “proof” derived from the signs of mind-
independent reality and the sensation of dissatisfaction with previous ways of 
knowing that sparks the need to inquire and interpret. 
Just as in many other “developing” parts of the world, the consolidation 
of the state border and strengthening of control over all mobility is the order 
of the day in Central and South-Central Asia. But while states make “West-
                                                                                                                            
Apunen, Jörg Friedrichs, Rudra Sil, Markus Kornprobst, and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson);
Jörg Friedrichs and Friedrich Kratochwil, “On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can 
Advance International Relations Research and Methodology,” International Organization
63, no. 4 (2009): 701–31; Pragmatism in International Relations, ed. Harry Bauer and Elis-
abetta Brighi (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Renée Marlin-Bennett, ed., Alker 
and IR: Global Studies in an Interconnected World (Abingdon, Oxon and New York: 
Routledge, 2012); Iver B. Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European For-
eign Ministry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). Other IR works, notably those of 
Hayward Alker (Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for Interna-
tional Studies, [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996]; Challenging Boundaries: 
Global Flows, Territorial Identities, [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996]) 
and Daniel J. Levine (Recovering International Relations: The Promise of Sustainable Cri-
tique, [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012]), demonstrate a broad consistency with 
pragmatism even if they are not explicitly pragmatist. 
23 Peirce calls these dimensions of the sign (interpreted reality) Firstness, Secondness and 
Thirdness. Peirce’s “Logic as Semiotic” provides a concise presentation of the logic of the 
sign. Relation (Peirce’s Secondness) makes the epistemological point of departure realist. 
The initial sensation (Peirce’s Firstness) again is the qualitative dimension of experience 
(thing in itself, rather than the relation it suggests) and may have “arbitrariness and variety 
in its essence.” Charles S. Peirce, “Trichotomic,” in The Essential Peirce: Selected Philo-
sophical Writings, (1867–1893), ed. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, vol. 1 (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 280.
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phalian” statements on the need to control and strengthen the border and 
mark the border with corresponding symbols, such authoritative acts often do 
not bring the expected results because the conventions of the state are not the 
only social agreements which generate border-making practices and justify 
them for the local people.24 The agile, shape-changing movements of armed 
insurgency and illegal economic activity become a “hard” reality for the con-
trolling efforts of the state whenever such mobility persistently leaves the 
borderlines between states “porous” and “leaking.” In the pragmatist sense, 
such “hardness” means that the practical consequences of the actions of other 
agents resist the implications inscribed in the concepts applied to them and, 
ultimately, are not changed by these concepts. This does not abolish the insti-
tutional reality (crossing is still legal or illegal), but failing to effectively con-
trol the practical consequences assigned to its authority leaves the institution 
(the state) weak: the demonstrable consequences of action do not realize the 
concept but leave its meaning empty. If the institution ceases to exist, the 
facts that exist with practical consequences and make sense within this insti-
tutional context also do so: the stamp that made border crossing “legal” is 
merely ink and the passport itself just paper, void of practical implications.25
Examining what words and stamps do in specific contexts also helps us 
to notice how concepts hold sway over multiple practices, both verbal and 
non-verbal, in ways that are intricate and concealed—for example, in the 
political authority attached to the concept of international community, which 
is argued to represent the principles of international law and instructs us to 
think of borders from the dualist perspective of respect versus breach of sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity. These legal concepts are easy to politicize in 
that they can be used to juxtapose “responsible states” with those engaged in 
condemnable action—aggressive geopolitics, harboring terrorism, and the 
                                                          
24 In the terminology of speech acts, this means that although the statements by state authori-
ties in their illocutionary force are (serious) performatives, their perlocutionary effect (to 
reach the “audience”) fails. John Langshaw Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
25 Through the analytical and interpretative concept of the “institutional fact,” John R. Searle 
argues that modern, institutional reality generates facts (reality) in accordance with the tasks 
assigned to the institutions. State borders are typically institutional facts, i.e. they exist and 
have practical consequences in the context of the institution (the state) which they manifest 
and symbolize. John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Allen Lane, 
1995).
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like—and, thus, become tools to heighten confrontation.26 Our criticism is 
not about the state as a social organization (this would be a different type of 
research) but as a discursive limitation which does not help to solve border-
related conflicts but can, instead, nourish them. The state is the concept 
which logically relates to state borders, and it is arguably the world’s most 
heavily institutionalized concept, authorized as it is by international law and 
diplomatic practices. Consequently it is also the concept which in multiple 
ways pervades the study of international relations.   
In the academic discourse of international relations “Westphalia” is a 
metaphor for the modern state. This usage has much less to do with Westpha-
len 1648 as a historical notion than it has with the reaffirmation of the re-
search conventions that prioritize systemic approaches and consider the state 
as the basic, or main, unit of analysis. In a more general sense, this points to 
the primacy of concepts and theory as features of the discipline’s discourse. 
The state is present in the scholarly debates of international relations not only 
because of its authority in all practical life but also because the concept is 
embedded in discourses dealing with power, the interstate system and inter-
national society.27 In other words, the field is less characterized by directly 
“state-centric” approaches than by conceptual a priori and theory-driven dis-
courses which premise the state as a basic unit or a point of reference. The 
use of a priori concepts is also typical of policy-related geopolitical discours-
es, which reduce geographic areas to theaters of war, “staging grounds,”
“strategic rear areas,” and which designate them as “fault lines,” “belts of 
uncertainty,” “crisis regions,” etc. In such discourses the events in the region 
become symbolic signs or indices of theory and concepts that have emerged 
from life-contexts and concerns elsewhere rather than in the region.
In the same way, the primacy of concept represented by theoretical 
frameworks erases the experience which originally inspired its elaboration 
                                                          
26 The practical wisdom of John W. Burton’s conflict resolution is that once a conflict can be 
defined by the parties an outline for its solution also exists. Burton emphasizes the 
limitations of the legal approach which a priori defines conflict (and thereby determines 
who is right and who is wrong) and in this way obstructs its genuine resolution. See, for 
example, John Burton, Deviance, Terrorism & War: The Process of Solving Unsolved 
Social and Political Problems (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979).   
27 Discourses about power typically apply the notion of national interest or deal with 
geostrategic projections and their geographic representations. The interstate system is the 
organizing concept of structural realist and neorealist approaches. In the international 
society approach, the state is the “unit” for two levels of analysis or approaches and by 
negation defines the third, the international society of groups and individuals. 
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and cannot convey this initial sensation in new contexts of application. An 
example of such research convention in studies dealing with Central Asia is 
the “regional security complex” (RSC). This is a theoretical framework 
which depicts post-Soviet Central Asia as a “weak subcomplex” in the RSC 
centered on Russia.28 Questions about Central Asia are posed in the universal 
(context-independent) terms of the RSC theory; they ask whether and 
through which specific developments in relation to the parameters of the the-
ory (such as boundary and polarity) this region may be moving towards a 
“proto-complex” and, hypothetically, towards a “mature RSC.” In the theory 
elaborated before 9/11/2001, Afghanistan is proposed as an “insulator” sepa-
rating South Asia from post-Soviet Central Asia and, thus, as an element 
constituting the boundary of the RSC. Later elaborations of the theory have 
suggested that Kazakhstan can take such a role and that the northern bounda-
ry of the RSC may consequently be drawn closer to Moscow.29 We do not 
consider any of these countries to be such a boundary. This is not because we 
argue against the possibility of corresponding developments but because our 
interest lies in deepening the understanding of the processes in the region 
rather than in using the region for developing this (or any other) predefined 
theory or theoretical framework. The knowledge we search for is rather more 
nuanced and comprehensive than that which is gained when we are interested
in primarily developing theory. 
This point can be made in more general terms. The present book does not 
aim to pose problems in the terms of a timeless, universal theory—a style 
which Stephen Toulmin calls “theory-centered.”30 In a theory-centered ap-
                                                          
28 Buzan, Waever and de Wilde define security complexes as durable features of the inter-
state system. They are sets of states “whose major security perceptions and concerns are so 
interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved 
apart from one another” (Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis, [Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998], 12). The structure of a regional 
security complex (RSC) is defined by its boundary, anarchic structure, polarity (distribution 
of power among the units), and patterns of amity and enmity among the units. Troitsky 
focuses on examining the boundaries of the “Central Asian Regional Complex” and 
concludes that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan could pull southern Central Asia into 
the instability of the Afghan area and even split the complex (that is, the interdependence 
presumed by the concept). Evgeny F. Troitskiy, “Central Asian Regional Complex: The 
Impact of Russian and US Policies,” Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary 
International Relations 29, no. 1 (2015): 2–22. 
29 Troitskiy, “Central Asian Regional Complex.”
30 Our criticism of the theory-centered “scientific” practice, which frames questions in terms 
that render them independent of context (Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden 
Agenda of Modernity [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990], 21), is about its 
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proach the relations and occurrences in the geographic terrain of the region 
are taken into account in so far as these concrete details have relevance for 
the abstract parameters of the theoretical framework. Stated in different 
terms, the connotations of the research convention predefine the possible 
range of the denotations or the types of facts that are to be considered. They 
do so irrespective of whether the facts in the practices of hypothesis formula-
tion are used to confirm or falsify hypotheses—and even if the ideal of theo-
ry testing is abandoned and theory is applied as the guideline for making 
sense of events and instances of experience. Although it may have merits in 
the theory development of disciplinary discussions, we argue that such an 
approach limits our understanding of the reality about which it speaks. It fol-
lows that we believe that Central Asia, like any region, should be spared 
from the predominance of this approach which is so characteristic of study in 
International Relations and even embedded in the identity of this field as 
“contending theories” and concept-driven approaches.31
It must be emphasized that although such a predefining approach is “ra-
tionalist” it is not adequate to use this term, which also has a vastly richer 
content and, furthermore, implicates questionable dichotomies (by invoking 
Romanticist notions of uniqueness, for example). Additionally, it may be 
noticed that criticizing the theory-centered approach implicates nothing less 
than criticizing the modern way of existence, the existence based on “world 
view” and the related “enframing” relation to reality—capturing and ordering 
reality for our potential use, as Martin Heidegger concludes. Such a general 
argument is beyond our focus in the context of this book.32 While these 
                                                                                                                            
predominance in research and the limited perspectives it offers in the study of international 
relations, in particular. We recognize its relevance for the specific analytical purposes of 
research which, for example, treats states as “discrete units” in order to study the 
“international system.” Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Ad-
dison-Wesley, 1979) is an example.
31 Contending Theories of International Relations is the title of a standard textbook by James 
E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. The book has been in use since its first 
publication in 1971 (New York: J. P. Lippincott). Rytövuori-Apunen argues that the theory-
centered approach is the constitutive feature of the field of International Relations in so far 
as it is a research tradition. Rytövuori-Apunen, “Forget ‘Post-Positivist’ IR!” and “Catching 
a formative moment: Epistemic unity in the European plurality,” European Review of 
International Studies 1, no. 1 (2014).
32 “Gestell,” translated as “Enframing.” Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Tech-
nology and Other Essays, (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 23–28. For example Lewis’ 
and Wigen’s criticism of the “jigsaw puzzle view of the world,” which in their argument is 
further bound up with the expectation that the “discrete pieces” are the mythical entities 
called nation-states (Martin W. Lewis and Karen Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Cri-
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points provide us with coordinates, we do not define an approach for our-
selves. We do not privilege any particular theoretical or conceptual frame-
work, and our critical attunement is not the empiricist criticism which de-
taches ideas and concepts from practice.33 Instead we look at the practices: 
the events in their more general (that is, symbolic) representations as they 
arise from study. The interpretations of events do not, in our conclusions, 
become signs of theory discourses and policy concepts—which would be the 
case if we used, for example, the RSC to frame our questions. This is not in 
order to avoid deriving concepts from specifically “Western” academic and 
policy contexts but in order to critique the initial framings that instruct us to 
generate findings in terms of the denotations that have already been defined 
in their connotations and, thus, leave us encountering what we already had 
presented for ourselves as an image of reality constructed by theory and con-
cepts. Pragmatism offers landmarks for interpretation, not a framing, and it 
asks for openness and humility in the search brought forth by the challenge 
of reality to conventional ways of sense-making. Following the same logic, 
we also do not approach the domain of study—the region—as an entity, as if 
it were defined for us by nature or social convention. Ours is a focus void of 
defined boundaries and a unity which, in principle, can emerge only in the 
interpretation of the relevant practices. If we could continue the present study 
and, for example, examine the possibilities to share water resources in com-
mercial cooperation in the region, existing plans would instruct us to include 
the arid northeastern areas of Iran in this region. 
The initial sensation that gave rise to the studies in the book is illustrated 
by the unease or puzzlement about “post-2016,” which asks about the differ-
ence that this year brings in relation to all that Afghanistan has represented 
throughout the period of Western military presence since September 2001. 
This is a question that puzzles both observers outside the region as well as 
the region’s inhabitants, who in their specific locations fear or welcome the 
signs of coming events arising on the temporal horizon. For us, it sparks the 
examination of the meaning—practical with consequences for action—of 
border-related issues. In the following chapters the authors express their spe-
                                                                                                                            
tique of Metageography [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997], 11) can gain a 
deeper sense from Heidegger’s critique of the modern way of existence.  
33 Empiricism conceives ideas and concepts in a dualistic, “testing” relation to facts and thus 
detaches them from life-practices. The methodology is based on the bifurcation of the mind 
and its externally conceived world (solipsism). 
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cific unease and “irritations” (dissatisfaction as Peirce has it) about theory 
and policy concepts that are predominant in discourses and that thereby sup-
press the experience necessary for other interpretations to emerge. For exam-
ple, for Mika Aaltola and Juha Käpylä, the source of unease and irritation is 
conventional geopolitical thinking; for Simbal Khan it is policy approaches 
which in Western practices have dominated the efforts to build security in 
Afghanistan; for Steven Parham it is concepts and policies which project na-
tional unity while history and culture have shaped a different sense of be-
longing. In Jeremy’s Smith’s contribution which opens this book it is the 
conflict models which forecasted that there would be far more violent con-
flict in Central Asia following the dissolution of the USSR than proved to be 
the case. 
The authors of the following chapters seek to make sense of the activities 
of state and non-state agents and groups of people by examining how these 
activities embody and represent patterns in their recurrence. These patterns 
are practices concerning what it is that is occurring and how this challenges 
previous interpretations, and how it (as a sign of something more general) 
anticipates recurrence, entails qualitative features and gives legitimacy or 
justification to responses that shape reality. Because our empirical scope is 
wide and includes a variety of materials, the tridimensional sign (“reality”) 
with its questions about sensation (what “is”?) and its relatedness to facts and 
the sense-making that merges it all into social convention provides us with 
clues and landmarks for analysis and interpretation. This application of 
pragmatism is but one amongst many possibilities and differs considerably 
from the far more intensive applications ranging from intricate semiotic study 
to the interpretation of structures in discourses. We would like to think that it 
is one way in which pragmatism can be made accessible to readers in a wide 
range of fields while being inspired by the Peircean idea of “semeiotic” as 
logic of the interpretation of reality (rather than a specific “semiotic” 
study).34
It remains to be emphasized that a focus on practices (of agents, socie-
ties, communities) does not suffice to make research pragmatist. While social 
                                                          
34 Logic in the sense of Peirce is semeiotic, encompassing the entire process of signification. 
Thus, formal logic in the sense of inductive and deductive inference is a very specific con-
cept of logic relating to modern science. See, for example, Charles S. Peirce, “Logic as Se-
miotic: The Theory of Signs,” in Semiotics: An Introductory Reader, ed. Robert E. Innis 
(London: Hutchinson, 1986), 4–23.
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research in general is typically preoccupied with the study of symbolic prac-
tices (social conventions) and patterns of conduct or behavior, the tridimen-
sional logic of interpretation also asks about the difference in experience 
which distinguishes “experience” from the routine and convention that makes 
no difference to the sequence of life. This is the “primacy of practice,” and 
this, in an instant, brings the interpreter—us as researchers—into formulating 
and arguing the problem. Thus, practice is not equivalent to “empirical,” and 
it is not logically and philosophically opposed to theory and concept, alt-
hough it does question their predominance in the signification processes that 
produce discourses. In the pragmatist spirit, we do not discuss pragmatism 
but instead apply it. While the individual chapters do this by focusing on the 
diverse bordering practices that exist beyond and in relation to the conven-
tional concept of borders as formal state borders, the pragmatist logic of in-
terpretation comes together (and opens up new rounds of inquiry) in the Epi-
logue. 
The final pages of this book summarize the conclusions in the patterns of 
practices that characterize the border problematique in Central Asia which 
makes this region different from the geographic areas that have been the 
main focus of studies on borders during the past decades. In this respect the 
thematic approaches in border(lands) studies, which have emerged in the 
North American context of critical discussions, offer points of reflection as a 
matter of course. Thus, while we are dissatisfied with the limited perspec-
tives on the dynamics of borders offered by the conventional understanding 
in International Relations of borders as state borders and criticize the ap-
proaches which make the concept a priori and detach it from practice, in the 
same vein of thought we must retain a critical attitude to the thematic per-
spectives in the emerging research area of border studies. We must be aware 
that these perspectives abstract from experience in specific life-contexts and 
that this experience cannot be conveyed in other contexts although the same 
concepts can be used. It is this interplay of similarity and difference in expe-
rience that is the starting point and logic of pragmatist research. The promise 
of the new opening, as we see it, is neither universalist (theory-centered, 
framing questions and seeking answers independently of context) in its ambi-
tion, nor is it focused on the particular (which would emphasize the unique-
ness of this domain of study). Instead, it is about reaching towards a more 
global experience by means of a relational logic of interpretation.
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PART I  State Borders: Creation, Consolidation and Challenges
Old Habits, New Realities: Central Asia and Russia 
from the Break-up of the USSR to 9/11
Jeremy Smith
In the years immediately following the break-up of the USSR, the five new 
states of Central Asia were the subject of a number of conflicting assump-
tions and expectations. On the one hand, Russian policy-makers and most 
Western analysts expected the Central Asian states to remain firmly within 
the Russian orbit. On the other hand, many commentators expected the re-
gion to be one dominated by internal conflicts. Ethnic violence in Osh and 
the surrounding regions of Kyrgyzstan, civil war in Tajikistan, and the con-
solidation of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to the south appeared to con-
firm the more pessimistic scenarios early on. However, as Neil Robinson has 
persuasively argued, Central Asia overall has confounded the conflict models 
forecast by political science and IR studies.1 In particular, the theory of 
“democratic peace” and its subsequent refinement, Mansfield and Snyder’s 
theory that states in transition to democracy are more prone to both internal 
violence and cross-border warfare than either stable democracies or stable 
authoritarian regimes,2 suggested that Central Asia and Russia would be 
more prone to conflict than has been the case. 
All five Central Asian states have, to a greater or lesser degree, displayed 
many of the attributes of a “failed state,” associated in political science litera-
ture with a high potential for collapse and violence. The geographical group-
ing of the five Central Asian states with Afghanistan and Pakistan, part of 
what Zbigniew Brzezinski dubbed the “arc of crisis,” has exaggerated expec-
tations of crisis including warfare. But in spite of a number of internal con-
flicts, to date there has been no international war involving a Central Asian 
state, and only the occasional distant threat of war. Russian expectations have 
been equally disappointed. Each Central Asian state has developed its own 
                                                          
1 Neil Robinson, “Why not more conflict in the former USSR? Russia and Central Asia as a 
zone of relative peace,” in Conflict in the Former USSR, ed. Matthew Sussex (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 118–145.
2 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go 
to War (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).
30
multivector foreign and trade policy, in which China and Europe figure al-
most as heavily as Russia, with the United States not far behind. Kazakhstan 
led the way in this multivector approach, with Turkmenistan going it alone 
with its official policy of “neutrality.” Predictions made in the early 1990s 
about Central Asia tended to be different from those made about Russia and 
Eastern Europe––but the empirical fact is that assumptions of instability and 
drift back to some kind of reincarnated USSR for the former were just as 
inaccurate as assumptions of a smooth transition from authoritarian rule to 
democracy were for the latter.
Robinson’s analysis suggests that at least part of the reason for this is 
that the preoccupation with regime-building rather than state-building in 
Central Asia, while weakening state capacity, discouraged leaders from en-
gaging in the kind of nationalist rhetoric and claims arising from border in-
consistencies which might have led to wars which they were ill-equipped to 
engage in. At the same time, the capture by the regime of what resources 
there were allowed them, to a certain extent, to buy off potential regional foci 
of opposition, albeit not to the same extent as Boris Yeltsin did in the Rus-
sian Federation.
Closer examination suggests, however, that the Central Asian states did 
engage vigorously in the types of state-building activities which Mansfield 
and Snyder identify with the cause of conflict between democratizing re-
gimes. A number of the disputes of the 1990s were between the Central 
Asian states themselves, but disputes between individual Central Asian states 
and Russia were more common overall. The classic ingredients for conflict 
between democratizing states as identified by Mansfield and Snyder––weak 
institutions, pursuit of parochial interests, populism resulting from regime 
insecurity, and ethno-nationalism––were all present not just in the Central 
Asian states but in Russia itself.3 Countervailing factors such as the familiari-
ty of the post-Soviet leaders with each other, engagement in internal conflicts 
(Tajikistan, Chechnya), and more pressing external ones (Transnistria, Na-
gorno Karabakh, Afghanistan) and the clear military superiority of one party 
(Russia), as well as the characteristics identified by Robinson, were at play. 
But for most Western commentators and observers, it was the general passiv-
ity of the Central Asian states, the preoccupation of regimes with internal 
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political struggles, and the readiness to follow Russia’s lead that account for 
the absence of overt conflict.4
The record of events as examined in this chapter, however, suggests that 
even before the end of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states were far 
from passive in accepting the shape of the post-Soviet space. Kazakhstan and 
its president Nursultan Nazarbayev were particularly important in negotiating 
the form of the break-up of the Soviet Union and in promoting Eurasian uni-
ty after it. And all five Central Asian states were not afraid to pursue their 
particular interests. Disputes arose frequently over three main areas: Borders, 
collective security arrangements, and the position of ethnic Russians and oth-
er ethnic issues. Borders and ethnic politics were frequently issues between 
Central Asian states, for example Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but here it is 
disputes with Russia that is the main focus. One feature that should be point-
ed out immediately is that in at least one way, these disputes with Russia did 
impact on relations between the Central Asian states themselves: not only did 
the five states fail to form any common general or specific strategies in op-
posing Russia, but on each issue a different constellation of states could be 
seen aligning themselves for and against the Russian position.
Borders: Free Trade vs. National Security
Although the Central Asian republics are generally viewed as having played 
a passive role in the events culminating in the break-up of the USSR, their 
leaderships were not unaware of the direction of developments. During the 
summer of 1990 the leaders of the Central Asian republics excluding the Ta-
jik SSR reached an agreement that Central Asia was a single cultural unit, 
but that the existing political arrangement into five entities would remain in 
place, and they pledged not to challenge any of the existing borders.5 This 
agreement signaled the readiness of the leaders to hold the USSR together 
while preserving their own privileged political status in each of the republics, 
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thus countering the aspirations of the emerging pan-Turkestani movement to 
create a unified political entity. Kazakhstan’s president Nazarbayev con-
firmed this stance at a press conference at the time of the March 1991 refer-
endum on the preservation of the Soviet Union––Nazarbayev declared Ka-
zakhstan’s full support for a continuation of the Union on the basis of a new 
agreement between sovereign states.6 This is not to say that Central Asian 
leaders behaved as if it was “business as usual” as far as the USSR was con-
cerned. The leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were using the opportuni-
ty to increase their own authority and freedom from Moscow. Uzbekistan’s 
President Islam Karimov justified the concentration of power in his own 
hands with the argument that “the transition period and the explosive situa-
tion that has developed in the country and here in our republic demand it.”7
These sentiments were regularly echoed by Nazarbayev who, like Karimov, 
had already succeeded in combining the posts of President and leader of the 
Republican Communist Party, as had Turkmenistan’s Saparmurat Niyazov, 
thereby providing an unprecedented basis for personal power. 
During the remainder of 1991, Nazarbayev was especially active in sup-
porting Gorbachev’s project to keep the USSR together. But his proposals 
went further than Gorbachev’s in seeing the future Union as one between 
sovereign entities, which would have strengthened self-rule in the republics 
while reinforcing existing economic and security relations. Even after the 
failed August coup in Moscow Nazarbayev was the leading initiator of an 
effort to secure an economic agreement between the Soviet Republics,8 and 
he maintained his support for a new Union Agreement as late as December 6,
1991.9
Nazarbayev was not a mere observer in this process, he was actively 
seeking to not only preserve some kind of union, but to shape it to his repub-
lic’s own advantage, securing greater rights but also a coordinated economic 
system which he saw as absolutely necessary for the future prosperity of all 
of the republics. At the same time as supporting Gorbachev’s project, how-
ever, Nazarbayev hedged his bets by paying careful attention to relations 
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with the RSFSR and its President Boris Yeltsin. Part of his strategy was to 
act as an intermediary who “…tried very actively to intervene, to bring their
(Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s) positions closer together,”10 in order to increase 
the chances of the preservation of the Union. But he also worked to develop 
bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Russia. Nazarbayev and Yeltsin 
met in Almaty on August 16–17, 1991, just two days before the coup began. 
Following this meeting they issued a joint statement of cooperation which 
included an early commitment to the principle of territorial integrity: 
“preservation of the territorial integrity of Kazakhstan and the Russian Fed-
eration is the most important guarantee for preventing disintegration of the 
country and its component states.”11 Thus the establishment of bilateral ties 
between republics was regarded as a means of preserving the Union, but at 
the same time Nazarbayev came under criticism for such independent ac-
tions. As he argued in an April 1991 interview: “The centre does not like our 
bilateral ties, although strengthening them is nothing more than an endeavor 
to protect the republics’ economies at a time when the management mecha-
nism is falling apart…I am deeply convinced that we can not get along with-
out a Union, and our agreements are a real foundation for a Union Treaty.”12
Nazarbayev was not alone among Central Asia’s leaders in developing 
bilateral ties. The Central Asian republics made a series of agreements with 
each other, such as the establishment in August 1991 of an Interrepublic 
Consultative Council aimed at integrating the five economies.13 They also 
individually concluded agreements with other Soviet Republics. In April 
1991, Kyrgyzstan agreed a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with 
Ukraine which, along with economic and political provisions, included a 
commitment by Ukraine’s leader Leonid Kravchuk for Ukraine to represent 
Kyrgyzstan through its seat at the United Nations.14 At a symbolic level, the 
move to be represented at the UN by another republic (Belarus was the sec-
ond republic to have its own UN representation), rather than through the So-
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viet Union’s delegation, demonstrated a clear willingness to move away from 
the Soviet Union’s orbit. Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev also signed a treaty 
with Yeltsin in July, providing for an 8 million ruble Russian loan and fixed 
prices for raw materials. In spite of protestations that bilateral ties could go 
hand in hand with the renewal of the Union, such moves were widely criti-
cized as preparing the ground for the break-up of the Soviet Union. In partic-
ular, four of the Central Asian republics (Turkmenistan was not included) 
were among the prime movers behind a meeting of twelve of the Soviet Un-
ion’s fifteen republics which met in Moscow in May the day after a meeting 
to discuss the new Union Treaty, to agree alternative plans for economic and 
foreign relations on a multilateral basis for 1992. Thus most of the Central 
Asian republics were preparing for a possibility of the dissolution of the So-
viet Union throughout 1991, at the same time as supporting a new Union 
Treaty to stave off this eventuality. 
Establishing the principle of territorial integrity and fending off any pos-
sible claims for border adjustments from Russia was a key aim of Nazarba-
yev’s at his meeting with Yeltsin on August 16–17. But it soon became clear 
that Yeltsin did not share this commitment. At the Almaty meeting Yeltsin 
declared unequivocally that “there can be no question of our tolerating the 
seizing of any territory of Kazakhstan in favor of Russia.” However, rela-
tions deteriorated dramatically following the failure of the coup and an ap-
parent suggestion by Yeltsin that the borders between the republics may need 
to be revised. A statement signed by Yeltsin’s press secretary Pavel 
Voshchanov stated: “The Russian Federation does not question the constitu-
tional right of every state and people to self-determination. However, there is
a problem of borders, a problem that can and may remain unsettled only giv-
en the existence of relations of union, codified in an appropriate treaty. If 
these relations are broken off [in other words, if the USSR ceases to exist––
JS], the RSFSR reserves the right to raise the question of reviewing its bor-
ders.”15 This prompted Nazarbayev to brand Yeltsin a “great power chauvin-
ist” and to condemn his undemocratic insistence on naming his own appoin-
tees to top government posts.16 However, on August 29 Nazarbayev moved 
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to heal the breach by sending a telegram to Yeltsin, in response to which 
Russian vice-President Alexander Rutskoy travelled immediately to Almaty. 
There, Rutskoy and Nazarbayev signed thirty agreements covering the econ-
omy, collective security, and the rights of citizens and territorial integrity. At 
a press conference afterwards, Rutskoy explained his boss’ earlier comments 
on borders as referring to the need for a general demarcation of inter-state 
borders on the basis of international norms.17
As soon as the dissolution of the Soviet Union became inevitable follow-
ing the Belovezh accords between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the Central 
Asian states were quick not just to join in but to influence the creation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States which would replace the USSR. At 
meetings in Ashgabat and Almaty on December 13 and 14, alternative reso-
lutions were tabled by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, but differences were 
only on technical details. All five Central Asian states insisted, successfully, 
that they would only join the CIS on the basis that they were considered as 
founder members, rather than as latecomers who were joining the original 
three Slavic states. They also referred to the CIS as a “Eurasian” union, a 
term that was not used at Belovezhskaya pushcha.18 Thus the Central Asian 
republics, while they continued to support the preservation of the Soviet Un-
ion until the last possible moment, also worked vigorously to shape its future 
and, once the dissolution had become inevitable, the future of the CIS. In 
particular, Nazarbayev’s condemnation of Yeltsin’s threat in August 1991 to 
revise state borders and his vigorous insistence on the principle of territorial 
integrity thereafter,19 ensured that the break-up of the USSR would, for the 
most part, be achieved without sparking damaging disputes over territory. 
Through this process, Nazarbayev and other Central Asian leaders were 
looking to get the best of both worlds. On the one hand, they wanted to 
achieve the sovereignty for their republic which would allow them to follow 
nation-building projects through to the end and escape the personal humilia-
tion encountered on being constantly reminded of their subordination to 
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Moscow;20 on the other hand, they would preserve the close economic inter-
action which was essential for their countries’ prosperity. As long as these 
two aims were achieved, the question of whether this should happen within 
the context of Gorbachev’s renewed Union or through multilateral and bilat-
eral arrangements between independent states was of no overriding im-
portance. It was not necessarily the choice of the Central Asian republics for 
the USSR to disappear, but once this became reality, they were ready to 
make the most of it. 
The two key aims of state sovereignty and economic union, while not 
exactly contradictory, led to tensions which were in evidence through the 
course of 1991 and 1992. Yeltsin’s ambivalent attitude to the integrity of 
existing borders in August 1991 has already been noted, and his insistence on 
Russia’s special place in the security structure of the CIS and its responsibil-
ity for Russians living outside the borders of the Russian Federation (see be-
low) also allowed for a flexible attitude to the new international borders. One 
implication of the hardening of republic borders into international borders 
had already been seen in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan in 1990: the more 
closed borders became, the more they were identified with a particular ethnic 
group, and the more politicized ethnic relations became. In and around Osh 
and other towns on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, ethnic violence in the summer 
of 1990 reflected, at least in part, fears over the implications of newly ac-
quired sovereignty for ethnic minorities.
While the revival of the Cossack movement and of Russian nationalism 
in general did lead to some unrest along Central Asia’s northern border with 
Russia, fears of similar bloodshed proved unfounded and this was not the 
main concern. Although Nazarbayev was committed to the belief that an 
open trade border with Russia was indispensable for Kazakhstan, he was al-
ready keenly aware of the dangers of being subject to an economic system 
over which he had no control. Before the break-up of the USSR, the 
RSFSR’s unilateral decisions on price rises or price liberalization led to 
goods flowing across the border from Kazakhstan and worsening shortages 
there. In response, Nazarbayev ordered the establishment of customs posts on 
the border for a short period in September 1991.
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Although the principle of free trade was consistently agreed on by the 
CIS states, the temptation to follow protectionist policies proved hard to re-
sist. On January 16, 1992, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an agreement On 
Removing Constraints in Economic Activity, which provided for the free 
movement of goods, services, labor and finance. Shortly afterwards, howev-
er, the Russian Federation set up customs points along the Kazakh border, 
leading to loud protests from Kazakhstan. When Kazakhstan in turn attempt-
ed to establish a customs regime with Russia in the summer of the same year, 
Russia responded by raising the price of energy exports to Kazakhstan until 
Nazarbayev backed down. 
The logic behind the sporadic strengthening of the border regimes be-
tween CIS states who were supposed to have signed up to the free passage of 
goods and peoples across borders was outlined by Yeltsin at a meeting of his 
government on June 4, 1992. The transportation across borders of stolen 
goods, most seriously of firearms, was showing a rapid increase and was set 
to keep growing, according to experts. As well as arms entering Russia, re-
ports from the Ministry of Culture of the disappearance of large numbers of 
icons and other cultural artifacts meant that traffic across the border was in 
need of control in both directions. Central Asian countries were picked out 
for having instituted visa-free agreements with non-CIS countries, which 
meant effectively that people could pass from the outside world to Russia 
and vice versa without any effective controls.21
The desire for free trade was in competition with a concept of interna-
tional borders which, in the Soviet experience, were always hard to cross. In 
addition, the security and inviolability of national borders were an important 
part of the legitimization of the new state and were closely linked to the idea 
of nations as they were conceived across the post-Soviet states. As a result of 
this symbolic nation-building role of borders as well as the difficulties al-
ready encountered with Russia and other neighbors in the course of 1992, the 
Law on Borders passed by the Parliament of Kazakhstan in December 1992 
and coming into force in 1993 was based on a very hard concept of borders. 
In discussions during the drafting of the law, the Border Guards’ Service 
went as far as insisting on a right to close the border altogether in case of the 
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threat of disease epidemics or other emergencies.22 Such a provision was not 
included in the final law, but the border forces did have almost unlimited 
rights to use weapons. The preamble to the law made clear the importance of 
the border to the nation of Kazakhstan, and its tone had much more to do 
with the defense of a border that divided the country from others, than it had 
about the free transport of goods. The final version of the law went further
than previous drafts in establishing “border zones” at some distance from the 
border crossing points, which could be entered only by citizens with a special 
permit.23
Russia’s border regime underwent similar developments, and while in 
principle international agreements were (as stated in the Kazakh law) to take 
precedence over national law, the reality was that neither side was ready con-
sistently to abide by obligations, and the nature of the border swung first one 
way and then another. Things came to a head at the beginning of 1997, when 
Russia deployed Cossack units along the border with Kazakhstan, with the 
power to check documents and search the baggage of anyone crossing the 
border into Russia.24 This move led to a downturn in Russian-Kazakh rela-
tions that lasted over a year. 
Russia justified the move as necessary to curtail drug trafficking and 
smuggling. By the early 2000s such concerns had hardened, and in the im-
mediate aftermath of 9/11 international terrorism was added as an even more 
pressing reason to increase the security of the border. Not for the first time, 
growing concerns over security coincided with moves to further promote 
regional economic integration, which became increasingly focused on Rus-
sia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which were to go on to become the founder 
members of the Eurasian Customs Union, rather than the whole CIS. But that 
integration process was and still is hampered by the emergence by the begin-
ning of the millennium of two incompatible discourses: one emphasized free 
trade, local cross-border cooperation in services, and cultural exchange; 
while the other emphasized the need to control drugs, terrorists, contraband, 
illegal migrants, and arms.
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Disputed Borders––the Caspian Sea
A different kind of border dispute emerged over the Caspian Sea. Here, as 
well as Russia and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan and Iran were involved. Previously the sea had been governed by 
a 1921 treaty between Soviet Russia and Iran, and a 1940 treaty between the 
USSR and Iran. Iran and the Russian Federation now argued that the terms of 
this treaty still applied and should be adopted by the four new states which 
were successors to the Soviet Union and, as agreed at the end of 1991, which 
were bound by the Soviet Union’s international obligations. Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan argued, however, that the earlier treaties could no longer be 
deemed valid now that there were five littoral states instead of two, and that 
the Caspian should be governed according to international maritime law.
There were significant geopolitical and economic issues at stake. Firstly, 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were keen to secure and develop the shipping 
route between Aktau and Baku, which could be used for oil and gas tankers 
to transport Kazakh and Turkmen energy resources through Azerbaijan and 
Georgia on to Europe without using Russian pipelines. But there was not 
much difference between the five states in terms of supporting the right of 
free navigation. The real issue which divided them was the exploitation of 
natural resources under the seabed. The significance of oil and gas deposits 
was becoming clear soon after the end of the Soviet Union, making the ques-
tion of rights and ownership a crucial one. Under the Russian-Iranian pro-
posals, the sea was treated as a common resource apart from a ten-mile fish-
ing zone, with joint control over the exploitation of oil and gas. By contrast 
applying maritime law would have divided most of the sea up into zones con-
trolled by each country according to the extent of their shorelines. The latter 
was clearly to Russia’s disadvantage as the heaviest concentration of re-
sources was in the more southern parts of the sea. It may also be that, while 
the geopolitics of energy were not as prominent in the early 1990s as in the 
2000s, Russian policymakers were aware of the significance of a possible 
energy transit route which bypassed Russia. 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan’s legal case that the sea should come under 
international maritime law rested in part on an unconvincing argument that 
the Caspian was connected to the high seas through the Don-Volga river sys-
tem. On the other hand, the United States, in pursuit of its own interests and 
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anxious to limit Russian power, was supportive of the Azerbaijani-Kazakh 
position. Things seemed to swing decisively in the direction of Russia and 
Iran in 1996, however, when Turkmenistan lent them its full support.25
As Russia, Iran and Turkmenistan pressed ahead with tripartite agree-
ments on sharing resources in the sea, Kazakhstan, with the support of Azer-
baijan, continued to insist on a full new agreement, rejecting concessions 
offered by Russia to allow for each state to claim exclusive ownership over a 
45-mile strip along their coastlines. Nazarbayev’s persistence appeared to 
have paid off when, in July 1998, he reached an agreement with Yeltsin to 
divide the northern seabed between Kazakhstan and Russia.26 Russia did not 
stick by this commitment however, and today the status of the Caspian sea is 
hardly closer to being resolved than it was in 1994.
Security––from Common Space to National Defense
Russia was widely expected to play a major role in the security situation in 
Central Asia, generally because it seemed intent on maintaining its ties with 
its former peripheries, and specifically because of the abundance of military 
bases, including nuclear installations, in the region. A plethora of security-
related treaties and agreements were signed between Russia and the Central 
Asian states in the first half of the 1990s, but in reality financial pressures 
meant that Russia was unable to live up to many of its commitments and to 
implement the desired new security arrangements.27 But this is not to say that 
Russia did not engage in the security situation in Central Asia, especially as 
long as the civil war in Tajikistan was raging, or that security arrangements 
were not a source of contention between Russia and the Central Asian states. 
The assumption that Russia would take responsibility for the collective 
security of the whole of the former Soviet Union––or at least those parts of it 
that entered into the CIS––was embedded in the agreements that accompa-
nied the Soviet break-up. These were more than mere declarations as far as 
Central Asia was concerned, especially once the neo-Eurasianists in Yeltsin’s 
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entourage had taken control of most aspects of Russian foreign policy around 
the middle of 1992. This coincided with an escalation of hostilities in Tajiki-
stan and a more concerted effort on the part of Central Asia’s leaders to en-
sure Russia live up to its security commitments in the region. The result of 
these pressures was the signing of a Treaty on Collective Security by Ka-
zakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Armenia in Tash-
kent on May 15, 1992. The treaty referred to the external borders of the CIS 
as common external borders, and therefore subject to defense by a CIS force 
which in practice came under Russian command. The dispatch of a further 
1200 CIS forces to the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan in July 
was one of the first consequences of this arrangement. The concern here was 
not with Tajikistan’s internal conflict but with the collapse of the regime in 
Afghanistan and the emergence of Taliban and other Islamist forces there. 
This did not, however, mean that Russian or Russian-led forces in the 
guise of CIS “blue helmets” were not a part of the military balance in the 
Tajik Civil War. Initially Russia’s involvement was promised jointly with 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, assuring support for the current 
Tajik leadership but urging responsibility.28 However, in November 1992, 
following the failure of Russia’s Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to secure 
the support of the Kulyab faction for a coalition government in Tajikistan, 
Russia threw its weight behind the government of Emomali Rakhmonov and 
sanctioned the use of the 201st Motorized Infantry Division (which had been 
stationed in Tajikistan since autumn 1945) “to keep order” and played an 
active military role from then on.29
A few days after these developments, Kozyrev provided some insights 
into his thinking on the role of Russia in the region in an interview with 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta: “Russia’s total withdrawal from Tajikistan would be 
detrimental to Russia’s national interests and a betrayal of our neighbours (I 
mean the Tajiks). We must also remember that Russians live there…Russia 
must act as a peacemaker. Russia’s current geopolitical interests in Central 
Asia do not involve a struggle for a sphere of influence. In order to protect 
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Russia’s borders, we must try to achieve political stability in the states of 
Central Asia.”30
Kozyrev and Yeltsin’s perception of Russia’s security role therefore had 
three elements: defense of the common external CIS border, internal security 
of each regime (with some option for backing one side or the other where 
there was more than one contender for leading the regime), and a special re-
sponsibility for the protection of the ethnic Russian population in the former 
Soviet republics. The all-encompassing nature of this role, and its links to 
Russia’s own national interests, was underlined by Yeltsin in a speech in 
February 1993: “Stopping all armed conflicts in the territory of the former 
USSR is Russia’s vital interest. The world community sees more and more 
clearly Russia’s special responsibility in this difficult undertaking…”31 What 
made this position controversial in the Central Asian context was that, while 
there was initially a general consensus over Russia’s special role in CIS secu-
rity, not all states agreed with Russia as to what that role should cover.
The single CIS army that had been promised as the key ingredient of a 
collective security strategy soon ran into objections from CIS members. 
Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan never signed up to the idea of a unified 
joint command of CIS forces, which was agreed by the remaining CIS states 
(Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and the Central Asian republics minus Turkmen-
istan) at the Minsk summit of December 30, 1991. But even at that early 
stage, the right of each member to form its own army was kept open, threat-
ening the whole idea of a single collective security arrangement. In the short 
term, however, individual states other than Russia were in no position to 
form such armies. Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev was the most ardent 
champion of a unified military. But even his support was tempered by Rus-
sia’s attitude. Yeltsin’s insistence in January 1992, shortly after Russia be-
came a separate state, that all military personnel swear a new oath of alle-
giance to the Russian Federation regardless of which republic they were sta-
tioned in, was immediately attacked by Nazarbayev, who preferred maintain-
ing the previous oath to the now defunct USSR. This dispute underlined the 
central problem with maintaining a unified military rather than separate na-
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tional armies. All of the post-Soviet states, Russia included, were actively 
engaged in a nation-building project in which, as we have already seen, terri-
tory and sovereignty played a major part.32 In spite of Nazarbayev’s enthusi-
asm, the notion that armed forces controlled by another country or group of 
countries should be stationed within the borders of a sovereign state never sat 
easily with such a project. For countries like Ukraine which were also dis-
trustful of Russian intentions, the objections were more than statements of a 
principle of sovereign statehood. For these reasons the project for a fully uni-
fied military command lasted only until April 4, 1992, when the Russian 
Federation announced it was creating its own national army, and within a 
month the Central Asian states had started to follow suit. 
One of the reasons for the failure of the early collective security ar-
rangements to stick was the perception of an arrogant attitude on the part of 
Russian military commanders. In July 1992, precisely as agreement was be-
ing reached between Russia and Turkmenistan over a joint command for 
Turkmenistan’s border troops, Russian officers raised objections to the re-
cruitment of Turkmen border guards to work alongside the Russian troops 
already in place, which this agreement entailed. Referring to the numerous 
tasks a border guard was expected to carry out Nikolai Reznichenko, the 
chief of the Border Defense Department of the Central Asian Border district, 
claimed “[t]he Turkmens, we have become convinced, are not yet capable of 
doing all these things…But when it comes to desertion and violating regula-
tions, they are masters.”33 Only weeks later, Turkmenistan declared it was 
setting up its own border guard without any agreement on joint command, 
and cited Yeltsin’s desire for greater control as the reason for withdrawing 
from joint arrangements.34 Similar feelings were expressed when Uzbekistan 
quit the Collective Security Treaty seven years later, claiming objections to 
“Russia’s military activities in certain CIS states” and blaming Russian 
heavy-handedness.35
                                                          
32 See also Elizabeth Teague, “Citizenship, Borders, and National Identity,” in Russia’s En-
gagement with the West, ed. Alexander J. Motyl, Blair A. Ruble, and Lilia Shevtsova (Ar-
monk: Sharpe, 2005), 17–32.
33 Vladimir Kuleshov, “Sozdaiutsia sovmestnye pogranvoiska,” Izvestiia, July 28, 1992.
34 Igor’ Zhukov, “Turkmenia: nezavisimaia strana dolzhna sama okhraniat’ svoi granitsy. 
Prezident Niiazov opredelil status pogranvoisk,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, August 14, 1992.
35 Vladimir Georgiev, “Uzbekistan zanial osobuiu pozitsiiu. Tashkent gotov vyiti iz Dogovora 
o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, February 4, 1999.
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By the middle of the 1990s a gap had clearly opened up between Russia 
and the Central Asian states over their respective understandings of Russia’s 
role in the region. Differences went back at least to the end of 1991 when the 
leaders of the three Slavic republics met at Belovezhskaya Pushcha and de-
cided on the dissolution of the USSR. According to Nazarbayev, he was not 
invited to these talks although he was in Moscow at the time, and instead was 
asked afterwards to sign the agreement already made, something which he 
refused.36 Although the Central Asian leaders were able to succeed in achiev-
ing equal status with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in the founding documents 
of the CIS, they had little possibility of challenging the Russian assumption 
of responsibility for security arrangements and broad political influence in 
the region: Central Asia had no military units of its own, and while it could 
call on conscripts from each republic it lacked any trained officers and the 
financial means or infrastructure. The leaders of the new states also faced 
political uncertainty and challenges to their own position. What Russian poli-
ticians seem to have underestimated was the fact that by the middle of the 
decade, that uncertainty had receded. Each country now had a strong presi-
dent who was vigorously engaged in building up their land as a nation-state 
as well as reinforcing the legitimacy of their regimes and launching varying 
degrees of personality cult. Standing up to Russia, or at least not fawning to 
Moscow, was an important way of reaching each of these three ends. By 
1995 Kozyrev appears to have taken some, but not all, of this on board. Now 
he was talking about “gathering” the former Soviet republics together using
Russia’s military influence, which had been exercised in resolving Tajiki-
stan’s civil war and could now be consolidated through the establishment of 
military bases throughout Central Asia.37 But by mid-1999 Russian plans for 
a new, permanent, military base in Tajikistan had been dropped, and even 
Russian border guards had been ejected from one country after another, apart 
from Tajikistan where they remained continuously up until 2005. As border 
guards departed Kyrgyzstan in May 1999, they were pursued by hostile 
crowds hurling abuse.38
                                                          
36 N. Zhelnorova, “Politicians answer for everything,” Argumenty i Fakty, no. 2, January 
1993, cited in the Current Digest of the post-Soviet Press.
37 Boris Vinogradov, “S vvedeniem natsional’nykh valiut v aziatskikh stranakh SNG v Rossii 
voznikli novye problemy,” Izvestiia, November 20, 1993.
38 Aleksandr Chuikov, “Ukhodim: Rossiiskie pogranichniki pokidaiut Kirgiziiu v chem mat’ 
rodila,” Izvestiia, May 6, 1999.
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As well as losing its military presence and vision of Russian-led collec-
tive security, between 1993 and 1995 Russia witnessed each of the Central 
Asian countries withdrawing from the ruble zone and introducing their own 
currencies. This was linked, in the eyes of Russian nationalists in particular 
but also in concerns raised by Kozyrev, to the apparent deterioration in the 
situation of ethnic Russians in Central Asia (see next section).39 Turkmeni-
stan continued to be closely tied to Russia and was the only country to reach 
an agreement on dual citizenship, largely because of its dependence on Rus-
sia’s gas pipelines for its own exports; but even here there were differences 
over the nature of the energy relationship.40 Nazarbayev repeatedly raised his 
vision of a Eurasian Union and in 1995 was even ready to return to the idea 
of joint military forces,41 but the clear trend by the middle of the decade was 
for the Central Asian states to march to their own tune, much to the disap-
pointment of Russian politicians and nationalists. From 1995 onwards high 
level contacts continued on a regular basis, but agreements tended to be re-
stricted to trade and energy matters.
A renewed security role for Russia in the region was back on the cards as 
a result of events in the second half of 1999. Terror attacks in Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan, blamed on Islamic extremist Wahhabis, were linked by Rus-
sia’s new Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to his own renewed war on Chechen 
terrorism. Putin promised support to Kyrgyzstan, received a standing ovation 
from Tajikistan’s Parliament on a state visit there, and signed a new security 
agreement with Uzbekistan only ten months after Karimov had denounced 
Russia’s military role. Putin declared that “Russia does not intend to declare 
any of the CIS countries to be zones of Russian strategic interests, for that 
would be inconsistent with our political tradition.” Instead, he proposed a 
series of bilateral “strategic partnerships.”42 Global events had conspired to 
allow Russia to replace its stance of unquestioning military dominance in the 
region with a more equal relationship based on a campaign which was soon 
to embrace the Western world as well––the International War on Terror.
                                                          
39 Vinogradov, “S vvedeniem natsional’nykh valiut”; Lerman Usmanov, “Posleduet li za 
razvalom rublevoi zony raspad sodruzhestva,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, December 15, 1993.
40 “Vstrechi v Ashgabade,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, December 24, 1993.
41 Boris Sherman, “Rossiia i Kazakhstan sozdadut Ob’’edinennye vooruzhennye sily,” Se-
gonia, January 21, 1995.
42 Leonid Panin, Yurii Stepanov, and Igor Shestakov, “Rossiia pomozhet Kirgizii razbit’ is-
lamistov,” Kommersant, September 2, 1999; Arkadii Dubnov, “Rossiia khochet byt’ 
‘neporochnoi’,” Vremia MN, December 16, 1999.
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Ethnic Russians
In addition to the border issues discussed above, the large numbers of Rus-
sians now living outside of the borders of the Russian Federation after the 
break-up of the USSR constituted an important element in Russia’s foreign 
policy. Russia’s self-proclaimed right to protect ethnic Russians beyond its 
borders played some role in Russia’s engagement in Tajikistan, where Rus-
sians made up 7.6 percent of the population in 1989.43 As already noted 
above, in November 1992, Kozyrev justified Russian intervention in Tajiki-
stan in part on the fact that “[w]e must also remember that Russians live 
there…Russia must act as a peacemaker.”44 Otherwise, the plight of ethnic 
Russians did not lead to any military or other direct cross-border activities in 
the 1990s. The Russian authorities did, however, use two other tools more 
regularly. One was to put direct pressure on governments to ensure the rights 
of Russians. These could be linked to international agreements or other forms 
of cooperation from Russia. Even before the end of the Soviet Union, in July 
1991 a treaty signed between the RSFSR and Kyrgyzstan linked a loan of 
800 million rubles to a guarantee of the rights of the populations of each oth-
er’s republics.45 In 1995, economic agreements made between Yeltsin and 
Niyazov were also linked to the protection of Russians in Turkmenistan.46
The second tool was to provide direct material, financial and political back-
ing to Russian organizations in the former Soviet states. In the first post-
Soviet years, such efforts were focused especially on Cossack groups in 
Ukraine and northern Kazakhstan. In 1993–1994, the status of Cossack or-
ganizations became a source of some tension between Moscow and Almaty, 
as Cossacks in northern Kazakhstan declared their own regional self-rule and 
the Russian Ministry of Justice registered a “Siberian Cossack Force” which 
had four of its sixteen subdivisions in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh authorities 
responded by refusing to register any Cossack organizations until a compro-
mise was reached whereby some Cossack organizations were registered with 
the proviso that they were not military formations.47
                                                          
43 Robert J. Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton: 
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44 Rotar’, “Moskva pytaetsia pogasit’.”
45 Aleksandr Riabushkin, “Dogovor Rossii i Kyrgyzstana,” Izvestiia, July 22, 1991.
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Russia also sought to extend the concept of citizenship on an ethnic basis 
to Russians abroad. A June 1993 amendment to the citizenship law allowed 
qualified people to obtain Russian citizenship even if such individuals had 
already acquired citizenship in another country. The right to dual citizenship 
was enshrined in Yeltsin’s constitution that was brought in later the same 
year. This dual citizenship was at odds with practices elsewhere in the former 
Soviet Union (and in the Russian Federation before June 1993), and raised 
fears that substantial portions of the population in countries like Kazakhstan 
would be encouraged to develop their identification with the Russian state at 
the expense of the nation-building and state-building projects of Kazakhstan. 
Despite strong pressure from Russia to sign bilateral treaties on dual citizen-
ship, Turkmenistan was the only Central Asian state that Russia was able to 
prevail on.48 Even in that case, Turkmenistan repealed its agreement in 2003. 
The Central Asian states were equally cool about a Russian proposal in 1994 
to create a common citizenship for CIS members.49
Rhetoric about the plight of Russians in Central Asia surfaced in the 
Russian press in response to new language laws and perceived discrimination 
against Russians. Concerns were highest in relation to Kazakhstan, where 
almost 4.5 million ethnic Russians remained by 1999 (down from 6.2 million 
in 1989). The language laws of 1989 and 1995, which relegated the Russian 
language to second place behind Kazakh while remaining an official lan-
guage, were a constant source of protest. The move of the capital of Kazakh-
stan from Almaty to Astana (formerly Akmola), on the edge of the predomi-
nantly Russian regions of northern Kazakhstan, in 1997 was widely inter-
preted in Russia as a move designed to keep an eye on those regions.50 Press 
reports complained regularly of the rewriting of history in Kazakhstan to por-
tray negative aspects of Imperial Russian rule, and linked this to discrimina-
tion against Russians.51 In November 1993, in the wake of the collapse of the 
ruble zone, Kozyrev toured the Central Asian states with the main aim of 
highlighting the plight of ethnic Russians.52 While official concerns about 
ethnic Russians generally became more muted after the mid-1990s, the issue 
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remained a popular one for Russian nationalists as well as Russian and Cos-
sack groups within the region. 
Conclusion
The suddenness of the dissolution of the USSR left little time for the prepara-
tion of concrete visions of the post-Soviet order. The perception that it was 
Yeltsin and Russia that had brought about the end of communism and that 
the Central Asian states were late arrivers in the process reinforced the as-
sumption that they would continue to operate firmly within Russia’s orbit. 
But this assumption underestimated the readiness of Central Asian leaders to 
push forward with their own state building, and the collapse of Russia’s 
economy propelled them to look in different directions for their economic 
relations––to China, South Asia and the European Union.
Central Asian governments, each at its own pace, were able to remove 
themselves from the Russian orbit without fear of serious consequences. In 
the mid-1990s, Russia was embroiled in the Chechen War, was struggling to 
overcome its economic difficulties and the consequences of the 1993 politi-
cal crisis, and was at odds with the West over NATO expansion, Kosovo, 
and the pace of economic and democratic reform. Russia’s deficit of power 
provided the opportunity, and a number of factors provided the incentive. In 
addition to geopolitical and economic realities, each of the Central Asian 
leaders had now embarked on a strategy of state and nation-building centered 
on the cult of the President, and standing up to Russia and promoting the na-
tional language and culture were central to that strategy.
By 1995, the reality that, in relation to Central Asia, the Soviet Union re-
ally had come to an end finally hit home, to a chorus of bitter recriminations. 
The influential Chair of the Duma Committee on International Affairs, Vla-
dimir Lukin, noted “[b]eyond Kazakhstan, nothing is clear…this creates a 
completely unprotected country. Completely unmonitored with respect to 
narcotics, arms dealing, and all kinds of gangsterism generally. This is very 
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dangerous.”53 In a similar vein, two correspondents for Moskovskie Novosti
complained “[i]t is not hard to see that Russia’s influence in the Central 
Asian region has been steadily declining from year to year. Pushed out of the 
ruble zone and fenced in by customs posts and new borders, post-Soviet Asia 
is turning southward.”54 The malaise caused by the loss of Empire clearly 
kicked in at this time and, combined with the reverses of the Chechen con-
flict, served to undermine Yeltsin’s popularity. It took the new shared dis-
course of the International War on Terror and a new leader, Vladimir Putin, 
to revive Russia’s presence in the region as the new millennium dawned. 
Putin’s War on International Terrorism in Chechnya became almost immedi-
ately an International War on Terrorism as the field of operations spread to 
Central Asia. From this position, Putin was able to respond to the attacks on 
New York and Washington of 9/11/2001 more rapidly and more confidently 
than any other European leader. For at least a while, he acted the part of in-
ternational statesman to great effect. Reasserting some kind of Russian pre-
dominance in Central Asia was an important part of this, since it was Putin’s 
readiness to approve the establishment of U.S. bases in Central Asia to sup-
port the new war in Afghanistan that made a genuine global coalition possi-
ble. This was not, however, an easy path for Russia, and the drift of the Cen-
tral Asian states away from the Russian orbit in the course of the 1990s was 
never fully reversed.           
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“The Problem With Our Borders in Batken”: Local 
Understandings of Border Control and Sovereignty 
in Kyrgyzstan
Steven Parham 
When the post-Soviet state of Kyrgyzstan recently celebrated its twentieth 
anniversary, it was commemorating not just two decades of “standing up and 
flourishing” in the land where the “dreams of the people came true” under 
the “flag of liberty,” in the words of the national anthem adopted in 1992.1
Exhortations in the new Constitution of 2010 to the state’s “unstinting con-
viction” to “protect state sovereignty and unity of the people” and to “serve 
for the benefit of the entire society” came amidst rising concern over precise-
ly how much control the state actually has over the fate of Kyrgyz border-
landers in the country’s far-flung South.2 In effect, the state was also mark-
ing twenty years of the concept of a citizenship tied to a very concrete notion 
of a national territory in which “rightful belonging” entitled Kyrgyzstanis—
often subtly and problematically glossed as “Kyrgyz”—to claim the re-
sources of the state in terms of a bordered identity. With the overwhelming 
majority of Kyrgyzstan’s more than five million inhabitants residing in the 
immediate vicinity of newly international borderlines, the ways in which the 
edges of the state are to be practiced in politically fractured spaces play a 
vital role in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstani lifeworlds and livelihoods. The Fergha-
na Valley in Kyrgyzstan’s south is such a region of contestation, made all the 
more immediate by its tattered borders, its traditional belonging to a larger 
area (the socio-economy of the Valley itself) than colors on the contemporary 
map would suggest, and its now century-long history of calling into question 
distant states’ policies of control.
                                                          
1 In the Kyrgyz original, “Örkündöy ber, ösö ber” and “Atkarylyp eldin ümüt, tilegi; Zhel-
biredi erkindiktin zhelegi.”
2 Quotes taken from, respectively, the Preamble and Article 5 of the unofficial English ver-
sion of the “Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic” (adopted by referendum on June 27, 
2010) translated from Russian by the European Union-UN Development Programme (EU-
UNDP) Project on Support to the Constitutional and Parliamentary Reforms and OSCE Of-
fice for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, accessed February 7, 2014, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/87546/99880/F1398573553/KGZ87546
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The Kyrgyzstani oblast’ (region) of Batken is the locus of a vibrant so-
cio-political dynamism that is usually cast in terms of interethnic conflict and 
political instability arising from the complex intermeshing of contested state 
territoriality, uncertain ethno-political loyalties, and a new economic periph-
erality. Batken today is a region of Kyrgyzstan only tenuously connected to 
the state that Kyrgyz claim as their meken, their homeland: roads intersect 
non-Kyrgyzstani territories, water is predominantly used for the agricultural 
needs of those described locally as non-Kyrgyz, dialects differ from the lan-
guage used by other Kyrgyz-speakers farther north. However, for the Kyr-
gyzstani state the territory of Batken oblast’ has come to symbolize some-
thing much larger and more significant than its cartographic isolation sug-
gests. Conflict in this administrative territory (which was carved out from 
Osh oblast’ in 1999) plays a role far beyond these impoverished and remote 
villages: a monument erected in the very heart of Bishkek in 2004 eulogizes 
the “heroes of Batken” who gave their lives to defend this outpost from what 
has been termed an incursion by Uzbek militants in the months before the 
creation of the oblast’; and policy commentators in Moscow, Brussels and 
Washington debate local ethnic distribution and the capacities of the state 
here to defend its borders along trafficking routes for narcotics originating in 
Afghanistan and terminating in Russia and the capitals of Europe. “Our bor-
ders seem to interest all sorts of people [...]. Maybe they should come and 
spend some years living along them to see what the problems here are and 
are not?,” a local historian and teacher exclaimed in Batken in September 
2013 after a long conversation on local memories of border-making in the 
Ferghana Valley.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, all the new Central Asian Re-
publics have been faced with complex socio-political realignments. In this 
they have been bound politically by the conventional rules of a “nation-state” 
system that tolerates no territorial inconsistencies in terms of state sovereign-
ty and that is loath to renegotiate lines on maps. Formerly internal boundaries 
within the Soviet Union, which were in effect borders in only an administra-
tive sense, have become state borders. This has allowed friction between 
groups that now find themselves on territories claimed by states struggling to 
assert their legitimacy to be expressed in three arenas: internally, to “their 
own” titular group as well as vis-à-vis non-titular citizens (frequently, and 
most controversially, sharing an ethnonym with a neighboring titular state); 
externally, to similarly new, neighboring titular states; and, on an interna-
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tional stage, to an audience accustomed to regarding the entire region 
through the twin lenses of contested ethnopolitical categorization and a de-
cline in geopolitical stability, so often (since 2001) expressed in terms of 
these post-Soviet states’ proximity to Afghanistan. In the case of Kyrgyz-
stan’s territory in the Ferghana Valley, these three arenas come together over 
the composition of this state’s borders, which can be seen as the locus in 
which conflicts between villagers become weighty matters of state. Important 
questions arise over how such local conflict has the potential to become a 
conflict between the states of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; and 
how such conflicts highlight a larger, regional narrative that is of interest to 
non-regional parties such as the European Union (that provides the Kyrgyz-
stani state with logistical support and a framework of border management 
deriving from European contexts) and the Russian Federation (that provides 
military hardware to the state).3
This contribution shifts our attention away from representations of Kyr-
gyzstan’s borders as being dysfunctional and in need of fixing because their 
“sub-basic infrastructure” in a region “especially prone to volatility” requires 
“cross-border collaboration [that] needs to improve considerably given the 
volatile security situation in the region.”4 Leaving aside vaguely defined no-
tions of their role in threatening “regional stability,” I focus on the interplay 
of how borders here are discussed and represented by Kyrgyz borderland 
inhabitants and the Kyrgyzstani state. Such a borderland perspective affords 
us an appropriate vantage point from which to reflect upon a range of behav-
iors as well as the parameters of local boundary-making and boundary-
reproducing processes because it inflects readily observable inscriptions of 
the state in locales “where the operation of state power is both naked and 
hidden from view.”5 I ask how border control in Batken relates to powerful 
narratives of threat in this region of Kyrgyzstan where the state has been 
struggling to assert its control. I address this question by discussing, first, 
                                                          
3 According to the Border Service at the Kyrgyz National Security Committee, Russian sup-
port comes in the framework of the “Brothers Fighting for Fixed Borders” program (as 
quoted by Deidre Tynan, “Central Asia: Russia Taking Steps to Reinforce Security Rela-
tionships,” Eurasianet, February 2, 2012, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64946).
4 See the Introduction section of the Outline of the EU-UNDP Border Management Assis-
tance Programme in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, April 2012, accessed February 7, 2014, 
http://www.bomca.eu/en/kyr.html.
5 Mark B. Salter, “The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the Interna-
tional Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 31, no. 2 
(2006): 185.
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how state authorities and locals express, contest or argue for the new signifi-
cance of border control; and, second, in which manner such Afghanistan-
driven narratives relate to local lifeworlds in Batken. By using as my sources 
data generated in long-term and repeated anthropological fieldwork as well 
as local media reports and publications of donor organizations active in the 
Ferghana Valley,6 I argue that the contentious question of enforcing control 
over a contested borderline (the “naked” control by the state) contains two 
dimensions, both of which revolve around a new practice of sovereignty. On 
the one hand, the state can be seen to pursue a course of centralizing control 
over Batken by casting local conflict as arising from the lack of sufficient 
and actually implemented border control, thus connecting border porosity 
here with the specter of increasing “regional instability” in Afghanistan’s 
neighborhood. From the perspective of the borderlands themselves, on the 
other hand, conflict over control of land and water usage, both of which are 
issues with a long history of contestation, have increasingly come to be ex-
pressed in the language of citizenship rather than merely ethnic affiliation, 
thereby presenting us with an example of “hidden” state control.
Local understandings of border control and state sovereignty in Batken 
oblast’ depend on perceptions of the manner in which the Kyrgyzstani state 
has chosen to inscribe control by the centre onto its periphery; thus, this con-
tribution begins by discussing domestic representations of the status of the
state’s actual control over its territory and how this is communicated to the 
outside world. The role that border control plays in this regard, and the ways 
in which the state regards outside assistance in this domain, shall be critically 
examined in light of its impact on local lifeworlds. The second section focus-
es on how borderlanders in Batken themselves witness the waxing drive for 
central control over their locales. Here, by following local voices I present 
ways in which locals attempt to lay claim to bordering processes through 
their highlighting of historical and contemporary tropes of (dis)connectivity 
and belonging, and how new manifestations of border control are received 
and appraised by those most directly exposed to them. I conclude by discuss-
ing how borderlanders characterize their position in relation to processes un-
                                                          
6 All quotations from interviews in this contribution were recorded during fieldwork con-
ducted between August and November 2013. A total of twenty-one semi-structured inter-
views were conducted (sixteen in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken and Osh oblast’s, and five in Tajik-
istan’s Sughd oblast’) in Russian; all translations into English are by the author. Names of 
interviewees have been altered throughout. The author expresses his especial gratitude to 
Martyn Aim and Erjan Sydykbekov for support during fieldwork.
55
leashed by Kyrgyzstani concern over how Afghanistan after the Western mil-
itary withdraws might affect domestic lifeworlds as well as state sovereignty 
in Batken.
Inscribing State Control onto Batken
Speaking of the pressures generated by a project of delimiting and demarcat-
ing the state’s new borders, a Kyrgyzstani ambassador in a speech held at a 
seminar organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope (OSCE) in 2011 clearly underlined the need for “strong political will” 
by the state in the face of local opposition to the work of boundary commis-
sions charged with resolving disputes over contested territories, who are of-
ten “accused of treachery” by local inhabitants.7 The inhabitants leveling 
such accusations of treachery at the Kyrgyzstani state are invariably border-
landers identifying themselves confidently as Kyrgyz—in other words, local 
villagers claiming specific territories inhabited by Kyrgyz as inalienable parts 
of Kyrgyzstan and not being up for territorial renegotiation with a neighbor-
ing state regardless of whether Tajiks or Uzbeks live there. As a successor 
state to the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan inherited strong regionally based pat-
ronage networks serving as the basis for the allocation of scarce economic 
and political resources, and which had been instrumental in developing ro-
bust administrative-territorial identities linked to the respective sub-divisions 
of the Union.8 The Soviet Union had taken the process of nation-building 
very seriously, and the system of titular nations (the Kyrgyz, the Tajiks, etc.) 
still provides groups in this region with the parameters of the negotiation of 
political power. As a state, however, this heir to the USSR was not imbued 
with the resources to implement on-the-ground border control at its new bor-
ders: even in the immediate neighborhood of the capital city in the north, 
along the new Kazakhstani borderline, manifestations of state control at the 
frontier were not to appear until a decade had passed.
                                                          
7 Erik Asanaliev, Ambassador of the Kyrgyz Republic in Belarus, speaking at an OSCE Bor-
ders Team Seminar in Vilnius, May–June, 2011, http://www.osce.org/cpc/85263?
download=true.
8 Pauline Jones-Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central 
Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 69–73.
56
Such a pronounced dearth of symbols relating to the actual implementa-
tion of practices of territorial sovereignty has continued to this day to charac-
terize the Kyrgyzstani state at its margins. In the far-flung south of the coun-
try, it was not until the “Batken war” of 1999 that central authorities found 
themselves unable any longer to ignore the issue of national control of 
“their” territory.9 Represented as an infiltration of Kyrgyzstani territory by a 
large group of Uzbek militants belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbek-
istan, neighboring Uzbekistan began the contentious project of unilaterally 
laying mines along what it regarded as its borderline with Kyrgyzstan, at that 
time a line that was largely neither delimited nor demarcated in a mutually 
acceptable form.10 A decade later, in another part of southern Kyrgyzstan, 
the borderline between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was once again in the 
centre of regional states’ attention when Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks, believing 
themselves to be persecuted by local (Kyrgyz) authorities in the southern city 
of Osh, temporarily fled across the border to Uzbekistan’s section of the Fer-
ghana Valley. Coinciding with the collapse of central authorities’ power in 
Bishkek and the ouster of President Bakiev in 2010, the state’s control over 
its territory was called into question even more fundamentally:
“I cannot answer this question for sure—[whether] we control the territory in the 
south of my country 100 percent. That’s because of such objective factors as the 
lingering tension between these two ethnic groups [and] because of the mistrust 
and lack of confidence of the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz communities toward lo-
cal law enforcement bodies.”11
The issue of the relationship between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks on Kyrgyzstan’s 
territory is explicitly linked to failing control over the periphery by the cen-
                                                          
9 By this time only roughly half of the 971-kilometre-long Kyrgyzstani-Tajikistani and a 
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agreed upon; see Necati Polat, Boundary Issues in Central Asia (Ardsley: Transnational 
Publishers, 2002), 51–59. Today this has remained at a similar level for the Kyrgyzstani-
Tajikistani border and risen to nearly three-quarters along the Kyrgyzstani-Uzbekistani bor-
der (as reported in “Working groups on delimitation and demarcation of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek 
state border met in Uzbekistan,” Kabar, January 29, 2014, http://www.kabar.kg/eng
/politics/full/9040).
10 George Gavrilis, The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 108.
11 Arslan Anarbaev, former Interim Head of the Kyrgyz Embassy in Washington, in an inter-
view with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 6, 2010,
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kyrgyz_Envoy_To_US_Says_Interethnic_Reconciliation_Cou
ld_Take_Decades/2120445.html.
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tre, in part at least deriving from local suspicions over the state’s objectives 
in mediating between the fraught categories of ethnicity (as expressed in 
terms of tension between local communities) and the institutions of a central-
ized Kyrgyzstani state as represented by local law enforcement bodies.
While widely reported bloodshed between these groups was limited to 
Osh and its immediate environs, farther west in Batken incidents between 
Kyrgyz and their Uzbek and Tajik neighbors have become seemingly both 
more frequent and more violent since 2010. Such conflict often arises from 
the contentious purchase of construction land by non-Kyrgyz or the domina-
tion by certain groups (usually ascribed with a non-Kyrgyz ethnic identity 
but not necessarily non-Kyrgyzstani citizenship) over the few remaining eco-
nomic lifelines leading out of remote valleys and, invariably, across border-
lines even in cases where the ultimate anchor of exchange is itself on Kyr-
gyzstani territory (such as is the case in direct trade between Batken and 
Bishkek or Osh). Local media have reported a significant increase since 2010 
in incidents that have included, inter alia, reciprocal kidnappings of Kyrgyz 
and Tajiks or Uzbeks, gun battles between borderlanders and border guards, 
the destruction of property linked to non-Kyrgyz ownership, and a barrage of 
accusations of border violations by citizens of Kyrgyzstan crossing into terri-
tory claimed by Tajikistan (the Vorukh enclave) or Uzbekistan (the Sokh 
enclave) and vice versa.12 What is at stake here is, in the words of the gov-
ernment, “the social and economic development of borderline territories” 
which has been negatively affected by the “problem of border management 
and lack of border infrastructure.”13
A majority of the Soviet Union’s successor states have been confronted 
with an imprecise fit between territorial allocation of political power within 
units defined by the larger context of the USSR and actual control over bor-
                                                          
12 See, for example, Natalia Yefimova-Trilling and David Trilling, “Kyrgyzstan & Tajikistan: 
Disputed Border Heightens Risk of Conflict,” Eurasianet, August 2, 2012,
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65744; Mirlan Alymbekov, “Border conflicts: no alterna-
tive to negotiations,” Kabar, January 27, 2015, http://kabar.kg/eng/analytics/full/9002.
For an excellent discussion of Sokh border conflict, see Madeleine Reeves, “The Time of 
the Border: Contingency, Conflict, and Popular Statism at the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan 
Boundary,” in Ethnographies of the State in Central Asia. Performing Politics, ed. Made-
leine Reeves, Johan Rasanayagam, and Judith Beyer (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2014), 198–220.
13 OSCE, “Speech of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, H.E. Mr. Erlan 
Abdyldaev on the 20th session of the Council of the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE
Member States,” December 5, 2013, http://www.osce.org/mc/109230?download=true.
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derland processes at the edges of those units. Kyrgyzstan, alongside its west-
ern and southern neighbors, has however benefited from the exceptional at-
tention accorded to its borders and, by implication, to its weak central control
over the movement of people and goods through its periphery by distant 
states due to its location. In a telling choice of imagery, the Foreign Ministry 
of Finland, which is a donor country that lacks a historical background to its 
relations in the region but which has been instrumental in recent years in 
broaching regional border porosity for the European Union and the OSCE, 
tersely introduces Central Asia with:
“The geopolitical situation in Central Asia is challenging: drug routes run from 
Afghanistan through Central Asia to Russia and Europe, and the unpredictability 
of the situation in Afghanistan and the neighboring states causes concern about a 
build-up of extremist Islamic movements in the region.”14
By emphasizing an imagery of regions that are successively penetrated, this 
European Union member state correlates the violation of European territory 
with failures of border control closer to the source of such undesirable new 
flows. To the European Union and, due to its position in-between, the Rus-
sian Federation, Kyrgyzstan (and its neighbors Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) 
seems to resemble what northern Mexico is to the United States: a drug-
infested borderland that fails to stem the flow of narcotics to where those 
who consume most of these drugs reside. Following the caesura of Septem-
ber 2001, Kyrgyzstan took its commitment to ousting the Taliban in Afghan-
istan very seriously, going so far as permitting the operation of the first non-
Soviet military base on former Soviet territory, which opened at Manas air-
port near Bishkek in December 2001. Mindful of public perceptions in a state 
that never rejected its crucial ties of socio-economic exchange with the Rus-
sian Federation, a second, Russian military base has similarly been permitted 
to operate at Kant since October 2003, in the immediate neighborhood of the 
airbase leased to the U.S. at Manas. The Russian state may well disagree with 
the military objectives and permissibility of such a base, and yet both of these
outside forces share a common concern over the factors alluded to in the cita-
tion above. In effect, it is the status of Kyrgyzstani border management that 
                                                          
14 The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Wider Europe Initiative: Finland’s Develop-
ment Policy Framework Programme,” June 2009, available at 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentId=167831&nodeId=15445&contentlan
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is the focal point for such outside interest, and pressure has been brought to 
bear upon the Kyrgyzstani state to get its borders “under control” in the in-
terest of “wider regional stability.”
Alerted to global representations of Central Asia as a “first line of de-
fense” in terms of preventing instability in Afghanistan from “spilling over” 
its borders, the Kyrgyzstani state has not argued against the imagery of glob-
al threat clinging to outside characterizations of local state weakness. Instead, 
such threats have been reformulated to relate to Kyrgyzstani lifeworlds in an 
immediate manner. Thus, Kyrgyzstani Foreign Minister E. Abdyldaev re-
cently stated:
“Kyrgyzstan is greatly influenced by the Afghan drug trafficking. In the last 
years drug-expansion has become more aggressive, being the main source of 
danger to the gene pool, contributing to transnational organized crime, terrorism, 
and extremism. Porous borders, weak equipment of the respective agencies, lack 
of human resources, and insufficient anti-drug propaganda affect the fight against 
illicit drug trafficking.”15
The connection between internal processes and outside attention (which is, 
first and foremost, focused on matters pertaining to Afghanistan) has been 
made explicit in the context of the Ferghana Valley’s contested borders. 
Thus, state elites suggest that there exists a direct correlation between local 
conflict in Batken and processes originating from beyond the state’s borders. 
The combustible mix of new economic peripherality and insistent calls for 
the pre-eminence of the titular Kyrgyz within the Kyrgyzstani state has coin-
cided with a steady increase in a rhetoric that links border violation from 
without with (in)stability within. In the words of A. Anarbaev, at the time 
Head of the Kyrgyzstani Embassy in the United States:
“The interests of [certain] internal destructive forces match the interests of exter-
nal ones, located in neighboring countries—radical Islamism and drug traffick-
ing. Matching interests unite those groups and may, God forbid, create a new 
burst of tension in our country. That’s why our government pays a lot of atten-
tion to border security.”16
“Border security” and the juxtaposition of “internal and external destructive 
forces” are tropes that belong firmly within a language of enclosure that 
                                                          
15 OSCE, “Speech of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic.”
16 Arslan Anarbaev, in an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
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characterizes the legitimacy of imposing sovereignty over the entire territory 
of the state. As a consequence of territorial enclosure, regions formerly at the 
heart of a larger market space can now become peripheral: deprived of its 
regionally predicated raison d’être, Batken has become an outpost of an evis-
cerated economy. The new reality of Batken’s economic peripherality is 
highlighted, and its plight reproduced, by what has been described, in a more 
general context, as states’ efforts to curb cross-boundary trade and transfron-
tier systems of production.17 Such peripherality is a characteristic conse-
quence of giving precedence to the political aspects of a borderland over and 
beyond its economic well-being: it stems from a core’s political needs and 
not from considerations of economic opportunity, especially when a bounda-
ry divides (from the state’s point of view) two political systems and two eco-
nomic systems that are potentially in conflict with one another.18
The Kyrgyzstani state claims to identify the solution to local conflict 
along its southern borders as lying in better implementation of border con-
trol. Arguing that “[t]he present and future of a state depends not only on its 
internal development but also on the nature of that country’s contact with the 
outside world and the ability to secure its interests, including through border 
security,” this state locates a critical threat to national security in “the out-
flow of the working-age population from the border regions deeper into, as 
well as out of the country, resulting in land reclamation by inhabitants of 
neighboring states.”19 By characterizing local conflict over land and water in 
its remote southern region of Batken as crucially involving territorial viola-
tion arising from overly porous borders, the specter of ever increasing re-
gional instability is invoked. Yet, as is evident in such pronouncements by 
state representatives, the state’s desire for increased control over internal 
movement is intrinsic to the desire to control the borderlands themselves. It is 
such a desire to “monopolize the means of movement” that lies at the heart of 
the drive to introduce techniques of identification and thereby unambiguous-
ly establish state identities (“citizenships”) through documentation such as 
passports, identity cards, and internal permits (propuski).20
                                                          
17 Niles Hansen, The Border Economy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 23–24.
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The speedy creation of new borderline infrastructure has not failed to 
come about because of a lack of societal experience and awareness of the 
functions of border control: a rarely acknowledged fact in the context of Cen-
tral Asian border control is that the polity of Kyrgyzstan has a half-century 
history of actually implementing border control on certain parts of its territo-
ry, namely along the former external boundaries of the Soviet Union (to the 
east with the People’s Republic of China, in this case). Practices of border 
control are widely remembered within societies that experienced a high de-
gree of militarization even in the 1980s. Instead, this has not occurred be-
cause of, first, the newly independent state’s incapacities in terms of the re-
sources to construct new, state-internal rather than regional, infrastructures 
and, second, the development of a clear narrative of “neighborliness.” Una-
ble independently to muster sufficient resources for such an enterprise and 
unable to cooperate directly with neighboring states in the contemporary 
framework of mutual distrust over borders, state elites have found it expedi-
ent to turn to outside assistance. This assistance can be seen as a type of re-
source that the state has generated by pursuing a narrative of great interest to 
outsiders: proximity to Afghanistan and the perceived threats that that post-
Taliban state poses beyond Central Asia’s borders. It is suggested that more 
central control over such remote peripheries is to the advantage of a con-
cerned outside world because it
“[…] enhances national and regional security, promotes global security, creates 
preconditions favorable to the implementation and development of the individual 
and society, stimulates the socio-economic and democratic development of the 
state, enhances the role of law, [and] strengthens mutually beneficial relation-
ships with other countries of the region and the world.”21
In this formulation, the Kyrgyzstani state represents itself as a responsible 
member of an international community of states as well as professing its wish 
to promote “neighborliness.” The existence of Kyrgyzstan as a state within 
such a community entails the diktat of sovereign control over territory, em-
bodied by a new infrastructure of border closure – in effect, new regimes of 
border control. Border control, “the sum of a state’s institutions to regulate 
the movement of people, communication, and goods across external bounda-
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ries,”22 represents the most visible manifestation of a state’s narrative of con-
trol over its territory by making the state legible to outsiders as well as to 
citizens, and it figures prominently in the international political system of 
states that dominates global discourses of foreign policy. The mechanisms 
and artifacts pertaining to the surveillance of the borderline itself project the 
parameters of sovereignty from the centre to the periphery through the mi-
cropolitics of border control and the powerful class of agents of border con-
trol, such as customs officials, border guards, and numerous police forces 
and state security agencies.23 The functions that such normative control are 
meant to have are easily divided into vigilance, monitoring, and restriction. 
These functions are accomplished through militarization, surveillance tech-
niques, and state-endorsed “gatekeepers” such as border guards and customs 
officials. Furthermore, such bureaucracies of control serve to “embrace” and 
keep track of both those who legitimately “belong to the state” (its citizens) 
as well as those temporarily on state territory.24 It is this convention of border
control that Kyrgyzstan has accepted through its emphatic endorsement of 
the border management concepts developed by the OSCE and the European 
Union’s Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA), thereby 
embracing a narrative of keeping borders “open yet secure” in order to pre-
vent “terrorism” and the smuggling of contraband.
But what does such assistance mean for the implementation of border 
control in a locality such as Batken? Forced to consider budget allocations, 
the state is moving away from the traditional Soviet-era convention of mili-
tary and para-military border control to “a special, multi-disciplinary [sic.] 
national system, which operates with wide-ranging powers and capabilities 
for the integrated protection of the interests of the country at the state border, 
in the border area, and throughout the regions of the country.”25 In effect, 
this means the replacement of Kyrgyzstani army units with a professional 
corps of border troops and “the establishment of functioning civilian control 
over the activities of border security agencies, the gradual implementation of 
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operative-mobile methods in border patrol, the full professionalization of the 
border service (that is giving up enrolling conscripts in the border ser-
vice).”26 Such “professionalization” visibly goes hand-in-hand with the con-
struction of watchtowers, training centers, and border post amenities; and it is
accompanied by the appearance of new vehicles, patrol and sniffer dogs, and 
new uniforms. Contractors are constructing new border infrastructure (truck 
inspection units, border outposts, road upgrading as well as new road con-
struction that by-passes pockets of extra-territorial spaces, communication 
towers, and barracks), and like this the landscapes of Batken’s borderlands 
are slowly being transformed to resemble physically the outpost of Kyrgyz-
stan that they have long figured as in representations in far-away Bishkek.
Borderlanders Laying Claim to Batken’s Borders
Confronted with such remodeled border control designed to harden borders 
here, Kyrgyz borderlanders in Batken choose to emphasize their own partici-
pation in boundary-making and boundary-reproduction. By no means merely 
on-lookers while states have come and gone from the region, borderlanders 
clearly express their attitudes towards such changes. Local representations of 
such change here hinge on historical rights as marked on old maps, often by 
using a vocabulary of entitlement introduced from afar; and borderlanders 
violate borders when these do not agree with tried and tested forms of inter-
action with their neighbors. In order to approach the framework within which 
interaction with the state has taken place from a local perspective, I quote at 
length the sweep of history that Amir, a local historian in Batken and a for-
mer engineer with the Red Army in distant Chernobyl, used to introduce “the 
problem with our borders in Batken”:
“There was a time when the settled peoples of the Ferghana Valley feared us 
[Kyrgyz] as great warriors. In those days, all the cities in this region existed only 
due to the whim of the Kyrgyz: we controlled those who were in power in 
Qoqand, Khujand, Osh, Andijon. Then, Russia came and they created an office 
in Tashkent, which was still Kazakh back then. We Kyrgyz and Kazakhs could 
not read or write back then, but the Uzbeks could, and they used their skills to 
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steal much of our land. We were not so clever: we loved our freedom and our 
sheep and horses. But they learned Russian and drew the very borders we now 
fight over. Before the Bolshevik Revolution [in 1917] we roamed everywhere 
and defended our way of life [byt’]: this is why there are Kyrgyz in all Central 
Asia, and also in China and Afghanistan. Today in this region, we are left with 
just Batken. This is like an island, left over after the sea washed everything else 
away. Truly, our lands have shrunk!”27
By employing an ethno-political terminology which would have been unrec-
ognizable in the period presented here, memories of connectivity are empha-
sized alongside the power that directly derived from such connectivity. Such 
memories of historical control are vivid and dominated by a Kyrgyz point of 
view that, in the nationalizing language of contemporary post-Soviet Central 
Asia, is able to draw upon commonly accepted notions of the Kyrgyz geo-
body,28 that mountainous island “left over after the sea.” Tellingly, it is the 
collusion of neighbors (the “Uzbeks”) with outsiders (“Russia”) that intro-
duced the territorializing state here by employing a foreign language (Rus-
sian), and not the outsiders themselves. From such a perspective, Kyrgyz 
have been stranded in their lands by historical processes that have now cul-
minated in enclosure.
Disconnecting the Formerly Connected
Distant debates over narratives of enclosure and filtering along “suitable cor-
ridors,” of the penetration of undesirable goods and individuals from Af-
ghanistan, and of the need to reintegrate Kyrgyzstan into a world that, until 
1991, it had clearly been a part of sit uneasily with a people that have a tradi-
tion of negotiating regional interaction in the face of a succession of polities 
claiming their allegiances to an array of political enterprises. Seen from the 
perspective of Batken, Kyrgyzstan’s new territoriality represents a deteriora-
tion of local connectivity; “regional cooperation” was a given fact of socio-
economic life in the decades prior to independence:
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“Before the end of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks and Tajiks would sit 
and discuss important matters like water and schools and family problems for 
many hours. Our respective kolkhoz cooperated on all these matters. These days 
we only meet to resolve business questions: what is the current price of potatoes 
or petrol in Osh [Kyrgyzstan], or Andijon [Uzbekistan], or Isfara [Tajikistan]? 
Where are the border guards today, and how much money do they demand if en-
countered? Before independence we all had the freedom to move, but now we 
have all shrunk in terms of geography and of ambition: we used to know the 
places personally that we talked about, our mines and mills and refineries 
worked, and we talked about more important things than potatoes and road 
blocks.”29
It is the existence of such slowly decaying connectivity that poses the conun-
drum that Batken finds itself dealing with today and with which a new state 
rhetoric of territorial boundedness must compete: memories of recent and 
larger, regional exchange figure more prominently than do official contem-
porary characterizations of exchange across the new borders of the region. 
Rural and, in present-day geopolitical terms, remote, livelihoods here have 
for a long time depended on connectedness within the larger region of the 
Ferghana Valley. Traditionally, the entire valley successfully cultivated fruit 
and various cereal crops as well as being a renowned area for horse and cattle 
breeding. However, during the Soviet period and as a consequence of collec-
tivization in the late 1920s, the valley’s abundant water resources were redi-
rected to cotton monoculture and the various food and fodder crops were 
subsequently heavily marginalized. Cotton production depended on the eco-
nomic integrity of the entire region due to the vital necessity of the water 
resources from upstream Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and food for this region 
was imported from other parts of the Union, most notably from western Sibe-
ria. Hence, within the Soviet economy, Batken was intricately linked to wide 
markets and diverse supply chains. The dissolution of the USSR entailed the 
hardening of the formerly administrative borders, making the water supply 
for the cotton fields (predominantly in the Uzbekistani segment of the valley) 
an international issue, due to Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s dependency on 
the same water for electricity generation. Today, the market space of the Fer-
ghana Valley, the bread basket of the entire region, is politically (and hence 
economically) more fragmented than ever before in its ancient agricultural 
history. More significant for local residents in the three post-Soviet parts of 
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the valley, however, is that infrastructure was similarly designed with one 
market space in mind, thereby newly affecting the transportation of food and 
goods, none of which were any longer produced self-sufficiently by any one 
of these three states.
“Where did these new borders come from? When they were designed in 
my grandfather’s days nobody could have wanted to mark them with fences, 
mines or police!”30 For the longest part of their lifetime, the borders of the 
Ferghana Valley were indeed marked on paper only: there were no customs 
posts, border zones, or checkpoints on the infrastructure connecting the Re-
publics. Locals in internal borderlands experienced the boundary’s existence 
due to the existence of the respective Republic’s state institutions (e.g., lan-
guage use in schools and insignia on local militias’ uniforms) rather than 
border control mechanisms. While archival information on internal bounda-
ries remains difficult to obtain (and seems to have been marked in contradic-
tory ways on Soviet-era maps),31 the internal boundaries most Soviet citizens 
had to deal with in general were those engendered by the system of collectiv-
ization and the subsequent restrictions on freedom of abode rather than ones 
between Republics. “The boundaries of the kolkhoz [collective farm] were 
far, far more important to us than the borders to the neighboring Republics” 
is a common statement encountered in Batken when locals talk about their 
experiences with border control prior to the imposition of the new practices 
of the territorializing post-Soviet state of the early twenty-first century.32
The battle against mestnichestvo (“localism”), regarded as the antithesis 
of socialist nationalization policy, was fought in the arenas of internal delimi-
tation (the bordering of oblast’s and raions) and, most importantly, in the 
new institution of the kolkhoz. Kolkhoz were not simply units of production 
but rather socio-economic communities often bringing together several vil-
lages in order to establish the key locus of all in-depth economic develop-
ment in the under-industrialized, un-urbanized South of the Soviet Union.33
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Collectivization, economic modernization, and sovietization all had been part 
of the drive behind the creation of the kolkhoz, and kolkhoz served as the 
most immediate encounter locals in Central Asia had with the state’s territo-
rializing strategies, in particular after 1932, when a new passport system cre-
ated categories of places for which individuals needed special permission to 
live. This had the effect of tying rural people to their respective kolkhoz and 
as such represented a central strategy in Soviet governing structures.34 When 
people in Batken today emphasize perceptions of a loss of mobility and, 
through this, a depreciation of practices of socio-economic exchange, it is the 
loss of institutionalized patterns of exchange within and between kolkhoz
“territories” that is inferred. Long experiences here with borders (through the 
kolkhoz) are centrally characterized by regarding them as marking the edge 
of a local belonging rather than in the enclosing and filtering function they 
are meant to fulfill for the sovereign states of the Ferghana Valley. It is these 
edges of local belonging that are now being claimed in the name of the state.
The Margins of Land and Belonging as a Local Resource
The borders that figure so prominently in local lifeworlds in the tripartite 
Ferghana Valley are here to stay, even despite the observation that these for-
mer administrative-only boundaries were never designed to delimit inde-
pendent and sovereign states. Characterizations by Kyrgyzstani borderland-
ers of their complexly bordered homeland in Batken overwhelmingly focus 
on conflict over enfranchisement and belonging rather than contesting the 
existence of these borderlines themselves:
“This here is Kyrgyz land—Tajiks should not be allowed to build houses on it, 
and Uzbeks should not be allowed to steal the water that comes from Kyrgyz 
mountains and flows through Kyrgyz valleys. Tajiks and Uzbeks are neighbors 
and sometimes guests, and they should stay neighbors and guests rather than pre-
tending to become family by moving in and demanding our things.”35
In their interaction with anthropologists, journalists and government repre-
sentatives, control over land and access to water is expressed in the language 
of citizenship in the post-Soviet state which, since the time of its inception as 
one of the ethno-territorial Soviet Republics, has come to be seen as a politi-
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cal homeland for a specific titular ethnic “nation.” Building upon an idiosyn-
cratic selection of “national attributes,” by 1936 (the year of the final changes 
to administrative borders in Central Asia) Soviet ethnographers and adminis-
trators believed they had identified territories that would be best suited as 
“containers” in which the national dialectic would play itself out and to 
which members of any given nationality would gravitate.36 The socialist 
homelands thus devised, in theory, were to be ethnically homogenous in an 
administrative sense: cadre distribution, linguistic education, and control 
over resources (both in terms of economic extraction as well as symbolic 
control over these within the framework of the Soviet state) were to be in the 
hands of the titular group. Because of access to local institutions (such as 
schooling) and the right to “national particularities” (such as practicing cer-
tain socio-economic ways of life), the delimitation of homeland and nation 
(in effect, the “internal bordering” of the constituent parts of the Soviet Un-
ion) mattered greatly to those who found new administrative boundaries on 
their doorsteps and who, as a consequence, found themselves the objects of 
new narratives of exclusion and inclusion.
Contestation by locals here of the precise demarcation of territory be-
longing to one or another state-administered homeland is by no means a nov-
el phenomenon: arguing for the renegotiation of borderlines by employing 
the language of contemporary normative orders has a long tradition in the 
Ferghana Valley. By using the terminology of the day, groups who were in 
the process of understanding themselves to be Kyrgyz or Tajik or Uzbek al-
ready petitioned the Soviet state throughout the 1920s and 1930s with the 
aim of securing certain territories (and with them, certain resources) for 
themselves. In doing so, “petitioners did not question the official assumption 
that ‘nationality’ was linked to land and other resources. Instead, the peti-
tioners argued that they were entitled to such resources as a matter of nation-
al rights.”37 Archival research has shown that locals actively participated in 
this process and exhibited considerable skill in molding revolutionary territo-
rial realignments into pre-revolutionary, pre-existing boundaries between 
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local groups.38 Thus, the delimitation of Ferghana borders was a dynamic 
process of interaction between local elites and the distant centre in Moscow, 
even if this process (as we have seen above) has come to be portrayed locally 
as a collusion of certain groups of locals (“the Uzbeks” in one common such 
representation) with the distant state.
By and large, the socialist state did not invent the categories to which 
people were to ascribe themselves, but it did objectify the categories of Kyr-
gyz-ness, Uzbek-ness, or Tajik-ness as well as tie them to a notion of right-
ful, and exclusive, territorial belonging.39 Today’s states in Central Asia have 
neither contested nor renegotiated these ethno-political identities, but today’s 
borderlines between these states now apportion not only access to local insti-
tutions but also inclusion into mutually antagonistic and economically inde-
pendent political systems. In an era of narratives that elevate allegiance to the 
state over locally defined and hybrid belongings—a time in which, most re-
cently, sanctions for violation of territory have actually begun to be imple-
mented—“nationality” as expressed through “citizenship” has remained a 
resource for borderlanders. Indeed, the increasingly strong language used by 
the state to argue the legitimacy of enforcing borders in places like Batken 
has made available a powerful weapon for locals in the fraught conflicts over 
land and water: by using citizenships to classify “theft” of land, villagers 
suggest a threat to the state as a whole rather than just conflict between indi-
viduals or residents of neighboring localities. In other words, while conflict 
between Kyrgyz herders over pasture rights should be resolved locally or by 
the oblast’ police (who, however, are generally not seen locally as reliable or 
impartial arbitrators), conflict over water usage (that frequently depends on 
Soviet-era canals that criss-cross borders) attracts the attention of state secu-
rity forces, the border police, and international observers alike and can, there-
fore, in local perceptions be assured to be decided a priori in favor of the 
Kyrgyz party’s interest precisely because higher level authorities are not seen 
                                                          
38 For an analytical discussion of these archives, see Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Re-
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as acting impartially as long as “rightful belonging” is shown to be at stake. 
Once again, petitioning the state in support of local causes has become a 
strategy that can yield advantages, and this has become a crucial local re-
source in a region that in most other respects has had much to lose from the 
new disconnectivity of the early twenty-first century.
Reappraisals of “New” Border Control
The new regimes of border control that have been taking hold steadily in 
Batken oblast’ in recent years are a clear sign for residents that the state has 
finally arrived, on the ground and in everyday life. This arrival is taking 
place in an environment already characterized by strong discourses and tradi-
tions of interaction between groups marked by different categories of nation-
ality and citizenship. I have shown how Kyrgyz borderlanders here empha-
size “local shrinking,” expressed in terms of the loss of regional-now-
international connectivity and “ambition”; simultaneously, more direct ave-
nues of interaction with the Kyrgyzstani state have opened up: relations be-
tween certain villages and villagers have become relations between states, 
and the forces of border control are the vehicles of this contextual shift. 
Equipped with a newly legitimated language of protection and sovereignty, 
these forces implement notions of citizenship through, for example, the prac-
tice of document checks. Adopting the “professional approach to border 
management” suggested to the government by foreign advisors and their do-
nors and which forms a vital pillar of both Kyrgyzstan’s international stand-
ing as well as providing much needed budgetary relief, the separation of in-
tricately interwoven lifeworlds is rapidly taking place here. A striking feature 
of new notions of separated territoriality, and a clearly visible instance of the 
inscription of sovereignty onto local landscapes, has been the construction of 
new infrastructures to replace Soviet-era arteries that nowadays violate state 
boundedness. Critically supported by donor money, such new infrastructures 
that eliminate the need to cross borderlines allow the state to perceive its ac-
cess to Kyrgyzstani villages as being completely under sovereign control 
rather than dependent on another state’s regime of border control and, as a 
consequence thereof, subject to unilateral enclosure by a neighboring state. 
From the perspective of the newly accessible locales, however, the burgeon-
ing narrative of disconnectivity of recent years is cemented through the out-
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side support so loudly proclaimed on the ubiquitous information boards 
adorned with European Union flags.
The “professionalization” of the agents of border control very much has 
an impact on the ways in which local lifeworlds are changing:
“The old system was for us—the new system is for them. Back then, if we didn’t 
cooperate with Uzbeks or Tajiks we could be accused of being unpatriotic to the 
[Soviet] state, of undermining the friendship of the peoples. We were all in this 
together, back then. Now, if we cooperate one-to-one with them we are accused 
of being smugglers, of not being vigilant enough about militants coming here. 
Now, we are traitors to our nation.”40
Significantly, border control matters because it matters to borderlanders—the 
agents of border control can be co-opted, cooperated with, or evaded but they 
cannot be ignored. In order to live their lives at the state’s margins, the intri-
cate and changing structures of hierarchical command, military control, ef-
fective gatekeeper power, and functioning bureaucratic channels and its lan-
guage of interaction must be learned by locals. The “old” system, in force 
from the time of independence until the current drive for professionalization, 
was negotiated between borderlanders and the Kyrgyzstani border forces in 
the frame of Soviet-era legitimacies with its own specific conventions of in-
teraction. In that environment, “border guards would depend on us for their 
everyday needs such as cash, food, and sometimes accommodation”41; sala-
ries were not paid on a regular basis by the state, conscripts were young and 
inexperienced, and officers knew that basic survival depended on coopera-
tion with locals. Cash was collected for the “crime” of violating an invisible 
border either through undocumented movement (in which case temporary 
exemption could be “purchased”) or by using Tajik somoni or Uzbek sum
instead of Kyrgyz som (where foreign currency would often in part be “con-
fiscated”). The “new” system, however, is far less reliant on local support: 
increased scrutiny from outsiders and, concomitantly, the increased reliability 
of state bodies that are starting to seem like employers suggests that, increas-
ingly, actually enforcing the borderline is to the advantage of border guards. 
Professionalization, in this regard, entails greater dependencies between such 
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agents and the state; for locals, the effect is most visible in fewer yet dearer 
“fines” for violation.
The juxtaposition between “us” and “them” points to the subtle shifts in 
locals’ appreciation of Kyrgyzstan’s new narrative of sovereignty. In casual 
conversation, locals in Batken are quick to point out their dislike of how bor-
ders are nowadays being controlled rather than, as I have argued above, re-
futing that borders themselves should in principle exist. Whereas conflicts 
invariably arising over land and water were negotiated between Kyrgyz, Ta-
jiks and Uzbeks, and border control had been co-opted, now these parties are 
on less equal footing. Taking a transborder perspective in order to identify 
the new differentials in interaction between these parties, experiences of non-
Kyrgyz “violators” cast light on this new reality:
“He was a young and new border guard and he asked to see my documents. I said 
I was a Tajik who had been selling melons to Kyrgyz friends here in Arka and 
that I’d never needed documents before. He told me Tajikistan ended at the 
southern edge of the road and that I should go and sell them in Tajikistan. He 
told me I was a trouble-maker—you know, driving up prices, trying to buy prop-
erty from the profit I make. I said I had a house and family in Gafurov [in Tajiki-
stan] and had been coming here for fifteen years every autumn, and he then ac-
cused me of maybe smuggling heroin or proselytizing Islam through my local 
friends. The bribe I paid wiped out all my profit—that’s the way it is these days I 
suppose, but why did he have to insult me by thinking I’m an Afghan?”42
The “us” of the old system included Tajik and Uzbek neighbors into negotia-
tion with the Kyrgyzstani state’s authorities; the new system’s “them” is the 
state and its novel type of control. The spaces in which non-Kyrgyz border-
landers can interact with Kyrgyz have shrunk, and their power to affect Kyr-
gyzstani border control has all but evaporated. The development of “trade 
corridors,” a central element in donor-sponsored activity here and designed, 
one suspects, with the state as a reference point rather than with the border-
lands themselves in mind, both disregards the strong networks that already 
exist between borderlanders and valorizes such exchange as betrayal—in the 
words of Orozbek as quoted above, “treachery to the nation.” Conflict be-
tween Kyrgyz and Tajiks certainly occurs frequently; and increasingly the 
Kyrgyzstani state is becoming involved by reinterpreting local conflict as a 
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matter to be addressed with the Tajikistani state. It is in this way that ethnic 
boundaries have finally been converted into state boundaries.
Beyond the domain of conflict over land control and water usage, locals 
show themselves to be uneasy with fresh categories of violation that have 
been appearing along these borders: accusations of narcotics trafficking, the 
spreading of new readings of Islam, and cross-border networks of armed and 
systematic opposition to the legitimacy of the post-Soviet state—a new lan-
guage of protection has taken hold, using the vocabulary of security, insur-
gency, and extremism. “Why does the OSCE build new guard posts up on 
the hills instead of much-needed new houses here in town?” is a legitimate 
question in the eyes of Batken residents, and an answer that quickly is given 
often highlights the fact that “such pointless endeavors are allowed because 
if we are all seen to be involved then they receive lots of money.”43 Suggest-
ing that the state “sees heroin where there is none, and Taliban where there 
are none,” and that this takes place because the government in “distant and 
corrupt” Bishkek gains resources through such discourse, is a common 
stance in Batken.44 Accusing an unstable central government of corruption 
and self-interest is a damning statement by no means limited to remote Bat-
ken oblast’, and yet here locals have been intimately confronted with Kyr-
gyzstan’s policies relating to the conflict in Afghanistan. A new generation 
of border guards serving here and trained in donor-financed facilities is 
armed with the knowledge that “[t]he Ferghana Valley area is especially 
prone to volatility, and the high degree of criminality associated with traf-
ficking in drugs, arms and people is a major destabilizing factor mitigating 
against the rule of law, the development of social capital and increased living 
standards for the poor.”45 Locals muse on who, exactly, the new language of 
protection is designed to protect.
The ongoing delimitation of borders in the Ferghana Valley is, under 
such conditions, by no means a simple demarcation of the limit of the state’s 
affairs and, thus, not at all a matter of little relevance to locals. Once agents 
of border control begin to actually implement the everyday separation of mu-
tually dependent socio-economic systems by pressing the parameters of ex-
change into state-sanctioned modes, local interests will suffer:
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45 Outline of the EU-UNDP Border Management Assistance Programme in the Republic of 
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“More borders mean more problems. These problems arise from us no longer 
knowing how to talk to our neighbors in a common language, or them to us. The 
conflict we then have makes Bishkek want more security for us. And this means 
more border control, and more borders than we already have. Of what use are 
new border markets then? We already have those, don’t we? But they’re illegal, 
or so they say.”46
For borderlanders in Batken it is markets that play a central role. Trade and 
markets function as lubricants of interaction between different ethnic groups 
who are nowadays citizens of different countries. These markets thrive off 
price differentials arising from the “nationalization” of economies. The new 
enclosures that have been suggested to Kyrgyzstan put the state and its needs 
at the centre of the state’s attention, as expressed in the (il)legality of certain 
types of exchange. In this reasoning, border control becomes a function of 
Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy rather than the sovereignty that it desires to de-
liver to its citizens. Interviewees in the Kyrgyzstani section of the Ferghana 
Valley are quick to point out that trade takes place despite the state, and not 
because of it or its “new foreign friends.” From such a perspective, the 
“strong political will” invoked by the state in the context of its desire to clari-
fy its limits through delimitation in order to resolve the dilemma of sovereign 
control over its territory can only be seen as treachery to the interests of those 
it purports to “protect”: Kyrgyz in Batken understand very well that their 
livelihoods are directly interwoven with structures of interaction that by their 
very nature violate the precepts of “new” border control.
Conclusion: Borders Beyond the Reach of the State
“The problem with our borders here in the Ferghana Valley is that everybody 
seems to have an interest in having them.”47 To be concrete, the spaces at 
Kyrgyzstan’s edges have become populated by a complex mix of state repre-
sentatives, delegates of outside concern, alleged agents of subversion of the 
state, and local borderlanders professing a belonging to mutually exclusive
categories of ethnic and national identities, all of whom compete for a stake 
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in the permissible parameters of local lifeworlds. The borders that exist here 
today are “problematic” not because they exist, but rather because their en-
forcement is seen as crucial to the notion of legitimate sovereignty in a young 
state. Borderlands, and with them borderlanders, loom large in their im-
portance for the state, far outweighing their socio-geographic peripherality. 
They are very much seen as an integral part of state territory in all official 
understandings—to imply otherwise can be seen as calling into question a 
state’s territoriality and, hence, a challenge to its integrity, its very existence. 
And yet this is precisely what processes within borderlands, and between 
borderlands and centers, seem to suggest: while the state may be seen by 
many as the geographical container of modern society, borderlands refute 
such assumptions by being, at least in part, larger than such containers.48 In 
places like Batken notions of temporal and political spatialization go far be-
yond the borders of Kyrgyzstan when regarded through a local lens: borders 
here are reproduced by using languages of titularity and enfranchisement 
directly descended from an older order, designed with a different, supra-
regional notion of inclusion in mind. In their argumentation today, Kyrgyz 
borderlanders invoke a Soviet-era, specifically Russian spatialization that 
outweighs Kyrgyzstan’s “shrunken” spaces in its legitimacy, and this is strik-
ingly underlined by the importance given by today’s antagonists to maps 
drawn up by Russian emissaries that were originally intended to outline eth-
nic distribution in the Ferghana Valley but now are taken to denote “historic 
ownership” of specific territories.49
In its search for establishing a similar but contemporary spatial legitima-
cy, the post-Soviet state has turned to a new narrative that is to be inscribed 
into borderland locales such as Batken in order to aid “spatial socialization 
and the territorialization of meaning”50 in a Kyrgyzstani context. Whereas in 
the Soviet period borderlander loyalty was directly wedded to a representa-
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tion of the margins of the socialist state as being at the forefront of patriotism 
to a socialist project that understood itself as being an island within an inimi-
cal socio-economic environment,51 today it is the ethno-territorial geobody of 
“the Kyrgyz” to which citizens are to subscribe. Choosing a narrative of dip-
lomatic interaction which casts itself as part of, rather than aloof from, wider 
global concern over the dynamics playing out in Afghanistan since 2001, 
Kyrgyzstan has placed itself firmly within that state’s neighborhood and, 
thus, directly connected questions of domestic control over its territory with 
its legitimacy as a state. This is how we can understand a contradiction often 
pointed out by “the unpatriotic” in Batken: the one form of exchange that 
today purportedly takes place across these borders, and which could be seen 
as a form of the “regional cooperation” proposed by international donor bod-
ies, is precisely the one form of exchange that the state must interdict if it is 
to be part of today’s world order—the trafficking of narcotics, a rare instance 
of a truly post-Soviet, transnational economic flow. Alongside the other un-
desirable transnational flow, namely that of a form of Islamic interpretation 
and teaching frequently glossed as “Wahhabi” or “fundamentalist” in this 
region, these two processes legitimate the need for the “new” border control 
discussed above as well as call its practices into question. Neither type of 
exchange will be permitted by the state to form the content of a new shared 
economic space in the Ferghana Valley. It is important to note that border-
landers in Batken are by no means equivocal in their opinions in this matter; 
these types of new flows find no support amongst them. However, local op-
position to this type of post-Soviet exchange centers on the lack of resources 
generated at a local level rather than agreeing with outside condemnation of 
the qualitative nature of this exchange.
When asked about Afghanistan and their feelings regarding the end of 
Western involvement there in 2016, locals in Batken are dismissive:
“It’s not our problem but Bishkek’s or Moscow’s problem. We only care about 
the price of petrol and fruit here. We don’t care for the Taliban and they don’t 
care for us. There aren’t any here, there never have been any here, and if they 
come after 2016 it will be to make war on [President] Karimov [of Uzbekistan] 
and not on us or on Bishkek.”52
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In the Soviet period, the connection between the inhabitants of the Ferghana 
Valley and Afghanistan clearly derived specifically from the Soviet promo-
tion of ethnic transfrontier ties between titular groups in Central Asia and 
their “national brethren” in northern Afghanistan in the 1980s, which were 
argued at this time to correspond to one another in the framework of socialist 
nationality policy.53 And such ties were directed southwards, with the Soviet 
Republics serving as models within this system. As a consequence, an image-
ry of invasion predominates in the minds of the many individuals in Kyrgyz-
stan, the so-called Afgantsy, who participated in the Soviet war effort there 
between 1979 and 1988 as soldiers, engineers, and drivers. Importantly, what 
was being taken to the south and subsequently brought back home again was, 
among other things, the knowledge that the state was powerful. Now this has 
been turned on its head: whereas before locals were actively involved in such 
types of (Soviet) state activity, today a passivity is felt to predominate in the 
manner in which the (Kyrgyzstani) state seems to subject itself to its geopo-
litical environment. In this vein, in contemporary Kyrgyzstan it is not the 
dwindled ethnic Kyrgyz minority of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan region that 
figures in Kyrgyzstani representations of Afghanistan and how that troubled 
state relates to the Ferghana Valley. Far more, in the language of the day it is 
the image of an Afghanization of the region in the sense of local insurgency 
financed by illicit trade networks and legitimated in the name of impermissi-
ble interpretations of religion that holds ascendancy. Seemingly at the mercy 
of a new type of global flow, the inscription of the state onto local landscapes 
embodies the powerlessness of the state. Today it is borderlanders them-
selves and their lifeworlds who are now “a problem to be dealt with” in the 
interest of the wider world.
A “border-less” world may well be developing for the new, highly mo-
bile transnational elites of the Western world, where border crossing has be-
come a formality and, within the European Schengen space, in effect an in-
visible process for the vast majority of crossers. Yet the Central Asian Re-
publics have experienced the reverse of this development: for decades, cross-
ing the internal boundaries of the Soviet Union (i.e., those lines that today 
represent formal state borders) was more a matter of internal travel docu-
ments related to the Soviet system as a whole. Today, however, the region 
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has become politically territorialized: goods need export/import documents, 
individuals might need permits and visas, and mutually exclusive citizenships 
have been created that superimpose a new nationality over ethnic identity. 
Thus, Central Asia has become less inter-connected over the past two dec-
ades, and borders have impacted local lives in ways never imagined before in 
the region. In this sense, “inter-connection” across borders today is shifting 
to signify the interaction of states with each other while borderland-to-
borderland interaction is in steady decline. This is the arena in which the dy-
namics of post-2016 border-making and border reproduction are unfolding.
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Dynamic Militant Insurgency in Conflicted Border 
Spaces: Ferghana, the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border, 
and Kashmir
Simbal Khan
Most analysts agree that during the last fourteen years the presence of 
Western military forces has acted as a counterweight to the threat of militant 
and terrorist organizations to the security of South-Central Asian states.1
These militant organizations are still viewed largely from the perspectives of 
globalization and terror. Both regional states and international stakeholders 
still routinely identify these organizations as a primary threat to regional 
stability. This chapter argues that the issue of transborder militant 
organizations is much more complex in character. A broad look at the most 
notable transborder militant organizations operating within South-Central 
Asia reveals that almost all of them, in one way or another, have cleaved to 
long-enduring geopolitical faultlines in the region. The faultlines that 
specifically interest us in this chapter run along the three most problematic 
borders which geo-spatially frame much of South-Central Asia: the state 
borders in the Ferghana Valley, the disputed Pakistan-Afghanistan boundary, 
and the Pakistan-India border in Kashmir. Notably, some of the better known 
and better organized transborder militant movements are associated with 
these three border spaces. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the 
Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, and Kashmiri militants are all intertwined 
with the complex histories of these border spaces.  
At the same time as the global war against terror is becoming 
increasingly diversified and sophisticated in its technology, most accounts of 
transborder terrorism fail to ask the simple, yet crucial, question about how 
                                                          
1 “Dangerous to Withdraw All Troops from Afghanistan: Experts,” First Post, July 11, 2013,
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regional states continue to relate to their conflicted border spaces. Also 
absent from analysis is how old geopolitical faultlines within the region have 
shaped the structures and created space for these transborder forces. Before 
9/11/2001, South-Central Asia was seen as a hotbed for the proxy wars of the 
Cold War era. Some of these proxy struggles involved international actors, 
such as the U.S.-supported mujahedin war against the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan in the 1980s.2 Accounts also exist of U.S. and Pakistani 
intelligence collaboration in supporting the infiltration of transborder militant 
actors in Soviet Central Asia, notably in Tajikistan.3 In other instances, 
regional states have used non-state actors as proxies to revise post-
independence borders, including both Pakistan and India. Pakistan has used 
non-state actors in Kashmir starting as early as 1948 to support the 
independence of Kashmir.4 India in 1971 successfully supported Bengali 
insurgents and helped in the secession of the eastern wing of Pakistan into an 
independent Bangladesh. Even now, the presence of armed non-state actors 
capable of attacking targets across borders, or what is being called the “sub-
conventional threat,”5 is extremely worrying when we consider that the 
nuclear security regime in the region, which has two nuclear-armed states 
(India and Pakistan), is extremely volatile and vulnerable.6
Since 9/11, however, old complexities of inter-state relations in the 
region and the conflicted geopolitics of borders have become subsumed by 
the dominant narratives of the Global War on Terror and concepts of “jihad” 
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(holy war or struggle). Although most militant movements have subscribed 
to the ideas of “Islamic Jihad” and have freely used its populist narratives, 
such a one-dimensional characterization of their dynamic is too simplistic. 
Furthermore, this obscures the intricate ways in which ideational aspects of 
Islamic Jihad have intersected with geopolitical forces in the region to create 
transborder militant actors. U.S. preoccupation with the fight against al-
Qaeda’s presence in the region and the need to ensure regional support for 
the war effort in Afghanistan have dominated the international agenda. There 
was an assumption amongst U.S. policymakers that the threat to regional 
security posed by transborder militant and Islamist organizations could be a 
common cause for greater regional cooperation between Central Asian 
countries.7  
Many regional states also found it expedient to subsume all their 
domestic challenges and regional geopolitical agendas and couch them 
within meta-narratives related to the Global War on Terror. This has 
obscured the fact that states sharing these three troublesome political borders 
continue to attach great importance to unfinished conflicts related to these ill-
defined spaces. All have complex interests intertwined with these borders, 
which have shaped and continue to shape practices towards the communities 
that straddle these borders as well as inter-state relations. In other words, 
state policies and practices have shaped the nature, forms, and actions of 
transborder militant organizations, and they continue to do so in significant 
ways.
This chapter explores the mechanism through which the peculiar geo-
spatial aspects of the three conflicted border spaces intersect with 
community-level solidarity groups. This is intended to explain how the 
ability of groups to move across or transcend borders itself changes and 
transforms these groups. We examine this dynamic process of existence by 
asking how initial, more local agendas become scaled upwards, thereby 
embracing more international jihadist causes with expanding geo-spatial and 
regional links. This is followed by brief accounts of the three border spaces: 
the Ferghana Valley, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and the Line of 
Control—the Pakistan-India border in Kashmir, which all relate to some of 
the largest transborder militant groups in the region. Finally, we conclude 
                                                          
7 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “India and Pakistan: Is Peace Real this 
Time?,” (a conversation between Husain Haqqani and Ashley Tellis), April 1, 2004, 9, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/India-Pakistan.pdf.
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that policies developed to address the issue of transborder militant actors 
must take into account two primary contexts: local conditions around border 
regions; and state practices towards their conflicted borders. The trend of
militancy within border communities is without exception linked to 
economic marginalization and chronically low development. 
Border Spaces: Points Where Jihad and Geopolitics 
Intersect  
The transformation of community-level solidarity groups into transborder 
organizations with links to regional and international jihadist causes is tied to 
the peculiar geo-spatial features of border spaces. A feature shared by all 
three border spaces, that is, the Ferghana Valley, the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border zone, and the Line of Control in Kashmir, is that co-ethnic, 
transborder communities are present in significant numbers around these 
borders, hugging them very closely at certain points. Cycles of societal and 
political change in the region, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991 or periodic foreign interventions, have led to revolts, insurgencies and 
other forms of group mobilization in the region. The states connected with 
these areas have used coercion through their respective security apparatuses 
to deny space to opposition forces and defeat them, and have consequently 
maintained a status quo on power within their countries for the last quarter-
century. The presence of transborder, co-ethnic communities straddling some 
borders has allowed threatened groups to secure their survival in sanctuaries 
across state borders.
The majority of the populations in the South-Central Asian region are 
Muslim. Consequently groups in the region have used the Islamic concept of 
“jihad” or struggle for a cause—both armed and peaceful—throughout 
contemporary history in reaction to the consequences of nineteenth-century 
imperialism and twentieth-century interventions in the region. The Basmachi 
uprising against Bolshevik expansion in Central Asia in the 1920s and 30s,8
                                                          
8 The Basmachi Movement (or Revolt) was a national liberation movement that occurred 
from 1916 to 1934. It was carried out mostly by Turkic Muslims in Turkestan in response to 
attempts at the Sovietization of Central Asia. Enver Pasha, a former Turkish army general, 
led the movement at the height of the resistance. Pasha’s death, as well as Soviet economic 
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and Afghan mujahedin-led insurgency during the 1980s9 against the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan, are examples of early and late twentieth-century 
struggle against foreign interventions. In both cases the concept of jihad was 
invoked by a coalition of religious and local communal leaders in order to 
rally resistance against domination by foreign occupiers.10
In both cases, these movements included solidarity groups that were 
either familial, clan or tribal, or that related to a mosque or madrassah and 
had wider transborder communal links. It is only over the last fourteen years, 
due to the Global War on Terror and the presence of al-Qaeda leadership in 
South-Central Asia, that there has been a conflation of practically all 
transborder armed actors waging jihad in the region with transnational 
terrorism.11 This rapid change calls for an examination of the processes by 
which limited, national-level struggles of transborder organizations or 
solidarity groups grow to become associated with wider “jihads” being 
fought regionally. The Afghan Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
and the Kashmiri mujahedin groups, all born out of very specific and limited 
geopolitical and spatial contexts have, over the years, gone on to embrace 
other causes that encompass regional “jihads.” All three aforementioned 
organizations have at one point described their cause or struggle in the 
typical language of jihad, but all three remain bound to more localized 
geopolitical contexts which shape their goals and aspirations.
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21, no. 1 (February 1989): 124. 
10 Kassymova, Kundakbayeva, and Markus, Historical Dictionary, 47; also see Gilles Kepel, 
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11 Christine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India, (Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004), 24; also see Jacob N. Shapiro and Christine Fair, 
“Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” International Security 34, no. 
3 (Winter 2009): 88.
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Much has been written about the jihad infrastructure in the region, 
including the training camps and sanctuaries in the Pakistan and Afghanistan 
border areas since the 1980s.12 There are a number of accounts describing 
how these training facilities for the Afghan mujahedin brought together their 
local Pakistani supporters, Arabs, and other Muslims from around the 
world.13 By most accounts, these training camps functioned as platforms for 
the cross-pollination of ideas, exposing Afghans and Pakistanis who trained 
there to the wider struggles in the Muslim world, which over time 
contributed to the formation of international terrorist networks in the areas 
covered by Pakistan and Afghanistan. The basics of jihad that were learned 
in these training facilities may very well have provided the ideational glue to 
bind together these denominationally different religious forces, thereby 
enabling them to cooperate across the geopolitical lines that separate them. 
For example, the Afghan Taliban (who are predominantly Pashtun) have 
cooperated with a whole spectrum of ethnic-based groups, including the 
Uzbek-Tajik IMU, which has been utilized to extend Taliban control to 
northern Afghanistan.14 The Deobandi Taliban have also at times cooperated 
with the Pakistani extremist group Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT), which is Ahl-e-
Hadith, a different religious denomination, in eastern Afghanistan.15
However, the focus on “jihad infrastructure,” while it highlights the 
ideational aspects and the appeal of jihad as motivational factors for group 
actions, omits a discussion of the wider socio-political dynamics at hand. 
                                                          
12 Coll, Ghost Wars, 83–87, 134; and see Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, 
Talibanistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 99–101; also see Rizwan 
Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2005), 121–24.
13 Coll, Ghost Wars, 83–87.
14 Michael Fredholm, “Uzbekistan and the Threat from Islamic Extremism,” Conflict Studies 
Research Centre, March 2003, 24, 
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islamic-extremism-8801; also see Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in 
Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 175–76; and see Jessica Stern, “The 
Protean Enemy,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (July–August 2003): 2; and see Michael 
Fredholm, “Islamic Extremism as a Political Force,” Asian Cultures and Modernity 
Research Report, no. 12 (October 2006): 19, http://gpfeurope.com/upload/iblock/874/
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15 Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat,” New America 
Foundation, February 2010, 3–4, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Lashkar-e-Taiba_in_
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York Times, June 15, 2010, http://www. nytimes.com/2010/06/16/ world/asia/16lashkar.
html.
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One aspect of militancy in the region evident in all three cases which has 
received far less attention is that the spatial relocation of each organization 
within the region has also induced the relocation of varying numbers of 
dependents. This has been sufficiently documented over the years: in the case 
of the Afghan Taliban, literally millions of their co-ethnic communities still 
live in Pakistan and, over the years, have become part of the political 
economy of Pakistan’s border spaces. The IMU’s transborder migrations 
from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan to Afghanistan, and then to Pakistan, have 
been accompanied by the migration of family members from Andijon, 
Namangan and other border regions in the Ferghana Valley.16 Although there 
is less evidence for the migration of families of Kashmiri fighters from 
Indian-controlled Kashmir, in recent years the patronage of the Indian 
Kashmiri diaspora by the Pakistani state already in early decades has had a 
profound impact on the agendas of Pakistan-based Kashmiri militant 
groups.17 In short, transborder movements of Islamic militants in search of 
sanctuaries in South-Central Asia are accompanied by the migration of 
extended families, clans and in some cases entire communities. All states of 
origin, as well as host states, have used violence, retribution, torture and 
detention of family members of militants as a punishment for anti-state 
activities. In times of civil war, armed non-state actors and factions have also 
used ethnic violence against wider communities related to opposing 
solidarity groups. The Afghan Civil War in the 1990s is a good example of 
such communal violence.18
These migrations across geopolitical lines in themselves constitute an 
important next step in a group’s transformation. Transborder militants and 
their community members are immediately confronted with the need to 
negotiate space and sanctuary. This negotiation for space by transborder 
groups takes place both at the level of local power elites, as well as with the 
agents of the host states, who are often members of intelligence and border 
                                                          
16 Fredholm, “Islamic Extremism,” 28; and see Noah Tucker, “Uzbek Extremism in Context, 
Part 1: The Uzbek Jihad and the Problem of Religious Freedom,” Registan, September 12, 
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security agencies.19 In short, all sanctuaries come with strings attached; for a 
transborder group which finds itself in a new environment, becoming 
involved in and giving support to new local struggles or “jihads” may almost 
immediately become a means of survival. Their ideational co-optation into 
wider (regional or global) meanings of jihad probably follow later and take 
place through the common experience of formal training camps.
All the states in the region which share the three complex border areas—
Kashmir, Ferghana, and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border—play a very 
significant role in shaping the agendas of these groups. This is primarily 
achieved through administrative policies and the use of state security 
apparatuses. State practices of coercion and the use of force against local 
opposition are not only responsible for denying space to these groups in their 
home bases but also for shaping how these transborder actors adjust within 
their new environments. The Uzbek government’s brutal attempts to stifle all 
opposition changed the contours of the IMU by pushing group leaders into 
exile in Tajikistan. Participation in the Tajik Civil War broadened the IMU’s
agenda and regional network of contacts. The use of overwhelming force by 
the Indian military in Kashmir in the 1990s swelled the ranks of Kashmiri 
militants who found sanctuaries, training camps, and also financial support 
provided by the Pakistani state on the other side of the disputed border.20
Lingering inter-state disputes have distorted states’ relations with border 
communities in these border areas, which often are referred to as being 
“ungoverned.”21 However, although these areas are predominantly rural and 
underdeveloped, and the state’s capacity to provide goods and services there 
is limited, they are not beyond the reach of the state’s security apparatus. 
Once on the other side, migrating groups are confronted with the 
                                                          
19 Fredholm, “Islamic Extremism,” 20–21, 25–27.
20 Stephen Phillip Cohen, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir,” Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 
4 (December, 2002): 47–48; also see Haley Duschinski, “Destiny Effects: Militarization, 
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no. 3 (Summer 2009): 697.
21 Ahmad Raza Rumi, “Pakistan: Ungoverned Spaces,” Centro de Documentación 
Internacional de Barcelona, July 2012, 2,
http://razarumi.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Pakistan-Ungoverned-Spaces.pdf; and see 
David Danelo, “Anarchy is the New Normal: Unconventional Governance and 21st Century 
Statecraft,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 14, 2013, http://www.fpri.
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Dragons: Dangerous Spaces and International Security,” in Ungoverned Spaces: 
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omnipresent, coercive security apparatus of the new host state. States with 
unresolved territorial conflicts with their neighbors view such local 
communities as the first line of defense against the revisionist or hostile 
designs of these neighbors and, consequently, they have developed complex 
political and security practices to control these border communities. 
India has increasingly militarized the zone along the Line of Control in 
Kashmir and has recently hardened the border even further by fencing large 
sections of it. Its relations with the Muslim Kashmiri communities that live 
along the border are marked by suspicion.22 The Indian-controlled Kashmir 
Valley remains excessively militarized, with over half a million Indian 
military forces deployed in a very narrow part of the territory. There is heavy 
penetration of state intelligence agencies within community groups, and the 
security force’s special powers for detention have led to gross violations of 
human rights.23 The Uzbekistani state has instituted arbitrary border control 
practices and put in place a complex web of checkpoints in order to control 
social and economic activity in the Ferghana Valley.24 Its worsening 
relations, in particular with Tajikistan, are reflected in the coercive practices 
of border guards at checkpoints against significant Tajik minorities, who 
thereby become victims of extortion. 
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The most complex case here is Pakistan’s relations with its tribal 
population on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.25 The rise of a left-leaning 
Pashtun nationalist movement in the 1970s rekindled the Pakistani state’s 
insecurities related to the old dispute over its border with Afghanistan. 
Pakistan inherited the Durand line, or the British-era border between India 
and Afghanistan, after its independence in 1947.26 The refusal of subsequent 
Afghan governments to recognize the border, and claims on Pakistan’s 
frontier regions by various Afghan leaders, have shaped the state’s relations 
and practices with its border communities. Over the years it has cultivated 
local tribal elites through patrimonial practices enshrined in the British-era 
FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulations), with its archaic system of rewards and 
collective punishment.27 The FCR guaranteed tribes a certain level of 
autonomy and patronage in exchange for their allegiance to the state and its 
interests. This allowed the Pakistani state to control tribal territories in border 
areas without deploying its regular military forces. 
The 30-year cycle of war in Afghanistan and changes in the political 
economy of the tribal areas has led to the breakdown of societal structures 
and the system of the traditional tribal elite. The Pakistani state has 
responded by undertaking a complex set of practices, which seek to 
reconstitute its old patrimonial relations with the tribes around the new 
militant factions that have emerged as modern power elites.28 Through neo-
patrimonial relations built around an informal system of rewards and use of 
force, the Pakistani state continues to shape the politics of these militant 
factions in line with its own geopolitical and security interests. 
The deployment of Pakistani military forces in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) since 2004 has had a destabilizing 
impact on Pakistan’s tribal belt. It has brought the state into direct 
confrontation with some militant tribal factions, while also increasing its 
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coercive power on the ground. Within this tight security environment, 
transborder migrant groups have few choices: they can either try to frame 
their goals and actions in line with pro-state local factions and assist them 
with their “jihads” in return for sanctuary, or they become allies of local 
militants who have taken up arms against the Pakistani state and military. 
The IMU, due to changing hostile state practices and local alliances, have 
taken the latter approach.29 Afghan Taliban factions, such as the Haqqani 
network, have taken the former approach.30 The Haqqani and other eastern 
Taliban groups have echoed the Pakistani state’s regional policy preferences 
in acting against Indian presence in Afghanistan. Under the same principle, 
Afghan Taliban have allegedly assured the Chinese government that they 
will not allow the establishment of an Uighur sanctuary for dissident 
members of the East Turkistan Independence Movement (ETIM) or other 
separatists in Taliban-controlled areas.31
In short, conflicted and disputed border spaces in South-Central Asia 
have recreated geopolitical faultlines that have played a complex role as 
drivers of conflict in the region. These border spaces form the physical 
terrain along which much of the operational activity of transborder militant 
movements has taken place. Within this physical terrain, militant 
organizations demonstrate a remarkable ability to operate on various 
geopolitical fronts simultaneously. In addition, they have shown the capacity 
to shift their focus from one geopolitical hotspot to another, closely 
following the regional flashpoint of the moment. In turn, states in the region 
have sought to mitigate threats to their security and to maximize control over 
their border spaces. In doing so, they have responded to this challenge by 
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adopting a complex set of practices. We now examine more closely the three 
different conflictual border spaces and transborder militant networks which 
operate around them.
Nested in Ferghana: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
The above-described process through which transborder actors transform 
into regionally networked groups is clearly visible in the development of the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The IMU evolved from a small-scale, local 
vigilante-style “Adolat” (justice) movement in Namangan, a city in the 
Ferghana Valley.32 The group emerged against the backdrop of the chaos that 
marked the early years of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a period of 
extreme uncertainty and upheaval.33
In 1992, when the “Adolat” movement emerged onto the scene, it was 
one of several new political platforms formed by diverse groups to challenge 
the old guard of the incumbent communist party. Empirical accounts suggest 
that it was not the primary challenge facing Islam Karimov’s regime as it 
grappled with post-independence chaos in Uzbekistan. It was the Tashkent-
centered Birlik party (led by Abdurahim Pulatov) and its splinter group Erk 
(led by Muhammad Salih) which contested the first presidential elections 
against Islam Karimov.34 At the time both Birlik and Erk had a significant 
following amongst the urban elite as well as intellectuals and students, and 
were a cause of greater concern for Islam Karimov and other ex-communist 
elites. By 1993, all three parties (including Adolat) had been banned, their 
members detained, and their leadership forced into exile.35
Escaping the Uzbek state’s crackdown, Tahir Yuldashev, leader of 
Adolat, and his deputy, Juma Boi Namangani, both sought refuge in 
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Tajikistan.36 Whereas over the years the Uzbekistani state’s extreme and 
repressive practices against all political dissent—both Islamic and secular—
led to the disintegration of the more urban-based Birlik and Erk, the geo-
spatial relocation of Adolat helped the movement to survive and to sustain 
and transform its agenda. The transborder migration of the Adolat leaders 
with their small group of followers into Tajikistan was the first step towards 
the evolution of what later became the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.37
The scaling up of the IMU’s jihad agenda followed each stage in the spatial 
migration of the group; from invoking Islamic practices and social ideas to 
promising a remedy for the chaos in Ferghana, displacement to Tajikistan 
immediately led to a widening of its jihad agenda. Adolat leaders were quick 
in siding with Tajik Islamists against the ex-communists in Tajikistan’s civil 
war.38
Repressive use of force and coercion by the Uzbekistani state also meant 
that Adolat members moved together with their families, if possible, or their 
families followed soon after.39 Family members who were left behind faced 
detention, arrest and torture. Some reports suggest that three of Yuldashev’s 
brothers were arrested and spent time in Uzbek jails, which are notorious for 
human rights violations, including torture. According to some sources, when 
Namangani arrived in Kurgan-Tyube (presently known as Qurghonteppa), 
Tajikistan in 1992, his entourage included only thirty Uzbeks and some 
Arabs who had served as emissaries to Adolat from Saudi Islamic charities 
(Saudi Arabia contained a large Uzbek diaspora, whose ancestors had fled 
during the 1918–1928 Basmachi Revolt).40
Subsequent migrations across multiple borders not only expanded the 
IMU’s political agenda but also transformed the group as it negotiated space 
in new environments and faced new political and economic realities. In 
Tajikistan, Namangani started out with a small group of close members and 
went on to form a substantial personal military force composed mostly of 
Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens, but also of Arabs. Many of the men were 
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accompanied by their families, and survival of the group in rural Tajikistan in 
the midst of a civil war necessitated finding new ways of adjusting to the 
political economy of the area.41 Namangani and his group soon involved 
themselves in the drug trade;42 and he appeared to have become heavily 
involved in the transportation of heroin from Afghanistan to Tajikistan and 
onwards to Russia and Europe, at times travelling to Afghanistan himself.43
Reports suggest that despite the deaths of Namangani and Yuldashev long 
before, the IMU cadre remain an important link in trafficking routes for 
narcotics connecting northern Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and the enclaves in 
the Ferghana Valley. 
More importantly, Yuldashev’s move to Afghanistan together with the 
leaders of Tajikistan’s Islamic opposition who refused to lay down their arms 
as required by the Russia-brokered peace settlement in the Tajik Civil War 
enabled him to launch a wider political and financial campaign to raise funds 
for the group.44 Joining the Tajik opposition leaders in exile in Afghanistan 
further expanded the Uzbek group’s network of alliances and consequently 
led to the broadening of their political agenda. Yuldashev’s campaign to raise 
finances for the expanding group brought him into contact with Afghan 
Arabs and other radical groups, as well as their financiers in the foreign 
security agencies present in the region immediately after the Soviet war in 
Afghanistan ended in 1989.45 According to various sources, Yuldashev 
travelled to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and later to Iran, the United Arab 
Emirates, Turkey, and perhaps the Caucasus as well, in order to make 
contacts with Uzbek diaspora members in these countries.46 His travels seem 
to have expanded his links to the intelligence services in these countries and 
possibly allowed him to access their covert funds. His relationship with 
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) is of particular interest 
here. According to some sources, he was based in Peshawar, Pakistan from 
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1995 to 1998, where he operated out of the Center of the Afghan Arabs.47
Many of the same Arabs went on to form the core of al-Qaeda at the end of 
the 1990s. Yuldashev also received funds from various Islamic charities and, 
according to Russian and Uzbekistani officials, from the intelligence services 
of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. The IMU’s relationship with the Pakistani 
state security services was to change significantly in later years due to 
developments related to the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and against al-
Qaeda. 
The changing nature of wars and geopolitical conflicts in the region has 
had a profound impact on the IMU’s goals and structure, and increased its 
incentives to wage “jihad.” A major triggering event was the end of the civil 
war in Tajikistan in 1997, which threatened the sanctuary and operational 
space of Uzbek militants and their dependents in this country. When the 
majority of Islamic groups, organized under the umbrella of the United Tajik 
Opposition (UTO), signed the peace deal with ex-communists to share 
power, Namangani and his followers became isolated.48 By this time, the 
group had come to include Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, and Uighurs based 
primarily in the valleys of the Rasht region in central Tajikistan. It is at this 
point in time that Yuldashev, along with Namangani, decided to re-launch 
the group as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan with its stated goal—as 
posted on the internet in August 1999—as the “establishment of an Islamic 
state with the application of the Sharia” in Uzbekistan.49 Thus, almost six 
years after the small Adolat group moved out of Namangan, the IMU 
emerged as its new hybrid face with a broader regional profile and agenda.  
The emergence of the IMU coincided with Namangani and Yuldashev’s 
relocation to Afghanistan. As the group was no longer welcome in post-civil 
war Tajikistan, the Afghan Taliban agreed to provide them with a sanctuary 
and a base.50 With their goals still focused on Uzbekistan, the IMU launched 
armed incursions into Uzbekistan from the Batken exclave in the Kyrgyz part 
of the Ferghana in 1999.51 Over the course of a year they continued to make 
forays into the Ferghana Valley by using routes out of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, attacking Uzbek border guards and taking some Japanese and 
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American hostages.52 By 2001 the IMU incursions started to abate without 
any lasting impact on the Uzbekistani state’s control in the Ferghana Valley. 
On the contrary, the IMU incursions were used by the Uzbek state to enhance 
its security presence in the conflicted border zones.53 These incursions also
allowed Islam Karimov’s government to increase Uzbek engagement with 
the U.S. and other Western states, which were by now becoming increasingly 
focused on the global threat of terrorism.54
When the U.S. military attacks against the Taliban-led government in 
Afghanistan began in autumn 2001, the IMU fought on the Northern Front in 
Kunduz under the al-Qaeda-led 555 Brigade, which was commanded by 
Juma Namangani.55 After the fall of the Taliban in November members of 
the IMU found refuge in the South Waziristan Agency, the territory of the 
Masood tribe in the Pakistani FATA.56 Up to this point, the rhetoric on the 
website of the IMU still remained focused on Central Asian governments. 
Some messages appeared to be more in line with the objectives of other 
Afghanistan and Pakistan-based groups with which the IMU was coming into 
contact. It is important to note that Yuldashev’s and the IMU’s online 
messages started to directly attack the U.S. only after the group moved into 
Pakistani tribal regions in the FATA.57
In 2002, the IMU split into the IJU (Islamic Jihad Union), a group that 
has acted as al-Qaeda’s recruitment and outreach wing to Europeans of 
Turkish descent.58 Western European Muslims have also been trained by the 
IMU in camps in North Waziristan, Pakistan. German nationals of Turkish 
and Moroccan descent have been identified based on their threat messages 
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against Germany. In September 2009, Pakistani investigators discovered a 
“village” of mainly German insurgents, including Muslim converts from this 
country but also a number from Sweden, who were being trained in a camp 
controlled by the IMU in the Waziristan area of Pakistan.59
In 2007, under pressure from the U.S. and other Western partners, 
Pakistan’s military launched an operation, with support from tribal forces 
under Maulvi Nazir, to evict the IMU from North Waziristan.60 The Pakistani 
state’s changing approaches and security perceptions regarding its own 
border spaces have had a profound impact on the changes that the IMU as an 
organization has undergone. IMU’s original leaders, Yuldashev and 
Namangani, both had very clear goals, one of which was establishing an 
Islamic caliphate in the Ferghana Valley. After its move into Pakistan’s tribal 
belt, much of the group’s energy became focused on surviving in an 
increasingly hostile environment, as the Pakistani state’s perceptions of the 
IMU changed. Yuldashev had to postpone his agenda of jihad in Central Asia 
as he and the IMU became more involved with local militant dynamics in 
FATA, including the Pakistani state’s complex relations with some of these 
local militant groups. The IMU became closely associated with Baitullah 
Masood, the leader of the Masood tribal militants and IMU’s main host in 
FATA.61 As the leader of a group of militants based in South Waziristan, 
Baitullah Masood became increasingly hostile towards the Pakistani military. 
In 2007, he launched the umbrella militant organization Tehrik-e-Taliban 
(TTP), which has waged a war against the Pakistani state and military. The 
IMU has become increasingly linked with the TTP.62
In short, the IMU’s geo-spatial journey has not only influenced its 
agenda and scaled up its goals, but it has also changed the very nature of the 
                                                          
59 Dean Nelson and Allan Hall, “Pakistan Discovers ‘Village’ of White German al-Qaeda 
Insurgents,” Telegraph, September 25, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/6226935/Pakistan-discovers-
village-of-white-German-al-Qaeda-insurgents.html. 
60 Daan van der Schriek, “The IMU: Fish in Search of a Sea,” Eurasianet.org, March 13, 
2005, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp031405.shtml; and see 
Witter, “Uzbek Militancy,” 6. 
61 Mansur Khan Mahsud, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in South 
Waziristan,” New America Foundation, April 2010, 4,
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4799~v~The_Battle_for_Pakistan___
Militancy_and_Conflict_in_South_Waziristan.pdf.
62 Witter, “Uzbek Militancy,” 6; also Amir Mir, “TTP Using Uzbeks to Conduct Terrorist 
Attacks,” The News, December 18, 2012, http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-
149025-TTP-using-Uzbeks-to-conduct-terrorist-attacks.
96
organization itself. After the death of Namangani in 2001 and Yuldashev in
2009, the IMU seems to have lost its original focus on Central Asia. The list 
of martyrs posted on its websites by the organization includes ever fewer 
names of fighters of Central Asian origin.63 The IMU of today appears to be 
made up mostly of members from northern Afghanistan and to be working in 
partnership with other local militant groups. Finally, the IMU’s lack of clear 
end-goals makes it difficult to distinguish it from other militant groups 
operating in Afghanistan or Pakistan, particularly when the remnants of the 
IMU rely on local forces to stay operational. Within their southern zone of 
operation around the border spaces between Afghanistan and Pakistan, they 
operate closely with groups allied with the Pakistani Taliban, which are 
fighting the Pakistani military forces in FATA.64 Intelligence reports suggest 
that the IMU cadre has also served as a bridgehead for the Taliban in helping 
them to expand influence in the northern zone of operation around the 
Afghanistan-Tajikistan border and in the Afghan border provinces of 
Kunduz and Baghlan.65
The Troubled Border Between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
The role played by Pakistani state policies, including those of its intelligence 
agencies, in shaping tribal transborder forces, such as the Afghan Mujahedin 
in the 1980s and Taliban in the 1990s, is well known and documented. What 
is less understood is how the thirty-year cycle of war and conflict within the 
border spaces between Afghanistan and Pakistan has accelerated the process 
of change within these areas and how it, in turn, has impacted state practices. 
The political geography of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border shares some 
of the features of the borders in the Ferghana Valley described earlier. A 
colonial-era relic, the 2,600-km-long Durand Line is badly defined and in 
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places practically nonexistent.66 It is also largely unregulated and inhabited 
by transborder Pashtun tribal groups. The British Envoy, Sir Mortimer 
Durand, and the Amir of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman Khan, agreed to this 
boundary in November 1893, but no Afghan government has ever officially 
recognized it as an international boundary.67 Afghanistan was the only state 
in 1947 that opposed the admission of Pakistan into the United Nations after 
its independence from India.68 The conflicted history of the border has had a 
complex impact on inter-state relations between the two countries. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing war in the 1980s 
critically transformed the demographic, societal, political and economic 
structures within the tribal regions of Pakistan. An important legacy of the 
war in the 1980s in Pakistan is the continued presence of more than 70 
Afghan refugee camps and settlements scattered along Pakistan’s western 
border. There are still 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and 
Pakistan’s internally displaced (IDPs) add a further 1.4 million (half of them 
caused by the ongoing security operations) to the people living in the camps 
maintained by the UNHCR.69 The enduring refugee populations have had a 
complex impact on transborder militant networks and solidarity groups built 
around the camps, schools, and madrassahs attended by both Afghan 
refugees and local tribesmen. An example is the Shamshatoo Refugee Camp 
run for the last thirty years by the mujahedin leader Gulbadin Hikmatyar’s 
group Hizb Islami.70 It is still a recruiting ground for the Hizb today.71 Over 
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the past three decades, the camp has become a small city of more than 64,000 
inhabitants, with mosques, madrassahs, high schools, a university, a hospital, 
and even two local newspapers.72 These camps have played a profound role 
in the recruitment strategies of militant organizations and the ability of 
groups like the Afghan Taliban to regenerate. 
While the Afghan Taliban operate in Afghanistan, for the past three 
decades they have also become embedded within the social, political, and 
economic landscape of Pakistan’s border zones. This includes Baluchistan 
province, parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK, formerly known as the Northwest Frontier Province), 
and key cities in the Pakistani heartland (e.g. Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta). 
The Afghan Taliban emerged from Deobandi Madaris (madrassahs) in 
Pakistan.73 They have retained their nearly exclusive ethnic Pashtun and 
Deobandi sectarian orientation, which they share with a large number of 
Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen, many of whom have also studied in the same 
seminaries and madrassahs.74 These multiple solidarity networks born out of 
the common experiences of war, conflict, and migration have resulted in a 
closely-knit network of contacts that have deepened connectivity between 
border communities from both countries. 
The transborder movement of men and materials has become more 
varied and complex today than it was before the U.S.-led war. On the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border, large refugee movements have now given way 
to labor migrations, along with continued social and cultural exchanges 
between the country of origin and the country of exile. This is facilitated by 
the presence of well-established transborder social networks on both sides. 
According to the UNHCR, approximately 80,000 to 100,000 Afghans cross 
the border daily into Pakistan from the two border crossings at Torkham and 
Spin Boldak for work as day laborers or for family visits.75 The vast majority 
(almost 75 percent) of them are young, single, working-age males.76 Most of 
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the transient labor migrants are from southern and eastern Afghanistan. 
These regions still remain Afghan Taliban strongholds and the Taliban’s 
main support bases in Afghanistan. 
These networked interests between the Afghan Taliban and their 
Pakistani tribal affiliates have had a complex impact on the Pakistani state’s 
security practices related to transborder militant groups. Forced into the tribal 
areas in support of the U.S. war in 2004, the Pakistani military has acted 
selectively and targeted only those groups with a narrower transborder 
support base. The IMU, with their Central Asian roots and their local hosts, 
the Masood tribal militants from South Waziristan, became the main 
targets.77 Most military operations avoided taking on the Afghan Taliban and 
their close networks among Pakistani tribal militants.78
This selective targeting of transborder groups has led to a complex 
reconfiguration of the militant landscape within the border regions. For the 
IMU sanctuaries within Pakistani border regions have shrunk, especially 
since the Pakistani military’s large-scale South Waziristan operation in 2009, 
and Operation Zarb-e-Azb launched more recently in June 2014 in North 
Waziristan Agency.79 Consequently, most of the IMU fighters and their 
dependents have relocated to northern Afghan provinces bordering 
Tajikistan.80 Some obdurate Central Asian fighters affiliated with IMU and 
IJU still remain in FATA and have joined al-Qaeda remnants and their other 
Pakistani affiliates in fighting the Pakistani military.81
On the other hand, the targeting of local Pakistani militants by the 
Pakistani military has led to the rise of another militant organization: Tehrik-
e-Taliban Pakistan. The TTP operates as an umbrella group for organizations 
that endorse al-Qaeda’s Takfiri82 ideology and consider the Pakistani state, 
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its citizens, and its cities legitimate targets because of their perceived 
complicity with the U.S. and the coalition forces in Afghanistan. Some 
Pakistani militant groups affiliated with the TTP from the Bajaur Agency in 
FATA and from the district of Swat have found sanctuary in the Kunar 
province in eastern Afghanistan.83 From these sanctuaries, militant groups 
launched several armed cross-border incursions into Pakistani territory in 
2011–2012,84 to which Pakistani military has since responded with the 
shelling of border villages on the Afghan side.85 This has added another 
dimension to the already tense inter-state relations between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. 
Presently, more than 150,000 Pakistani military troops remain deployed 
along the border,86 engaged in several small and large military operations 
against an assortment of militant groups. The selective use of force by the 
Pakistan military against some militant factions has had a transformative 
impact on militant group structures and agendas. It has pushed the TTP and 
IMU remnants in FATA closer to al-Qaeda’s more internationalist jihad 
ideology. Since 2008, the U.S. has expanded the use of drone strikes to target 
al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and their affiliates such as the Haqqani 
Network and their Pakistani networks in the tribal belt.87 These strikes have 
inflamed local resentment and have been successfully exploited by anti-
Pakistani state militants such as TTP and al-Qaeda in order to increase 
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recruitment.88 The TTP, along with remnants of al-Qaeda, has retaliated to 
drone strikes and Pakistani military operations by launching terrorist strikes 
against soft targets in all major Pakistani cities and military installations.89
The Disputed Kashmir Border Between India and Pakistan 
The history of the disputed Kashmir border has defined inter-state relations 
between the two South Asian neighbors, Pakistan and India, for the past sixty 
years. This high altitude border in the Himalayan foothills has several 
features in common with the two other disputed borders described earlier. 
Transborder communities comprised of ethnic Kashmiris tightly straddle the 
740-km-long border at certain points.90 After the partition of the Indian 
subcontinent in 1947, a dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir started 
in 1948–1949.91 The military control line or the cease-fire line between the 
Indian and the Pakistani parts of the former princely state of Jammu and 
Kashmir became the de facto border. The Line of Control (LoC), to this day, 
does not constitute a legally recognized international boundary. Running 
through the heart of villages and communities, it divides families and clans 
and disrupts all normal societal interactions such as commerce and trade in 
these areas.
The presence of Kashmiri militant groups and their training camps 
within Pakistani-controlled parts of Kashmir has been a cause of inter-state 
tensions and war. The link between the Kashmir dispute and the Pashtun 
tribes from FATA dates back to 1948, when Pakistan used irregular forces 
and tribal militias from this area to infiltrate the state of Kashmir and prevent 
its accession to India.92 This practice of state support for non-state actors as a 
tool of foreign policy by employing the principle of “plausible deniability” is 
not confined solely to Pakistan. For example, India used the same practice 
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when it supported and armed transborder insurgent groups in East Pakistan in 
the 1970s, successfully helping Bangladesh to secede from Pakistan.93
The lingering disputes between India and Pakistan, and especially over 
Kashmir, have impacted how both states treat their border communities and 
transborder militants. The Indian state has had a zero-tolerance policy in 
regard to Kashmir-centered militant groups and has responded with brutal 
force to all political mobilization and dissent by Kashmiris. Since the 1990s, 
it has deployed a growing number of military forces to quell a populist 
uprising in the Kashmir Valley.94 Starting in the 1990s and ending in 2004, 
India proceeded to install landmines and an electrified double fence along 
550 kilometers of the LoC. In addition, it has deployed around 700,000 
military and paramilitary forces within the narrow valley and along the 
border spaces, thereby making the LoC one of the hardest, most excessively 
militarized borders in the world.95 A large number of Kashmiri militants have 
been forced to relocate to the Pakistani part of Kashmir so as to escape being 
killed or captured. This has allowed them to continue their armed struggle 
from the other side.96 On the other side of the border, the Pakistani state has 
provided varying levels of support to Kashmiri militants, including training 
camps and financial support for militants and their dependents.97
Over the last two decades, the old conflict over the Kashmir border has 
become intertwined with the ebb and flow of war on the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border. The links built between certain Kashmiri and Punjabi 
fighters from Pakistan with the Afghan mujahedin during the Soviet war in 
the 1980s have persisted and gone through various complex transformations. 
Most of these transformations have followed larger trends in the inter-state 
relations between India and Pakistan and other flashpoints within the broader 
region. 
Several militant groups operating across the LoC proclaim Kashmir to be 
their sole focus. These include the Jamaat-e-Islami-based Hizb-ul-
Mujahedin, or HuM, and Al Badr, which tend to be comprised of ethnic 
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Kashmiris and have retained their focus on Kashmir.98 However, there are a 
number of other groups with different religious denominations that have 
expanded their jihad agenda since the latest phase of the U.S.-led war in 
Afghanistan. These include Deobandi groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad 
(JM), Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami (HuJI), and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), as well as 
the Ahl-e-Hadith group, Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT), which in the last ten years 
has moved away from an exclusive focus on Kashmir.99 Various intelligence 
sources suggest that, since at least 2005, LeT has increased its focus on the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border and currently operates in some areas in eastern 
Afghanistan, albeit on a limited scale.100
One reason for this shift in focus was the 2003 ceasefire agreement 
between India and Pakistan over the LoC.101 According to the agreement, 
Pakistan would act to reduce militant incursions from the LoC into the 
Indian-held Kashmir Valley. A number of Pakistani and Kashmiri militants 
saw this as an act of appeasement by General Musharaff to the Indians and 
the U.S., and this led to the splintering of some of these groups.102 Several of 
the splinter groups from Jaish, HuJI, and LeJ became more closely allied 
with al-Qaeda, which was being chased out of Pakistan by the U.S.-Pakistan 
counterterror operations. Currently, most of the splinter groups have joined
the increasingly active TTP in order to open dual fronts against NATO-led 
troops in Afghanistan and against Pakistani state targets and its military in 
FATA.103 Some Indian and U.S. analysts are currently projecting that the 
withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO from Afghanistan will encourage some of 
the Kashmir-centered groups such as LeT and HuJI to return full circle to 
their focus on the Kashmir front, thereby escalating tensions between India 
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and Pakistan. Since 2012, an increase in incidents of cross-border firing and 
attacks along the LoC give some credence to such analysis.104
Conclusion
As the U.S.-led War against Terror and the Taliban in Afghanistan nears its 
end, al-Qaeda has responded with its own geopolitical strategy. Since 2010, a 
clear pattern has emerged whereby al-Qaeda operatives and their affiliates 
have tried to embed themselves and find a role in conflicts that are local in 
nature. Long-running local political disputes within the poorly governed 
border spaces of weak states such as Afghanistan and Pakistan (other 
examples include Yemen and Somalia) are providing opportunities for al-
Qaeda and other groups to resurrect their weakening structures and operate 
through local partnerships.105 There are certain similarities in the broad 
dynamics of how these organizations operate in these very diverse arenas. By 
aligning themselves with local political actors who are challenging weak 
states, they are able to find sanctuaries and space for the radicalization of 
local militants or insurgents into cells with transnational ambitions and goals. 
Crucially, al-Qaeda is finding space in these conflicts less as foot soldiers 
and more as “tech savvy” specialists bringing in specialized knowledge of 
new communication, explosives, and weapons technologies. The growing 
reliance on counterterrorism strategies by the U.S. is made evident by the 
sharp increase in the number of drone strikes from 2008 to 2012.106 These 
strikes have inflamed popular resentment in Pakistan as well as in Yemen 
over issues of sovereignty, legality and human costs, and ultimately resulted 
in increased support for the militant groups.
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Clearly, there are limits to what force-based strategies can achieve in 
containing the challenge of transborder militancy. In fact, the immoderate use 
of force by states in border zones has led to the metastasizing of militancy 
and extremism in South-Central Asia. As international engagement with the 
region is set to change with the U.S. and NATO military withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, it is imperative that the policies and practices of international 
actors and regional stakeholders take heed of the complex linkages between 
state policies, the geo-spatial features of borders, and transborder militants. 
There is a need for a fresh look at the problem and further exploration of 
ways in which conventional use of force may be coupled with other 
approaches to target root causes. 
The two things that directly impact the presence of transborder actors are 
the local conditions that pertain in border regions, and state practices towards 
their conflicted borders. Only through a consistent recalibration of these two 
problem areas does it become possible to achieve long-term mitigation of the 
threat posed by militant actors. Economic marginalization and low 
development trends within border communities help sustain dynamics of 
militant transborder movements. There are no alternatives to painstaking but 
steady development within conflicted and marginalized spaces around border 
regions in order to sufficiently transform local conditions which breed and 
sustain transborder militant movements. 
State practices towards militant actors in the region are linked in 
complex ways to enduring inter-state geopolitical issues. These intractable 
conflicts over territory, borders and resource issues have to be revisited 
whilst designing future responses. There are practical policy implications that 
emerge from this evaluation. The possible waning of the Global War on 
Terror does not mean that the challenges faced by regional states from these 
movements will dissipate. The presence of transborder actors will continue to 
pose complex problems for states in South and Central Asia that already 
suffer from varying degrees of governance and state capacity issues. For the 
regional states, however, the loosening of the “Global War on Terror” 
framework has meant greater possibilities of differentiation between groups. 
Increasingly, as trends suggest, the politics of militant groups and terrorism 
are likely to become a focus of national policies and practices. States in the 
region are making distinctions between groups who are using terrorism as a 
tactical tool for political ends and those who have more globalist and diffuse 
jihad agendas. Just as the U.S. and its allies are differentiating between Al 
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Nusra107 and other radical groups fighting against the Assad regime in Syria, 
stakeholders in Afghanistan are beginning to differentiate the Afghan 
Taliban from al-Qaeda. Similarly, Pakistan continues to respond to the 
Afghan Taliban, the TTP, and Kashmiri militant groups focused on Kashmir 
differently from the Kashmiri groups aligned with al-Qaeda and attack the 
Pakistani state and its security forces. 
Indeed, drawing distinctions between groups is a key to policies that can 
untie the linkages weaving together conflicts and confrontations in border 
spaces. Such policies are becoming all the more pertinent as also the Islamic 
State, which has developed in Syria and in Iraq, is gaining influence in the 
region. Regrettably, the present international emphasis on greater regional 
cooperation as a means to build security in the post-withdrawal situation in 
and around Afghanistan has largely stalled over the issue of transborder 
organization and its linkage to militant activity and jihadist causes. As a 
consequence, this extremely complex problem area is being left to mainly 
national policies.
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PART II  Bordering Afghanistan: Threats and Opportunities
Turkmenistan’s Afghan Border Conundrum 
Jan Šír and Slavomír Horák
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the former Soviet 
republics found themselves in an entirely novel geopolitical setting. One of 
the necessary steps in affirming their existence as new, independent states 
was for these post-Soviet republics to face the need of establishing their 
international borders. This process included both the creation of new 
international borders between the republics themselves as well as the 
transformation of their existing Soviet borders with third countries. In 
Central Asia, this challenge pertained clearly to Turkmenistan, the 
southernmost republic of the former Soviet Union that inherited the longest 
section of the southern Soviet borders with Afghanistan and Iran. In this 
chapter we focus on Afghanistan as a reference point in regard to this 
transformation of the former external Soviet border. We examine 
Turkmenistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan after 1991 and argue that 
the shaping of relations between the two neighboring countries is a specific 
case of building transborder ties, the evolution of which derives from the 
distinct path of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. Our analysis reveals the inner 
tensions inherent to the making of foreign policy in Turkmenistan, 
specifically the tensions that arise between the quest for alternative export 
markets for its most valued, and largely only, assets in energy and the 
imperative to preserve the newly established regime despite its perception as 
being largely incompatible with the open and geopolitically exposed 
international environment in which it is to function.
The chapter begins with an overview of the delineation and constitution 
of the border between Afghanistan and what traditionally used to be the 
Turkmen-inhabited tribal areas of Central Asia. The time span of our 
examination of the historical background extends from the late nineteenth 
century and the Soviet decades to Turkmenistan’s independence. Following 
this, the chapter continues with four sections that each deal with one area of 
interaction between the two neighboring states. The first provides an 
overview of political relations after 1991 and outlines Turkmenistan’s 
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foreign policy towards Afghanistan with a rough periodization up to the 
present. Next, we focus on trade and economic affairs where major 
infrastructure projects play an ever-growing role. There follows a discussion 
of the still rather infrequent people-to-people contacts between Turkmenistan 
and Afghanistan as seen from the point of view of the regime in Ashgabat. 
Finally, Turkmenistan’s changing border security will be assessed through an 
analysis of the latest radical Islamist insurgency arising from Afghanistan 
and the subsequent border clashes that have taken place. We note here that 
regional affairs will not be in the center of our discussion. Nevertheless, we 
occasionally digress into the geopolitics of Central Asia so as to highlight the 
way in which, as we argue, Afghanistan matters most to Turkmenistan, that 
is, as a possible bridge linking it to its prospective export markets farther to 
the south. 
Historical Background
Historically, the Turkmen-Afghan border, and the very notion thereof as a 
border, occurred no earlier than the late nineteenth century, and it came about 
as a result of the delineation of spheres of influence within Central Asia 
between the Russian and British Empires. Until that time, Turkmen pastoral 
areas were under the reign of local tribal authorities, which were subject to 
constant interference from the rulers of Bukhara, Khiva and Persia. The 
advance of Tsarist Russia into the region was dictated by both commercial 
and military strategic interests. The eventual conquest of the Turkmen lands 
by the Russian army opened up the prospect of consolidating Russia’s grip 
over the vast territories ranging from China to the Caspian Sea. In this sense, 
the Turkmen-Afghan borderlands became the setting for the final stage of the 
“Great Game” rivalries between Russia and Britain.1
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The Turkmen-Afghan borderlands once again became unstable following 
the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, when the Russian civil war hit Central 
Asia. A local resistance movement, the basmachi, emerged and found 
footholds in the north of Afghanistan in order to rise up against the new 
Soviet regime from there.2 Large groups of Turkmens subsequently left for 
Afghanistan in several waves. The proclamation of the Bukhara People’s 
Soviet Republic in 1920, in effect, pushed out some 40,000–50,000 
Turkmens, particularly from the regions of Charjew (today’s Turkmenabat) 
and Kerki (or Atamurat).3 Another 100,000 moved south from the Turkmen 
Soviet Socialist Republic following the water and agrarian reforms and the 
anti-religious campaigns of the 1920s and 1930s.4 Stalin’s collectivization of 
agriculture caused some additional 50,000 Turkmens to flee to Afghanistan 
and Iran.5 Migration continued for some years despite the closing of the 
border in 1932 and the often dire conditions of life on the Afghan side of the 
border. As a result, substantial parts of the north and north-west of 
Afghanistan were settled by ethnic Turkmens, and the local economy was
enriched by, for instance, the famous qaraqul sheep industry.6
For most of the Soviet period the border between Soviet Turkmenia and 
Afghanistan remained closed, both in the administrative and in the physical 
senses. Border fortifications and barriers were erected alongside the 
delineation line by the Soviets, thereby making transborder flows 
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increasingly more difficult. Due to the fact that the attitudes of the Afghan 
Turkmens, and in particular of their tribal elites, were far from sympathetic to 
the Soviet regime, there was little reason for them to maintain close ties with 
their brethren on the opposite side of the border. Afghan Turkmens were also 
recruited in large numbers to work for German or Japanese intelligence 
services before World War II as they hoped for the defeat of the Soviet 
Union and for a return to their homelands.7
Despite the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan’s industrialization 
between the 1950s and 1970s, transborder contacts intensified again only 
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan after 1979. The border crossing in 
Gushgy (today’s Serhetabat, meaning “border town” in Turkmen) became 
one of the two key entry points for invading Soviet troops and the supplies 
entering Afghanistan. Moreover, the Turkmens, just as Uzbeks and Tajiks, 
were contracted in high numbers by the Soviet army, since they could serve 
as interpreters and possessed knowledge of local social conditions. Due to 
the increasing number of Turkmens switching sides and joining the Afghan 
anti-Soviet resistance, however, this practice was soon abandoned.8
The relationship of the Afghan Turkmen diaspora to their northern 
brethren, and to the Soviets in general, was characterized by caution. The 
historical memory transmitted by the descendants of refugees who had fled 
the Bolshevik regime in the 1920s and 1930s was largely negative in nature.9
The Soviets were for the most part concerned about the Central Asian 
diasporas in Afghanistan, especially that of the Turkmens, because the mood 
for resistance amongst them was considered to be higher than amongst other 
minorities.10 Curiously, this resistance among the Turkmens has not been 
transformed into a strong national movement on either side of the border. 
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Overview of Political Relations After 1991
The collapse of the Soviet Union marked a watershed for the Turkmens and 
their relations with their neighbors. This was not least because, prior to 1991, 
a state entity corresponding to the territory of today’s Turkmenistan had 
never before existed. Accordingly, the status of the 800-km-long border with 
Afghanistan has also undergone change. Turkmenistan’s foreign policy has 
been primarily an extension of the state and nation-building processes that 
have largely remained unfinished to this day. From the very beginning, the 
main function of its foreign policy has been the legitimization of the new 
regime and the securing of its survival.11 In conceptual terms, since 1992 
Turkmenistan’s foreign policy has been based on the principles of “positive 
neutrality” which, in practice, quickly degraded to isolationism in 
international affairs under Turkmenbashi, the “Head of the Turkmens,” as 
Turkmenistan’s first president Saparmurat Niyazov was called; energy 
exports, however, remained a notable exception. This explains 
Turkmenistan’s specific approach to, and its very selective engagement in, 
international affairs, which can be exemplified through its relations with 
neighboring Afghanistan. 
Despite some first tentative steps in the time of late perestroika, the 
process of establishing direct political ties with Afghanistan began only in 
the post-independence period. Diplomatic relations between both countries 
were established on February 21, 1992, on the occasion of the visit of Vice-
President of the Republic of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Hatef to Ashgabat. 
Voicing a readiness by the Najibullah government to open trading points in 
the ports on the Amu Darya River, the agenda proposed by Kabul focused 
mostly on procuring specialists from Turkmenistan to achieve the 
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electrification of Afghanistan’s north and north-west.12 In order to facilitate 
these contacts, Turkmenistan opened consular missions in Mazar-e Sharif 
and Herat in 1993. The consulates did not cease their operations even during 
the fiercest period of fighting in the late 1990s and they remained 
Turkmenistan’s main liaison offices in Afghanistan for nearly a decade.13
However, the continuing fragmentation of the country was a problem in that 
control over Afghanistan’s provinces in the north and north-west by the 
central government in Kabul, and hence its ability to ensure compliance with 
its policies, was contingent on its loose authority over local warlords who, in 
effect, administrated these territories. For this reason, in order to achieve 
progress Ashgabat was forced to clear any outstanding issues first with 
General Abdul Rashid Dostum and Mohammed Ismail Khan, the rulers of, 
respectively, Mazar-e Sharif and Herat. 
In March 1996, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan 
Burhanuddin Rabbani visited Ashgabat for a meeting with Turkmenbashi to 
discuss mostly transborder trade.14 However, this first bilateral summit was 
to remain the last meaningful contact between Ashgabat and Kabul for a long 
time, as the north-west of the country around Herat by then had fallen under 
firm control of the Pashto-dominated Taliban movement, who proceeded to 
conquer Kabul later that year.15 Moreover, by 1995 Turkmenistan had 
achieved the recognition of its declared neutrality by the United Nations16––a
success it deliberately used as an ideological rationale for keeping its 
distance from any foreign policy activities that it deemed to compromise its 
high international status. Thus, for the following years most transborder 
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contacts consisted of illicit trade, in particular drug trafficking and possibly 
also arms smuggling, which increased in volume after the Russian border 
guards left Turkmenistan’s “outer” borders at the end of 1999.17 In 1999 and 
2000, three rounds of unsuccessful peace talks were held, with great 
propaganda fanfare, between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance in 
Ashgabat under the auspices of the UN.18 After these talks ultimately failed 
in late 2000, the UN Security Council imposed a nearly total embargo against 
the Taliban-ruled Islamic Emirate, thereby leaving Turkmenistan with little
space for cultivating relations with its neighbor.19
The September 11 attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom provided the 
isolationist Turkmenbashi regime with both opportunities and challenges. 
Having only hesitantly joined the U.S.-led coalition in its War on Terror, in 
early 2002 Turkmenistan declined an official request from Berlin to establish 
a military base on its territory in order to support the German Bundeswehr in 
its operations in north Afghanistan.20 Nonetheless it made available air and 
land corridors for the delivery of international humanitarian aid to 
Afghanistan and received a further incentive to enhance its diplomatic profile 
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there by opening an embassy in Kabul.21 Importantly, the increased 
international attention directed at Turkmenistan as an emerging transit hub 
gave Ashgabat an additional boost in its ambitious development plans, 
particularly in regard to the expansion of its transport infrastructure. Such 
infrastructure would become important to Turkmenistan once the foreign 
policy priorities of the Ashgabat government evolved at a later point in 
time.22
This finally happened under Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, who came 
to power in late 2006 following Turkmenbashi’s unexpected death in office. 
From the very beginning the new Turkmen leader set an energetic foreign 
policy agenda. Gradually, and still in a selective and careful manner, 
isolationism began to be replaced by a diversification of external relations, 
particularly in the context of the gas industry where Turkmenistan achieved 
significant progress by opening new export routes to China and Iran. 
Obviously, regional cooperation plays a prominent role in these endeavors.23
From the summer of 2007 onwards, when the first official top-level meeting 
of Presidents Berdimuhamedow and Karzai took place, relations between 
Turkmenistan and Afghanistan produced a series of summits as well as a 
noticeable activation in all spheres of interaction, from business to people-to-
people contacts. At the same time, the two countries’ cooperation improved 
also in select multilateral formats, as their most important joint projects are 
trans-regional in nature.24 Curiously, Afghanistan also remains at the center 
of all major international initiatives set forth by Turkmenistan, for 
ideological reasons, through the United Nations. Berdimuhamedow’s calls at 
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traditsii bratstva i dobrososedstva,” Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, May 27, 2011. 
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the UN General Assembly to host a peace conference in Ashgabat in 2010 on 
confidence-building measures in Afghanistan are an example of this.25
Trade and Economic Affairs
In Turkmenistan it is politics, rather than business, that is the driving force 
for reaching out to foreign partners through external relations. Therefore, 
trade and economic relations after 1991 largely followed the pattern 
indicated above, with its initial upheavals and setbacks. Foreign relations 
have depended primarily on the changing perceptions within the regime of its 
own needs for legitimacy and survival. In mid-1993, Turkmenbashi passed a 
decree that outlined measures for improving economic cooperation with 
Afghanistan and a provision of technical assistance to its northern provinces. 
This act reflected proposals submitted to Ashgabat by two Afghan missions 
earlier in 1992. The measures that were to be adopted ranged from the 
construction of electric power facilities in Afghanistan, over prospecting and 
exploratory drilling for oil and gas, to road reconstruction and upgrading, 
road resurfacing and the reconstruction of a cement production plant; all of 
these activities were supposed to take place in the country’s north and north-
west.26 In 1995 the first direct telephone landline connection was laid 
between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan’s north-west. Furthermore, a new 
border crossing between Ymamnazar and Aqinah was opened in early 1996 
after some delay, thereby complementing the one that already existed 
between Gushgy (Serhetabat) and Towrgondi.27 Aside from a small number 
of local water irrigation projects, however, the presidential directive did not 
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27 Turkmen Press, “Ustanovlena telefonnaia sviaz’ s Afganistanom,” Turkmenskaia iskra,
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produce much activity until the end of the decade, not least due to the 
deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. 
In late 1994 a first truck convoy from Pakistan reached Turkmenistan by 
way of Taliban-held Kandahar and Herat and returned safely with a shipment 
of Turkmen cotton, thus pointing to the vast opportunities that could be 
realized by building an “economic bridge” between Islamabad and 
Ashgabat.28 In the 1990s, these multilateral projects were elaborated mostly 
according to the framework of the Economic Cooperation Organization, in 
which Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan all have been members. 
However, the time was not yet ripe for this despite the fact that Turkmenistan 
exhibited little unease in maintaining relations with the Taliban until their fall 
in 2001.29 After the end of the Taliban regime, Hamid Karzai, then Chairman 
of the Afghan Transitional Administration, made a rare visit to Ashgabat in 
March 2002 and an important agreement on cooperation in matters of energy 
was signed, thereby paving the way for supplying north and north-west 
Afghanistan with electricity on a large scale.30 Despite this limited progress, 
bilateral trade stagnated and remained low for most of the Turkmenbashi era. 
An intensification in business relations occurred only after 
Berdimuhamedow took office in 2007 and slowly opened Turkmenistan to 
the outside world. During the Ashgabat summit in the summer of 2007, 
Turkmenistan and Afghanistan concluded an agreement on trade and 
economic cooperation, followed by sectoral agreements on, amongst others, 
international transit transport. The countries thereby reciprocally granted 
most-favored-nation status to each other as a first step towards the gradual 
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creation of a standard bilateral trading regime.31 At the same time, a bilateral 
commission on trade, economic and technical cooperation was established in 
2007, which held four meetings between 2008 and 2013.32 In the absence of 
almost any meaningful private business initiatives, this inter-governmental 
body turned out to be the key instrument for identifying the main areas of 
future sectoral cooperation in line with the parties’ national plans. 
At present, trade and economic relations revolve around three strategic 
areas. First is cooperation in the electricity sector, which became possible 
due to an apparent stabilization of the security situation in large parts of 
Afghanistan after 2001. Between 2002 and 2004, Turkmenistan provided for 
the construction and further upgrading of two high-voltage power 
transmission lines linking the border settlements of Ymamnazar and 
Serhetabat, respectively, with Sheberghan and Herat. At the same time, 
Turkmenistan’s power engineer specialists and constructors provided for the 
establishment of substations and other electric power infrastructure along 
these lines. This has allowed Turkmenistan to steadily expand supplies of 
electricity to the territories of Afghanistan’s north and north-west, including 
the region’s two most populated cities of Mazar-e Sharif and Herat.33
Furthermore, massive investment projects have been under way in 
Turkmenistan’s domestic power industry since 2011, with the aim of further 
increasing its power generation capacities and producing electricity for 
export to the south.34 Nevertheless, existing plans to expand the two 
transmission lines to Kabul and Kandahar and, in a next phase, to link these 
to Pakistan’s power grid remain on paper only. 
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A second area of cooperation that has potentially far-reaching 
consequences for the geopolitics of Central Asia and beyond lies in joint 
transportation and communications projects. In this respect, Turkmenistan 
can capitalize on its pivotal geopolitical position and a strong 
complementarity of interests with the key international players engaged in 
“reconnecting” Afghanistan through a wide range of transportation and 
communications networks to the wider Central Asian region.35 As of writing, 
the most important infrastructure project in place here is the new joint 
railway line Atamurat-Ymamnazar-Aqinah-Andkhoy, which was launched 
on the occasion of a trilateral Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan summit
in spring 2013.36
Third, cooperation in the oil and gas industry is a matter of utmost 
priority for Ashgabat in the context of its diversification strategy aimed at 
securing multiple export routes to world markets. These efforts are embodied 
primarily in the project of a Trans-Afghanistan gas pipeline. Initiated with 
Pakistan in 1992 and following several unsuccessful attempts at its 
elaboration in the second half of the 1990s, this major capital investment 
project of trans-regional significance gained impetus with the trilateral 
Islamabad summit in May 2002. India eventually joined in 2006.37 In 2010, 
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India signed a framework 
agreement on the gas pipeline, which would carry up to 33 bcm of natural 
gas annually from Turkmenistan’s richest gas fields in the south-east of the 
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country through the territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian 
border town of Fazilka in Punjab.38 Upon completion of all commercial 
contracts between the national oil and gas energy companies in 2013, the 
four parties proceeded to form the TAPI Pipeline Company, Ltd., which was 
designed to own, build and operate the pipeline. The Asian Development 
Bank serves as the transaction adviser in finding a consortium leader.39
Economic relations between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan have seen a 
steady recovery in recent years. According to official Turkmen sources, trade 
between these two countries has grown from some $40 million in 2005 to 
almost $1 billion in 2014.40 Yet, the structure of this exchange is still largely 
underdeveloped. Trade has mostly consisted of Turkmen exports of electrical 
power and LNG, agricultural products, textile production, petrochemicals 
and other primary commodities and goods with low added value, partly as a 
form of humanitarian aid. Given the structural weaknesses of both national 
economies as well as the lack of an investment protection and promotion 
regime, this situation is likely to persist for some time. It must, however, be 
emphasized that, in the context of Turkmenistan’s ambitious development 
and diversification plans, Afghanistan might not necessarily be considered 
solely as an actor on its own but rather as a bridge for extending relations 
with further players in the region, primarily the developing markets of
Pakistan and India. In this respect, Afghanistan’s role is set to grow yet 
further. 
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People-to-People Contacts
Transborder relations between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan rest on close 
historical, cultural and religious ties that traditionally link the peoples of the 
two neighboring nations. As mentioned earlier, the very concept of a border 
in the given context is a relatively modern phenomenon. Moreover, as the 
result of a long common past as well as several migration waves in the early 
years of the Soviet period, a large Turkmen population exists in 
contemporary Afghanistan. Estimated at between half a million and, 
according to Turkmenistan’s authorities, three million people, its exact size 
and composition is impossible to establish. No population census has been 
carried out in Afghanistan since the late 1970s. Regardless of their exact 
number they constitute a significant minority in their areas of compact 
settlement, particularly in the north and north-west of the country, with 
Turkmen villages dispersed throughout the provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan, 
Samangan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Faryab, Badghis and Herat; small enclaves of 
Turkmen diaspora, mostly merchants, are also to be found as far as Helmand 
and in the capital city of Kabul.41 This makes the Turkmen diaspora a 
primary target of any transborder policy for Ashgabat in its relations with 
Afghanistan. 
Most of Turkmenistan’s activities in this area are part of broader 
international efforts aimed at Afghanistan’s post-conflict reconstruction and 
have taken shape since Berdimuhamedow came to power in 2007. This 
involves primarily humanitarian aid; already in 2001 Turkmenistan granted 
overflight and transit rights to the international community for these 
purposes. During the harsh winter of 2008, Turkmenistan sent an emergency 
convoy to Afghanistan consisting of over one hundred trucks carrying flour, 
fuel, clothes and oil pumps, worth $2 million in total, alongside the other 
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emergency supplies which have been provided on a regular basis.42 In 
addition, Turkmen specialists have successfully implemented a number of 
small-scale government development projects in north and north-west 
Afghanistan. In particular, a fully refurbished health center in the village of 
Qaramqul, Faryab, and a school facility in Hazara Toghai, Balkh, were 
opened in the summer of 2009 thanks to Turkmenistan’s development 
assistance.43 Recent projects, to be commenced in 2015, include the 
construction and equipping of a maternity home in the border village of 
Towrgondi, Herat, an orphanage in the district center of Sheberghan, 
Jowzjan, and a mosque in the town of Aqinah, Faryab.44
These activities have been accompanied by efforts aimed at human 
capacity-building in Afghanistan. Here, cooperation in education has 
advanced to a certain degree. Since 2002, each year up to thirty Afghan 
youths are offered free education in Turkmenistan’s universities within 
national quotas in line with an inter-governmental agreement. Upon 
completion of their schooling as trained agronomists, power engineers, 
teachers and medical personnel, they will contribute to the painful recovery 
of the still narrow base of Afghanistan’s human resources by providing badly 
needed professional skills.45 Furthermore, some limited contacts have been 
established in health care where every year an additional sixty citizens from 
adjacent areas in north and north-west Afghanistan obtain medical treatment 
at the health facilities of Turkmenistan’s Mary and Lebap regions.46 In 
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theory, framework agreements on bilateral cooperation also exist in the fields 
of science, culture, art, as well as mass media, sports and tourism.47
In regard to the humanitarian sphere, finally, the issue of refugees merits 
attention, although this issue has not necessarily been an example of a model 
development of transborder relations. Turkmenistan has been affected by the 
huge migration flows originating from war-torn Afghanistan, albeit not as 
much as other countries in the region have been. It has served both as a first 
transit stop as well as the final destination for refugees seeking shelter and, 
possibly, a better life. Particularly in the second half of the 1990s, several 
waves occurred of Afghan migrants crossing the Turkmen border illegally in 
their thousands, sometimes with yurts, entire households and livestock, and 
settling, or being interned, in Turkmenistan’s hinterland and causing 
headaches for the oppressive Turkmenbashi regime. As in all previous 
instances, little aggregate data are available concerning this politically 
sensitive topic. Still, there have been credible reports of instances where 
refugees were involuntarily handed back to the ruling Taliban regime from 
which they had previously fled, much to the outrage of international human 
rights organizations.48 In total some 13,000 refugees were officially reported 
to have been granted asylum in Turkmenistan by 2004,49 mostly from 
amongst the ethnic Turkmens of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, whose 
integration into Turkmen society was reasonably expected to be smoother 
than in the case of other ethnic and national groups. 
Whilst definitely no longer negligible, Turkmenistan’s activities in the 
humanitarian domain still lack one important feature that would make 
transborder interaction a true people-to-people policy: the existence of spaces 
in which spontaneous initiatives arise from below. For the moment all 
activities are limited to those authorized by the government and as such 
remain rather narrow in both scope and outreach, targeting almost 
exclusively the Turkmen diaspora in the provinces of Afghanistan’s north 
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and north-west. It is also here that the expected propaganda effect arising 
from these measures is at its greatest. Thus, for instance, since the early 
1990s Afghan Turkmens have regularly been invited to attend the high-
profile conferences of the Humanitarian Association of the World Turkmens, 
a government-affiliated body that strives to cultivate relations with the 
Turkmen diaspora abroad. Aside from this, Turkmenistan’s humanitarian aid 
supplied to Afghanistan often consists of items such as books about the 
President (many of which have supposedly been written by him) that are of 
little practical value to people in need.50 In addition to this, a very restrictive 
visa regime is in place that applies to foreign nationals including citizens of 
Afghanistan and which effectively hampers free transborder contacts. 
Nevertheless, a solid potential exists, largely as a side-effect of the joint 
infrastructure projects, which have been part of broader international efforts 
aimed at Afghanistan’s post-conflict reconstruction that presuppose the 
integration of both Turkmenistan and Afghanistan within a wider regional 
context. However, the implementation of these projects is still pending and 
will depend not only on the political will of all concerned but also on the 
stabilization of the security situation in Afghanistan, the prospects of which 
remain unclear.
Border Security
In the long term perspective, border security is the key security problem 
pertaining to Turkmenistan’s policy towards neighboring Afghanistan. 
Unlike Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the two other post-Soviet states directly 
neighboring Afghanistan, Turkmenistan has afforded comparably little 
attention to the security of the border with Afghanistan after 1991. Doctrinal 
blueprints of Turkmenistan typically define the main threats for national 
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security as stemming from within, rather than from the outside world.51
Nevertheless, in the light of the civil turmoil in Afghanistan and the possible 
spread of religious fundamentalism, terrorism and the illicit trade of drugs, 
border security has always figured high on the Turkmenistan agenda adopted 
by foreign powers and relevant international bodies. In 2005, Turkmenistan 
and Afghanistan finally entered into negotiations over demarcation and 
fortification works on the perimeter of their shared border.52 Despite some 
progress, it is apparent that not every effort has been made to address this 
issue, particularly in the light of the volumes of funds and sectoral 
cooperation programs made available to Turkmenistan for this purpose by 
the international community.53 Since 2013, the situation on the 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border has gradually deteriorated, and events 
there have developed into what may turn out to be perhaps the most serious 
challenge for the ruling Ashgabat regime since independence. 
Throughout 2013 militant Afghan groups acting under the umbrella 
Taliban brand, including allegedly hundreds of Turkmen fighters, spread 
their operations farther north and approached to within direct proximity of 
Turkmenistan’s border.54 First violent clashes on the border erupted in 
February 2014, killing three of Turkmenistan’s border guards and several 
militants. Over the second half of 2014, the security situation in north-west 
Afghanistan further deteriorated and clashes broke out between militants and 
newly formed local Turkmen militias. Fighters linking themselves to various 
radical Islamist groups continued to extend their theater of operations into 
adjacent border provinces. There were incidental reports that the militants 
purportedly had some links to the radical Islamists from the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; also known as the Islamic State, IS). Nonetheless 
it appears that this movement is still only in the process of taking root in 
Afghanistan. As of early 2015, they were active mostly in the southern parts 
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of the country.55 But with the phased transition of authority and the final 
pullout of the U.S. and NATO forces, this risk may become relevant.
In the case of the Islamic State successfully establishing itself in 
Afghanistan, Ashgabat could be faced with a real threat as it is reasonable to 
assume that these militants would not necessarily respect current 
international borders and would attempt to destabilize Turkmenistan’s 
secular regime from both outside and within.56 Hypothetically, there is a risk 
that the radicals could take over the water management facilities in 
Turkmenistan and thereby shift the water resources away from the Amu 
Darya River and the main Garagum canal. The border area with Afghanistan 
is particularly vulnerable in terms of water security because its waters feed 
into most of the territory of Turkmenistan, which lies farther downstream. 
For the moment, however, it does not seem likely that the insurgents would 
be in a position to accomplish technically complex interventions in the 
existing water flow systems.57 Facing worsening security along its borders, 
Ashgabat seems likewise concerned about the safety of the giant gas fields 
located in the south-east of the country. Unlike in Syria and Iraq, where oil is 
a major source of income for the Islamic State, however, the groups that 
operate near the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border could not reliably count 
on the possibility of similar sales. The transportation of natural gas here 
depends almost entirely on gas pipeline systems. 
Despite the fact that the imminent threat for Turkmenistan is still quite 
low, the incidental raids conducted by militant groups from Afghanistan have 
already forced Turkmenistan’s leadership to engage in intense dialog with its 
southern neighbor, with a view of creating a buffer zone along the joint 
border in order to prevent armed insurgency on the territory of Turkmenistan. 
After some initial communication with the tribal elders and spiritual leaders 
in the north and north-west of Afghanistan, Ashgabat seems to have 
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backtracked from the idea of providing support to the local Turkmen militias. 
Instead, it adopted unprecedented steps to seal the border.58 In 2014, in a rare 
move for unilateral demarcation, Turkmenistan’s border troops captured 
pastures on the Amu Darya islands traditionally used by local Afghan 
Turkmens.59 Further reshuffles are taking place within the military forces. 
Regular border guards are now being complemented and slowly replaced by 
elite army units. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan’s sappers have started digging 
ditches and erecting additional perimeter protection fences. Here, 
Turkmenistan relies on the elements of a relatively well-equipped intrusion 
detection system inherited from the Soviet Union, which has been recently 
improved to some extent.60 However, in the event of a concentrated 
insurgency or raid these border fortifications and barriers will be easy to 
penetrate, as was demonstrated several times already during 2014 and early 
2015. In addition, a complete refurbishment and improvement of the 
fortification facilities along the entire borderline will take time and remains a 
challenge for Ashgabat to resolve before an armed insurgency eventually 
occurs.
Turkmenistan further encounters the problem of lacking well-trained 
border guards and army units that would be able to cover the entire perimeter 
of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border. Poor organization of military 
recruitment as well as corruption and hazing are the main reasons for the 
persistently low combat readiness of Turkmenistan’s border troops.61 In 
order to reverse these trends, Turkmenistan implemented an acceleration of 
recruiting conscripts from among secondary-school graduates, university 
students and those studying abroad during the summer season of 2014.62
Later that year, Turkmenistan’s Defense Ministry began to mobilize reserves 
and launched a campaign designed to attract volunteers to serve in the 
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army.63 All in all, Turkmenistan’s border guards and intelligence services, in 
close interaction with the elite brigades of Turkmenistan’s army, might yet be 
able to prevent or suppress attacks stemming from within. However, it is 
unclear whether they would be able to counter a massive armed insurgency 
staged from beyond its borders. It is in this context that we can read the still-
unconfirmed reports from spring 2015 that state that Russia’s border guard 
officers have returned to Turkmenistan as military instructors so as to train 
Turkmenistan’s forces in guarding Afghanistan’s border.64
Conclusion
The way in which Turkmenistan approached Afghanistan in the context of 
establishing itself on the world scene is illustrative of the evolution of 
Turkmenistan’s foreign policy as a whole after 1991. Conceptually labeled as
neutrality, Ashgabat’s foreign policy following the Soviet collapse 
effectively evolved into an isolationism in internationally affairs. As a 
consequence, relations with its neighbors suffered. Foreign policy was 
largely understood as an extension of domestic policies aimed at the regime’s 
legitimization and survival. This helps to explain the prevalence of 
Turkmenistan’s rather restrained approach in reaching out to Afghanistan. 
Despite the fact that Turkmenistan and Afghanistan are historically close 
neighbors, the level of relations remained generally low for the entire initial 
period following independence, and their intensity and scope, as well as 
prime areas of interaction, were limited. A warming of relations, while still 
taking place rather selectively and targeting a small number of chosen areas, 
became apparent only with the change of power in Turkmenistan following 
Turkmenbashi’s death in late 2006 and is part of Turkmenistan’s gradual 
opening to the outside world. Under Berdimuhamedow, Turkmenistan has 
shifted away from isolation towards a diversification of external relations, 
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including to the states of wider Central Asia. Still, this opening of 
Turkmenistan, just as was the case in its former isolationism, seems to be a 
result of a deliberate decision on the part of its ruling elites rather than a 
possible by-product of a complex interplay in the dynamically changing 
geopolitics of the region. Hence, this may change once again should the 
regime’s perceptions of its need for legitimization and survival further 
evolve. 
While regional affairs have not been the primary focus of this chapter, 
they nonetheless are important for an understanding of Turkmenistan’s select 
priority areas of its engagement. Turkmenistan has been traditionally most 
active in areas of interaction that form the financial backbone of the regime. 
Obviously, this concerns primarily energy and the gas exports that critically 
depend on safe and stable transportation routes to world markets. In this 
context, for Ashgabat Afghanistan is not a matter of interest merely as a 
trading partner per se. Rather, its importance lies in its position as a natural 
and logical transit country for Turkmenistan to reach out to potential 
customers on the Indian subcontinent who, from Ashgabat’s point of view, 
present a welcome alternative in overcoming its inherited dependence on 
Russia. In this respect, the pilot project likely to have the biggest impact on 
Turkmenistan’s international standing to date is the TAPI gas pipeline jointly 
developed by four countries that aims to transport Turkmenistan’s natural gas 
through the territory of Afghanistan to the fast-growing and unsaturated 
energy markets of Pakistan and India. Its importance for the bilateral 
relations of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan is comparatively meager. Yet, a 
stable and viable bilateral link is absolutely vital for the successful 
implementation of this infrastructure project; without this link the project 
will remain only on paper. Framed predominantly in humanitarian terms in 
domestic public discourse, that is, as Turkmenistan’s contribution to 
Afghanistan’s post-conflict reconstruction, this “pipeline of peace” will not 
only give impetus to increased trade but also provide Afghanistan, as the 
transit country, with a source of income, create new jobs and attract 
investments along the planned route and, in this way, prove key to the future 
stability, security and prosperity of the entire region.65 In this sense, 
Afghanistan is an indispensable element in the vast majority of 
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Turkmenistan’s international initiatives which have been raised under the 
aegis of the United Nations. It lends ideological credence to the declared 
peace-loving nature of Turkmenistan’s neutrality. 
Unlike other Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan has until recently
not perceived neighboring Afghanistan primarily through the prism of 
potential security threats arising from within this largely failed state. 
However, the latest Islamist insurgency and recent border clashes appear to 
have changed this perception of Afghanistan and induced the Ashgabat 
regime to take decisive measures in order to counter these threats and 
improve the security of its border. How serious a danger this poses is 
difficult to assess at present. Yet, doubts remain about the ability of 
Turkmenistan to withstand major external shocks such as a large armed 
insurgency, in particular given the bad governance, low institutional 
performance as well as other features of the ruling regime, the legitimization 
and survival of which its foreign policy seeks to achieve. Therefore, much 
still remains to be done in the field of border security so as to make the 
border between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan a true “border of friendship 
and peace,” as most bilateral documents in this area claim in the language of 
institutional foreign policy.
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Tajikistan’s Unsettled Security: Borderland 
Dynamics of the Outpost on Russia’s Afghan 
Frontier
Helena Rytövuori-Apunen and Furugzod Usmonov
How does Tajikistan seek to survive as a state as well as benefit from the 
geographic situation in which the uncertainty over the threats and opportuni-
ties offered by “Afghanistan after 2016” relates to the wider region’s future? 
Our question arises from the fact that the state that emerged from a devastat-
ing civil war during 1992–1997 is still very much internally cleaved. We 
seek to answer this by studying the action and policies of the state in relation 
to three problem areas. First, we examine how Tajikistan’s recent internal 
conflicts challenge the state, as represented by its central government and 
regime. Second, we ask how Tajikistan’s relations with Russia evolve against 
the backdrop of threats that are both internal and external; and, third, we dis-
cuss how Tajikistan is utilizing the moment of international cooperation to 
develop energy infrastructure projects aimed at alleviating the security prob-
lem which Afghanistan represents in the region. These three focal points are 
meant to shed light on the practices that connect Tajikistan with an emerging 
configuration of regional security. We begin with a brief description of the 
situation in Tajikistan following the civil war that had left 60,000 dead, 
100,000 missing and created 55,000 orphans. 
The Peace Accords were agreed upon in June 1997, nine months after 
the Taliban had taken power in Kabul, Afghanistan. During the next two 
years, this agreement resulted in the formation of an interim government 
which included the two main parties of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), 
namely the moderate Islamists (Party of Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan, 
IRPT) and the Pamir party (Lal’i Badakhshan).1 The core idea of the peace 
deal was the notion that power-sharing would incorporate the opposition into 
the central and local military, police and civil bodies on the basis of a thirty-
percent quota. This was a political compromise meant to disarm and include 
the former guerrilla groups in a country-wide regime system cutting through 
all administrative levels and setting up the basis for the common state. The 
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more extreme political Islamist groups fled to Afghanistan and, later, to Paki-
stan; and the militant anti-Islamists again escaped to Uzbekistan.2 The peace 
deal, which had been brokered by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
cooperation with the UN, thus remained under pressure from both sides from 
across the borders. The following decades did not consolidate the formula 
meant to establish legitimacy for a national state. In late August 2015, an 
order by the Ministry of Justice banned the IRPT, which since 1999 had been 
the only officially registered Islamic party in Central Asia and which had 
been poised to win the position of the second largest party in the country in 
the spring 2015 parliamentary elections. One month later, Tajikistan’s Su-
preme Court declared the party to be an extremist and a terrorist organiza-
tion.3 The peace deal, which over many years was seen to set an example for 
Afghanistan, had ultimately failed, and the secular regime that had estab-
lished its power already during the civil war with Russia’s support prevailed 
alone in an increasingly polarizing country. 
The political polarization which sets the supporters of a secular regime 
against various pro-Islamic forces intertwines with the dividing lines between 
regions where, during the civil war, armed groups fought for either the con-
trol of central power in Dushanbe or for greater autonomy from it. In the civ-
il war the north led by factions from Leninabad (today’s Khujand), which 
were competing yet also allied with eastern Khatlon (led by factions from 
Kulyab), fought against the Islamists with strongholds in Rasht in central 
Tajikistan, Gorno-Badakhshan in the south-east and Qurghonteppa (western 
Khatlon) in the south. Simultaneously Gorno-Badakhshan, which had been 
an Autonomous Oblast’ (termed GBAO) in Soviet-era Tajikistan, fought for 
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more self-determination. A further feature of the anatomy of the initially 
fractured Tajikistani geobody is that its borders are not congruent with the 
idea of a bounded geographic identity. Like elsewhere in post-Soviet Central 
Asia, the borders of the state are fused with ethnic connections intertwined 
with family networks and economic activity. In terms of population, the 
greatest fusion is with Afghanistan: the Panj River leaves more ethnic Tajiks 
on the Afghan side (7–8 million in the north-eastern regions) than within the 
Republic of Tajikistan (80 percent of a total population of 7.5 million).4 Even 
though Afghan and Tajik people have been separated since 1895, when the 
borderline was demarcated on the basis of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 
1872, Tajiks living on either side of the Panj River have maintained a bond 
of kinship and “brotherhood.” During the years of heavy fighting in the civil 
war (1992–1995), groups from Afghanistan supported the Tajik Islamic op-
position, and Tajikistan’s territory provided shelter for the Northern Alliance 
fighting against the Taliban between 1996 and 2001. Following this Tajiki-
stan became a part of the logistics network set up in the region for the ISAF, 
and the Dushanbe airport was used by mainly the French military contingent. 
Simultaneously the state border with Afghanistan is Tajikistan’s only 
border lacking controversy over the allocation of territory. The border be-
tween Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is still largely mined and reveals the deep 
hostilities that surfaced after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The border 
to Kyrgyzstan is fraught with inter-communal conflict that is intertwined 
with land issues; and pressure from the Chinese government to buy land from 
eastern Tajikistan has proved too great for Dushanbe to resist. However, 
even if the relations between Dushanbe and Kabul are unproblematic in 
comparison with these other neighbors (and a possible return to power by the 
Taliban in Kabul is unlikely to change the situation much), the threat that 
developments in Afghanistan will pull Tajikistan deep into conflict is real 
because instability in Afghanistan reinforces the tensions that in Tajikistan 
have remained below the surface of the unifying projects of the state after 
1997. In recent years (that is, during a time which coincides with the prepara-
tion of the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO-led troops from Afghanistan), 
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Tajikistan has experienced several incidents of violent insurgency which, 
even when occurring deep within Tajikistani territory, have arisen through 
transborder connections and caused tension with neighboring states. All this 
means that the government in Tajikistan is already greatly burdened with 
problems resulting from fragmented power even while being expected by the 
international community to show that the Tajikistani state is “fit” to ward off 
security threats seen to be shared by other regional states and external pow-
ers. 
The border to Afghanistan is heavily defended through the security guar-
antees given by Russia and the CSTO, and also the U.S. and China provide 
technical and material support in strengthening this border. The paradox of 
this international security cooperation and assistance is that whilst it 
strengthens external defense it also risks contributing to the increase of inter-
nal tensions in an already divided country. International cooperation for the 
security of borders is an authoritative statement about the existence of threats 
and can be used to support the legitimacy of measures that risk reproducing 
the conflicts left by the civil war inside the country. This situation is illustrat-
ed by the fact that the dissolution of the IRPT in early September 2015 coin-
cided with armed attacks in the capital and in its vicinity, leaving at least 45 
people (including 13 soldiers) dead, many wounded and some 139 detained 
in an anti-terrorist operation. General Abdukhalim Nazarzoda, a former 
deputy defense minister, and a group of his supporters were killed in an 
armed operation carried out by units of the Ministry of the Interior in the 
Romit Gorge some 150 kilometers from Dushanbe. This took place a few 
days after the occurrence of violent incidents that included weapons seizure 
and attacks on the police; the group was accused for planning a coup in favor 
of Islamic political forces within the country and charged with treason and 
terrorism. General Nazarzoda was one of the former UTO leaders who had 
been incorporated into the fragile power-sharing system but who ultimately 
came to symbolize its failure due to internal rivalries and power struggles. 
Russian commentary marginalized the significance of the events and Russian 
authorities reconfirmed their support for Tajikistan.5 In the same month the 
CSTO held its summit in Dushanbe and Tajikistan hosted the Exercise Re-
gional Cooperation 2015 organized by the U.S. Central Command, and the 
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U.S. also announced a delivery of tactical equipment to Tajikistan’s police. 
These were scheduled events, yet the temporal connection made them into 
signs of support for the regime.6
In the section that follows we examine how Tajikistan’s initially fragile 
and forcibly welded political “geobody” takes shape in the signification of 
the “frontier land” through the government’s responses, both verbal and ki-
netic, to three outbursts of violence which have created security alerts in Ta-
jikistan during the 2010s: the Rasht events of 2010; the violence in Khorog 
in 2012; and the long-enduring conflict complex in Ferghana which, in 2014, 
attracted attention within the CSTO because it had started to impact state 
relations between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The three series of events all 
connect with different regions and border dynamics in Tajikistan. We then 
proceed to examine the role that Russia is taking as the guarantor of security 
in Tajikistan and the policies through which Tajikistan is striving to expand 
its space for deliberation and bargaining in determining their common inter-
est. As an external border of the CSTO, Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan 
is a “common border.”7 Tajikistan hosts Russia’s largest ground-force base
beyond Russia’s own borders and is firmly aligned with Russia. The 201st
Russian Military Base (formerly Soviet 201st Motorized Rifle Division) near 
Dushanbe, with branches in Qurghonteppa and Kulyab in the south and with 
some 7,500 military troops (and announced plans to increase the number to 
9,000), is emphasized in Moscow to be Russia’s “outpost” on the southern 
CIS borders.8 Following an examination of these issues, we discuss how the 
Tajikistani leadership seeks to benefit from the increased international inter-
est that has propelled the states in Central Asia to the center of international 
efforts to foster economic and social development in and around Afghani-
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stan. We conclude with a summary of the patterns of policies which shape 
Tajikistan in its uncertain situation.
Tajikistan’s “Problematic Regions”: Recent Violent 
Encounters and Security Alerts
Rasht, August–September 2010
On August 23, 2010, a group of twenty-five prisoners in Jail No. 1 of Du-
shanbe City escaped from the prison, killing several security guards, and 
scattering throughout the country. The escapees included not only criminals 
but also political prisoners. The Tajik government sent troops under the Min-
istry of Defense to search for the fugitives in all the regions of the country. 
On September 19, 2010, the motorcade of the Ministry of Defense, which 
had been sent to the Rasht region to locate fugitives, was attacked by an 
armed group. According to official data, 28 people died in a shootout; the 
number given by non-official sources was about 40. The Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan (IMU) claimed responsibility for the attack. In a video the 
IMU announced its demand that the government was to abandon its current 
domestic and foreign policies.9 The IMU has systematically organized armed 
attacks aimed at establishing the rule of an Islamic state in Central Asia. Ac-
cording to the government’s version of events, the aim of the attack was to 
impede the law enforcement agencies from performing the tasks by which 
they represent the authority of the present regime and to gain control over the 
eastern part of Tajikistan.
The Tajik government announced that the leaders of the group behind 
the armed attack in Rasht were well-known Tajik warlords from the civil 
war—Mullo Abdullo (Abdullo Rahimov), Ali Bedaki (Alovuddin Davlatov) 
and Mirzokhuja Akhmadov. According to official sources, this group was 
attacking motorcades with the support of international terrorist networks. 
Several dead bodies of ethnically non-Tajik insurgents were brought forward
as evidence. The Tajik government reacted “symmetrically”—with a deter-
mined use of military force—to what it unequivocally described as a terrorist 
                                                          
9 Maksim Kulinov, “Ubiitsy tadzhikskikh voennykh obeshchaiut novye terakty,” Segodnia,
September 24, 2010, http://www.segodnia.ru/content/13998.
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attack. In January 2011 government sources released the news that Ali Be-
daki had been killed during military action. However, at the same time a vid-
eo was posted on the internet that showed the detained Ali Bedaki being in-
terrogated by government authorities. A short while later the government 
made an official announcement that the detainee in the video was not the real 
Ali Bedaki. Further, Tajikistan’s most infamous terrorist, Mullo Abdullo, 
was killed during a military operation in Rasht in April 2011. This field 
commander in the civil war, who had rejected the 1997 Peace Accords and 
remained mainly on the Afghan side of the border ever since then, was ru-
mored to have been establishing a terrorist camp in Rasht. Only Mirzohuja 
Akhmadov was granted amnesty during the military action for his loyalty and 
support of the government troops. 
From the very beginning of the civil war onward the Rasht region had 
been the cradle of Tajikistan’s Islamic opposition. By its heavy-handed mili-
tary response to the attack in the gorge the Tajik government demonstrated 
that it had complete control over the country’s territory. The result of these 
actions was the establishment of a power vertical which subordinated the 
Rasht region to Dushanbe’s control. Through its response the government 
also made clear its uncompromising attitude towards anybody wishing to 
mobilize political forces for regime change. This message was sent not only 
to the local inhabitants; the Tajik authorities repeatedly made statements that 
they were aware of who had been supporting Tajikistan’s domestic terrorists. 
This reference to outside forces was easily deciphered due to the fact that the 
Tajik radical Islamic opposition from Rasht had the reputation of being deep-
ly connected with militant insurgent networks such as the IMU and the Tali-
ban. The group attacking the motorcade was reported to be a combination of 
Tajik, Uzbek, Afghan and Arab radical Islamists. Following the govern-
ment’s military action in Rasht, region-wide insurgent organizations lost one 
of their strongholds in Central Asia. In addition to this, the Dushanbe gov-
ernment had now also accomplished the elimination of various key figures of 
the militant opposition of the civil war era. Since the civil war, Tajikistan has 
lived with the shadowy figures of the former “warlords.” Some of these have 
physically returned to Tajikistan, whilst some repeatedly return to people’s 
minds; yet already the rumors and stories of these nebulous figures of the 
former warlords of the civil war have had a mobilizing—and dividing—
effect on the population, especially in rural areas.
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It is reasonable to assume that the insurgents did indeed have connec-
tions with the Taliban and the IMU; the latter of these had already shown its 
presence in Afghanistan a decade earlier and were known to operate from the 
border zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Whether it was the IMU that 
was actually behind the attack is a different question; yet to assume this is to 
legitimize the use of force in the state’s response. Credibility is stretched 
when the logical truth that an ethnic Uzbek or Afghan is not Tajik is suggest-
ed to further demonstrate that there are “foreigners” inside Tajikistan’s bor-
ders who are participating in terrorist activities. The information that is avail-
able does not reveal from which side of the legal state border the non-Tajik 
insurgents came. Such facts are difficult to establish in a multi-ethnic region 
where family bonds extend beyond borders, and it is hardly credible that the 
official information on the origin of the insurgents could be based on identity 
papers carried by the insurgents. Interpretations driven by ideas and conven-
tional concepts (the state confined by its borders, nationals vs. non-nationals) 
are useful in broadening the frame of legitimate action and make it possible 
to perform legal action in terms of one law rather than another. Although the 
evidence is not clear in multiethnic Tajikistan, where Uzbek and Afghan eth-
nic faces are encountered every day, the features argued to demonstrate the 
presence of “foreign” elements make it possible to frame the events as terror-
ism steered from abroad. Such interpretations also contribute to an ethno-
nationalist project of state-building by constructing a distinctly “national” 
project of security. 
Another question crucial for the meaning of the event is whether the mil-
itant insurgents included ethnic Arabs and whether the event, on this basis, 
can be called “international terrorism” in a wider sense rather than merely 
regional connections? The evidence provided by official information sources 
consisted in photographs of bodies, which are data easily manipulated by 
modern techniques. Again, we cannot know how facts were used to support 
the argument by which the global war on terror is used to legitimize action 
eliminating figures (both corporeal and mythical) that have remained from 
the civil war and that are perceived as acute threats today. The horizon of 
interpretation we need to introduce in order to make sense of the events and 
the government’s responses that they elicit hinges on the specific future envi-
sioned by decision-makers in Dushanbe. It was important for the government 
to gain control of the Rasht region before it could become a node in interna-
tional militant insurgent networks. This is a real threat if and when the Tali-
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ban intensify their fight, even if their own goals remain focused on Afghani-
stan. In the stress moment over the uncertainty of the future of Afghanistan, 
the government in Dushanbe is under pressure to show that it is capable of 
controlling its own territory and of fulfilling the tasks expected of an inde-
pendent state. 
The Pamir, July 2012
In 2011 Tajikistan’s parliament acquiesced to China’s territorial claims and 
allowed 5.5 percent of Tajikistani territory in the mountainous Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast’ to be ceded to China. The fact that this 
raised civil protests nowhere else other than in this region itself tells about 
the political isolation of this ethnically non-Tajik part of Tajikistan from the 
rest of the country. While Dushanbe was content in having been able to re-
duce China’s demands by fifty percent, within GBAO the deal re-awakened 
civil war-era arguments about the need for the devolution of the central 
state.10 The Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (Pamir) has never been 
effectively included into the judicial system of the republic since Tajikistan
became independent. The institutions representing the central power—the 
Court of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of the Republic of Ta-
jikistan and the Prosecutor’s Office of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous 
Region of the Republic of Tajikistan—have little legitimacy in the eyes of 
the local people and it is local leaders who hold authority in judicial matters. 
During the Soviet decades this ethnically and geographically distinct region 
was an external border of the USSR directly linked to Moscow as a special 
military district which residents from elsewhere in Tajikistan could not enter 
without a special permit. But although the entire GBAO was a border region 
towards China, the far-western parts of China were still habitually closer to 
the population along the ethnically mixed border than were Dushanbe, Tash-
kent or Moscow; these capitals were distant not only logistically and geo-
graphically but also because of Soviet state practices.11
                                                          
10 “Tajikistan cedes land to China,” BBC, January 13, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12180567.
11 Steven Parham, “‘Rightful’ versus ‘Real’ Homelands: Changing Concepts of Kyrgyz 
Boundaries and Belonging on the China-Kyrgyzstan Frontier,” Asian Ethnicity 15, no. 3 
(July 2014): 265–85.
140
In July 2012 conflict culminated in a violent encounter between govern-
ment troops and local inhabitants and resulted in a large number of casual-
ties. This was preceded by a series of incidents, among them occasions on 
which prosecutors and other representatives of the republic’s juridical system 
as well as members of the police staff had been physically abused by local 
leaders. The murder of General Abdullo Nazarov, the head of the Pamiri 
branch of the Committee of National Security, on July 21, 2012, in the vi-
cinity of Khorog was the event which triggered Dushanbe’s response. The 
official authorities announced that the General had been killed by order of 
Tolibek Ayombekov, a local criminal leader accused of drug trafficking and 
the smuggling of tobacco and gemstones. Ayombekov had a background of 
being a “warlord” in the civil war and, until recently, he was deputy chief of 
the border unit in the Ishkashim district.12 His person illustrates how, at the 
conclusion of the civil war, the militia of the opposition forces laid down 
their arms and became a part of the state, contesting “their share of the rents 
of statehood.”13
When the events in Khorog were officially reported, their course at first 
seemed relatively clear: the central government had shown its determination 
to punish the General’s murderers. The population of Khorog, the region and 
the entire country could sigh in relief because the government troops and the 
armed Pamir groups had agreed on a truce and thereby suspended the mili-
tary operation with its use of air, artillery and special units of the Ministry of 
Interior Affairs and the Committee of National Security. Imam Aga Khan 
had once again demonstrated his skill at successfully concluding a peace-
making mission: Ayombekov, who initially argued that the operation was a 
pretext for increasing the grip of central power over the region, himself em-
phasized that his group surrendered their weapons because Imam Aga Khan 
had asked them to do so and to cease fighting against the government.14
However, the situation at the conclusion of the military action was far more 
contradictory. 
The government of Tajikistan had sent around 800 troops (or more than 
1000, according to some media sources) to Khorog, where they were faced 
                                                          
12 Statement of the General Prosecutor’s office of the Republic of Tajikistan, “Za chto ubili 
generala Nazarova?,” Avesta.tj, July 28, 2012, http://www.avesta.tj/goverment/13360-za-
chto-ubili-generala-nazarova.html.
13 Jesse Driscoll quoted in Heathershaw and Herzig, “The Sources of Statehood,” 11.
14 “Interv’iu Toliba Aiombekova pered sdachei,” InoZpress Press Digest (source: Radio Svo-
boda), August 15, 2012, http://inozpress.kg/news/view/id/36829.
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with fierce armed resistance by a group of local leaders whom the govern-
ment termed “militants.” The active stage of the military action took place on 
July 24, 2012. According to official data, 30 people from a militant criminal 
group and 12 members of the law enforcement bodies of the Republic of Ta-
jikistan died while a further 23 people were injured. According to a number 
of other (including Russian) media sources about 200 people died, more than 
half of whom were unarmed, ordinary citizens.15 As opposed to the Rasht 
events, in which the majority of the population supported the government 
and were able to accept the harsh military measures, the events in the Pamirs 
divided public opinion throughout the country. In Rasht militant insurgents, 
allegedly affiliated with radical international jihadist groups, had fought 
against the secular regime. In Khorog, the opposition consisted of local in-
habitants, both unarmed people and armed groups, and their action was 
aimed at increasing the autonomy of regional policies and businesses. The 
government defined the events in Rasht as a terrorist attack, whereas the re-
sponse to the situation in the Pamirs was described as a struggle against crim-
inal groups. Bringing the army into the region with armored personnel carri-
ers and helicopters—an operation which necessitated closing the Khorog-
Dushanbe highway and switching off internet servers—made the action ap-
pear as a massive demonstration of the state’s power in the classical sense of 
its monopoly over the means of violence. Whether this showing of the pres-
ence of the state’s power was intended to deter the pursuit of regional auton-
omy from governance structures or whether it was designed to crush illegal 
local enterprise is difficult to ascertain; in all likelihood, both reasons pertain.
The Pamiri population took an active part in the information war against 
the government’s military action. Local residents had access to the mass me-
dia and international organizations, and they were able to organize a popular 
campaign against the government’s military action through their social net-
works. The demonstrations organized by the Pamiri people near Tajik em-
bassies in various countries showed that the government’s regular measure—
to close down Tajik and Russian internet providers—was not effective due to 
the wider international connections of the Pamir population. Pamiri repre-
sentatives evaluated the government’s actions as an ethnicity-based repres-
                                                          
15 “Okolo 200 chelovek pogibli v khode spetsoperatsii v Tadzhikistane - SMI,” RIA Novosti,
July 24, 2012, http://ria.ru/world/20120724/708131588.html. 
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sion of Badakhshan’s inhabitants.16 Both internal and international pressure 
forced the Tajik government to start negotiating an agreement with local 
leaders. While the government’s measures in Rasht were able to benefit from 
the international condemnation of terrorism, in Khorog international opinion 
constrained action. The Tajik government also needed to take into account 
that a prolonged conflict would affect the economic situation. The Pamir re-
gion is one of the main gateways for the transit of goods between Tajikistan 
and China even if in recent years it has been losing its pre-eminence to the 
more accessible routes through southern Kyrgyzstan.  
Very little was achieved from the government’s point of view. The con-
flict was merely brought to a standstill but, unlike in Rasht, the central gov-
ernment did not continue its efforts to establish full authority over the Pamir 
territory. The majority of local leaders who had participated in the violent 
outburst remained free. No guarantees were established to prevent the con-
flict from reigniting, and armed clashes relating to protests prompted by the 
detention of locals again flared up in December, 2013 as well as in May, 
2014. In summer 2012 the need to maintain a peaceful political climate be-
fore the upcoming presidential elections of November 2013 (in which the 
incumbent president was re-elected) was one of the reasons requiring the 
cessation of the conflict before it threatened to proliferate. The decision-
makers in Dushanbe also had to consider the sensitivity of the political situa-
tion in Badakhshan, where local leaders have close connections with Afghan 
Badakhshani across the border; the latter would likely support their “broth-
ers” were a conflict to flare up between the Pamir region and Tajikistan’s 
central government. In light of the draw-down of the U.S. troops from Af-
ghanistan, such cross-border bonds are likely to be further strengthened. 
There were also rumors—reinforced from government-related sources one 
year later, in July 2013—that a new country, “Greater Badakhshan” (which 
would combine the two regions straddling the border) is being supported by 
countries external to the region.17 If “Greater Badakhshan” was in fact be-
lieved to be on the “New Great Game” chessboard in order to better control 
Afghanistan after the Western military withdraws, Dushanbe’s show of force 
                                                          
16 In Tajikistani state practices, the Pamiri are not considered as a separate ethnic group but 
instead as a sub-group of the Tajik people who speak a different dialect and adhere to the 
Ismaili branch of Islam.
17 “Russia and China will help prevent creation of ‘Great [sic] Badakhshan,’ says Tajik Ex-
pert,” ASIA-Plus, July 12, 2013, http://news.tj/en/news/russia-and-china-will-help-prevent-
creation-great-badakhshan-says-tajik-expert.
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was also a message sent to the alleged plotters. However, for the domestic 
audience the lack of transparency about the purpose and the goals of the op-
eration were striking. All the same it became clear that while the uncertainty 
over the developments in Afghanistan was an important reason for the Tajik-
istani government to implement its measures in Rasht, in Khorog and the 
Pamir region a massive use of force would generate a backlash and, ultimate-
ly, prove to be counterproductive. Alongside these local and regional dynam-
ics, a more general, country-wide political polarization also impacts the re-
gion. The region is not spared from the crackdown on Islamist politicians that
is taking place throughout the country and which affects not only radical 
wings but also the more moderate Islam of the IRPT, that is, of the political 
force which, at the conclusion of the civil war, was meant to prevent political 
polarization. Because the international war on terrorism has made it com-
monly acceptable to claim that phenomena described as political and reli-
gious “extremism” predict terrorist acts and, consequently, in legal codes and 
in other policies and action can be legitimately brought under the concept of 
the “threat of terrorism,” violent acts or their preparation are not needed as 
evidence of the threat situations which can legally invoke the government’s 
response, including the use of armed security units. The alleged enemy is not 
limited to the militant insurgency which challenges the state’s authority but 
also includes the rather more diffuse ideological enemies, in which case the 
evidence of subversive activity can be as arbitrary as the existence of family 
relations and religious habits. This practice of political polarization, which 
has been present and on the increase ever since the first years following the 
implementation of the peace settlement, diminishes the space for a middle 
ground in politics and, in this way, strengthens authoritarianism. The uncer-
tainty over Afghanistan has become a further push towards such develop-
ment. 
Russia did not directly involve itself in the conflict events in Rasht and 
the Pamirs but it did support Tajikistan’s authorities through the regional 
institutions within the frame of the CIS and, especially, by providing military 
and technical assistance and training for the Tajik enforcement bodies 
through the CSTO. The Russian president and foreign ministry, like also the 
state leaders in Tajikistan’s Central Asian neighbors, expressed their concern 
over the need to restore stability and public order in the problem regions yet 
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refrained from any active involvement in the conflicts.18 Only the president 
of Belarus, Alexandr Lukashenko, presented a demand that the CSTO should 
react to the events in the Pamirs in order not to undermine its own goals as a 
serious organization. In his response to this demand, Nikolai Bordiuzha, the 
general secretary of the CSTO, underlined that the situation in Tajikistan was 
that country’s internal affair and that its authorities were capable of solving 
the difficulties in question on their own. Lukashenko’s intervention, just like 
Bordiuzha’s more technically worded emphasis on the need to “monitor” the 
situation, shows that the CSTO continues to closely observe the situation in 
Tajikistan and that there are pressures to develop support which would de-
crease the need to become directly involved in a member state’s internal con-
flicts.19 In the Moscow media a few months later, Bordiuzha assured that the 
use of servicemen at the Russian base in Tajikistan in conflicts such as those 
in Khorog was categorically “ruled out” because the bilateral agreements 
between the two countries dealt with Russia’s assistance only in relation to 
external threats.20 Because non-interference applies to “internal” conflicts, it 
is also in Russia’s interest that these conflicts can be internally contained and 
that its support, which continues to cleave the political landscape in the coun-
try, remains in the background. 
Sugd, Spring 2014
The third region in which recent violent outbursts with cross-border implica-
tions have taken place is Sugd, Tajikistan’s part of the Ferghana Valley. Ever 
since the final years of the Soviet Union, the Ferghana Valley has been a 
high-risk area for violent social and interethnic conflict. Violent outbursts in 
recent years have arisen mostly from conflicts over development resources—
in particular over land, water and road construction. Because the valley is 
today a habitual space divided between three states (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
                                                          
18 “IDUt k ‘OKNU’?,” Novaia Gazeta, October 21, 2010, http://www.novgaz.com/index.php/
2-news/529---‘.’
19 Anna Analbaeva, “Pora vmeshat’sia,” Vzgliad, July 31, 2012,
http://www.vz.ru/politics/2012/7/31/591112.html.
20 “Russian troops will not be used for suppressing protests in Tajikistan, says CSTO Secre-
tary General,” ASIA-Plus, November 21, 2012 (the article makes reference to RIA Novosti
and Bordiuzha’s interview in Moscow News),
http://news.tj/en/news/russian-troops-will-not-be-used-suppressing-protests-tajikistan-says-
csto-secretary-general.
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and Kyrgyzstan), the eruption of violence in one part of the region affects 
another part and, like this, becomes an issue which involves the territories of 
various states. The large number of enclaves and the absence of delimited 
and demarcated borders increase the complexity of communal and ethnic 
relations. The fertile valley, where land is scarce due to dense population and 
where one ethnic group so often lives surrounded by another, is commonly 
perceived as an ethno-political powder-keg. Tensions escalate when violent 
incidents in one country not only draw attention in the neighboring country 
but also prompt it to mobilize its security forces to prevent the disorder from 
spreading, thereby unleashing mutual accusations over the operation of for-
eign agencies and terrorist groups in their respective territories. The role of 
the Ferghana Valley as one of the main routes (“the North corridor”) for nar-
cotics from Afghanistan and its reputation, brought about in the late 1990s, 
for being a “hub” of Islamic activities, increase the complexity of conflict at 
the inter-state level.
Ethnically polarized conflicts between the Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek 
populations have occurred frequently over the past three years in the Kyrgyz-
stani Batken and Osh regions.21 On January 11, 2014, a border skirmish over
road construction resulted in violent conflict that included hostage-taking 
amongst the Tajik and Kyrgyz populations in the enclaves in the undemar-
cated border zone between the two countries.22 During May 7–8, about 60 
people on both sides were reported to have been injured in interethnic clashes
which resulted in the blockage of the Isfara-Vorukh road by the Kyrgyz and 
the Batken-Isfara road by the Tajiks; the former road runs through a Kyrgyz 
village, and the latter through a Tajik village. Because these territories are 
deeply intertwined violence has erupted on the Kyrgyz as well as the Tajik 
(and Uzbek) sides, even if media attention has focused on Kyrgyzstan in par-
ticular.23 The neighboring states have complained that Kyrgyzstan’s social 
                                                          
21 “Vorukh vyshel iz blokady,” Radio Ozodi, April 28, 2013,
http://rus.ozodi.org/content/tensions-in-vorukh-ended/24970574.html; Malika Sharif, 
“Kak izmenilis’ otnosheniia mezhdu kirgizami i uzbekami posle konflikta,” Deutsche Welle 
online, July 22, 2010, http://dw.com/p/ORdt.
22 “Na kirgizsko-tadzhikskoi granitse proizoshla perestrelka mezhdu pogranichnikami, est’ 
ranenye,” REGNUM, January 11, 2014, http://www.regnum.ru/news/17533343.
html#ixzz2s4fyQ1Ta.
23 “Rasstrel demonstrantov v Andizhane – prestuplenie, ne imeiushchee istoricheskoi davnos-
ti,” Jarayon.com, May 23, 2015, http://jarayon.com/ru/index.php/2012-04-03-17-13-06/
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and ethnic tensions and political conflict, as well as Bishkek’s changing re-
gimes, have resulted in the inability of the country’s central authorities to 
properly govern the difficult territory in the south of Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz-
stan, for its part, has blamed local Tajiks for “hooliganism,” and initiatives 
were formulated that ranged from closing the border crossing points to in-
creasing the fees for transit, although these were only partly implemented. 
Alexander Knyazev, a Russian analyst, expressed the opinion that “the Kyr-
gyz officials are looking for an external enemy to mobilize the population; 
and Tajikistan, in comparison with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, with which 
the Kyrgyz Republic also has border tensions, is the least dangerous coun-
try.”24 Both countries started constructing longer road routes that bypass the 
villages populated by the titular ethnic group of the neighboring country.  
However, the fact that closing the border would have negative conse-
quences for the economies of both countries ultimately pushed the two gov-
ernments to try to resolve the conflict by diplomatic means. Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan have had a joint border commission since 2002 and have been 
able to define 50–60 percent of their almost one-thousand kilometer-long 
mutual borderline. Although the CSTO, of which both countries are mem-
bers, refrained from openly intervening in the conflicts that erupted in spring 
2014, its assistance was clear from the results of the visit of the organiza-
tion’s Secretary General, Nikolai Bordiuzha, to Dushanbe and Bishkek in 
February 2014: after this meeting Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan continued their 
negotiations without further outbursts of violence.25 Earlier, in late spring 
2010, the social upheaval and interethnic violence between Uzbek and Kyr-
gyz populations in south-western Kyrgyzstan and the city of Osh had demon-
strated how such conflicts could create dissent within the organization and 
negatively affect its reputation. In spring 2015, at a time when Tajikistan and 
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Kyrgyzstan were already in diplomatic negotiations to solve the problems of 
communal violence in Ferghana, they also confirmed their willingness to 
cooperate in their search for solutions to these conflicts within the frame of 
the CIS. 
Both the tightened security situation in the region as well as the benefits 
that are expected to accrue from mutual economic cooperation have brought 
Dushanbe and Bishkek together in trying to find solutions to communal vio-
lence in the Ferghana Valley. However, without Uzbekistan’s participation 
the bilateral efforts to control the flow of drugs and militant insurgency can-
not be effective.26 In the Alay mountain ranges the borders of the three states 
converge in rough terrain that shelters illegal trade routes as well as insurgent 
groups linked with IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir. If the routes in Ferghana were 
closed they could be redirected through Pamir areas, and new air routes using 
small planes across the largely mined land border of Uzbekistan could also 
be opened. The hostilities between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which have to 
do with historical conflicts and present-day economic and energy relations, 
have created obstacles to the mutual cooperation of the two countries 
throughout the years of their independence. Tajikistan’s tightened policies 
towards the political forces of Islam have an appeasing effect on relations 
with Uzbekistan because Dushanbe’s moderate policies were not initially in 
line with Tashkent’s expectations. Throughout the three countries’ years of 
independence Uzbekistan’s suppression of radical Islam has pushed these 
forces across its borders. More recently this has meant that the IMU has con-
nected with especially the activity of Jamaat Ansarullah (“Allah Associates 
Society”) in the north of Tajikistan—a group that has been vocal in con-
demning the Russian military presence in Tajikistan.27 Closing the front of 
radical Islam in the intersection of the three countries requires Uzbekistan’s 
cooperation; and burying the peace deal by banning the IRPT is conducive 
towards this end.
                                                          
26 The borderline between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan is 1,378 km, of which 337 km have 
been agreed upon (as of June 2014); the rest remains disputed and under negotiation.
27 Igor Rotar, “Moscow and Dushanbe Strengthen Their Military Alliance,” Eurasia Daily 
Monitor 10, no. 184 (October 16, 2013), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?
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Negotiating Frontier Security with Russia
In the military sense Russia’s role in Tajikistan today does not fundamentally 
differ from the role it played there during the civil war when it sent forces to 
secure the Dushanbe airport and the Afghan border, nominally in the CIS 
frame and under the Tashkent treaty (CST). However, while this backing at 
that time was used to weld together a country from the pieces of the former 
Soviet republic, today its military presence provides external backing to the 
burial of the process envisioned in the Peace Accords. From the point of 
view of both Russia and Tajikistan, the dilemma is that while insecurity in 
the wider region seems to necessitate tightening the belt of security vis-a-vis 
not only the Taliban but also the Islamic State (IS) which provides support 
and intermingles with regional insurgency, this belt also threatens to break up 
Tajikistan from the inside and to deepen the conflict north of the Panj and 
Amu Darya rivers.  
Russia’s two-track approach in security cooperation, which includes 
multilateral cooperation in the CSTO and cooperation based on bilateral 
agreements, provides it with a decisive role in most issues while at the same 
time allowing it to use the formal legitimacy of the multilateral frame of co-
operation. Such complementarity is practical in the situation that pertains 
here, where the organization’s collective security (that is, aggression against 
one is considered as aggression against all) applies at the Afghan border, but 
the actual threat from the south as well as from other directions appears in 
other forms. Terrorism, religious extremism and narcotraffic are the actual 
issues on the cooperation agenda between Russia and Tajikistan. On the eve 
of 2015, Russia’s special representative to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, 
warned that up to five thousand “Islamists” were concentrated in northern 
Afghanistan and that at least three camps were each training some fifty mili-
tants every two months with recruits from the Central Asian countries.28
While the Taliban is growing with these non-Pashtun groups, this ebbing 
towards Afghanistan threatens to turn into a returning flood, thereby creating 
a new “Afghan front” for Russia and leading to the crumbling of the outer 
edge of its power that had been set by the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. This 
                                                          
28 “Russian Ambassador Warns of Afghan Problems Spilling across Border,” ASIA-Plus,
Dushanbe, December 30, 2014, http://news.tj/en/news/russian-ambassador-warns-afghan-
problems-spilling-across-border. Kabulov’s original interview was given to Interfax.
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means that Tajikistan’s role is more than one of being merely a control zone 
for violent insurgency and illegal economic transactions: it is also a zone of 
containment for ideological influence. 
Russia has a long historical tradition of flexible outer borders that inter-
twine geopolitics and ideology, and the habitual space shared by Tajiks in-
side Afghanistan has played a significant role in such frontier dynamics in 
Central Asia. Historians have argued that the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, 
which was established in December 1929 to replace the Tajik ASSR within 
the Uzbek SSR, was actually formed to reflect and politically utilize the 
closely bonded relations between Tajiks on both sides of the bordering riv-
er.29 By providing the Tajik population with the privilege of having their 
own titular republic within the USSR, Moscow’s decision-makers wished to 
attract the “new Afghanistan” and bring it under Soviet influence. Such an 
opportunity existed when, in early 1929, ethnic Tajiks came to power in Af-
ghanistan as a people who represented the lower stratum of Afghan society 
and, thus, were able to share in the ideology of the Soviet state. However, 
events soon took another course: Pashtun tribes and Great Britain supported 
Muhammad Nadir-shah, who captured Kabul in October 1929 and was de-
clared king. 
Another opportunity to connect Afghanistan to the Soviet sphere came 
half a century later, in 1978, with the establishment of the Democratic Re-
public of Afghanistan. A coup known as the Saur Revolution brought to 
power the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which, 
however, soon succumbed to ideological strife between its radical and mod-
erate wings. In December 1979 the Soviet Union intervened to support the
moderates led by Babrak Karmal and, much too late in 1986, to launch a pol-
icy of national reconciliation under the leadership of Muhammad Najibullah. 
During the decade-long Soviet quagmire, which ended with the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops in the months from May 1988 to February 1989, ethnic Ta-
jiks acted as advisers and interpreters and in this way played a bridging role 
between Afghan authorities and Soviet power. Because the Russians were 
unable to understand Dari (the variety of the Persian language spoken in Af-
ghanistan), they invited Tajiks to implement Soviet policies.30
                                                          
29 A. D. Bogaturov, Sistemnaia istoriia mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii, vol. 1 (Moscow: 
Kul’turnaia Revoliutsiia, 2007), 210.
30 The communist leaders were all Pashtun, but in Afghanistan and Tajikistan Babrak Karmal 
was also recognized as a nephew of the ethnic Tajik Habibulloh (Bachai Sako) from his 
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Even after the Soviet troops had pulled back from Afghanistan to the Ta-
jik border in early 1989, and the Panj and Amu Darya rivers had, for the first 
time in their history, become a militarily sealed borderline, Moscow still con-
sidered the northern part of Afghanistan—inhabited as it was by ethnic Ta-
jiks and Uzbeks—very much as its external borderland. There were still 
hopes that northern Afghanistan could be linked with Soviet Central Asia in 
energy networks and other economic cooperation, and that the Hindu Kush 
mountain range in the east could in this way be included in a line of defense 
against the political unrest and clan turmoil to the south. However, the fol-
lowing years made it clear that the line of containment of radical Islam was 
much farther to the north, along the banks of the border river.31 This was a 
line, thin not only in terms of geo-space but also ethnically and politically, as 
well as in terms of the law enforcement structures that could be established in 
order to curtail the trade in opiates and other illegal border crossings. Al-
ready during the final years of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan’s economic situa-
tion had been dire, and its southern regions had been hit by starvation. When 
the civil war brought a further drastic deterioration in social conditions, the 
contraband of opiates and gemstones in the Pamir region became a way of 
survival for large parts of the civilian population. It also became a source of 
income for those militant Islamist groups who had refused to disarm and 
chosen to regain their strength on the other side of the southern border.  
The civil war led to the withdrawal of the radical opposition and militant 
insurgency into the Afghan and Pakistani border zones, and the massive 
ISAF presence held the situation in abeyance. Nevertheless, it was not until 
2005–2006 that the Russian border guards left the border to Afghanistan un-
der Tajikistan’s control. The return of Russian border guards to the Afghan 
border has been on and off the bilateral agenda ever since December 2010, 
when Russia began to apply pressure on Tajikistan over this issue.32 Russia’s 
                                                                                                                            
mother’s side. However, Pashtun was his declared ethnicity and, in practice, formed a con-
dition of becoming a general in Afghanistan.
31 During the 1980s Moscow had sought to initiate national reconciliation in Afghanistan. By 
autumn 1987 it had become clear that this had failed in regions south of the Hindu Kush. 
Joseph Newman, Jr., “The Future of Northern Afghanistan,” Asian Survey 28, no. 7 (July
1988): 729–39.
32 In 2005 Tajikistan decided against continuing the agreement from 1992, which had tasked 
Russian troops with controlling the border. The number of Russian border guards amounted 
to 12,000 (70–80 percent of whom were Tajikistani citizens employed by the Russian bor-
der guard corps). The Russians left in 2005–2006 (after having been there ever since the 
borders of the Uzbek SSR began to be guarded in the 1930s). Some 300 advisers and ex-
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expressed concern was over the massive flow of opiates across the border, 
but Tajikistani authorities were able to deflect this by arguing that this specif-
ic problem could not be solved by increasing manpower at the border.33
Solving this problem, they argued, required international cooperation in sev-
eral multilateral formats, including the CIS and the SCO. At the CSTO meet-
ing in Sochi in September 2013, President Rakhmon (Rakhmonov with the
Slavic names ending used until March 2007) asked for support for the Tajiki-
stani law enforcement bodies in their task of managing the border with Af-
ghanistan, and at the next meeting in Moscow in May 2014, he called to 
mind that the promises of a CSTO resolution on the provision of military 
technology had not been fulfilled. A few weeks later the Council of the 
Heads of State of the CIS reached a decision signed by the CSTO members 
(Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) on assis-
tance to Tajikistan in regard to the fortification and development of the bor-
der area with Afghanistan; its implementation was left to the bilateral rela-
tions between Tajikistan and the other signatories.34 The smaller members of 
the CSTO have little reason to commit any substantive amounts of their own 
scarce resources but, within Tajikistan, an increase in the number of partners 
clearly serves a policy profile that seeks to show Tajikistan’s independence 
from Russia.
After Tajikistan’s parliament in October 2013 ratified the agreement that 
extends the Russian use of the base in Tajikistan until 2042, a series of bilat-
eral agreements have ensured Russia’s military presence in the country and, 
thus, also the possibility to quickly mobilize troops along the border. Rus-
sia’s direct and permanent presence at the border has little strategic military 
significance in relation to the bilateral cooperation developed inside the 
country for tracking illegal border crossings and setting up the collective air 
force of the CSTO. In December 2014, the leaders of the CSTO member 
                                                                                                                            
perts remained. Their number was later reduced to several tens only. More recently, the 
number has once again been increased and today also the border agency of the CIS member 
states focuses on the Afghan border.
33 See Introduction, note 15 in this book. The drug traffic has increased in recent years despite 
international efforts to curb opiate cultivation in Afghanistan, and the economic situation in 
Afghanistan leaves little economic and political space for the regime in Kabul to curb the 
flow. Sergei Balmasov, “Russian Border Guards to Fight Taliban,” Pravda.ru, December 
17, 2010, http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/conflicts/17-12-2010/116248-russia
_tajikistan_afghanistan-0/.
34 “CIS to Provide Assistance to Tajikistan in Strengthening of Tajik-Afghan Border Protec-
tion,” AKIpress, Bishkek, June 5, 2014, http://www.akipress.com/news:542655/.
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states agreed upon developing a comprehensive and functionally flexible 
collective air force which includes military transport and special aviation 
units of not only the armed forces but also police forces, interior troops and 
security agencies.35 The collective force remains effectively under Russian 
control, and the disparity of capabilities is especially striking in relation to 
Tajikistan, which possesses but one squadron of small aircraft. 
An episode in this development has been the negotiations between Tajik-
istan and Russia over the use of the Ayni airfield, which is located in the vi-
cinity of Dushanbe and lies just ten minutes away from the Rasht region by 
air, and which was reopened in autumn 2010 after its modernization with 
Indian technical and financial support worth $70 million. The question over 
the use of Ayni had gone unanswered since summer 2007, when Tajikistan 
announced that it was not negotiating over the use of the base with India.36
However, it was not until May 2013 that an announcement was made to the 
effect that the Ayni airfield would be part of Russia’s military base in Tajiki-
stan and, together with the facilities in the south, would be used as the key 
base for the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force.37 Tajikistan used Ayni 
as a bargaining chip in the bundle of issues concerning the financing of the 
Rogun hydropower station and the rents that could be gained from the use of 
the main base as well as Ayni. Although Russia did not signal that it would 
make any promises in regard to financing the Rogun power station, and alt-
hough Russia’s opinion on compensation was that this would come in form 
of modernizing Tajikistan’s security forces, the negotiations over Ayni and 
the delay in the ratification of the agreement on extending the Russian base 
in Tajikistan show Dushanbe’s determination in trying to bargain for re-
sources in exchange for Russia’s military presence. 
                                                          
35 “CSTO Summit Adopts Joint Statement, 19 Resolutions, Two Protocols,” TASS, Moscow,
December 23, 2014, http://tass.ru/en/world/768706.The cooperation in the CIS frame in the 
1990s already included development of joint air force.
36 India did not jeopardize its relations with Russia with favorable arms deals because of 
Ayni. It was left with the smaller field in Farkhor, which it had renovated for some $10 mil-
lion.
37 In October 2014, President Rakhmon met with Nikolai Patrushev, head of Russia’s federal 
security services; the details of the discussion have not been made public. “Russia Con-
cerned Over Tajik-Afghan Border Security,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, November 
11, 2014, http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/13087-russia-
concerned-over-tajik-afghan-border-security.html.
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High Stakes for Energy Sufficiency and Beyond
The lack of energy is the primary resource problem undermining Tajikistan’s 
eight million inhabitants’ support for the government. Coal-burning during 
cold winters is a health hazard and has even led to deaths, and the repeated 
cut-offs initiated by Uzbekistan in the flow of energy have seriously harmed 
the state-owned Tajikistan Aluminum Company (Talco) which, in Turzunza-
de in the immediate vicinity of the Uzbekistani border, produces more than 
60 percent of Tajikistan’s export revenue.38 As a consequence it is crucially 
important for the Tajikistani government to capture the political moment in 
regard to developing Afghanistan in order to diversify its economic relations 
and to participate in large-scale energy projects that could drastically reduce 
its dependence on Russian investment and energy and, above all, on the en-
ergy resources of neighboring Uzbekistan. Throughout the years of inde-
pendence the conflict-ridden relationship with Uzbekistan—the country 
through which Tajikistan must transit to Russia and Europe—has created 
major obstacles to developing its economic capacities. Air traffic between 
Tashkent and Dushanbe was halted in 1992, and Uzbekistan has on many 
occasions halted trains transporting vital items for Tajikistan’s agriculture 
and industry. This has become all the more burdensome because the bilateral 
economic relations in terms of Russian investments in Tajikistan and any 
structural development of the mutual economic relations have been in sharp 
decline. At the same time as Eurasian economic integration has been ad-
vanced within the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU, also abbreviated as 
EAEU), Tajikistan has lost the kind of individualized, special relationship it 
had still had with Moscow in the aftermath of its civil war.39
Moscow’s failure to fulfill its initial promise to support the moderniza-
tion of the Soviet-era power plant in Rogun has caused major disappointment 
in Tajikistan. With a height of 335 meters the Rogun dam was planned to 
become the tallest dam in the world and to make Tajikistan a major exporter 
                                                          
38 In order to avoid such extreme vulnerability, Talco has developed a capacity to use domes-
tic coal instead of Uzbek gas, which causes its own environmental problems.
39 Russia has not made any major investments in Tajikistan since the Sangtuda hydropower 
station in 2009. The treaty for the establishment of the EEU was signed on May 29, 2014, 
by Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and it became effective on January 1, 2015, following 
its ratification by the parliaments of those three countries. Armenia signed the agreement on 
accession in October 2014, and Kyrgyzstan in December 2014.
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of electric power. The Russian aluminum giant RUSAL negotiated a bilateral 
agreement with Tajikistan in 2004 as a trade-off for a nominal one-dollar 
lease for Russia’s military base, yet it withdrew from the deal to avoid con-
flict arising between Tashkent and Moscow. Uzbekistan, a downstream 
country and ill-disposed to Tajikistan’s entry into the energy market, has 
been fiercely opposed to the Rogun plan and shown itself willing only to ac-
cept a far smaller hydropower station. Although Moscow’s “promise” was a 
deal concluded through an oligarchic company and never resulted in a plan 
that would also have committed the Russian government, the withdrawal of 
support left not only Tajikistan’s elites but the entire population disillu-
sioned: Russia had signaled very clearly that it would not risk its relations 
with the larger and economically stronger Uzbekistan by showing solidarity 
with Tajikistan.40
In 2008, Tajikistan founded the Open Joint-Stock Company NBO Rogun 
and, in 2010, launched a country-wide campaign which obliged every family 
in this poorest of countries in Central Asia to buy stocks of the $3–5 billion 
megaproject which had now become a national symbol and personally asso-
ciated with the president. In September 2014, after several years of delays
due to ongoing environmental impact assessments in the frame of the World 
Bank, an evaluation came to the conclusion that, subject to design changes 
and safety measures based on three design options ranging from 1,220 to 
1,290m, the dam was the type of high-risk yet potentially highly rewarding 
hydroelectric power project that the World Bank would accept under the 
condition that the resettlement of some 42,000 people could be adequately 
solved. Using the political momentum of developing energy grids benefiting 
the development of Afghanistan, Tajikistan has been seeking to invite exter-
nal investment by lobbying hard in the world’s capitals and exempting (by 
way of a presidential decree in February 2014) the Rogun HPP construction 
owner and contractor from taxes.41
A potentially game-changing endeavor for Tajikistan is the CASA-1000
power transmission project—a $500 million project financed by a group of 
                                                          
40 After the U.S. had left the base in Karshi-Khanabad following the Andijon events in 2005, 
Uzbekistan became ready to rejoin the CSTO.
41 Human Rights Watch, “Q&A: The Human Fallout from Tajikistan’s Dam Project,” June 25, 
2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/25qa-human-fallout-tajikistans-dam-project;
“Finalized Assessment Studies for Rogun Project Find It’s Possible to Safely Build and 
Operate Dam,” AKIpress, Bishkek, September 3, 2014, http://www.akipress.com/news:
546870/.
155
global development banks and connecting Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan in order to export electric power.42 The Tajikistan-
Kyrgyzstan electricity network is planned to be operational by 2018 and will 
use the excess of summer energy in Tajikistan made possible by new facili-
ties there. The use of summer energy is envisioned by the Tajikistani leader-
ship to be only the first phase. The ultimate, game-changing prospect for Ta-
jikistan in the CASA-1000 project is that if the Rogun power station con-
struction could be completed in time (current plans aim for 2021–2022), this 
would massively increase Tajikistan’s capacity to produce electricity for ex-
port. The plan to construct Rogun awaits external financing, and in the mean-
time CASA-1000 represents rather more than just this one project for Tajiki-
stan: it is a base for performing a “quantum leap” that could turn energy-poor 
Tajikistan into an electric power-exporting country. As the flagship for the 
“New Silk Roads” approach launched by the U.S., the project has exception-
al political weight internationally. However, building the transmission line in 
the Afghan-Pakistani border zone is a major challenge because of the deeply 
conflictual political terrain, and this problem can be solved neither in the In-
ter-Governmental Council set up by the four states nor through the agree-
ments of the Joint Economic Commission of Dushanbe and Islamabad.43
Tajikistan did not join the Eurasian Economic Union as readily as did 
Kyrgyzstan (which joined in December 2014); instead, it has set up six work-
ing groups to study the benefits and problems of membership.44 In a country 
where 50–70 percent of the active workforce are migrant workers in Russia 
there is no alternative to joining. Moreover, the EEU is the only frame which 
exists in the region for comprehensive economic integration, and it can also 
be expected to offer new possibilities, in particular in the context of the 
planned integrated energy market.45 Nonetheless the EEU, which brings in 
                                                          
42 The main financers of the $500 million project are the World Bank, the International Bank 
for Development, the Islamic Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development. Initially, Russia proposed a $500 million investment for the Tajiki-
stan-Kyrgyzstan energy line, but the reimbursement and other conditions were not accepted 
by these two countries. Contrary to its previous plans, the Asian Development Bank decid-
ed in late spring 2013 not to participate due to the security risks in Afghanistan. 
43 Tajikistan and Pakistan have established a Joint Economic Commission and reached agree-
ment on the CASA project at the governmental level.
44 Saodat Olimova, “Tajikistan’s Prospects of Joining the Eurasian Economic Union,” Russian 
Analytical Digest, no. 165 (March 17, 2015),
http://www.laender-analysen.de/russland/rad/pdf/Russian_Analytical_Digest_165.pdf.
45 The Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC, established in 1991) never became 
operative due to mutual distrust, territory claims and other disputes between the Central 
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Kazakhstan and other member states, does not offer a sufficient frame for a 
consortium to finance Rogun as long as Russia declines to play any major 
role. This situation forces Tajikistan to seek investment from elsewhere, in-
cluding from China, Iran and the Arab states; this, in turn, may remain a 
long-term prospect should China choose to wait and see how the EEU im-
pacts the region, and should Western states’ commitment to financing CASA 
reduce their interest in contributing to the regionally controversial Rogun 
project. Additionally, the richer Arab states are unlikely to make significant 
contributions to a project that angers Uzbekistan, which is a far more im-
portant market than Tajikistan due to its energy wealth and population of 28 
million. 
Because Russia’s economic support for Tajikistan has declined, Tajiki-
stan looks for economic resources first and foremost in its relations with 
China. The fact that Tajikistan is a neighbor of the world’s second-largest 
economy is visible not only in the commodity market but, increasingly, also 
in major infrastructure projects including energy, industry and the construc-
tion business (in particular, building roads and tunnels as well as urban envi-
ronments). In spite of Uzbekistan’s strong opposition and lobbying efforts, 
China is building a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which is economically more rational than the 
longer route through Uzbekistan. As this project also shows, Dushanbe is 
logistically coming closer to China through Kyrgyzstan, which connects the 
northern Sugd region to trade flows from China. Because Chinese interests 
are seen to largely follow business and economic rules, cooperation with 
China is considered to be more promising in terms of long-term stability than 
is cooperation with Russia, which has the reputation of prioritizing political 
interests.46 While relations with Russia are increasingly focused on security, 
Tajikistan needs to look elsewhere for economic help. In relation to the EEU, 
it cannot avoid accession (in order to avoid the political and economic con-
sequences of not joining) and is waiting to see what benefits this integration 
perhaps could bring in the future. 
                                                                                                                            
Asian states. In 2005 it merged with the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), which 
had (on paper only) preceded the EEU.
46 Khamrokhon Zarifi, “Tadzhikistan i Kitai: dobrososedstvo, druzhba i sotrudnichestvo vo 
imia mira, stabil’nosti i protsvetaniia,” People’s Daily, April 27, 2010, http://russian.
people.com.cn/31521/6964733.html.
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Conclusion: the Problematic Equation of Security
Tajikistan’s government has repeatedly confirmed its determination to fight 
terrorism, extremism and criminal groups, both through its action and in its 
announcements. This sends a message to its declared enemies and also sig-
nals that Tajikistan is a responsible member of the international community 
and able to control its own territory; not doing so would leave room for spec-
ulation over its status as a “failed state” and raise questions about the need 
for external intervention (that is, intervention by Russia and the CSTO) in 
order to secure the southern border. Similarly, the aim to expand the space 
for independent policy-making and to decrease dependence on Russia induc-
es Tajikistan’s leadership to welcome security cooperation with a large num-
ber of countries, including the U.S. (in the context of its regional cooperation 
and bilateral assistance) and China (its assistance in improving the facilities 
of the border guard corps and army). Nonetheless it is the Russian military 
presence which is the whole backbone of security; and not only as a collec-
tive security arrangement for external security but also as political support to 
the government in Tajikistan. 
Simultaneously the relationship with Russia is increasingly problematic: 
at a crucial moment when the Taliban may be increasing its power in Af-
ghanistan’s north, the relationship with Moscow is narrowing and becoming 
emphatically security-related and ever more of a security guarantee against 
radical Islamist influence, which again easily makes the conflicts stemming 
from Tajikistan’s civil war resurface. The fact that Russia is no longer help-
ing to build Tajikistan as a state but, instead, seeks to increase its own mili-
tary presence in the country by expanding the base system and inviting more 
Tajiks to serve in its own forces, undermines the legitimacy of the close rela-
tionship with Russia and leaves a large part of the population disillusioned 
whose experience of the greatness of the huge country they were part of in 
the Soviet era may yet be an asset to build the future. In this situation it is 
understandable that the Tajikistani government attempts to repair the social 
elements of legitimate relations with Russia by bargaining economic re-
sources in exchange for Russia’s military presence. Tajikistan’s bargaining 
attitude has been met with annoyance in Moscow, where the argument per-
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tains that Russia is in Tajikistan so as to avert common threats.47 Clearly, the 
bargaining that Tajikistan’s leadership can accomplish remains within the 
limits of the considerations relating to its own position and power in the 
cleaved state. All the same, such bargaining shows how the smaller party is 
trying to negotiate resources and expand the space of its independence within 
the context of its own difficult security situation and geopolitical location. 
While the consequences of economic integration into the EEU cannot yet 
be established, the picture in the field of security is already clear: Tajikistan 
is being developed as a terrain for Russia’s forward-pushed defense and, un-
like the borderline to which the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989, the border is 
now a space prepared for the projection of power. Russia consolidates its 
base system in Tajikistan, and it also modernizes the Tajikistani army. How-
ever, it does not use nearly as many funds to renovate the Tajikistani forces 
as it uses for Kyrgyzstan (which in autumn 2012 was promised a sum ex-
ceeding $1 billion, a figure which is almost double the amount Tajikistan has 
received since 2005). This does not signal that Russia is drawing away from 
the Afghan border and towards the north but, instead, that the border is be-
coming a wider zone of defense arrangements. The extent to which Russia 
also participates in the collective effort to train and equip Afghanistan and 
makes arrangements for security cooperation with the government in Kabul 
is a welcome development from the perspective of Dushanbe: rather than 
focusing on Tajikistan as the theater of its forward-pushed defense, Russia 
now moves across the border and defends Tajikistan from within the territory 
of Afghanistan. However, as long as Russia remains unwilling to cross the 
border with troops and heavy weaponry, the pressure on Tajikistan as Rus-
sia’s “Afghan border” can only marginally be decreased. 
These developments have buried once and for all the already initially ra-
ther weak idea that Tajikistan’s Peace Accords could present an example for 
Afghanistan, and Tajikistan’s leadership is now in the process of looking for 
a new role to play in mediating in the conflict. Based on the “Persian” cultur-
al profile which has been built in post-civil war Tajikistan, the argument fre-
quently proposed by the Tajik president has been that, because Tajikistan 
alone amongst the “Persian countries” has the tradition of a secular regime, it 
is well-positioned to act as a mediator in negotiations in which Afghanistan 
                                                          
47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Interv’iu stats-sekretaria –
zamestitelia Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii.”
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and Iran are one party and the world community led by the Western states the
other party.48  The notion of cultural identity is a strategy to raise Tajikistan’s 
diplomatic profile and help to resolve the political bottleneck of Iran, which 
is hampering the building of those logistical routes that would also benefit 
Tajikistan. While the gamble of Tajikistan’s leadership in the energy field to 
create a financing consortium for Rogun entails a game-changing “quantum” 
leap, the same can be concluded in regard to an idea which attempts to appeal 
to actors as diverse as Iran, Afghanistan and the U.S. These diplomatic ef-
forts convey much about the unifying identity project of the Tajikistani state 
and no doubt will succeed to some extent in fusing shut the ideological lines 
of division which the frontier towards the Taliban and the Islamic State in 
Afghanistan is tearing open within Tajikistan. However, these divisions can 
only be significantly alleviated by improving the economic situation and the 
social conditions of life within the country. It is for this reason that the stakes 
are high in the infrastructure projects of energy cooperation: should they fail, 
social pressures will increase and there will be political forces to utilize 
these; the government would further tighten its grip and political polarization 
would increase. In this case, the conflict smoldering beneath the surface in 
Tajikistan would become increasingly difficult to contain and the landscape 
of war and violence could also open up north of the Panj and the Amu Darya. 
                                                          
48 “Rakhmon predlozhil privlech’ k rabote v OBSE Afganistan,” 24 Mir TV, January 23, 
2014, http://mir24.tv/news/politics/9723906.
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Uzbekistan’s Balancing Act: A Game of Chance 
for Independent External Policies
Vadim Romashov
In Uzbekistan, like in the other countries in the region, the uncertainty related 
to the current developments in Afghanistan as well as the declarations of the 
U.S. on reforming the military mission there have affected the geopolitical 
environment and aroused speculation regarding the transformation and relo-
cation of the foreign military presence. Compounded by the increasing rival-
ry between the U.S. and Russia for regional influence, Uzbekistan’s main 
goal is to retain maximum independence in its external policies. Tashkent 
holds its foreign partners at a distance with divergent regional strategies 
whilst simultaneously keeping all avenues open for additional security guar-
antees in order to ensure stability at its state borders.
Since gaining independence in 1991, Uzbekistan’s external policy has 
been characterized by constant fluctuations in its relations with international 
actors who aim to project their political and economic power onto the region. 
Uzbek analysts traditionally share the view that the country pursues a “multi-
vector” policy, referring to this as “foreign policy pragmatism” or “foreign 
relations diversification.”1 Outside experts often describe Uzbekistan’s poli-
cy as one that “swings” between a close relationship with Moscow and the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and cooperation with Wash-
ington and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such terms, no-
tably “pendulum diplomacy” or “zigzag policy,” have been applied repeated-
ly to describe frequent reorientations in the direction taken by Uzbekistani 
external policy.2 However, labeling Uzbekistan’s foreign policy in such ways 
                                                          
1 For example, see Adhamdjon Yunusov, Yakov Umansky and D. Zainutdinova, “National 
Interests and Pragmatism in the Foreign Policy of Uzbekistan,” in Building a Common Fu-
ture: Indian and Uzbek Perspectives on Security and Economic Issues, ed. P. Stobdan, 
(Delhi: Hardev Printers, 1999), 20–36; Rafik Saifulin, “How Myths Are Born: A View 
from Tashkent on the CSTO and Central Asia,” Russia in Global Affairs, no. 3 (July–
September 2012).
2 For examples of the use of the terms “swing,” “pendulum,” and “zigzag” see Jyotsna Bakh-
shi, “Russia and Uzbekistan Sign ‘Treaty of Alliance Relations’,” Institute for Defense 
Studies and Analyses Comment, December 27, 2005,
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has several serious conceptual limitations. This chapter aims to address the 
limitations of the “pendulum perspective” on Uzbekistani policies and em-
ploys another approach, which allows a better understanding of the complex 
relations Tashkent has with its foreign partners.
From physics we know that a pendulum-like motion implies moving to 
one direction with a synchronous departure from another, opposite direction 
and to which it must ultimately return. Applying this logic to Tashkent’s di-
plomacy, policy must constantly swing back and forth between the two sides, 
but in fact the external strategy of Uzbekistan is far more complicated than 
this logic implies. It may include simultaneously moving in both, seemingly 
opposite, directions and, thus, contraposing and superimposing one strategy 
over another. Moreover, an idealized model of the “geopolitical pendulum” 
commonly places Uzbekistani diplomacy in-between the two positions char-
acterized as pro-Russian and pro-U.S. directions. Such an approach based on 
the dualistic division of its policy orientation neglects the country’s im-
portant relations with China, Turkey, the European Union (EU), Iran, India, 
and other influential actors involved in the region’s politics.
A view of Tashkent’s foreign policy in the frame of the swinging pendu-
lum, however, presupposes that there is a period of time available in which to 
calculate policy reorientation. Thus, we may identify a predictivist perspec-
tive here, a belief in the possibility to forecast foreign policy transformations
with calculated certainty. This belief induces fallacious expectations of an 
inevitable, radical shift in Uzbekistani external strategy within a defined pe-
riod.3 In this way, the importance of chance, changing circumstances and 
situational junctures in foreign and domestic affairs is downplayed. The ana-
                                                                                                                            
http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/RussiaandUzbekistanSignTreatyofAllianceRelati
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Uzbekistan,” Uzbekistan Initiative Papers, no. 2 (February 2014), http://origin.library.
constantcontact.com/download/get/file/1110347635144-152/UI+papers+ht2-
Farkhad+Tolipov.pdf.
3 For instance, Murat Laumulin, a Kazakh researcher, estimates that the “Uzbek pendulum” 
swings every two to three years. See Laumulin, “Virtual Security of Central Asia: The 
CSTO in the face of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Russia in Global Affairs, no. 
3 (July–September 2012).
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lytical idea of a pendulum-like external policy mechanism can also affect 
strategic decision-making in the countries that are engaged in Central Asian 
politics. As a final point, such an approach does not answer the critical ques-
tions of why the policy pendulum oscillates and what would constitute its 
“equilibrium position.”
Taking into consideration the limitations of the pendulum approach, this 
chapter presents an alternative view of Uzbekistan’s external policy as a 
“balancing act” that essentially refers to balancing feats performed by a tight-
rope walker rather than to the realist concept of “balance of power.” From 
this perspective, the rope that is stretched taut above the ground appears to be 
the path to a given destination defined by the long-term goals of the coun-
try’s government, acting as a “tightrope walker,” which aims to position Uz-
bekistan as an independent and strong leader of Central Asia. The strategic 
track towards independence and leadership is seen as an equilibrium position 
of Uzbekistani policy, while a tumble from the tightrope would mean the loss 
of the country’s advantageous position in the region. Therefore, the fluctua-
tions of Tashkent’s foreign policy are not the swings of a pendulum but ra-
ther represent efforts to hold the strategic equilibrium. Similar to a tightrope 
walker, who by receiving inertia from many different directions holds onto 
the wire, Uzbekistan attempts to obtain political, military, and economic sup-
port from various international actors in order to secure its independence and 
leading position in the region. Obviously, the wider the amplitude is of the 
wire’s sway caused by circumstantial changes, the bigger the inclination of 
the ropewalker to that side that is able to provide better assistance in main-
taining the balance.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the practices forming the pat-
tern in Uzbekistan’s balancing act. I argue that the drastic changes in the ex-
ternal and internal security environment cause the Uzbekistani strategic 
“rope” to sway and, thus, force the country’s leadership to lean in different 
foreign policy directions. Importantly, for Uzbekistan the changes represent 
both a chance to achieve an advantage in regional politics as well as the risks 
associated with subsequent actions taken by foreign and domestic forces as a 
reaction to the fluctuations of the country’s policy. Such a game of chance 
and risk played by the Uzbekistani government introduces an element of po-
litical gamble to state policies. The goal of this game is to implement inde-
pendence in a way that builds on an Uzbek tradition of power and historical 
past associated with the country’s previously central position in the region. 
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The revival of the past serves the present-day purpose of constructing a uni-
fied national identity in support of the state organization that has been 
formed under the long-lasting reign of President Islam Karimov.
Any examination of Uzbekistan’s relations with Russia must take into 
account Moscow’s indirect influence on strategic decision-making in Tash-
kent. Russia’s policy practices tend to exert specific influence on the policy 
practices of Uzbekistan through various spheres of the interaction between 
the two states, which recently has been affected by conflictual relations be-
tween Tashkent and the CSTO, the modification of Russia’s role in the secu-
rity system of Uzbekistan, and the emergence of Eurasian economic initia-
tives within the region. By focusing on regional security influenced by Mos-
cow-Tashkent relations, this chapter examines important internal-external 
dynamics in the formation and transformation of borders within and around 
Uzbekistan. It analyses official speeches, foreign and defense policy legisla-
tion, international agreements, and media and expert accounts. A broad range 
of sources is needed to alleviate the problem that characterizes research on 
Uzbekistan: limited access to a number of important Uzbekistani official 
documents, including the concepts of National Security and Foreign Policy
Activity.
“Eternal Independence” and the Balancing Act
Independence Day is a widely celebrated holiday in Uzbekistan, to which 
Islam Karimov devotes his long and emotionally colored speeches. At the 
celebration of the twenty-second anniversary of Uzbekistan’s independence 
in 2013, Karimov stated,
“[The] achievement of independence is precisely an opportunity to fulfill our 
great and sacred obligation, that is, to command our destinies and the fate of our 
country on our own, along with its natural, economic and intellectual resources… 
Independence means to be independent of anyone at any time, to secure sustain-
able growth rates of the economy, consistently boost the wellbeing of the popula-
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tion, and bolster the standing and prestige of our country at the international are-
na, taking into account our national interests and long-term objectives.”4
The idea of the country’s “eternal independence” for which Uzbek “forefa-
thers had strived for centuries” is a fundamental element of national ideolo-
gy, and state policy practices have been designed accordingly.5 Foreign poli-
cy is aimed at positioning Uzbekistan as a regional leader, independent from 
external influence in its decision-making. The country’s aspirations to re-
gional leadership are rooted in Central Asian history associated with the 
dominance of Uzbek tribal groupings in Transoxiana, the power of Uzbek 
khanates, and a special role assigned to the Uzbek SSR during Soviet rule. 
Neil Melvin observes that during the national delimitation process in 1924–
1925 held by Moscow planners, Uzbekistan gained the pre-eminent historic 
centers of the region, including most of the territory of the three former 
khanates, and Tashkent became the main city of Central Asia, all of which 
contributed to the further development of a strong Uzbek identity.6
The balance between the extra-regional powers anchoring influence in 
the region, primarily Russia, the U.S. and China, appears to be the way in 
which Uzbekistan realizes its long-term goals. While China’s sources of in-
fluence are based mostly on economic power, Moscow and Washington are 
deeply involved in security cooperation with Tashkent.7 Proceeding from the 
view that Russia and the U.S. are geopolitical rivals in the region, Tashkent 
avoids crossing “the point of no return” in its relations with them. The Uz-
bekistani leadership strives to keep all directions open as options for receiv-
ing security guarantees in case the political conjuncture were to develop in a 
way that would force Uzbekistan to affiliate itself with one of the centers of 
power in order to eliminate immediate security threats and to bargain for bet-
ter treatment from a powerful state or international organization. In the con-
text of the strategic goal to maximize political independence, third-party se-
                                                          
4 Islam Karimov, “Greeting Address at the Festive Event to Celebrate 22nd Anniversary of 
Uzbekistan’s Independence,” Press Service of the President of Uzbekistan, August 31, 
2013, http://www.press-service.uz/en/news/159/.
5 Ibid.
6 Neil Melvin, Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road (Florence, KY: 
Gordon & Breach Publishing, 2000), 91.
7 Unlike Uzbekistan’s 2004 Strategic Partnership Agreement with Russia and the 2002 Dec-
laration on Strategic Partnership with the U.S., the 2012 Declaration on Strategic Part-
nership with China is less focused on security issues and instead concentrates on economic 
cooperation.
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curity guarantees mean a promise by an outside power to provide concrete 
resources and assistance in eliminating security threats, rather than an assur-
ance of direct military intervention to protect the state in situations of threat.
Since independence, the immediate policy objective of Uzbekistan has 
been to reduce Russian influence in Central Asia. However, the civil war in 
Tajikistan that erupted in 1992 between the central government and the Unit-
ed Tajik Opposition of Islamist and democratic forces, compelled Russia and
Uzbekistan to maintain security cooperation. Apprehensive of the spread of 
Islamic radicalism to Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov backed the pro-Russian 
forces of Emomali Rakhmonov (Rakhmon), who became the president of 
Tajikistan in November 1994. In order to neutralize the risks of a possible 
expansion of the Tajik war and rapidly escalating tensions in Afghanistan, 
the Uzbekistani leadership actively supported the idea of creating a collective 
security system with Russia. In May 1992, in Tashkent, Armenia, Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed the Collective 
Security Treaty (CST). As an additional security guarantee, in 1994 Russia 
and Uzbekistan concluded a military cooperation agreement, which involved 
among other issues the joint use of military facilities located on their territo-
ries. Thus, the shared interest of Russia and Uzbekistan in suppressing what 
was referred to as “Islamic extremism” provided the stimulus to preserve 
security ties between the two states.
In August 1998, the Taliban defeated the forces of Abdul Rashid Dos-
tum, the warlord of a separatist movement in the northern, Uzbek-populated 
region of Afghanistan, and proceeded to approach the Uzbekistani border. 
These events prompted Tashkent to conclude that relying solely on military 
ties with Russia was not sufficient to ensure state security, and contacts with 
the U.S. and NATO were activated. In April 1999, Uzbekistan refused to 
renew its membership in the CST and, at the NATO summit in Washington, 
announced its decision to join GUAM, a bloc of pro-Western post-Soviet 
states formed by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. However, in 
summer 1999 the security situation along Uzbekistan’s borders deteriorated 
and slowed down any rapprochement with Western countries: the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), created in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, 
attempted to infringe upon Uzbekistani territory by way of Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Increased danger at the borders brought Tashkent to realize that 
by severing close security ties with Russia this unstable situation could take a 
turn for the worse. Hence, in 1999, Moscow and Tashkent signed an accord 
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on the further enhancement of comprehensive military and military-technical 
cooperation. In May 2001, the two states concluded a cooperation agreement 
on border issues that covered the joint fight against terrorism, illegal migra-
tion, arms and drug trafficking, and the mutual exchange of information, lo-
gistical support, officer training, etc. In addition, later in 2001 the two states 
signed an agreement on the joint use of air forces and air defense systems.8
A chance for Uzbekistan to abandon its security dependence on Russia 
occurred following the 9/11 events in 2001. The International Security Assis-
tance Force (ISAF) began anti-Taliban military operations in Afghanistan, 
and Tashkent offered its support to the U.S. However, President Karimov 
underlined that in order to provide assistance to the anti-terrorist campaign,
Uzbekistan would need to have “guarantees of national security and territori-
al inviolability” and be able to “enhance the combat ability of the armed 
forces and the vigilance on borders.”9 In October 2001, Uzbekistan and the 
U.S. signed an agreement on the use of the Karshi-Khanabad airbase (K2) 
for military operations in Afghanistan and released a joint statement about 
consultations between both states in case of a threat occurring to Uzbeki-
stan’s security and territorial integrity. Based on this cooperation, in March 
2002 the two states signed a Declaration on Strategic Partnership and Coop-
eration. In exchange for the use of the airbase, the U.S. increased the budget-
ed assistance to Uzbekistan, especially in relation to the objective of “peace
and security enhancement.”10 According to Dmitry Gorenburg, military as-
sistance from Washington included two armored river patrol boats, radios, 
upgrades for helicopters, navigations systems, facilities renovations, and 
support in training. During the period 2001–2005, the U.S. and Uzbekistan 
                                                          
8 Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, “Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiiskoi Feder-
atsiei i Respublikoi Uzbekistan o sovmestnom primenenii Voenno-vozdushnykh sil Rossi-
iskoi Federatsii i Voisk protivovozdushnoi oborony i Voenno-vozdushnykh sil Respubliki 
Uzbekistan v interesakh obespecheniia bezopasnosti vozdushnogo prostranstva Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii i Respubliki Uzbekistan,” Biulleten’ mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov, no. 6 (June 
23, 2005).
9 “Uzbekistan May Allow U.S. To Use Its Air Space for Humanitarian Flights,” Interfax,
September 27, 2001 as cit. in “Turkmen Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Sep-
tember 29, 2001, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1347103.html.
10 See Jim Nichol, “Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests,” Congressional 
Research Service, CRS Report, August 21, 2013, 24–25,
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21238.pdf.
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had a broad-scale military cooperation program, and Uzbekistani forces par-
ticipated in a number of NATO-led military exercises.11
In 2001, whilst trying to keep its foreign policy balanced, Uzbekistan 
joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Nevertheless, its ex-
ternal policy remained largely one-sided until the SCO summit of June 2004, 
held in Tashkent, when Uzbekistan made new attempts to balance its policy. 
The SCO adopted a decision to establish a Regional Antiterrorism Structure 
with headquarters in the capital city of Uzbekistan, and Islam Karimov 
signed a Strategic Partnership Treaty with Russia, which provided for close 
cooperation in creating “an enduring and effective system of regional securi-
ty in Central Asia.”12 The parties agreed to form consultative mechanisms 
through relevant ministries and agencies to fight terrorism. Once again, the 
terrorist threat was on the agenda: in spring 2004, reportedly, the Islamic 
Jihad Union, a splinter group of the IMU, perpetrated a series of bomb at-
tacks in Uzbekistan.13
In May 2005, the Andijon events suddenly swung Uzbekistan’s strategic 
path towards an independent policy. Western governments attacked Islam 
Karimov over the cruel suppression of riots and repeatedly called for an in-
ternational investigation into the incident; this was rejected by the president 
on the grounds that it would violate state sovereignty.14 The U.S. and EU 
restricted aid and arms exports to Uzbekistan as well as visas for Uzbek offi-
cials, and their assets were frozen. Tashkent turned to Russia and China for 
support. On a visit to Moscow in June 2005, Karimov accused Western 
countries of backing “extremist and radical forces” in Andijon,15 and shortly 
after Uzbekistan left GUAM. At an SCO meeting in July 2005, the president 
                                                          
11 Dmitry Gorenburg, “External Support for Central Asian Military and Security Forces,” 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Working Paper, January 2014, 52, 56, 
http://www.sipri.org/research/security/afghanistan/central-asia-security/publications/SIPRI-
OSFno1WP.pdf.
12 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Dogovor o strategicheskom partnerstve mezhdu 
Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Uzbekistan,” 2004,
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/spd_md.nsf/0/04545C3F32532D6DC3257DB9004735F1 (trans-
lation by Vadim Romashov).
13 Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” 
Congressional Research Service, CRS Report, June 6, 2006, 8,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/68821.pdf.
14 Nichol, “Uzbekistan,” 16–17.
15 President of Russia, “Beginning of a Meeting with Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov,” 
June 28, 2005,
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/06/28/1824_type82914_90517.shtml.
169
of Uzbekistan joined in the declaration of the organization that called for the 
parties of the anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan to “set a deadline for the 
temporary use of… infrastructure facilities of the SCO member states and for 
their military presence in these countries.”16 Thereupon, Tashkent demanded 
that the U.S. withdraw all military units from the base in Karshi-Khanabad 
within six months, and in November 2005 the base was closed.
Under these changed circumstances, Tashkent needed to demonstrate to 
the Western states that the country could not be isolated within its borders 
from the rest of the world, and that it had other strategic partners that could 
help to ensure national security. In November 2005, Russia and Uzbekistan 
signed a Treaty of Alliance, which stipulates that 
“If an act of aggression is committed against one of the sides by any state or 
group of states, this will be viewed as an act of aggression against both sides….
the other side... will provide necessary assistance, including military assistance, 
as well as giving aid through other means at its disposal.”17
The Treaty called for consultations in the event of a security threat to either 
country and emphasized that the states were to pursue the enhancement of 
stability and security at global and regional levels.18 Furthermore, in January 
2006 Uzbekistan joined the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and, 
in May of that year, Karimov announced the country’s accession to the 
CSTO. The accelerated deepening of Russian-Uzbekistani military-political 
cooperation must be seen as an attempt by the government in Tashkent to 
receive inertia from the Russian side in order to keep its balance on the oscil-
lating “strategic wire.” The aim of the Uzbek policy-makers was to induce a 
change in the attitude of Western states so that they would recognize Uzbeki-
stan as an independent regional power.
Contacts between Uzbek and U.S. officials resumed by 2007, and at the 
end of 2008 Western countries started to soften sanctions on the Uzbekistani 
government. In turn, U.S. military personnel received permission to transit 
through the Termez airbase near the Afghan border (leased to Germany) and 
to use the Navoi airport for transportation of non-lethal goods to Afghani-
stan. In 2009, Washington restarted military cooperation with Uzbekistan in 
                                                          
16 Cit. as in Nichol, “Central Asia,” 15.
17 Cit. as in Bakhshi, “Russia and Uzbekistan.”
18 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Dogovor o soiuznicheskikh otnosheniiakh 
mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Uzbekistan,” 2005,
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/spd_md.nsf/0/72EF98B3AEF0CDC9C3257DB90047370E. 
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the field of military education and training, and initiated Annual inter-
governmental Bilateral Consultations (ABC), which have significantly im-
proved security cooperation and boosted high-level official contacts between 
the two states.19 Uzbekistan assumed a central role in the Northern Distribu-
tion Network for non-lethal military supplies to Afghanistan. In parallel with 
the restoration of Uzbekistan’s relations with Western states, and as a part of 
the balancing act, its cooperation with Russia was curtailed. In November 
2008, the country’s officials announced the suspension of their participation 
in the EurAsEC. However, Uzbekistan’s formal commitments within CSTO 
were still hindering the reinforcement of a pro-Western direction, which at 
that time was seen in Tashkent as a way to achieve a position of regional 
leadership and independence from Moscow. Therefore, the Uzbekistani poli-
cy of balancing acts required further steps to expand the space for independ-
ent external relations.
The Policy toward Multilateral Cooperation and Russia’s 
Response
The strategic goal of Uzbekistan to achieve “eternal independence” is mani-
fest in policy practices aimed to distance the state from multilateral formats 
of any deeper international integration. In 2011, Islam Karimov stated,
“When it comes to the formation of various inter-state associations, it is possible 
that they will go beyond economic interests and gain political color and content,
which in turn may adversely affect the already established contacts and coopera-
tion of the members of the association with other external partners, the develop-
ment of integration processes with third-party countries.”20
Following this guideline, Uzbekistan assumed nominal participation in the 
CSTO yet left aside any substantive engagement with the organization. Uz-
bekistan did not take part in the CSTO military exercises, it opposed the 
creation of the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces, and finally, on June 28, 
                                                          
19 See Nichol, “Uzbekistan,” 18–20; and Gorenburg, “Central Asian Military and Security 
Forces,” 62.
20 Islam Karimov, “Doklad na torzhestvennom sobranii, posviashchennom 19-letiiu Konsti-
tutsii Respubliki Uzbekistan,” Press Service of the President of Uzbekistan, December 7, 
2011, http://www.press-service.uz/ru/news/4913/ (translation by Vadim Romashov).
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2012, the CSTO Secretariat received the official note from Uzbekistani au-
thorities regarding their decision to suspend participation in the organization. 
It is not accidental that Tashkent sent the official note two weeks after the 
Uzbek and Russian presidents signed a Declaration on the Further Consolida-
tion of Strategic Partnership and a Memorandum of Understanding on 
Measures for Uzbekistan’s Accession to the CIS (Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States) Free Trade Zone Agreement. The signature of the documents 
and the decision to suspend its participation in the CSTO testify to the inten-
tion of the Uzbekistani government to switch to bilateral relations with Rus-
sia and to participate only in those inter-state integration associations that do 
not imply close political engagement but do bring economic benefits.
However, an unidentified “source from Uzbekistani Foreign Ministry” 
explained this decision to the Russian media by referring to Tashkent’s disa-
greement with the CSTO’s strategic plans towards Afghanistan, which imply 
a joint approach to relations with that country.21 Islam Karimov repeatedly 
underlined the irreplaceable nature of bilateral relations with Kabul. At the 
September 2014 SCO summit he stressed that “Uzbekistan builds and will 
continue to build steady and friendly relations with Afghanistan deriving 
from the national interests of both countries and exclusively on [a] bilateral 
basis.”22 A bilateral relationship with Afghanistan, as opposed to a unified 
policy within an inter-state alliance, widens Tashkent’s maneuvering room 
for cooperation with different foreign partners.
The decision by Uzbekistan to suspend participation in the CSTO trig-
gered guesswork in the Russian media and the expert community on the real 
motives behind this policy action. Most accounts immediately speculated that 
Tashkent had bargained for certain security guarantees from Washington. 
Increased political contacts between Uzbek and American officials were pre-
sented in support of this conjecture.23 Some experts assumed that Tashkent 
and Washington were discussing the possibility of the resumption of a U.S. 
military presence in the country in exchange for excess military equipment 
from Afghanistan, including the return of the military base to Karshi-
Khanabad or, alternatively, the substitution of German troops in Termez by 
                                                          
21 Gennadii Sysoev, Elena Chernenko, and Maksim Iusin, “Uzbekistan otryvaetsia ot kollek-
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22 Islam Karimov, “Speech at the SCO Summit,” Press Service of the President of Uzbekistan,
September 12, 2014, http://www.press-service.uz/en/news/5005/.
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U.S. forces.24 At the same time, Uzbekistan was portrayed as a troublesome 
member of the CSTO, an “enfant terrible,” as a Kazakh analyst had it, mean-
ing that it had been problematic for the CSTO participants to conduct con-
structive dialogue with Tashkent regarding the deepening of security integra-
tion and enhancement of the organization’s functionality and efficiency.25
The General Secretary of CSTO, Nikolai Bordiuzha, reasoned that Uzbeki-
stan’s decision had arisen from the country’s divergent views on the for-
mation of a system of collective security, which had led to difficulties of co-
operation within the organization itself. At the same time, the “Gen Sec” ad-
mitted that it would be challenging to build “the most effective” system of 
collective security in Central Asia without Uzbekistan, and he added that 
Tashkent would not be able to form its national security goals without the 
participation of the CSTO members.26
In order to decrease oscillations caused by the growing speculative en-
thusiasm of the Russian media and the expert community, as well as the an-
noyance of the political elite in Moscow, at the end of August 2012 the Sen-
ate (the upper chamber of Uzbekistan’s Parliament) adopted a Concept of 
Foreign Policy Activity. The Concept proclaims that Uzbekistan is free to 
join any inter-state organization but reserves the right to withdraw in case 
that organization becomes a military-political bloc. This principle was al-
ready enshrined in the 1992 Law on Defense and in the 1996 Law on Main 
Principles of Foreign Policy Activity. The 2012 Foreign Policy Concept re-
placed the 1996 Law on Foreign Policy Main Principles and made significant 
amendments to the 1995 Military Doctrine, which ruled out any participation 
of Uzbekistani forces in international peacekeeping operations. Presenting 
the concept to the Senate, Abdulaziz Kamilov, Foreign Minister of Uzbeki-
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stan, stressed that “the Uzbek soldiers would never fight in foreign coun-
tries.” 27
The main provision of the Concept, which aims to reassure Moscow of 
Tashkent’s reliability as a strategic partner and an ally of Russia, states that 
Uzbekistan does not allow the deployment of foreign military bases and fa-
cilities on its territory. However, there are many nuances in the document 
that allude to the continuing balancing act. The real engagement of Uzbeki-
stan with the principle of the non-deployment of foreign military on its terri-
tory is questionable, as the adoption of the Concept did not affect the German 
airbase in Termez. Moreover, the document does not ban access to the coun-
try’s military facilities and, in fact, Uzbekistan may allow other foreign 
troops to use its own infrastructure.
By adopting the Concept, Tashkent aimed to demonstrate that it does not 
intend to engage closely in terms of military and political cooperation with 
NATO and the U.S., and neither with the CSTO and Russia. Additionally, 
the document casts a shadow on Uzbekistan’s commitments under the Treaty 
of Alliance with Russia. In particular, the commitment to mutual support in 
case of aggression against one of the parties is called into question. One of its 
important components, military assistance, is limited by the Concept’s provi-
sion of non-participation of Uzbekistani soldiers in operations abroad. How-
ever, Uzbekistan has not declared neutrality and has thus left room for politi-
cal maneuvering with its international partners. To emphasize the independ-
ence of Uzbekistan from foreign actors, the Concept states that “no integra-
tion should be imposed from the outside” and “problems in Central Asia 
should be solved by the states in the region without interference from exter-
nal forces.” 28
Thus, the adoption of the foreign policy concept closed the door that had 
previously been left ajar following the notification of suspension of participa-
tion in the CSTO. The member states of the security organization decided not 
to accept the conduct of their “enfant terrible” and locked the door shut. In-
stead of upholding Tashkent’s wish to suspend its participation only, the 
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Council of Collective Security adopted a decision at the CSTO summit on 
December 19, 2012 to suspend Uzbekistan’s membership entirely. In this 
way the member states deprived Tashkent of the right to use the capacity of 
the system of collective security in case of security crises and to participate 
in the organization’s decision-making process. The Council laid down a key 
condition for Uzbekistan’s possible return: Tashkent would have to sign and 
ratify all the international agreements and decisions adopted under the 
CSTO.29
The transformations of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy in 2012 signal the 
country’s return to the strategic path toward an independent policy of being a 
regional leader and, through this, a pivotal actor in Central Asia. The imme-
diate motivation for the decision to leave the CSTO was the maximization of 
gains from relations with Western countries, who had announced the with-
drawal of their troops from Afghanistan and expressed an intention to gift 
surplus military equipment to Central Asian countries. Therefore, Tashkent 
has striven to demonstrate that NATO and the U.S. remain better security 
providers for the border between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan than are the 
CSTO and Russia, and has inclined towards negotiating security guarantees 
primarily with Washington. However, in this situation Uzbekistan risks un-
dermining its strategic relations with Russia and departing from its policy of 
balancing act.
Threats to National Security and Regional Stability
Along with a chance for gaining the advantage in regional politics sought by 
the Uzbekistani leadership, the reorganization of the U.S. military presence 
in Afghanistan brings with it risks for national security. Tashkent often draws 
attention to its anxiety that the withdrawal of Western troops from Afghani-
stan will result in deterioration of the security environment along Uzbeki-
stan’s borders. At the SCO summit in September 2014, Islam Karimov 
warned,
                                                          
29 Collective Security Treaty Organization, “Ob itogakh sessii Soveta kollektivnoi bezopas-
nosti ODKB,” December 19, 2012,
http://www.odkb-csto.org/news/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=1536&SECTION_ID=91.
175
“[T]he withdrawal of international security assistance forces from Afghanistan 
can lead to mounting threats and growing instability, expanding terrorist and ex-
tremist activities as well as increasing scales of drug trafficking not merely in the 
wider Central Asian region, but also far beyond its rims… [A]ny vacuum emer-
gent in Afghanistan can within a short period of time be filled by various de-
structive and terrorist groups.”30
However, Uzbekistan is not overly concerned about its own 137-kilometer-
long border with Afghanistan, the shortest Afghan border amongst the Cen-
tral Asian states. The frontier is well secured by the Uzbekistani military with 
heavy arms and a border barrier with two barbed wire lines (one of which is 
electrified) and landmines, which was erected by Tashkent after the Taliban 
victories in Afghanistan. The presence of the German airbase in Termez and 
a natural barrier, the Amu Darya River that separates the two states, also con-
tribute to border protection. The only bridge across the river can be closed at 
any time if danger arises from the southern neighbor, just as was the case in 
the period of 1996–2002. Simultaneously, the heavy security at the border is 
not conducive to building relationships of trust between local people and au-
thorities on the two banks of the Amu Darya. The Uzbek population is nu-
merically prevalent in the northern districts of Afghanistan, but the cross-
border flows of people are substantially restricted. Moreover, Uzbekistani 
authorities commonly present the frequent border incidents that result in ci-
vilian deaths as terrorist attacks and infiltration.31
The state border with Afghanistan is not the only border to create con-
cern for the Uzbekistani government. In the Central Asian context, the words 
“Afghan border” do not mean merely any particular country’s national bor-
der with Afghanistan but also carry the connotation of the former Soviet Af-
ghan border. The general expectation is that the security threat emerging af-
ter the military withdrawal of ISAF may reach the territory of every single 
Central Asian republic. Uzbekistan’s geographic location in the middle of 
Central Asia with its apparent strategic and economic advantages also creates 
specific security challenges for Tashkent. In light of this threat, the Uzbeki-
stani government considers its frontiers with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as its 
“secondary Afghan borders.” According to Christian Bleuer and Said Reza 
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31 For an example of this type of presentation, see “Grazhdane Afganistana napali na pogran-
nariad Uzbekistana, imeiutsia zhertvy,” 12news.uz, March 16, 2013, http://www.12news.
uz/news/2013/03/grazhdane-afganistana-napali-na-pogra/#more-19254.
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Kazemi, such a perception, coupled with the belief that its neighbors are not 
able to prevent incursions of “militants and terrorists” through their territory 
and into Uzbekistan, reinforces the conviction of the necessity to maintain 
heavy security measures at the Tajik and Kyrgyz borders.32 In effect this in-
creases distrust (high as it is already) between Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks, 
and adds to the instability at their joint borders; and the conflict-ridden rela-
tions between these neighboring states play into the hands of those termed 
“extremists.”
In the recent past, the main territorial target for the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan has been the Ferghana Valley, which is situated in the immediate 
vicinity of Tashkent, the center of Uzbek power. The instability at the cross-
roads of the three countries of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan can 
undermine security and the political situation in the entire Central Asian re-
gion. Besides this region with its troublesome reputation, there is a threat that 
a new channel for the infiltration of insurgents into Uzbekistan’s territory 
might occur through the Afghan-Turkmen border. Since 2013, the Taliban 
and its allies have intensified their activity in Afghan provinces adjacent to 
Turkmenistan. Some areas were temporally taken in the province of Faryab, 
and in Badghis province a group of gunmen stormed the border checkpoint.33
In February and May 2014, militants from these two provinces, reportedly of 
Turkmen and Uzbek ethnic origin, crossed the border and attacked Turkmen-
istan’s border guards.34 In comparison with the Afghan borders of Uzbeki-
stan and Tajikistan, the Afghan-Turkmen border is poorly defended. Tash-
kent pays considerably less attention to the border with Turkmenistan than it 
does to its turbulent frontiers with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. As a conse-
quence, the IMU and other insurgent groups could be in a position to use the 
Afghanistan–Turkmenistan channel to intrude into Uzbekistan’s territory.
Related to these developments, the crisis in Ukraine that began in late 
2013 also poses a threat to Tashkent’s authority. The domestic opposition 
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and external actors have received a stimulus for their actions taken in re-
sponse to Uzbekistan’s policy practices. In spring 2014, along with the de-
velopments in Crimea, the activity of a little-known movement “Alga Kara-
kalpakstan” fighting for the independence of Karakalpakstan, an autonomous 
republic in Uzbekistan, suddenly increased. The Alga Karakalpakstan activ-
ists held several protests urging the exercising the republic’s constitutional 
right to organize a referendum on secession from Uzbekistan. The activists 
called for Moscow to support their aspirations and even to admit Kara-
kalpakstan to the Russian Federation in spite of the absence of common bor-
der. The pro-Karakalpakstan activists made similar requests to neighboring 
Kazakhstan on the basis of the argument that it is the Kazakh language which 
is closest to Karakalpak. Such appeals have been backed by references to the 
history of Karakalpakia.35 The leaders of Alga Karakalpakstan emphasize 
that accession to Russia or Kazakhstan is not a goal in itself but instead a 
possible way “to protect the sovereignty and the future development” of 
Karakalpakstan.36 Even though the strength and viability of this movement 
remains unknown, the Karakalpak precedent may trigger centrifugal tenden-
cies also in Bukhara and Samarkand, Uzbekistan’s cities with large Tajik 
populations and historically significant for Tajik identity. Furthermore, 
Karakalpakstan is the site of the “Jaslyk” prison, which houses many inmates 
allegedly jailed for crimes related to outlawed Islamic organizations, mainly 
from Hizb ut-Tahrir but also from the IMU. Although the Islamic radicals in 
the Karakalpak opposition for the time being form only a small group num-
bering around 50 people based mostly in Kazakhstan and partly in Kara-
kalpakstan,37 the prison might represent a particular interest for radical Is-
lamists to “liberate” their associates. There is no reliable information on links 
with terrorist groups from Afghanistan, but members of the IMU and other 
Islamist radical organizations may attempt to infiltrate Karakalpakstan 
through Turkmenistan in order to manipulate potential separatist aspirations, 
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destabilize the situation, and undermine the authority of the government in 
Tashkent.
The Ukrainian developments in 2013–2014 have also inspired Uzbeki-
stan’s political opposition, in particular the People’s Movement of Uzbeki-
stan (PMU), which in February 2014 called for the use of arms to unseat 
President Karimov.38 The leader of the Movement, Muhammad Salih, resides 
in Turkey, and, as his representatives do not fail to mention, Karimov is con-
cerned about the possibility that Istanbul could provide political and financial 
support to the PMU.39 Such concerns were linked with the country’s presi-
dential election in 2015, in which Karimov was re-elected despite rumors 
that the aging incumbent would not participate in the election and was 
searching for possible successors.40 However, as experts note, the moment of 
power transition from 77-year-old Islam Karimov is inevitably approaching 
and this heightens internal risks notwithstanding his re-election to the presi-
dential office.41
In order to ensure stability inside the country and at its borders, Tashkent 
expects security guarantees primarily from Washington because, amongst 
other issues, these guarantees may involve the delivery of military hardware 
from Afghanistan through the Excess Defense Articles program. Uzbeki-
stan’s military equipment is mostly of Soviet origin and, unlike in Kazakh-
stan, it has not undergone extensive modernization.42 Despite the fact that the 
Uzbekistani army appears quite capable of suppressing opposition unrest and 
of fighting against small groups of Islamist insurgents, the condition of its 
hardware is unworthy of a country that purports to be a regional leader. From 
this point of view, Tashkent seeks high military capability for the improve-
ment of its political position in the negotiations over water issues and border 
conflicts with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the strengthening of its position 
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in relation to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan’s main regional competitor. Therefore, 
receiving even second-hand NATO equipment is a better option for Tashkent 
than the continued use of obsolete Soviet arms, the maintenance of which 
contributes to preserve Uzbekistan’s dependence on Russia’s technical ser-
vice and supply of components.
In 2012, Moscow decided to provide unprecedented direct military-
technical aid to Kyrgyzstan worth $1.1 billion as well as $200 million for the 
Tajik army, including aviation, armored vehicles, artillery, air defense weap-
ons and small arms.43 This decision points to Russia’s response to the in-
creased military cooperation between Washington and Tashkent and an at-
tempt to restrain Uzbekistan’s conduct toward its neighbors. The increasing 
dependence of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on Russian military supplies sub-
stantially reduces U.S. influence in these countries, and the simultaneous 
prolongation of the lease contracts for Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan (for twenty and for thirty years, respectively) further consoli-
dates Russian presence in the region. In autumn 2012, Moscow also made an 
effort to outbid the U.S. for a possible military deal with Uzbekistan and 
signed a bilateral program with Tashkent on arms supplies until 2020. At the 
time of writing, details on the implementation of this program remain una-
vailable.
Despite these Russian actions, Uzbekistan and the U.S. have continued 
to intensify their military cooperation. In March 2013, NATO redeployed its 
Central Asian Liaison office from Astana to Tashkent. Although the organi-
zation’s representatives asserted that the redeployment is part of a regular 
regional rotation process, it raised a new wave of speculations about the fu-
ture development of the office into a military structure.44 No matter what the 
real motive is for this, the move indicates that NATO is not going to leave 
the region. In May 2014, following the official opening of the office, James 
Appathurai, the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, stated that “curtailing of combat units in neigh-
boring Afghanistan does not mean the end of cooperation with the countries
of the region” and added that “just a small change in the mission will hap-
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pen.” Appathurai promised assistance to Uzbekistan in its military reforms, 
which include the modernization of military institutions, defense structures, 
and military training.45
The trend of increased military cooperation between the U.S. and Uzbek-
istan has cemented the conviction in Russian expert opinion that Washington 
plans to reset its military presence in Uzbekistan.46 However, the transfer of 
Western excess military equipment to Uzbekistan is still unspecified, and 
Tashkent continues to maintain its military cooperation with Russia. In De-
cember 2014 at a meeting with President Vladimir Putin, Islam Karimov un-
derscored that Tashkent “supports a systematic and active expansion of con-
tacts in this strategically important area for full and effective implementation 
of the adopted long-term intergovernmental agreements and programs.” He 
explained this position due to “serious security threats, unpredictable situa-
tion in Afghanistan after the upcoming withdrawal of ISAF peacekeeping 
forces, the increasing scale of terrorism and drug trafficking, and […] creep-
ing expansion of militant extremism and religious radicalism.”47
The intentions of the U.S. and Russia to enhance military cooperation 
with Uzbekistan reveal that Uzbekistan remains their important strategic 
partner in Central Asia. However, the future format of the rival powers’ mili-
tary presence in Uzbekistan depends on Tashkent’s decision on how to coun-
ter the threats to its national security and the attacks on its authority within 
the state. These risks are concomitant to the gamble for wider political inde-
pendence, which Uzbekistan actively engages in by balancing between the 
extra-regional powers whilst the international military presence in Afghani-
stan is undergoing reorganization.
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“Triumvirate” Politics and the Eurasian Detour Around 
Uzbekistan
Russia’s attempts to involve Uzbekistan in the Eurasian integration projects 
following the rupture of Tashkent’s relations with Western states after the 
2005 Andijon events have not succeeded. The choice of the Uzbekistani 
government to favor bilateral relations instead of multilateral formats of co-
operation is not ultimately to Moscow’s liking because of the low engage-
ment it achieves in integration initiatives. Moreover, Uzbekistan continues its 
traditional policy towards the neighboring states, above all in regard to Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan, from the position of strength, which takes full ad-
vantage of its central location in the region. In disputes with its neighbors, 
Tashkent from time to time employs energy and transport blockades as poli-
cy instruments in order to demonstrate its dominant position. Nevertheless, if 
the security situation requires support from the Russian side, or if there is a 
need to balance policies, Uzbekistan is willing to normalize relations with 
Moscow’s Central Asian allies. This foreign policy conduct is not merely a 
manifestation of Uzbekistan’s balancing act; it also stems from its identity as 
a regional leader. Against the background of Uzbekistan’s history, it is even 
possible to argue that the attitudes to its neighbors, which change from exert-
ing pressure to expressing benevolence, reflect something of the practices of 
the khans’ relations with their vassals.
However, the Uzbekistani leadership has a different attitude to Kazakh-
stan and sees it as a strong state that can be an equal partner. Taking into ac-
count this view of Tashkent, Russian and Kazakh experts promote the idea of 
a “triumvirate,” in other words the trilateral cooperation of Russia, Kazakh-
stan and Uzbekistan. Trilateral cooperation would grant a “privileged” status 
to Uzbekistan as a regional leader on a par with Russia and Kazakhstan. The 
“triumvirate” is supposed to be based on Russia’s comprehensive bilateral 
relations with the two regional leaders as well as the strategic bilateral coop-
eration between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and complemented by coopera-
tion in the frame of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).48 In June 2013, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan took the first political step in this direction by 
signing an agreement on strategic partnership that brings closer Kazakhstani-
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Uzbekistani and Russian-Uzbekistani cooperation. At a December 2014 
meeting of Putin and Karimov, it was announced that the parties discussed 
the possibility of signing an agreement on a free trade zone between the EEU 
and Uzbekistan.49
Alexander Knyazev, a Russian expert on Central Asia, believes that the
scheme of trilateral cooperation will contribute to regional security as a 
common strategy of the three major states in addressing threats, primarily 
those related to the developments in Afghanistan.50 However, the intensified 
Uzbekistani-U.S. military-political dialogue does not strengthen confident 
relations between Moscow and Tashkent, which are necessary for the crea-
tion of a sustained trilateral structure of security cooperation. Therefore, the 
Russian government is developing an alternative approach in its relationship 
with Uzbekistan, an approach that potentially brings considerable risks for 
Tashkent’s leadership aspirations in the region. It implies setting up a detour 
around Uzbekistan in order to substantially decrease the dependence of Rus-
sia and its allies on this country as the main transit territory and energy sup-
plier.
Uzbekistan is the sole gas exporter to Tajikistan and the south of Kyr-
gyzstan, and this arrangement provides Tashkent with powerful leverage that 
backs its position in territorial and water disputes with the neighboring states.
Tajikistan has not received gas from Uzbekistan since late 2012. In April 
2014, the Uzbekistani gas transit company UzTransGaz cut off supplies to 
Kyrgyzstan. In addition to the political motives to apply pressure to the Kyr-
gyzstani and Tajikistani governments, there are economic reasons for sus-
pending supplies. A variety of problems related to the exploration and devel-
opment of gas fields as well as growing domestic demand limit the export 
potential of Uzbekistan. Moreover, part of the resources are consumed for 
developing the Turkmenistan–China gas pipeline system. In order to secure a 
share in the strategically important and profitable Chinese energy market, 
Uzbekistan has to provide the pipeline with gas almost at maximum capacity 
and at the expense of traditional customers.
Tashkent’s position in regional energy politics has left Moscow with 
both the opportunities and the need to organize gas deliveries to southern 
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Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Gazprom has allocated 65 billion rubles to con-
struct the gas pipeline connecting the north and south of Kyrgyzstan by the 
year 2016. In order to provide the Osh region, which is completely deprived 
of gas, with alternative energy sources before this date, the gas company has 
earmarked 20 billion rubles as a soft loan to the Kyrgyzstani Ministry of En-
ergy.51 In December 2014, the president of Kyrgyzstan, Almazbek Atamba-
yev, announced that there is also an agreement with Gazprom on the con-
struction of a gas pipeline from a gas field in Batken province to the Osh and 
Jalal-Abad provinces.52 In order to substitute gas imports in Tajikistan, the 
company plans to start gas production at the Sarykamysh field near Dushan-
be and to exploit resources from the Western Shaambary field.53 Moreover, 
the fourth line of the aforementioned gas pipeline to China is planned to run 
via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which would allow both Central Asian coun-
tries to purchase Turkmen resources directly from the pipe. Eventually, 
Tashkent may lose the “gas cudgel” that it traditionally has employed toward 
Dushanbe and Bishkek.
Tashkent plays an important role also in the regional electricity distribu-
tion network due to the fact that most of the transmission facilities of the 
Central Asian Power System (CAPS), including its dispatch center and per-
sonnel, are placed in Uzbekistan. During the Soviet period, the CAPS was a 
key mechanism that united Central Asian republics within an integrated sys-
tem of redistribution of water and energy. When relations became market-
based following the dissolution of the USSR, Tashkent gained additional 
leverage with its neighbor states. The parties are frequently unable to finalize 
contracts on electricity transit and, as a result, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan suf-
fer from energy shortages in winter. Kazakhstan is in a better position be-
cause transmission in the northern parts of the country operates in parallel 
with the Russian Unified Power System (UPS) and it is only the southern 
regions that depend on CAPS. In 2003, Turkmenistan disconnected the na-
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tional transmission grid from CAPS and managed to create a separate power 
grid.
In June 2014, Tajik state energy company Barki Tojik announced that 
Astana, Bishkek and Dushanbe plan to revive CAPS without the involvement 
of Uzbekistan.54 For the first time the idea of connecting Tajikistan and Kyr-
gyzstan’s South to the joint power grid of Kazakhstan and northern Kyrgyz-
stan was officially announced in 2010.55 In 2013, this idea gained additional 
momentum when Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia decided to create a com-
mon energy market within the EEU.56 The initiative implies the deeper inte-
gration of national energy systems and the joint export of electricity to the 
power grids of other countries. In this situation, it is essential for Kazakhstan 
to detach itself from the unstable operation of CAPS, which provides Tash-
kent with a central role, and to connect Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to the 
common energy market. Participation in this will be profitable for Kyrgyz-
stani and Tajikistani hydroelectric power stations, which produce surplus 
electricity in summer. If these plans are realized, Uzbekistan’s leverage de-
riving from its advantageous position as the dispatch center of CAPS could 
turn into leverage for its neighbors, who by creating an independent electrici-
ty grid would become able to control water discharge according to their own 
needs.
The construction of a transmission line from Khujand in Tajikistan to 
Datka in Kyrgyzstan is part of the U.S.-initiated CASA-1000 project.57 Its 
extension to Shymkent in Kazakhstan (as a part of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz-Tajik 
UPS) would connect the CASA-1000 project with the EEU market. Like this, 
a large energy market could be formed that would limit Uzbekistan’s partici-
pation and reduce the influence of the U.S. Against the backdrop of this pos-
sibility it can be understood why, in 2011, Russia radically changed its atti-
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tude to CASA-1000 (from opposing the project to supporting it) and pro-
posed $500 million as investments to build the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan line.58
Tashkent has been against the CASA project and believes that it is directly 
related to the construction of giant hydropower plants (HPP) in Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan.59 Being a downstream country, Uzbekistan has concerns 
that the power plants will create a mechanism that “will enable its owner to 
dictate unilaterally the harsh terms of water discharge to downstream coun-
tries,” and “this mechanism can be converted into explicit tool of political 
pressure.” 60
In fact, “the owner of the mechanism” to which Tashkent refers is not 
Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan but rather the Russian state-run companies. In 2012, 
the Russian and Kyrgyz governments signed agreements on building and 
operating Kambaratinskaya-1 and the Upper Naryn Cascade HPP. Since the 
Russian side finances the projects, parts of Kyrgyz shares in the joint organi-
zations created for operational management of the projects are transferred to 
the Russian founder companies or the financing organizations. The Russian 
side is authorized to conduct strategic and operational management of the 
projects for the period of payback and the return of borrowed funds.61 The 
realization of these plans will help Russia to increase its influence in Central 
Asia by gaining control over the Naryn, one of the most geostrategically im-
portant cross-border rivers in the region. Similar perspectives also appear for 
the long-discussed Rogun HPP in the case that Tajikistan, following the posi-
tive conclusion in September 2014 of the World Bank’s final assessment re-
port on the plant’s construction, finds itself unable to fund the project with-
out Russia’s participation and if Moscow subsequently resumes its promises 
in regard to contributing to its construction.
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Russian transport infrastructure initiatives in the region are similarly 
aimed at by-passing Uzbekistan and thus ensuring the independence of its 
Central Asian allies by avoiding transit through Uzbekistani territory. Tajiki-
stan is the most dependent country because all of its railroad lines to other 
countries run through Uzbekistan. The railroad connecting Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan has remained inoperative since November 2011 (reportedly) due to
an explosion on a railway bridge near the border of both states; as a conse-
quence, the southern regions of Tajikistan have become cut off from the Cen-
tral Asian main line. In response to these developments, Russia and its allies 
in the region have developed a project that can undermine the Uzbekistani 
role as the main railroad hub of Central Asia. In March 2013, Turkmenistan, 
Afghanistan and Tajikistan signed a memorandum on the construction of a
railway connecting the three countries. It is planned that the Afghan and Ta-
jik parts of the railway will be financed under the CAREC (Central Asia Re-
gional Economic Cooperation) programs. In September 2013, the Russian 
delegation at a meeting of Joint CAREC Transport Sector Coordinating and 
Customs Cooperation Committees proposed to connect the project with the 
Russia-Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan railroad construction plans dis-
cussed at an informal meeting of the CSTO heads of states earlier in May.62
The combination of the two projects would provide not only Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan, but also Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan with better ac-
cess to Afghanistan and, potentially, South Asia. For Tajikistan this would 
mean breaking the transport blockade, and it would also undermine Uzbeki-
stan’s advantageous position in the region.
The dissociation of Uzbekistan from the Eurasian integration projects
and regional initiatives would lead to a significant degree of isolation of this 
state from the economies of the ex-Soviet republics and also sever trade rela-
tions with Russia. The government in Tashkent would lose its non-military 
mechanisms of influence on Bishkek and Dushanbe. It goes without saying 
that such a scenario is not conducive to the Uzbekistani strategic path of as-
piring to being a regional leader. Tashkent thus faces a dilemma that requires 
performing new balancing feats on the “strategic wire” in order to prevent 
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negative developments and to remain an independent leader of Central Asia. 
Concerns over its increasingly difficult position perhaps were in the back-
ground when the Acting Head of Freight and Commercial Operation of Uz-
bekistan Railroads, Utkur Astanov, in July 2014 announced that the Uzbeki-
stani side had decided to launch Tajikistan’s transit transportation on a new 
line.63 Easing relations with neighbors is also essential for maintaining stabil-
ity at the borders in the situation of Afghanistan’s uncertain future and 
changing geopolitical conjunctures.
Conclusion: The Risks Involved in Uzbekistan’s Game of 
Chance
The long-term goal of achieving “eternal independence” declared by Uzbeki-
stan is an important element of the project of nationalizing state identity. This 
makes the foreign policy of Tashkent different from the policies of Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In those countries, the well-established set 
of security, political and economic links with Moscow significantly limits the 
maneuvering room in relations with other countries. Striving to be as inde-
pendent as possible in its foreign policy, Uzbekistan performs a balancing act 
in its relationships with international actors. Proceeding from the interpreta-
tions of the changing external and internal dynamics, this act entails a simul-
taneous reduction and enhancement of one direction or the other. Any radical 
changes in the regional and domestic security environment have an impact as 
“shock points” or “explosions” that send out waves leading to the oscillation 
of the “wire” upon which Uzbekistani strategic goals are strung. In tune with 
such oscillations, the country’s foreign policy inclines in those directions and 
can thus provide immediate support for state security. However, when the 
explosive wave calms and the security environment stabilizes, and the “wire” 
settles into a state of gradual motion, Uzbekistani policy subsequently returns 
to its strategic balancing act. Eventually, in Uzbekistan’s game of chance, 
maintaining a balance depends on how successfully the opportunities and 
risks inherent in the changing environment are met.
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By pursuing its desire to be an independent Central Asian leader, Tash-
kent plays a risky game that affects developments in the region. Since this 
policy is based on contraposition rather than complementing the external di-
rections, the Uzbekistani gamble is fraught with increasing confrontation 
between the country’s foreign partners, who try to anchor their presence and 
influence in Central Asia by counterbalancing the policies of each other and 
design their regional strategies correspondingly. Because external and inter-
nal developments are connected to each other, this political environment also 
threatens the domestic situation in Uzbekistan. The radicalization of the op-
position and the problematic areas in the Ferghana Valley, Karakalpakstan 
and the Tajik-populated territories, in addition to the uncertainty related to 
the upcoming transfer of presidential power, can foster the fragmentation of
state organization. If the political elite in Tashkent loses its grip on domestic 
affairs, the risk of major internal crises will increase. In this situation, both 
the states engaged in the region’s politics as well as transborder groups of 
insurgents will try to gain a stake in the redistribution of political power in 
Uzbekistan for their own benefit, which again will accelerate confrontation 
between the foreign actors.
Any instability arising in the Central Asian states can undermine Rus-
sia’s influence in the region and prompt its proactive foreign policy measures 
in the security sphere, including the use of military force in accordance with 
the commitments in the framework of the CSTO and bilateral agreements. To 
secure its regional presence Moscow tries to engage Tashkent in the Eurasian 
integration processes, but such efforts have thus far not been successful. For 
this reason the integration projects have been redirected to make a detour 
around Uzbekistan. Currently, the intensification of Russian political, eco-
nomic and military ties with the Central Asian CSTO members and the sim-
ultaneous dissociation of Uzbekistan from regional economic arrangements 
are the points of departure for Moscow’s policy toward Tashkent, which 
aims to persuade the Uzbekistani government to participate in Eurasian inte-
gration. However, the leadership in Tashkent perceives close engagement 
with the emerging Eurasian Union as a threat to national independence and 
its right to rule the state.
As the country’s participation in the CSTO shows, Uzbekistan with its 
high level of vertical integration is incapable of making compromises in mul-
tilateral frames of cooperation. In the Central Asian states any initiative for 
the delegation of authority to supra-national institutions encounters uncom-
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promising perceptions of sovereignty. Additionally, mutual distrust between 
these states amplifies contrasting opinions over security-related issues. Secu-
rity is strongly associated with the survival of personified regimes in these 
countries, and a collectivistic approach has little chance of developing due to 
divergent views on common threats. Political organization in Uzbekistan, 
which is centered upon the leader, President Karimov, makes it difficult for 
Tashkent to accept a multilateral regional institution led by another and more 
powerful state. By contrast, the Uzbekistani leadership feels more comforta-
ble in bilateral contacts: in such cases there is no need to coordinate political 
agenda with a number of different actors and no risk of finding one’s own 
position marginalized by a group of associated states with concordant opin-
ions. Moreover, bilateral relations provide the possibility of informal ar-
rangements that suit Uzbekistan’s balancing act amidst extra-regional pow-
ers. In bilateral cooperation, Tashkent is able to demand “equal rights” treat-
ment from powerful foreign partners. At the same time bilateral agreements 
are easier to break than those adopted in multilateral formats.
The policy choices made by Russia, which are aimed at depriving Uz-
bekistan of its tools of influence over its neighbors, affect the present struc-
ture of state borders in Central Asia. Russian initiatives for regional energy 
and transport projects that by-pass Uzbekistan, and its plans for military sup-
plies to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, strengthen the relative positions of Bish-
kek and Dushanbe in border disputes with Tashkent. The implementation of 
these initiatives can also reshape the Central Asian borderlands in those areas 
through which the routes of Uzbekistan’s economic interaction with Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan traditionally run. The aggravation of Uzbeki-
stan’s relations with its neighbors perhaps can be alleviated by means of the 
joint efforts of extra-regional actors focused on regional development and 
linked with such initiatives as the “New Silk Roads” proposed by the U.S. 
and China, as well as the projects within Eurasian integration promoted by 
Russia and Kazakhstan.
Since independence the Uzbekistani leadership has attempted to rely on 
its own sources of power for resolving domestic problems, while the protec-
tion of the Afghan border, both official and “secondary,” has required sup-
port from international actors. The reorganization of the foreign military 
presence and the change of power in Afghanistan drives the government of 
Uzbekistan to active negotiations regarding security guarantees with its for-
eign partners. In this process, two security systems are in competition with 
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each other: the Russian-led CSTO and the U.S.-led NATO. In the field of
security, the EU does not have much to offer Uzbekistan separately from the 
U.S. and NATO, and its emphasis on good governance, human rights and, 
more generally, democratization is counterproductive to building relations 
with the independent-minded ruling elite in Tashkent. The structure of secu-
rity guarantees provided by Washington is flexible because it is based mostly 
on rather vague political declarations. The security interaction between Mos-
cow and Tashkent has a solid foundation with legally binding security guar-
antees that are enshrined in numerous agreements on military cooperation 
between the two states, and above all, in the Treaty of Alliance.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Uzbekistan favors a more pro-
Russian direction that would eventually mean drawing the country into the 
deeper political integration within the developing Eurasian association. To 
avoid this scenario Tashkent has shifted from the format of collective securi-
ty cooperation to a bilateral alliance with Russia. The Uzbek “task of the 
day” is to bargain for such security guarantees which involve minimum inter-
ference of an external authority in decision-making concerning issues within 
the political boundaries of the country; boundaries relating to both domestic 
politics and interaction with international actors. The balancing act of Uzbek-
istan implies the diversification of foreign policy directions in order to ensure 
security on its path towards “eternal independence.” However, this game of 
chance also entails the continuous risk that the path could result in a loss of 
the positions that this state aspires to in regional political and economic af-
fairs; and this risk is growing due to the increasingly tense relations between 
the rival security arrangements of Russia and the U.S. in the region.
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Pakistan-Russia Relations and the Unfolding 
“New Great Game” in South Asia
Tahir Amin
The historical and territorial conflict between India and Pakistan dominates 
the political scene in South Asia, and this conflict is also one of the regional 
tensions that keeps the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
unsettled and agitated. Because India-Pakistan relations are very much a 
“zero-sum” conflict (that is, a loss for one party is interpreted as a 
corresponding gain for the other party), the region is a type of political 
terrain that readily absorbs the geopolitical rivalries of external powers and 
weaves them into the bilateral conflict. It is against this background of the 
Cold War legacy in the region that this chapter examines the present-day 
relationship between Pakistan and Russia. It inquires how this bilateral 
relationship has transformed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
what prospects it has for contributing to the security and stability of the 
region when the Western military presence declines in Afghanistan. 
Although the wider region has undergone profound changes over the 
past decades, change in Pakistan-Russia relations has been only modest. The 
problematic legacy of their mostly hostile relationship with each other during 
the Cold War continues to cast its shadow. From the point of view of 
Islamabad, any improvement in this relationship is difficult when Russia at 
the same time continues to maintain a robust strategic relationship with India, 
thereby raising serious security concerns in Pakistan over strategic stability 
in South Asia. Russia also supports India in its goal to gain a permanent seat 
in the UN Security Council. The interpretation is common in Islamabad that 
the main reason why Russia seems reluctant to engage in closer cooperation 
with Pakistan, especially in regard to the sale of military hardware, is the 
priority it gives to its relations with India.1 Despite high-level visits from 
both countries not much concrete progress has been generated in Pakistan’s 
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relations with Russia during the last decades. However, more recently there 
have also been signs of change. 
In the wake of the on-going Ukrainian crisis and the implementation of 
American and European sanctions, Russia has begun to re-evaluate its 
policies in South Asia as part of Russian President Putin’s “reaching East” 
strategy. A new opening in the relationship was provided by the visit of 
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu in Islamabad on November 20, 
2014. This was the first high-level visit since the visit of Prime Minister 
Mikhail Fradkov to Pakistan in April 2007. Shoigu’s visit was all the more 
significant due to the fact that President Vladimir Putin’s visit, which had 
been planned for October 2012, had been unexpectedly cancelled, and this 
had been widely interpreted as a “major setback” which had made it clear 
that the post-Cold War relationship between the two countries still lacked a 
solid basis.2 Shoigu’s visit also bore concrete results: a cooperation 
agreement on security and defense issues was signed and, thus, the 
relationship between both states became more institutionalized. 
The consequences of the “endgame” in Afghanistan will be significant in 
the wider region and they will immediately be felt in Pakistan,3 but it is still 
too early to argue what exactly they will be and how they will impact 
Pakistan’s relations with Russia in particular. The question that has inspired 
the writing of this chapter is how the Pakistan-Russia relationship is 
preparing for the change. We argue that a potential convergence of interests 
is on the horizon in Pakistan-Russia relations as the U.S. and its allies 
prepare to depart from Afghanistan.4 Russia is interested in cooperation with 
Pakistan in terms of building a defense capacity around Afghanistan so as to 
prevent the spreading of unrest from this country into surrounding areas and, 
ultimately, to Russia’s borders. While this is in harmony with the approach 
of its policies in Central Asia as well, the problematic issue is how the two 
parties will be able to build cooperation against the background of their 
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contradictory interests in regard to India and the mutual suspicions that have 
existed between them throughout the decades since Pakistan achieved its 
independence. 
Research on Pakistan-Russia relations generally employs traditional 
realist frameworks when analyzing the relationship between the two 
countries.5 While this approach can be helpful in analytical reconstructions 
of the “zero-sum game” between India and Pakistan, it provides very limited 
perspectives for analyzing the more comprehensive regional dynamics that 
exist. Western presence is waning not only militarily but also economically 
and culturally, and Russia cannot offer any social order to replace the 
Western liberal order. Because the issues of a desirable social order today 
cannot be left to the side, and because the region cannot be considered 
merely a chessboard for the mutual rivalries of major powers—as is the case 
when the notion of the historical “Great Game” is invoked—it is also 
misleading to interpret a possible increase of Russian influence in the region 
from the perspective of its geopolitical rivalry with the U.S. Rather, we may 
recognize that a “new great game” is unfolding with intricate patterns of 
interaction that involve both strategic competition and economic cooperation 
between multiple “world orders.” Such orders are not simply predetermined 
by nature or history; instead, they are geographically linked socio-historical 
unities of practices. These interpretative unities are identifiable on the basis 
of patterned regularities in the relationships between international or world 
actors or in their relations with their social and natural environment.6 The 
regions of Central and South-Central Asia are a good illustration of how 
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multiple world orders—some authors have identified the Western liberal, 
Russian-Slavic, Islamic, Indic, and also a residual Socialist order—overlap, 
intermingle and coexist simultaneously.7 In the following, we review the past 
decades of Pakistan-Soviet and Pakistan-Russia relations and examine how 
the present changes unfold in such broader contexts.
Historical Burden of the Soviet Decades
Although the frame itself was ideological, it was mainly as a geopolitical 
contest that Soviet policies were perceived in South Asia. It did not go 
unnoticed in Pakistan that the Soviet Union under Stalin initially displayed 
an indifferent attitude towards the emergence of India and Pakistan in 1947. 
It regarded their independence as “illusory,” indeed, as a part of British 
policy to “divide and rule” in order to perpetuate its control over India by 
creating two hostile states and acting as arbiter between them.8 Nationalist 
leaders in the two countries were seen as “stooges of British imperialism.”
The creation of Pakistan was considered even worse than that of India 
because of the religious rationale of the independence movement. It was 
against the backdrop of the unfolding Cold War that the Soviet Union, when 
the U.S. invited Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru to visit in 1949, 
immediately extended an invitation to Moscow to Pakistan’s Prime Minister 
Liaqat Ali Khan—even though Pakistan at that time had not even established 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. However, Liaqat Ali Khan chose 
to go to Washington instead of Moscow, possibly using the Soviet invitation 
as a bargaining chip to extract an invitation from the U.S. This incident 
created deep mistrust between the Soviet Union and Pakistan.9
Pakistan joined the U.S.-sponsored alliances of SEATO (1954) and 
CENTO (1955), which were aimed at the containment of communism, and it 
eventually become “the most allied ally” of the United States in Asia. The 
main purpose of the Pakistani decision-makers was to seek military 
assistance against India, which was four times larger and perceived as 
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Pakistan’s principal security threat because of the unresolved dispute over 
Kashmir.10 Soviet-Indian relations were further strengthened during the 
1960s, when India became a leading country in the Non-Aligned Movement. 
The Soviet Union gave its strong support to India on the Kashmir issue and 
twice used its veto in the UN Security Council in India’s favor. It also began 
to cultivate its relations with Afghanistan and extended its support for the 
issue of Pashtunistan, which had developed into a border issue between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.11 Soviet-Pakistani relations hit rock bottom when 
a U.S. U-2 plane (flown from Peshawar in Pakistan for espionage purposes) 
was shot down by the Soviets in 1960 and Premier Nikita Khrushchev 
subsequently threatened to annihilate Peshawar with rockets.12
Anxious over the threats issuing from the Soviet Union and also 
increasingly disenchanted with the U.S. for courting India (as U.S.-India 
relations were intensified in the wake of the Sino-Indian war of 1962), 
Pakistan moved to normalize its relations with the Soviet Union and to 
strengthen further its relationship with China.13 It signed an agreement on oil 
trade with the Soviet Union (1960) as well as a boundary agreement with 
China (1963). In April 1965, Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan visited 
Moscow and, one year later in the wake of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, 
the Soviet Union successfully mediated between the warring parties at 
Tashkent.14
When the political crisis in East Pakistan (which led to another India-
Pakistan war in 1971 and resulted in the birth of Bangladesh) started 
brewing, the Soviet Union again moved closer to India. Pakistan’s role in 
bringing rapprochement between Washington and Beijing by arranging 
Henry Kissinger’s (then President Richard Nixon’s National Security 
Advisor) secret trip to China further alienated Moscow from Islamabad. 
These developments eventually led to the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty of 
1971, which extended Moscow’s full support to India during the Indo-
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Pakistani war of that year.15 Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
visited the Soviet Union in 1972, and again in 1974, in an attempt to 
normalize the relationship between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Pakistan 
withdrew from U.S.-sponsored military alliances and adopted a non-aligned 
foreign policy. It started to play an active role in the Non-Aligned Movement 
and more vigorously espoused Third World causes in international forums. 
By taking these measures, Pakistan adopted a course designed to distance 
itself from the West and to move closer to both China and Russia.
The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 led 
Pakistan once again to seek the support of the U.S. and Western countries.16
The containment of communism—the “red menace”—now became the focus 
of its policies. Pakistan feared the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union 
towards the Indian Ocean and lent its full support to the Afghan mujahedin 
against the Soviet troops. The Soviet Union again sought support from India 
and threatened to further dismember Pakistan, from which Bangladesh had 
separated only eight years earlier in 1971.17 Pakistan-Soviet Union relations 
remained intensely hostile until 1988, when the Soviet Union started to 
withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. A new phase in the relationship 
between the two countries was opened when the Soviet Union disintegrated 
and the Russian Federation was established in December 1991.
Post-Cold War Overtures
During the Soviet decades, Moscow’s political rivalries with Washington 
worsened the conflict between India and Pakistan and increasingly made the
region an arena for geopolitical contest. When the Soviet Union 
disintegrated, geo-economical competition gradually grew more important. 
Simultaneously, issues related to identity, culture and “civilization” assumed 
greater significance. Realist and traditional geopolitical interpretations lost 
their earlier significance and the new complexity of world politics made it 
increasingly important to understand these processes as an interplay of 
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multiple world orders. The change of times was immediately manifested in 
the identity debates in which Russia found itself.18 Is Russia part of the West, 
as the new Atlantic-oriented foreign policy elites liked to argue; or is it a 
Eurasian power with a unique bridging position towards both Europe and 
Asia; or perhaps a more isolated historical-cultural formation with its own, 
distinctly “Slavic” features? Should Russia pursue an abiding policy towards 
the West, a pragmatic policy, or a more aggressive nationalist policy that 
would keenly protect Russia’s own national interests?19 During the first years 
of the re-born Russia, it was the Atlantic’s policy of “looking towards the 
West” that dominated. The new Russia that emerged under the leadership of 
Boris Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev was more interested 
in becoming part of Europe than representing Asia. Asia was regarded as an 
area of low priority. In these early years, Central Asia (as a former part of the 
Soviet Union) was mainly regarded as being part of the Islamic world and as 
a “burden” to be shed in the new post-Cold War era.20
In the first decade of the new Russia, South Asia assumed an even lower 
priority in the eyes of Moscow’s decision-makers. Russia-Pakistan relations 
focused on the issues of terrorism, Afghanistan and drug trafficking 
emanating from the region. The Russian government accused the Pakistani 
government of sponsoring terrorism in Chechnya and the Caucasus.21
Pakistan sought to allay Russian concerns by explaining that it was neither 
sponsoring nor encouraging terrorist movements in Central Asia or in any 
part of the Russian Federation. In 2000, during the second Chechen war, 
Pakistan even sent the Chief of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) General 
Mahmud Ahmad to reassure Russia that the Pakistani government was not 
involved in any of these activities.22 Another concern in Moscow was 
Pakistan’s support for the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, which 
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Moscow’s decision-makers interpreted as having the ability to potentially 
undermine the status quo in entire Central Asia.23 Against the backdrop of 
Tajikistan’s Civil War (1992–1997) and the fragile peace attained to 
conclude it, Russia was deeply concerned about the spread of the armed 
insurgency to the other Central Asian states and to southern parts of Russia.24
These concerns were intertwined with the drug-trafficking business from 
Afghanistan which very easily reached Russia through the territory of 
Central Asia’s former Soviet republics.25 Pakistan was thus looked at from a 
perspective that connected it with this troubled zone and Russia’s 
burdensome historical “backyard.”
Islamabad, in turn, had hoped that the formulation of policy in the newly 
established Russian Federation would set New Delhi and Islamabad at an 
equidistance from Moscow. Strategic stability in South Asia continued to be 
the main concern of Pakistan’s decision-makers, who feared that the 
continuity of Indo-Russian ties, and especially the sales of sophisticated 
military hardware to India, would affect the precarious military balance 
between Pakistan and India. Immediately in 1992, the first year of the 
existence of the Russian Federation, Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ahmad 
Ali and the Foreign Secretary Akram Zaki visited Moscow in order to voice 
Pakistan’s concerns and to allay Russian fears over Pakistan’s support of 
militant insurgency in the region and even on Russian territory; and this 
message was repeated when Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited 
Moscow in 1999.26 The prospects of economic cooperation were also 
discussed and a joint commission to promote trade and economic cooperation 
between the two countries was formed in 1999. Although this was regarded 
as a sign of a new beginning, no major breakthrough followed that could 
ease the historical burden in the relationship.
                                                          
23 A. Z. Hilali, “Pakistan-Russia Relations: Bitter Cold War & Better Today,” The 
Diplomatic Insight 5, no. 6 (2012): 17–18.
24 Hussain, “Pak-Russia Relations.” 
25 Mohammad Farooq Afzal, “Pakistan-Russian Relations warm up,” Business Recorder, June 
12, 2013, http://www.brecorder.com/supplements/88/1269401/.
26 Zahid Anwar, “Pakistan-Russia Relations in the Regional and Global Context,” Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, June 30, 2004, http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/2237.  
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Relations After 9/11 
Autumn 2001 became a turning point: Pakistan’s volte-face in its policy on 
Afghanistan and its participation in the War on Terror removed a major 
irritant between Russia and Pakistan. Russia had been quite uncomfortable 
with Pakistan’s support of the Taliban, and all this was reversed in the wake 
of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. In addition to Afghanistan and the 
Taliban, Moscow’s interests specifically focused on issues of terrorism, drug 
trafficking and the non-proliferation of nuclear materials (neither Pakistan 
nor India have joined the non-proliferation regime established in the NPT of 
1968). In February 2003, Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf visited 
Moscow and categorically declared that Pakistan regarded Chechnya as 
Russia’s internal problem and that it had no role whatsoever in encouraging 
or sponsoring Islamist networks in Central Asia or any areas of Russia. 
Although neighboring Afghanistan was a concern in Pakistan, its main 
interest in relations with Russia continued to relate to strategic stability in 
South Asia and the prospects of trade and economic cooperation between the 
two countries.27 This order of priorities was Islamabad’s own but was 
certainly facilitated by the presence of the U.S. and NATO-led forces in 
Afghanistan. 
Musharraf’s visit paved the way for more institutionalized cooperation 
between the two countries. Joint Working Groups on the issues of counter-
terrorism, strategic stability, and economic and cultural cooperation were 
established. In April 2007 Mikhail Fradkov was the first Russian Prime 
Minister to visit Pakistan. President Asif Ali Zardari visited Russia in 2011 
and invited President Vladimir Putin to Pakistan. Putin’s visit to Islamabad, 
planned for early October 2012, was cancelled at the last moment, and the 
event was immediately interpreted as a major setback in the attempts to 
improve relations. Moscow sent foreign minister Lavrov to assure Pakistan 
that the visit had been merely postponed because of scheduling issues.28
High-level visits of both Pakistani and Russian military and civil officials 
continued throughout 2013 and after. General Asif Kayani, the commander-
                                                          
27 Mohammad Faheem Khattak, “Pakistan-Russia Relations since 9/11: Implications for 
Pakistan’s Security,” (master’s thesis, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 2011). 
28 “Lavrov Stresses Ties With Pakistan After Putin Cancels Visit,” The Moscow Times,
October 5, 2012, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/lavrov-stresses-ties-with-
pakistan-after-putin-cancels-visit/469309.html.
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in-chief of Pakistan’s army, visited Moscow twice and Russian military and 
Air Chiefs paid visits to Islamabad. However, this did not signal any 
breakthrough in the relations between Russia and Pakistan.29
Pakistan facilitated Russia’s entry into the Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC), and Russia reciprocated by helping Pakistan to gain 
observer-status (and later in 2014 to start accession procedures to full 
membership) in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).30 Russia also 
agreed to the re-export of 150 engines of JF-17 planes from China to 
Pakistan and helped Pakistan in launching a communication satellite, Badar 
11.31 Russia has also signed a memorandum of understanding on the 
upgrading of a major steel mill in Pakistan, and it has expressed interest in 
the new strategic energy pipelines, of which the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–
Pakistan–India gas pipeline (TAPI) and the Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline 
(IPI) are major examples. All this has meant that Russia’s annual trade with 
Pakistan has grown to half a billion dollars. Simultaneously, Russia has left 
relations with Islamabad in the cold by continuing to sell highly sophisticated 
military hardware to India and by supporting India’s case for a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council.32
It is against the background of a long period of “no breakthrough” that 
the visit of Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu in Islamabad on November 21, 
2014, and the signing of a deal on military cooperation were hailed as a 
“milestone development” by Pakistan’s Ministry of Defense.33 The 
agreement provides for the exchange of information on politico-military 
issues, cooperation in promoting international security, an intensification of 
counter-terrorism and arms-control activities, the strengthening of 
collaboration in various military fields, and sharing experiences in peace-
keeping operations. Joint efforts in fighting international terrorism and drug 
                                                          
29 Zahid Ali Khan, “New Trends in Pak-Russian Relations since 9/11,” Journal of the 
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30 Asif Manzoor, “Pakistan Russia Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” (master’s thesis, 
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31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 “Pakistan, Russia ink milestone defence pact,” The News, November 21, 2014, 
http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-34246-Pakistan-Russia-ink-milestone-
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trafficking were also discussed.34 The announcement by Shoigu confirming 
that “during the meeting, we agreed that bilateral military cooperation should 
have a great practical focus and contribute to increasing combat efficiency of 
our armed forces” was met with much appreciation in Islamabad.35
Reportedly, Russia gave its “political approval” to a deal to sell twenty MI-
35 helicopters to Pakistan.36
The significance ascribed to this new opening in Pakistan illustrates the 
great importance attached to cooperation in the military sector in this 
country. These developments also show how change in Pakistan-Russia 
relations reflects wider changes in world politics. Since 2014, the 
deterioration of Russia’s relations with Western states because of the crisis in 
Ukraine and the economic sanctions posed against it have alienated Russia 
from the Western liberal world order. After the collapse of the Soviet Union 
the triumph of this order had been made manifest in the foreign policy and 
international relations debates that claimed that the “end of history” (that is, 
the coming of Western liberal democracy and a downplaying of all 
differences making matters political) and “complex interdependence” were 
now the order of the day.37 In South Asia, specifically, it is India’s increasing 
collaboration with Western states—its move closer to the West through its 
multi-billion-dollar arms deal with a number of Western countries, its deals 
on civilian nuclear cooperation, and the development of a strategic 
partnership with the U.S.—which has pushed Russia to re-evaluate its 
policies and to move closer to Pakistan, which is a crucial player in the “end-
game” in Afghanistan.
                                                          
34 Ibid.
35 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan, Russia sign landmark defence cooperation agreement,” 
Dawn, November 21, 2014, http://www.dawn.com/news/1145875. 
36 Ibid.
37 These are the broad political implications of the debates which, in research literature, 
crystallize in works such as Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man
(Toronto: Maxwell, 1992) and Joseph S. Nye Jr. “What New World Order?,” Foreign 
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Future Prospects
From Russia’s perspective the possibility to exchange information and 
intelligence with Pakistan is extremely important to its prospects for 
controlling the processes shaping the region. Russia has repeatedly voiced its 
anxieties to Islamabad about the possible chaos that threatens to destabilize 
the borders of Central Asian regimes and also spill across the southern 
borders of Russia. These concerns were summarized by Russian Deputy 
Foreign Minister Sergey A. Ryabkov when he visited Pakistan on January 
24, 2011: 
“The ultimate objective of Pakistan and the Russian Federation is to combat the 
growing menace of terrorism and militancy, and to sabotage the nexus between 
transnational terrorist organizations. The transnational militant organizations 
have been undermining both states’ internal security. The link among al-Qaeda, 
Afghan Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban, the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan and 
militants from the North Caucasus and other Muslim Russian regions has been 
devastating and destabilizing for both Pakistan and Russian Federation.”38
Pakistan, too, is deeply concerned over the developments on its own border 
with Afghanistan—the Durand line, which even without the current pressures
is extremely problematic. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) movement 
has been fighting Pakistani armed forces in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) since 2007, and the erosion of the writ of the Pakistani 
state in the tribal areas adjacent to Afghanistan keeps Islamabad on alert.  
Pakistani military forces have launched a major military operation, Zarb-e-
Azb, in these areas with the stated goal of eliminating all those terrorist 
groups fighting against the Pakistani state. Thus, whilst Pakistan is fighting 
for the unity of its own state, it is also working to prevent the kind of anarchy 
(the “Coming Anarchy”)39 that, within the liberal world order, is seen to 
result from a decay of state structures in many non-Western parts of the 
world and prepare breeding grounds for terrorism. At the same time the 
border is far too much of a political and ethnic mosaic, and the inter-state 
relations in the region too conflicted, for any consistent and all-encompassing
front against militant insurgency to develop. The strong reactions of the 
                                                          
38 Cited in Khan, “New Trends in Pak-Russian Relations.”
39 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 (February 
1994): 44–77. 
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Pakistani government against the U.S. drone strikes in its western regions
illustrate policies that emphasize formal sovereignty; yet, they also show just 
how much the Pakistani government needs the support of the large 
populations living in the north-western regions and the wide stretch of land 
along the border with Afghanistan. Because it is highly problematic for 
Pakistan to participate in the U.S.-led global war against terrorism on its own 
territory, its fight against the anarchy in which the self-image of the Western 
liberal order crumbles cannot but be fraught with contradiction. 
Due to this very complex border problematique, any development in 
Afghanistan will immediately impact the political and ethnic mosaic in the 
unsettled border areas of Pakistan and stir the pieces into the form of a new 
puzzle. The revival of the Pashtunistan issue between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan has been one of the perennial problems for Pakistani leaders. If 
the Taliban were to achieve victory in Afghanistan, the TTP, which already 
claims the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan, would be further 
emboldened: a separate enclave along the border could be demanded, thereby 
also reviving the dispute over an independent Pashtunistan. Other possible 
courses of development are the maintenance of the status quo; the eruption of 
a full-scale civil war between the contending groups, or at the least a form of 
prolonged chaos; and the reaching of an agreement over a broad-based 
power-sharing formula amongst the contending groups. Each of the above 
alternative developments has different implications for Afghanistan and the 
wider Central Asian region, and also for Pakistan-Russia relations.40
The enthusiastic turnout of voters in the presidential elections in 
Afghanistan in 2014 gives hope that perhaps the status quo can hold even 
after the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO-led forces from Afghanistan. In 
September 2014, Ashraf Ghani, the new president of Afghanistan following 
these elections, agreed to the Bilateral Security Assistance Pact with the U.S. 
which his predecessor Hamid Karzai had been reluctant to sign. President 
Ghani has visited Pakistan to seek improved relations and he has undertaken 
an initiative to bring the Taliban into negotiations. However, the maintenance 
of the status quo seems unlikely in the case of the Western military almost 
entirely (leaving hundreds rather than thousands of troops in place) 
withdrawing from the country. The Afghan National Army would be 
                                                          
40 Seth G. Jones and Keith Crane, “Afghanistan After the Drawdown,” Council on Foreign 
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204
unlikely to withstand the onslaught of Taliban insurgents for a longer period 
of time. The regime may hold for some time; but it would eventually start to 
crumble as a result of desertions from the national army and shrinking 
international support. 
A Taliban victory would spell disaster for the region as it would revive 
fears in Russia, China, the Central Asian states, India, Iran, and Pakistan over 
the potential instability of their borders. Although the Taliban are less likely 
to spread beyond Afghan borders out of fear of international reaction, their 
victory within the country would create a backlash from other ethnic groups 
in Afghanistan. This situation would be very difficult for the Taliban to 
handle and, therefore, the third possible scenario for future developments is 
the re-eruption of civil war between the major ethnic groups of Afghanistan. 
These groups would seek the help of their international supporters, possibly 
recreating the scenario of the 1990s when Pakistan was supporting Pashtun 
groups and Tajik, Hazaras and Uzbeks were being supported by India, 
Russia, the Central Asian states, and Iran. A new civil war could also bring 
about the balkanization of Afghanistan and lead to the creation of separate 
ethnic enclaves. The fourth possibility for the future would be that 
Afghanistan’s ethnic groups could devise some broad power-sharing formula 
amongst themselves without involving outside parties. Such a solution could 
not only bring peace to Afghanistan but also stabilize the wider region. 
However, when power-sharing formulas are incomplete and do not work to 
the satisfaction of all parties, the only option that remains for those opposing 
the regime is to move across the borders and start preparing a new round in 
the conflict. This is a common pattern in many states of the region and can 
only be prevented if Afghanistan grows to become a strong state, both 
internally as well as externally. Today, just as much as it was in the wake of 
9/11/2001, this is an unachievable mission if foreign forces are not prepared 
to sustain the Afghan state militarily and economically. 
Conclusion
At present the relationship between Pakistan and Russia is no longer hostile 
for ideological reasons that could be perceived as threatening Pakistan from 
the inside and forcing it to crumble along its land borders. On the contrary, a 
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convergence of interests in respect to Afghanistan and its potentially 
destabilizing effects on Central Asia and parts of southern Russia has 
induced Russia and Pakistan to cooperate with each other. However, the fact 
that substantive cooperation has only recently developed despite its 
preparation at the declaratory level over the years, tells us that Russia 
continues to consider its policies towards Pakistan in relation to its policies 
with other countries and, especially, its relations with India. If India 
increasingly integrates into the world order of the Western states, its strategic 
partnership with Russia will relatively come to weigh less, and Russia in turn 
will be willing to explore new markets in the region and to look for them also 
in Pakistan. The fact that China also fears the possible spillover effect of 
Islamic militancy in Afghanistan that could destabilize its already potentially 
restive Xinjiang region may further promote Pakistan-Russia cooperation in 
the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  
The Chinese or “Sinic” world order is expanding in Central and South 
Asia, and the practical implications of this process depend on how this order 
takes shape within China’s internal discourses: whether or not China should 
act as a “strong state,” and whether it should follow a pragmatic policy or, 
rather, more aggressively pursue a nationalist policy.41 Indic and Islamic 
world orders are also waxing in the region and can be similarly identified 
through the identity debates that prescribe alternative visions of the world for 
action (for different foreign policy strategies).42 Thus, while the Western 
withdrawal means that the influence of the Western liberal world order 
enjoys fewer prospects in the region, its retreat is not due to radicalized 
militant Islam. Although Afghanistan is the pivotal point of a deeply 
“civilizational” struggle, the impacts of Islamic, Indic and Sinic culture will 
be increasingly felt in the economies and everyday lives in the region quite 
independently of such a struggle. In this setting, Russia’s possibilities to gain 
influence depend on its collaboration with other countries and its ability to 
connect with especially the Islamic, Indic, and Sinic world orders (arguably, 
it is already connected with the Western liberal order). These orders, as 
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already emphasized, are not given entities; rather, they are sets of practices 
embodied in action and discourse. 
One such discourse is the “Clash of Civilizations,” which together with 
those already mentioned (and many others not mentioned) are symbolic 
representations of the Western liberal world order.43 We conclude this 
chapter by calling attention to the practical implications of this concept 
which basically puts traditional realist “struggle for power” in the frame of 
“culture.” Although the conflict between Islamic religious forces and secular 
(mostly authoritarian) governments in Central and South Asia is very much a 
“clash” of “civilizational” proportions, it is far from being a conflict between 
cultural entities with distinct boundaries. Under present circumstances when 
the Taliban, its associates and, more recently, also the Islamic State is 
preparing to strengthen their positions in Afghanistan, images like this can 
obstruct our identification of real problems. The question for the coming 
years is whether the fear of transnational militant Islam, which in recent 
years has been on the rise in the region of our focus due to the developments 
especially in northern Afghanistan, can bring about a broad-based 
collaboration against these specific forms of Islam. Such a “new great game” 
puts Pakistan in a pivotal position and requires wise policies which avoid 
treating different groups as simply “enemies.” Unless such a “front” can be 
built on the ground, any international cooperation on it remains ineffective. 
Concerning the role of Russia specifically, the policies which deepen the 
conflict between Pakistan and India can best be kept under control if 
“multipolarity”44 as a basis of communication is chosen from amongst the 
many discourses articulating the Western liberal order.
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PART III  Development and Projects of Regional Leadership   
U.S. and Chinese Silk Road Initiatives: Towards a 
Geopolitics of Flows in Central Asia and Beyond
Mika Aaltola and Juha Käpylä
When the geostrategic gaze meets the geography of Central Asia, the scene
can be communicated to wider audiences when the description connects with
conventional historical knowledge and invokes imaginaries of a glorious and
famous distant past to build identities for the present. The specific contours
of the geographic landscape are then reimaged in terms of the possibilities
they seem to possess when being transformed by the new functions which
make them part of a strategic idea. Both the U.S. and Chinese strategic vi-
sions for the future of Central Asia are based on the Silk Road concept. The
Silk Road originally refers to the ancient trade and cultural routes between
China and South and Central Asia, Europe and the Middle East that started to
emerge already during the Han dynasty in the 2nd century BC and met their
ultimate demise with the rise of the growing influence of Tsarist Russia and
then the Soviet Union in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Since the 1990s, the
concept has resurfaced in the context of various logistics and energy projects
across the greater Central Asian region.1 This chapter focuses on two recent
Silk Road initiatives by the U.S. and China––on their design, intent and con-
sequences in Central Asia in the context of the U.S. withdrawal from Af-
ghanistan.
Strategic thought emerges from the context of some actual political prob-
lem that cannot be solved by routine action and the means previously availa-
ble. For the U.S., the central problem in contemporary Central Asia has been
Afghanistan: how to create sustainable economic and political conditions in
the country after the withdrawal of U.S. military presence while at the same
time responding to global geopolitical games involving other great powers.
For China, the problematic has been more complex, involving domestic secu-
rity and economic issues in Western China, regional security issues in Cen-
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tral Asia, global geostrategic scenarios following the U.S. rebalancing to
Asia, as well as energy and trade factors in (and beyond) the region. The two
Silk Road concepts represent contemporary solutions to these dilemmas. Fol-
lowing pragmatist insight, strategic ideas are best understood as “rules of
action”2; they are not abstract reflections or even accurate representations3,
but intimately related to organizing new action, thus having practical effects
in socio-political reality.
From the U.S. perspective, the global space is organized according to
U.S.-centric networks.4 These networks are comprised of logistic flows of
resources, people, goods, and data. The focus is on the ways in which these
flow-systems with their hub-and-spoke topologies combine with circulations
of power. Mobility networks become signs of a landscape that has been mas-
tered. This vision contrasts with decaying or non-existing networks that often
signify anarchy.5 The hub-and-spoke structure has a history of being read as
a “health indicator” of mastered environments. Ikenberry, for example, draws
an explicit parallel between the changing global power hierarchy and the air-
mobility systems, where all “major power centers (airlines) have their own
distinct and competing hub and spoke system.” 6
The transformation into a hub-and-spoke pattern is what Ikenberry indi-
cates might be happening to the global hierarchy of power. Ikenberry makes
a distinction between a more unipolar hub-and-spoke arrangement and a mul-
tilateralist situation, where actors coordinate their actions based on mutually
agreed upon and shared rules and principles. The earlier Pax Americana hub-
and-spoke relationship was clearly more unilateralist: one hub makes the de-
cisions and expects the spokes to conform.7 In his later 2009 analogy, the
hub and spoke is considerably more “fragmented,” with the emergence of
                                                          
2 Charles Sanders Peirce, “How to Make our Ideas Clear,” in Pragmatism: A Reader, ed. 
Louis Menand (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 33.
3 This is a particularly “neo-pragmatist” claim; see e.g. Juha Käpylä and Harri Mikkola, 
“‘Getting Things Right?’: A Reconsideration of Critical Realism as a Metatheory for IR,” 
Journal of International Relations and Development 14, no. 4 (2011): 413–14.
4 See e.g. Mika Aaltola, “The international airport: The hub-and-spoke pedagogy of the 
American empire,” Global Networks 5, no. 3 (2005): 261–78; Mika Aaltola, Juha Käpylä,
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5 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 (February 
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competing China as a hub that has partially overlapping spokes with the
American-led liberal hub (thereby instigating a growing need to compromise
on practices of governance). Thus, it seems that the geo-economics of
(asymmetric) interdependence is propelling ways of seeing strategic maps
and transforming landscapes that goes beyond mere traditional geopolitics.
With the emergence of U.S. and Chinese Silk Road initiatives, the geopoli-
tics of Central Asia can also be seen to be in transformation.
This chapter investigates the two strategic visions in and around Central
Asia: the U.S. “New Silk Road” and China’s “one belt, one highway” initia-
tives which primarily highlight the establishment of infrastructure for region-
al and global flows of resources, goods and people and which have strong
secondary geopolitical relevance. The two approaches are similar yet exhibit
particularities in design, execution and intent. The U.S. vision is Afghani-
stan-focused, vertical, multilateral and seen as a Central Asia-India connec-
tion. The Chinese vision is more diffuse, horizontal, bilateral and state-based
in its concrete investments, and seen as a broad march towards the west. The
key question is whether they can, or ought to be, read as competitive or com-
plementary. These contrary interpretations leave the future ambiguous from
the perspective of power politics. However, the two initiatives will have a
large impact on the daily lives of the people in the region, particularly when
they are integrated into the processes of global logistics and flows. The U.S.
initiative faces multiple challenges whereas the Chinese version, despite its
challenges, is the one which is more likely to shape practices in the region.
The U.S. Silk Road Initiative
A Regional Economic Strategy
In a speech on July 20, 2011 at Chennai in India, the Secretary of State Hilla-
ry Clinton laid out the outlines of the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Cen-
tral Asia after the withdrawal of the majority of U.S. (and ISAF) combat
forces from Afghanistan––at the time envisioned to take place by the end of
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2014 but today set to happen in 2016.8 The strategy was based on three ele-
ments: (1) a new strategic partnership framework to define the U.S.-
Afghanistan relationship after the U.S. withdrawal––a pact that was finally
signed in September 2014 following the power-sharing deal to secure the
new Afghan presidency for Ashraf Ghani;9 (2) active diplomatic efforts with
regional powers to facilitate a responsible political solution in Afghanistan,
including a chain of meetings in Istanbul, Bonn and Kabul to obtain formal
pledges of non-interference coupled with confidence-building measures from
regional players; and (3) an economic strategy to increase commercial ties
and activity in South and Central Asia so that goods, resources, capital, and
people could flow more easily across borders and, thus, enhance economic
growth in the region.10
Washington’s economic strategy took the form of the New Silk Road
(NSR) initiative. The primary focus of the NSR is Afghanistan, with the aim
of making Afghanistan economically and politically sustainable after the
withdrawal of the main part of the U.S. and ISAF forces. However, as Af-
ghanistan is unlikely to achieve this alone and isolated from its neighbors, the
NSR has a specific regional emphasis aimed at connecting and boosting all
the land-locked economies of Central Asia that are seen to possess vast natu-
ral resources and growing markets but to have remained relatively unin-
tegrated, both regionally and globally.11 The overarching idea of the initia-
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tive is that Afghanistan needs to move from aid-dependency to a sustainable
economy, and that this in turn requires the combination of government lead-
ership, private sector investment, and regional cooperation and connectivity.
As Secretary of State Clinton put it, “[f]or Afghans to enjoy sustainable
prosperity, they will have to work alongside all of their neighbors to shape a
more integrated economic future for the region that will create jobs and will
undercut the appeal of extremism.” 12
In more detail, the NSR initiative is a regional approach to peace and
prosperity in Afghanistan. It goes beyond the limited focus on Afghan inter-
nal dynamics or even Afghanistan-Pakistan relations and aims at integrating
the whole region into an international network of trade, transit, and commu-
nications links along the north-south axis with Afghanistan as the main hub–
–as the new “heart of Asia.”13 The goal, as Mankoff explains, is to connect
Afghanistan and its neighboring Central Asian countries to the growing
economies of South Asia––Pakistan and India––which in turn will help draw
in new foreign investment, open up new sources of hydrocarbons and miner-
als, and give Central Asian actors a stake in economic development that will
turn them away from violence and radicalism.14 In this vision, says Clinton,
“Turkmen gas fields could help meet both Pakistan’s and India’s growing
energy needs and provide significant transit revenues for both Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Tajik cotton could be turned into Indian linens. Furniture and
fruit from Afghanistan could find its way to the markets of Astana or Mum-
bai and beyond.” 15
The NSR initiative suggested the development of hard and soft infra-
structure as two particular ways of advancing trans-regional connectivity and
economic activity in Central and South Asia. The key part of the proposal
was the construction and extension of hard infrastructure in order to connect
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Central Asian states to Pakistan and India via Afghanistan. In this task, the
U.S. State Department identified up to 40 infrastructure projects to pursue in
the region.16 These included initiatives to develop energy transmission net-
works, energy pipelines, transport connections (e.g. roads and railways) and
information networks (e.g. fiber optic cables). The two flagship projects in
the U.S. initiative, illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2, are the Turkmeni-
stan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline, which is to transport
Turkmen natural gas to growing markets in India that currently have only
half the natural gas that they require, and the CASA-100017 energy transmis-
sion network, which could transport surplus summer hydropower from Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, all three of which
are states with significant energy deficits.18
Figure 1: TAPI Pipeline
Source: The Hindu (2014). Illustration: Kauko Kyöstiö.
These efforts complement existing infrastructure initiatives in the region that
the U.S. has supported diplomatically or through indirect financial support
via multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank (WB) or the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). The work of the Central Asia Regional Econom-
ic Cooperation (CAREC) program is a prime example.
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CAREC is an ADB-coordinated development program that brings to-
gether 10 Asian countries and 6 multilateral institutions. It was established in
1997 to promote cooperative regional development, with the aim of acceler-
ated economic growth and poverty reduction. The backbone of CAREC is its
investments in transport and trade facilitation projects, to date worth of $18
billion. Since 2008, these projects have been pursued in the framework of
Trade and Transport Facilitation Strategy (TTFS), the goals of which include
“establishing competitive corridors; facilitating the movement of goods and
people through these corridors; and providing sustainable, safe, and user-
friendly transport and trade networks” through Central Asia.19 Among the
key projects are the six multimodal transport corridors that seek to facilitate
regional connectivity and trade flows. According to TTFS, some of the origi-
nal corridors remain incomplete, with inadequate connection to maritime
ports and intermodal logistics hubs. This limits their effectiveness in enabling
increased trade flows and necessitates ongoing improvement and exten-
sions.20 Many of these extensions currently seem to emphasize the north-
south focus of the NSR initiative even if they also serve broader interests,
including those of China in its own Silk Road initiative.
These regional hard infrastructure projects complement the multibillion
U.S. nation-building effort in Afghanistan,21 part of which has focused on
rebuilding infrastructure that could ultimately enable Afghanistan to become
the new crossroads of Asia. The U.S. has financed the construction or reha-
bilitation of over 3,000 km of roads as well as key bridges to facilitate trade,
transport and people-to-people connectivity in Afghanistan and beyond.
Prime examples are the 2,200-km-long Afghan Ring Road connecting major
Afghan cities and the $40 billion and the 672-meter-long Tajikistan-
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Afghanistan bridge across the Panj River.22 The U.S. has also provided fi-
nancial support for the construction of energy transmission lines, hydropower
plants and related reforms across the country, worth more than $2 billion in
total.23 According to one estimate, the most significant development has been
the connection of Afghanistan’s and Uzbekistan’s electricity grids for the
provision of electricity to Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif.24 In the cyber domain,
the U.S. has provided technical assistance to the establishment of a 4,000-
km-long network of fiber optic cables in the country.25
Figure 2: CASA-1000 electricity network
Source: CASA-100 Homepage. Illustration:
Kauko Kyöstiö.
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In addition to improving connectivity, the U.S. has also emphasized the crea-
tion of potential hubs and spokes for the emerging trade and transport flows
in and through Afghanistan. These have included the port of Shir Khan Ban-
dar26 in Kunduz province that began to grow after the completion of the ad-
jacent Tajikistan-Afghanistan bridge in 2007, as well as the port of Haira-
tan27 in Balkh province that hosts one of the country’s few international rail
connections.
The establishment of hubs and connections is also related to Afghani-
stan’s natural resources that could be extracted and shipped out in return for
revenue to sustain the country. Consequently, the development of extractive
industries in Afghanistan has also been identified as important, not least be-
cause the U.S. Geological Survey has verified that “Afghanistan sits on top
of at least $1 trillion in mineral wealth––iron, copper, gold, rare earth ele-
ments, and others.” 28
The rest of the U.S. proposals in the NSR initiative fell into the category
of soft infrastructure development that aims to accelerate the free flow of
resources, goods, services and people in the (assumedly) increasingly con-
nected region, particularly along the north-south axis. This amounts to an
attempt to pursue economic growth through trade liberalization while at the
same time seeking reduction in crime and corruption. While it is recognized
that the underdeveloped hard infrastructure (as well as the security situation)
in the region remains a formidable challenge, significant obstacles to smooth
cross-border trade are perceived to be institutional, bureaucratic and political
in nature. Inefficient border bureaucracy, corruption and rent-seeking, and
differing national regulations are seen to stall efficient movement, create un-
predictability, and add significantly to the cost of cross-border trade.29 In
order to alleviate this situation, the NSR initiative has emphasized the need to
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upgrade border crossing facilities and procedures, remove bureaucratic trade
barriers, and coordinate trade policies in the region.30 Increasingly profes-
sional customs administration and standardized customs procedures coupled
with more harmonized regional trade policies are expected to amount to sav-
ings in time and reductions in the cost of regional trade. U.S. activities in-
clude31:
• Support of various border security initiatives in the region to prevent 
the exploitation of growing trade and transit by terrorists, narco-
traffickers and other criminals. The U.S. State and Defense Depart-
ments have also increased the capacity of customs and border control
officials in all Central Asian countries as well as supported the work 
of the OSCE to train officials, several hundreds of whom are Afghans, 
both in its Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe and its Cus-
toms Academy in Bishkek. 
• Agreement with the Central Asian countries upon a Trade and Invest-
ment Framework Agreement (TIFA), through which the parties seek 
to identify opportunities for new economic activities and work toward 
the removal of impediments to trade and investment flows amongst the 
agreeing parties and Afghanistan. The U.S. has also provided tech-
nical assistance for the realization of the 2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan 
Transit Trade agreement (APTTA) and supported the Cross-Border 
Transport Agreement (CBTA) between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan.32
• Support for Kazakhstan and Afghanistan has resulted in their accession 
to the WTO. The U.S. has also welcomed Uzbekistan’s efforts to re-
vive its WTO negotiations and Turkmenistan’s renewed interest in the 
organization. 
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• Afghanistan’s decision to rejoin the International Road Transport 
Convention (IRTC) in 2013 was seen as a positive move by the U.S. 
as this convention harmonizes the formalities of transporting goods by 
road in all Central Asian countries. The U.S. has also helped to estab-
lish the National Rail Authority and develop a national rail plan to fa-
cilitate enhanced transport and logistics in the country.
Moreover, in addition to improving hard and soft infrastructure the NSR ini-
tiative also maintains that regional economic connectivity should involve a
people-to-people aspect and particularly the improvement of opportunities
for youth, women and minorities to participate in social and economic life in
Afghanistan and the broader region. This creates a conditional aspect to the
U.S. strategy and connects it to a broader recognition among Western experts
according to which “improving the status of Afghan [and Central Asian]
women and girls is also important for the nation’s [region’s] political devel-
opment and stabilization.”33 In order to support these aims in the context of
the NSR initiative, the U.S. has funded university studies of Afghan students
across the region, sponsored economic and entrepreneurship symposiums for
women in Central Asia and South Asia, and organized trade delegations and
conferences in the region.34
The U.S. Initiative in Its Long-Term Policy Perspective 
Contrary to the word “new” in the name of the initiative, the very idea of a
Silk Road is not a novelty in the U.S. strategic discourse on Central Asia.
The notion can be traced back to Washington’s broader geopolitical consid-
erations which, during the 1990s and 2000s, focused on democratic transi-
tion, human rights promotion and economic cooperation in “Greater Central
Asia,” thus ultimately connecting it to the Caucasus region, Turkey and Eu-
rope in the West rather than to the North (Russia) or the East (China). Kucera
notes how the U.S. in the late 1990s, “pushed for the construction of pipe-
lines leading from the Caspian Sea through Georgia and Turkey, for the first
time breaking Russia’s monopoly on the region’s rich oil and natural gas re-
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serves.”35 This was meant to solidify the sovereignty of newly independent
Central Asian states and counter the influence of Russia as well as China in
the region––thus feeding into the competitive “great game” in Central Asia.36
The events of September 11, 2001, however, changed the situation and
Washington’s long-term strategy was replaced by short-term military expedi-
ency. The more recent idea of the New Silk Road as a post-withdrawal eco-
nomic strategy emerged from discussions in think tanks in Washington and
was adopted in a condensed form by government policymakers––initially at
the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and, subsequently, at the more
skeptical State Department and White House.37 In particular, the new initia-
tive drew from experience and lessons learned in the war in Afghanistan,
particularly in regard to the issue of military logistics in the Afghan theater of
operations.  
In order to sustain its combat forces in Afghanistan, the U.S. has had to
deliver a wide range of materiel to the country. Initially, the majority of non-
lethal U.S. military materiel was delivered to the Pakistani port of Karachi
and then transported overland to Afghanistan by commercial trucking com-
panies. As a result of a number of disrupting factors, including a lack of in-
expensive alternatives, trucking strikes and increased insurgency activity, in
2009 the U.S. sought to establish a more flexible and reliable northern supply
network into Afghanistan to support the growing number of its forces. The
shutdown of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border following the death of several
Pakistani soldiers in a NATO incursion on Pakistani soil made clear that the
northern dimension was vital. 38 Through a combination of diplomatic pres-
sure and financial incentives, the U.S. was able to establish a number of lo-
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gistical routes that utilized existing rail and road networks as well as com-
mercial carriers in Europe, Russia and Central Asia. Together, these routes
constituted the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), illustrated in Figure
3.39
Figure 3: The Northern Distribution Network
Source: Kuchins et al. (2010). Illustration: Kauko Kyöstiö.
Given the successful transport of materiel through the NDN––according to
official reporting over 66,000 containers by May 201240––Washington’s
NSR strategy envisioned that the NDN could work as a foundation for re-
gional commercial interaction in the future. In May 2012 Susan M. Elliott,
the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of South and Central Asia,
argued that “[b]ecause we’re using existing infrastructure and commercial
transit routes, these same routes can and should be used by the private sector
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to continue trade across the region, where there is ample opportunity for
growth.” 41
Leading think tanks and Central Asia experts in Washington had argued 
precisely this point prior to the adoption of the NSR initiative. Frederick 
Starr and Andrew Kuchins, in particular, have been prominent in this respect. 
For example, in 2009 the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) report by Kuchins et al. suggested that:
“By linking Afghanistan with Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia through
commercial carriers, existing infrastructure, and multiple routes, the NDN is
proof that the embattled country is currently accessible. Unfortunately, the flour-
ishing export trade of Afghan-grown opiates to Asia, Central Asia, Europe, Iran,
and Russia also serves as proof of transit potential. At the same time, the NDN is
creating additional demand for transcontinental transport services, bolstering the
logistical links between Afghanistan, NDN ports of origin, and NDN transit
states. Through this demand, the U.S. military is helping create and sustain trans-
continental transport capacity that could one day service the MSR [Modern Silk
Road] and become the engine for Afghanistan’s economic growth as prioritized
in the 2008 Afghan National Development Strategy.”42
In 2010, another CSIS contribution by Kuchins et al. argued that “[w]hile the
creation of the NDN was motivated by the U.S. military’s immediate logisti-
cal needs, its establishment nonetheless offers a unique opportunity for
Washington to lay a foundation for a Modern Silk Road, which would help
stabilize Afghanistan in the long term and transform Eurasia.”43 In the same
year, Starr and Kuchins together concluded more broadly that:
“The U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom radically changed [the] situation by
reopening Afghanistan‘s northern border to long-distance trade for the first time
since 1936, and by creating similar potential on Afghanistan‘s eastern border
with Pakistan. This action, entirely unintended and largely unnoticed in America
or elsewhere, is one of the most transformative developments on the Eurasian
landmass in the past century. Today, the best, and possibly only, way for Ameri-
ca to consolidate and expand its military gains in Afghanistan is to build on this
achievement.”44
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The New Silk Road concept, based on successful experience in commercial 
and logistics transactions towards the north and north-west along the NDN, 
was the model and way forward for the U.S., Afghanistan and greater Central 
Asia. Furthermore, as the U.S. was to withdraw the majority of its combat 
forces from Afghanistan, the existing NDN routes were to be used to 
transport out U.S. military equipment and, as such, they were expected to 
persist not only throughout the exit phase but also beyond it.
The Rationale for the U.S. Initiative: Goals in Afghanistan and 
Beyond 
The U.S. has had various security-related and geostrategic reasons for
launching the NSR initiative. As stated explicitly, the U.S. required a plan to
transition from a costly, security-oriented mission to a comprehensive but
less taxing long-term engagement with Afghanistan that would enable an
economically self-sustaining and extremism-averse Afghan society to emerge
in the context of an increasingly interconnected and interdependent Central
Asia. The costs of the absence of such a long-term plan or an “exit strategy”
were considered to be quite significant. First, gains in security and stability
would be short-lived if the U.S. and its Coalition partners abruptly were to
lose interest in Afghanistan. Second, the Afghan population would not be the
only party to draw the disillusioned conclusion that the U.S. is a self-
interested player unwilling to work for the Afghan goal of socio-economic
development. Third, non-engagement would also signal that the U.S. pres-
ence and interest in Central Asia was declining, thus creating further incen-
tives for Russia and China to increase their influence in the region. Fourth
and finally, a failure to accomplish the broader goal of a stable and self-
sustaining Afghanistan would be likely to undermine the willingness of
NATO and non-NATO partners to join U.S.-led missions in the future.45
Furthermore, the NSR initiative embodies broader U.S. geostrategic in-
terests in the region, among them the potentially growing strategic partner-
ship with India in combination with strategic rivalry between the U.S., China
and Russia. The Obama administration has defined India as its “indispensa-
ble partner” for the 21st century, based on converging strategic interests,
shared democratic values, and a common problem-solving mentality in re-
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gional and global affairs.46 However, political speech and practices have not
always coincided. The indispensable partnership has become tested in recent
years as the U.S. has “devoted less attention to India than to its rivals China
and Pakistan, pursuing economic links with the former and counterterrorism
ties with the other.”47 Nevertheless, India is still seen as an important region-
al leader as well as a democratic counterbalance to China in the Asia-Pacific
region, particularly in the maritime domain.48 The U.S. would like to consid-
er India as a key “pillar of economic and political stability in the Asia Pacif-
ic.”49 This strategic perspective explains why the U.S. NSR vision favors
vertical connections that seek to link Central Asia and Afghanistan to India
instead of the largest––and growing and expanding––market in the region,
namely China. This is expected to both enable the rise of India and to con-
strain the rise of China, including the Chinese expansion towards the west.
It is also worth noting that, despite its vertical design, the official NSR
strategy excludes both Russia and Iran from the equation––even if Russia did
facilitate the emergence and continuation of the NDN throughout the war in
Afghanistan. These exclusions reflect both the ongoing U.S. effort to limit
Russia’s influence in Central Asia, for example vis-à-vis Russia’s infrastruc-
ture (energy) and political projects (Custom’s and Eurasian Economic Union)
in the region, as well as the U.S. interest in limiting Iran’s participation in
potentially lucrative trade relations and in the stabilization of Afghanistan.50
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However, although the U.S. has not encouraged connections between Af-
ghanistan and Iran, it also has not banned them. In official statements the
U.S. has recognized, for example, “India’s historical linkages with Iran and
Persian culture” and understands “its interest in developing Iran as a gateway
to Afghanistan and Central Asia.”51 India’s possibilities to propose and exe-
cute road and rail projects connecting Afghanistan to the port of Chabahar in
Iran have not been restrained.
However, these efforts to limit Russian, Iranian and especially Chinese
influence in the region whilst simultaneously trying to develop and stabilize
Afghanistan through increased economic integration and activity are ex-
tremely challenging. If the stabilization of Afghanistan is premised on its
economic growth, and economic growth is to a large degree a function of
Afghanistan’s integration with the region and the region’s integration into
broader global markets, then it must also be noticed that Russia and particu-
larly China are geographically so favorably placed that they, too, play a role
in this process. Both of them, and more recently especially China, have al-
ready managed to penetrate the region and wield growing influence in Cen-
tral Asia. For example, Chinese investments in developing Turkmenistan’s
natural gas and Kazakhstan’s oil infrastructure provide China with leverage
over and beyond the competitive advantage that sheer geographic proximity
provides (more on this further below). Given the constraints on U.S. re-
sources due to the financial crisis and budgetary challenges coupled with a
lack of private sector investment, it is regional players and especially China
that are likely to fund many of the critical projects in the long term. This, in
turn, gives China a say in the content and consequences of such endeavors.52  
Whether this is necessarily a negative thing from the U.S. point of view
remains an open question. On the one hand, China’s significant investments
in the region do facilitate the region’s integration into the global economy as
well as its economic self-sufficiency––the two mechanisms that the U.S. em-
phasizes in the long-term development of Afghanistan and Central Asia. This
is something that U.S. official statements have come to recognize:
“We welcome the efforts of China to develop energy and transportation infra-
structure in the region, including projects announced during President Xi’s recent
[2013] visit. We see all these efforts as mutually reinforcing and beneficial to the
                                                          
51 Sherman, “The United States and India.”
52 Mankoff, “The United States and Central Asia,” 21.
224
Central Asia countries and Afghanistan. We are realistic. The United States is an
important partner for all the countries of the region, and our companies are major
players there […]. But China, as a neighbor to these countries and as a result of
its own dramatic growth, is naturally going to be leader there in trade and in-
vestment. We want to work with China […].”53
On the other hand, China has paid much less attention to Afghanistan and
much more attention to other Central Asian states than the U.S. did after 9/11
when Afghanistan was a strategic priority in the Global War on Terror. As a
consequence of this, Chinese influence in the region has grown as a function
of successful investments, mostly outside of Afghanistan and not necessarily
in favor of the development in Afghanistan that is the emphasis of the U.S.
China’s Silk Road Initiative
Two Roads in One Initiative: The Economic Belt and the Maritime 
Road
The idea of the Silk Road has a long history in China, dating back to the
original route(s) and its subsequent utilization in Chinese political discourse.
China has proposed its own concrete vision of the modern Silk Road that
imitates, yet goes beyond, the U.S. strategy initially suggested by Hillary
Clinton in 2011. The proposal includes both terrestrial and maritime roads
that connect China not only to Central Asia but much of the world, including
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The terrestrial part of this vision was
presented by President Xi Jinping in a speech at Nazarbayev University in
Astana, Kazakhstan, while visiting Central Asia in September 2013. Presi-
dent Xi proposed that China and the Central Asian countries build an “eco-
nomic belt along the Silk Road” that would span the Eurasian continent from
the Pacific to the Atlantic and the Baltic Sea––a massive economic area with
close to 3 billion people that “represents the biggest market in the world with
unparalleled potential.” 54 Later on, in a speech during his Southeast Asian
tour on October 3, President Xi spoke of the importance of a 21st-century
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maritime Silk Road. According to the vision, “the seaway that bridges China
and foreign countries is as prestigious as the Silk Road that connects the East
and West.”55 This maritime vision of the Silk Road was echoed almost simul-
taneously by the Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, in the October 2013 ASEAN-
China summit in Brunei, as a part of his seven-point proposal for cooperation
in the South-East Asian maritime domain.56
Figure 4: Chinese Silk Roads
Source: Xinhuanet (2015). Illustration: Kauko Kyöstiö.
More recently, the state owned Xinhua News Agency has provided one of the
few visual illustrations of the Chinese vision and particularly its immense
scope (Figure 4; see also Tiezzi 2014).57 The subsequent release of an offi-
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cial policy paper by China’s National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) has elaborated on Chinese aspirations in more detail.58 It has be-
come obvious that China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative is not reducible
to the two specific terrestrial and maritime routes suggested in Xinhua’s im-
age. In fact, already in his 2013 speech on the “economic belt,” President Xi
put forward a five-point proposal to develop the broader economic area to
strengthen relations between China, Central Asia and Europe. This proposal
emphasized increased policy communication to help joint economic coopera-
tion, the development of transport and other networks to facilitate intra- and
intercontinental trade, and the improvement of trade relations by eliminating
trade barriers and reducing trade and investment costs. Two more highlights
were the enhancement of financial cooperation with the aim of decreasing
transaction costs and reducing financial risks and the strengthening of cultur-
al relations, for example through government-sponsored scholarships, study
tours and various kinds of cultural events.59
Policy communication, infrastructure development and financial cooper-
ation are currently the three most topical embodiments and tools of the Silk
Road initiative. In order to establish a favorable political environment, China
has engaged in active high-level political dialogue with prospective partners
along the maritime and terrestrial Silk Roads. It has established strategic
partnerships with all five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan in 2005 and 2011,
Uzbekistan in 2012 and Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan in 2013) as
well as with ASEAN countries (Malaysia in 2013 and Indonesia in 2005 and
2013).60 The typical policy is that bilateral relations are upgraded to strategic
partnerships and coupled with mutually beneficial (“win-win”) economic
cooperation and projects. Concretely, this has meant infrastructure develop-
ment to facilitate economic flows and ultimately also Chinese economic and
political influence along the two Silk Roads. Through financing and by car-
rying out construction projects China continues to pursue the establishment
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of a vast network of international connections: transport corridors overland
(roads, high-speed railways) and at sea (sea routes), oil and natural gas pipe-
lines as well as extraction infrastructure, telecommunications infrastructure
(“Information Silk Road”), airports and ports, special economic zones, and
so on.61
In regard to the “economic belt” across Central Asia, in particular, these
include more localized initiatives with strategic value, such as the establish-
ment of an agricultural free trade zone along the Xinjiang-Tajikistan border62
and the establishment of the Kashgar special economic zone63. They also
include broader, regional and trans-regional initiatives with strategic signifi-
cance, such as: the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline that bypasses Russia and
transports Caspian oil directly to China64; the Central Asia–China gas pipe-
line that bypasses Russia’s Gazprom-Transneft network and transports natu-
ral gas from Turkmenistan via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to China’s new
West-East pipeline65; the establishment of a China-Pakistan overland
transport corridor between Kashgar and the Chinese-operated port of Gwadar
in Pakistan in order to provide China with alternative access to Middle East-
ern oil66; the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railroad that could move Chinese
low-value goods from Xinjiang to Central Asia and bring Central Asian
products, such as uranium from Uzbekistan, to China67; and the China-
Europe railroad to connect inland China to Central Europe (illustrations in
Figures 5 and 6).68
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Figure 5: China-Central Asia Transport and Energy Connections.
Source: Stratfor (2013). Illustration: Kauko Kyöstiö.
To facilitate infrastructure development, China has not only financed projects
bilaterally (e.g. loans as prepayments of natural resources), but also moved to
establish new funding mechanisms. In November 2014, China announced the
establishment of a $40 billion Silk Road Fund, managed by Chinese policy
banks, to fund infrastructure, resource extraction, industrial and financial
cooperation projects along the two Silk Roads. In the previous month repre-
sentatives of 21 Asian nations had gathered in Beijing to sign a memorandum
of understanding on establishing a new multilateral Asian Infrastructure In-
vestment Bank (AIIB)––a Chinese alternative to the Asian Development
Bank dominated by Japan––with capital of $50 billion to finance various
infrastructure projects in the greater Asian region.69 Simultaneously the es-
tablishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization financing institution
is under discussion amongst the member states.70
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The Rationale for the Chinese Initiative: Broad Objectives in 
Geostrategic Contexts  
In order to understand China’s Silk Road initiative, we must see it as a part
of a broader and ongoing Chinese westward expansion––“March to West”71
or “Pivot to West”72––that began with a domestic focus. As Wang explains,
modern China’s strategic attention has been directed at its coastal areas in the
east. When China began to open up, contact with Western powers and Japan
took place primarily by maritime routes, which resulted in the placing of
many of the Chinese cities and its industry on the East coast. This led to an
accumulation of population and wealth in coastal regions. The establishment
of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in south-east China further emphasized
this focus. These developments meant that throughout much of China’s mod-
ern history, its Western regions have remained socio-economically backward
as well as lacking contact with the rest of the world.73
Beginning with the launch of the Great Western Development Strategy
by the central government in 2000, China began to pay serious economic
attention to developing its Western regions.74 This regional modernization
and industrialization has borne economic fruits. One expert sees “the begin-
nings of an economic boom in the inland provinces, producing a particularly
noticeable impact since 2010.”75 As a consequence, migration flows to the
more industrialized coastal area have lessened as work has become available
closer by (thereby contributing to labor shortage and a rise in salaries in the
East). Furthermore, increased economic activity has resulted in increased
demand for energy that could be found close by and through much more di-
rect supply routes from the Middle East and Central Asia.
The development strategy is related to the Chinese aim to secure territo-
rial integrity and maintain political stability in its Western regions, most no-
tably in the multiethnic Xinjiang borderland region that rebelled from the
Republic in the interwar-period and remains the home of a critical and politi-
                                                          
71 Jisi Wang, “‘Marching Westwards’: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy,”
International and Strategic Studies Report no. 73 (October 7, 2012).
72 Ankit Panda, “China’s Pivot West,” The Diplomat, October 29, 2013,
http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/chinas-pivot-west/.
73 Wang, “Marching Westwards,” 1–3; see also Szczudlik-Tatar, “China’s New Silk Road 
Diplomacy,” 2.
74 Wang, “Marching Westwards,” 1–3, and Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules, 77.
75 Chen Yo-Jung, “China’s Westward Strategy,” The Diplomat, January 15, 2014,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/chinas-westward-strategy/.
230
cally active Uighur population.76 The official Chinese policy assumes that
the promotion of rapid economic development––supported by massive state
investments and subsidies––coupled with increased contact with the east will
change local ethnic and cultural identities over time, thus decreasing the dan-
ger of regional political instability or outright separatism. China has also not
shied away from using coercion in the region to suppress Uighur organiza-
tions with either nationalist or separatist agendas––to combat what the Chi-
nese consider the “three evils” of religious extremism, separatism and terror-
ism. Since the early 2000s, China has advanced regional security cooperation
through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to combat these
“evils” in its Western parts and beyond in Central Asia.77
Today, the Chinese march to the West is increasingly international in
character. China is not ignorant of political instability due to ethnic tensions,
intertwined borderlands and border disputes, and the presence of the “three
evils” close by in Central Asia. In particular, China fears a potential “domino
effect” in which instability in neighboring states would spill over into West-
ern China. Much like in Xinjiang, China has an interest in stabilizing the re-
gion through a combination of improved political relations, economic devel-
opment and security cooperation. The first of these is pursued with strategic
partnerships, the second through growing economic investments in the re-
gion, particularly in the hydrocarbon sector and infrastructure projects, and
the third through multilateral cooperation in the SCO in order to improve its
regional capability in fighting the “three evils.”78
The Chinese march to the West is also related to a broader geostrategic
scenario within which China finds itself confronting foreign powers. While
China remains broadly committed to the global liberal economic order, it
pursues regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. To counter the rise of China
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in general and in the Asia-Pacific in particular, the U.S. has been rebalancing
its strategic attention to the region.79 This has meant that China increasingly
perceives itself as being a target of a comprehensive U.S. policy of “con-
tainment” pursued through strengthening military partnerships and efforts to
undermine Sino-ASEAN political relations as well as Chinese-led regional
economic integration, notably the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific
(FTAAP) through the promotion of the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP). In this potentially zero-sum situation, where both the U.S. and China
are seeking to expand (or at least maintain) their own influence in the region,
China recognizes the danger of an open confrontation with the U.S. and pur-
sues a policy that combines gradual military build-up at home with new polit-
ico-economic diplomacy abroad.80
A growing geostrategic emphasis on regions to the west of China––
including Central Asia and the Middle East––currently presents the leader-
ship in Beijing with a more favorable option than open U.S.-Sino confronta-
tion, with much less to lose and much more to gain. The U.S. withdrawal
from Iraq and Afghanistan opens up geopolitical and geo-economic space
into which China can advance and from which it can reap economic (re-
source extraction, market penetration), political (conversion of economic
influence into political power) and security (development of Central Asian
countries) benefits with almost no risk of a direct military confrontation be-
tween the two––something that is much more difficult to achieve in the Asia-
Pacific. Although China’s Silk Road initiative is a rival to the U.S. economic
strategy, there is potential for a cooperative U.S.-China relationship in the
region, for example because of common interests in economic investment,
energy issues, counterterrorism and maintaining regional stability as a whole.
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In Afghanistan, in particular, the U.S. has signaled that China could contrib-
ute more to the stabilization of the country.81
As China has become an important investment and trade partner in Cen-
tral Asian states, Beijing’s vision of the “economic belt” also contests Mos-
cow’s attempt to establish the multi-dimensionally challenged Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union82 in the region. While sharing the strategic interest of counter-
ing U.S. hegemony, Moscow is uneasy about a significant expansion of Chi-
nese economic reach including energy and transport links to Central Asia that
will not only diminish Russia’s economic footprint but will also be converted
into Chinese political power in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence,
thereby reducing its role to that of a mere “junior partner” for Beijing.83 As a
result of the crisis in Ukraine, Russia has found itself increasingly isolated
from the West and it has turned its attention to the east and, particularly, to
China. This has meant new energy deals and investments from China––
notably for expensive hydrocarbon extraction projects in eastern Siberia and
the Arctic––with terms that may turn out to be unfavorable to Russia.
As a growing market, China expresses rising demand for a stable and se-
cure supply of energy from alternative sources. As a consequence of this,
access to energy reserves in Central Asia has become increasingly important
for China.84 This has also suited Central Asian countries, which have been
looking for new export markets so as to reduce their dependence on Russia.85
From this perspective, President Xi’s tour in the region in September 2013
was illustrative. During the trip, a range of investment, trade and loan agree-
ments were reached with strategic partnership countries, in total worth over
$50 billion. Oil-rich Kazakhstan was the prime target of the trip with deals
amounting to up to $30 billion, primarily related to oil extraction and the
transport thereof. China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) invested $5
billion in the Kashagan offshore oil field in the Caspian Sea from which oil is
transported to China via existing pipeline infrastructure (Figure 5). Another
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set of agreements was reached in Uzbekistan where Beijing and Tashkent
completed oil, gas and uranium deals worth of $15 billion. In Turkmenistan,
China’s interests were primarily related to the expansion of production and
supply of Turkmen natural gas to China. The Turkmen government pledged
to supply China with an additional 25 billion cubic meters of natural gas an-
nually by 2020, and in return Beijing agreed to finance the redevelopment of
the massive Galkynysh gas field––the second largest in the world––and addi-
tional pipeline projects to carry the increased supply to China.86
Figure 6: Central Asia–China Oil and Gas Infrastructure
Source: Cooley (2012). Illustration: Kauko Kyöstiö.
Until the early 1990s, China was self-sufficient in oil. With subsequent
growth rates exceeding 10 percent per year, it soon became dependent on
foreign oil.87 In 2009, China became the second-largest consumer of oil after
the U.S. and, assuming continued economic growth, it will surpass the U.S.
in the near future. While coal remains the primary source of energy (around
70 percent), a significant part of the total energy consumption in China––18
percent in 2011––is covered by oil. China’s overall demand of oil reached
10.7 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2013 and more than half of it––circa
5.6 million bbl/d––was imported to China. According to 2011 statistics, the
single largest exporter of oil to China is Saudi Arabia, with a volume of over
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1 million bbl/d, whereas Iran with 0.5 million and Iraq with 0.27 million
bbl/d are also important sources of oil for China.88 In conjunction with the
worst-case geostrategic scenario in which the U.S. would cut the supply of
oil by blocking the Strait of Malacca, this increases the importance of alter-
native transport routes for Middle Eastern and African oil.
To alleviate its over-reliance on the Asia-Pacific maritime routes, China
has investigated the possibility of an alternative maritime corridor (Northern
Sea Route), energy sources (Yamal LNG) and logistics hubs (Iceland) in the
opening Arctic.89 It has also invested in the development of transport and
energy infrastructure as well as logistic hubs on land in order to bypass the
Strait of Malacca. We have already mentioned the transport corridor between
Kashgar (Xinjiang) and the Gwadar port in Pakistan. In April 2015, President
Xi unveiled infrastructure and energy projects, worth $46 billion in total, for
its establishment as an economic corridor with road infrastructure, railways
and oil and gas pipelines. Previously China had already invested in the de-
velopment of the trans-shipment terminal in Gwadar, with several multipur-
pose berths and oil terminals. In 2013, China took over operational control of
the port as the Singaporean company, PSA International, was replaced by the
state-run Chinese Overseas Port Holdings (COPHC).90
Finally, China also has a long-term interest in developing transport infra-
structure to facilitate trade flows connecting growing Western China with the
global market place. In its immediate neighborhood, Central Asia exhibits
some potential for economic growth91 which China has an interest of tapping
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into, at least by providing the region’s markets with low-cost products from
western Chinese manufacturing sites. However, other markets, most notably
those in Europe, are the main target. This requires the establishment of a
comprehensive land-based transport network consisting of highways and
high-speed railroads to Eastern and Central Europe. In rail transport, this has
already started to become a reality when the China-Europe railroad from
Zhengzhou in Henan province to Hamburg, Germany was inaugurated in
2013. While certainly not a full-blown alternative to maritime logistics, con-
tinental railways do provide some economic incentives as it reduces the time
(by 2 weeks) and expenses (by 25 percent) for transporting certain manufac-
turing goods from China to Europe. The savings in expenses are even higher
when compared to air logistics. The electronics company Foxconn, computer
manufacturer Hewlett-Packard and the logistics company DHL already uti-
lize this railway to ship their products from western Chinese manufacturing
sites to European markets. 92
Silk Road Initiatives and the Future of Central Asia
What future should one expect for Central Asia in the light of these two 
strategic Silk Road initiatives? While both rely primarily on the 
establishment of resource and trade flows and related infrastructure, the 
strategies suggest two alternative approaches for organizing the practices that 
make economic and political space in Central Asia. The U.S. Silk Road 
initiative emerges from the specific problem of Afghanistan and amounts to a 
limited regional economic strategy that emphasizes vertical (North-South) 
terrestrial interconnectivity between Central Asia and India, i.e. energy and 
logistic connections between land-locked Central Asian countries and India 
with Afghanistan as the gateway and benefactor in between. The current 
strategy, as discussed, is derived from the experience of the Northern 
Distribution Network during the war in Afghanistan. Paradoxically, though, 
the NDN was more extensive in scope and varied in direction as its routes 
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shipped U.S. military equipment through Europe, the Caucasus and Russia to 
Afghanistan.93 In the interest of facilitating regional interconnectivity in 
Central Asia, the U.S. strategy is a politically multilateral approach that seeks 
to leverage the cooperation of regional states (as responsible stakeholders), 
international organizations (the World Bank) and the private sector, with the 
latter two serving as primary sources of finance.
China’s Silk Road initiative differs from the U.S. version in crucial 
aspects. First, it is more varied in nature, including the maritime and 
terrestrial parts, the latter of which contains various routes for logistic and 
resource flows. It is also significantly broader in scope, consisting of routes 
that span not only the Eurasian continent but also the whole of the southern 
maritime route to Africa, the Middle East and Europe. And lastly, it is 
primarily horizontal (East-West) in its direction of interconnectivity, and 
aims to connect China to European commodity markets as well as to African, 
Middle Eastern and Central Asian resource bases. 
All this suggests that the Chinese Silk Road strategy is not merely the 
manifestation of a “neighborhood policy”94 designed to create a favorable 
geopolitical environment in Central (economic belt) and South-East 
(maritime road) Asia, but also reflects China’s global approach to secure its 
own economic growth and political stability (“go out” policy), and through 
them, its growing global political aspirations. The focus on adjacent 
geopolitical regions such as Central Asia can be seen as a necessary step in 
China’s broader objectives in the long term. In this respect, and again unlike 
the U.S., China’s political approach emphasizes bilateral strategic 
partnerships, such as those China has formed in Central Asia, through which 
a favorable geopolitical climate can be established. China also emphasizes 
public capital to fund costly infrastructure projects with these strategic 
partners. This is even the case with the establishment of the new multilateral 
Asian financial instrument in which China, as the leading country, assumes 
the greatest burden in financing.
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Of these differing strategies, it is the Chinese initiative that is currently 
the more feasible one––at least if regarded through the prisms of resource 
commitments, security and regional geopolitics. First, in terms of resource 
commitments China has been remarkably successful in implementing 
difficult and costly infrastructure projects by combining strategic partnership 
with significant, and mutually beneficial, public funding (and often-imported 
workforce) with various key countries, notably in Central Asia. The newly 
established Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
further highlight Chinese seriousness about implementing the strategy and its 
numerous projects. The U.S., on the other hand, has struggled to match 
financial commitments with great ambitions, such as the TAPI gas pipeline 
and the CASA-1000 energy network that remain “work-in-progress.” Much 
of the U.S.’s reticence stems from post-2008 economic challenges, the 
memory of high financial––as well as human and political––costs of its 
engagement to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan for over a decade, and a 
domestic political environment opposed to new costly involvement abroad.95
The U.S. has directly supported the flagship CASA-1000 project with a mere 
$15 million following the March 2014 commitment of $526 million by the 
World Bank (in which, however, the U.S. remains a major donor).96 This 
captures the current U.S. sentiment that Silk Road projects are to be realized 
“with limited government support.” 97
Second, the Chinese Silk Road initiative––particularly its terrestrial 
“economic belt” across Central Asia––suffers less than the U.S. strategy 
from the increasingly fragile security situation in Afghanistan.98 Apart from 
relatively limited Chinese investments in Afghanistan, notably in its 
resources sector, the majority of Chinese hard infrastructure projects bypass 
Afghanistan and are directed to other Central Asian countries, such as 
Kazakhstan for oil and Turkmenistan for gas, or beyond Central Asia 
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altogether. Furthermore, as Chinese have been reluctant to become involved 
in the Afghan stability operation and have, in fact, had a long relationship 
with the Taliban (and their de facto sponsor, Pakistan), they are less likely 
than U.S. forces or projects to become the target of anti-government violence 
to begin with. Much like in South Sudan, China even appears to have sought 
to broker a deal between the Taliban and the Afghan government by hosting 
Taliban representatives in China.99 Simultaneously China has its own 
problem with indigenous Uighur Muslim separatists in Xinjiang that have 
connections to groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan (and in bordering Central 
Asian countries). Thus, the fragile security situation in Afghanistan does 
affect via proxy the western part of China through which infrastructure 
projects enter and exit China.
By contrast, the U.S. Silk Road strategy is particularly vulnerable to the 
security situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the “heart” of the whole 
strategy, and insecurity in the country undermines the economic, social and 
political recovery of the country in general. Furthermore, key infrastructure 
projects of the U.S. strategy––the TAPI gas line and the CASA-1000 energy 
network––are to pass through volatile Afghan and Pakistani territory where 
continued insecurity will risk financial prospects and practical 
implementation.100 This entails that stability in the country is paramount for 
the successful execution of the strategy; such is not the case and the U.S. has 
found itself faced with a conundrum. Moreover, given the currently limited 
capability of Afghan security forces, full withdrawal would be likely to 
create a security vacuum in which anti-government and other radical groups 
could achieve territorial control at least in certain parts of Afghanistan, thus 
annulling the effort of the U.S. and the coalition forces over the course of 
more than a decade to stabilize the country as well as endangering any
prospect for economic recovery envisaged in the Silk Road initiative.
In order to respond to resurging violence, Afghan security forces have 
decided to resume the controversial “night raids” into private homes––
banned in 2013 by President Karzai due to their offensive nature––in order to 
hit the Taliban when and where they are at their most vulnerable. However, 
Afghan forces lack the capability to execute this effectively, thereby 
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prompting President Obama to quietly continue limited combat operations 
with the remaining U.S. forces in Afghanistan. This means in particular the 
provision of “combat enabler support,” including air support, transportation, 
intelligence, and communications that are critical in mobile night raids.101
Whether this will solve the security problem remains to be seen but appears 
unlikely, given that even the 2009 surge was not able to accomplish this.
Third, while the antagonistic regional geopolitical situation remains 
challenging for both strategies, the Chinese are, and have already been, more 
successful than the U.S. in navigating these stormy waters. By relying on 
bilateral partnerships and lucrative financial arrangements, the Chinese have 
clearly recognized that Central Asia, where the former Soviet republics are 
particularly wary about defending their sovereignty and where conflicts have 
erupted over poorly demarcated borderlines and strategically important water 
resources and hydropower installations102, is not likely to become a unitary 
regional grouping with aligned policies. Moreover, by involving all countries 
China has not only succeeded in diversification but has also established 
incentives for national elites to secure Chinese projects, even amidst rising 
nationalistic fears of “Chinese take-over” or poor employment practices in 
the region.103 Furthermore, as Chinese investments are not conditional on 
social transformation, e.g. the promotion of democracy or human/gender 
rights, not only are the Chinese more welcome among many of the region’s 
elites, but China itself considers to have contributed to regional security by 
bolstering national economic development and the resources of governments 
and local elites.
While the U.S. did pursue bilateral arrangements, including substantive 
and often murky financial compensation, with Central Asian governments 
and elites during the war in Afghanistan, most notably in order to secure 
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important military bases and fuel supply104, the U.S. Silk Road strategy has 
pursued a multilateral approach that overestimates the potential for trust and
cooperation in a divided and conflict-prone region––particularly so in the 
absence of direct U.S. financial compensation and strong diplomatic 
pressure. For example, disputes over water resources and hydropower 
installations are likely to affect negatively the finalization of the CASA-1000
project that ought to transport hydropower from Central Asia all the way to 
India. Moreover, the U.S. approach has also overestimated the willingness of 
private investors given both Afghan insecurity and regional geopolitical 
uncertainty. The U.S. initiative has also included elements of social 
transformation, e.g. in relation to human rights/gender issues, the fight 
against corruption and improved border control, that may be difficult to 
accomplish in some countries, the former because of enduring patriarchal 
practices and fears of bottom-up democratization processes and the latter two 
due to the systemic nature of corruption.105 Conditionality is unlikely to 
advance U.S. efforts.
Regional geopolitics is further complicated by the presence of a third 
great power, Russia. While the collapse of the Soviet Union meant the loss of 
Russia’s formal authority over the five Central Asian countries, China 
recognizes Russia as a notable player in the region in various relevant 
spheres.106 First, and foremost, Russia leads the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) and continues to have a notable military presence in 
the region, including bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Russia also has 
already existing economic and energy relations, and has been pursuing 
regional integration through the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EEU, alternatively abbreviated EAEU), even if the future of this 
project is uncertain.107
Both the U.S. and Chinese Silk Road initiatives can be read as geo-
economic alternatives to the EEU. While the U.S. Silk Road strategy 
explicitly excludes Russia––and given current East-West tensions this is 
unlikely to change––the Chinese have remained relatively ambiguous about 
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possible cooperation or conflict (of interest) between the “economic belt” 
and the EEU. After the EEU entered into force in January 2015, Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi stated that China was open to “win-win” cooperation with 
all interested parties, no matter whether they were countries or 
organizations.108 It also must be noted that although China’s interest lies in 
maintaining stability in Central Asia, it has no willingness to pursue the role 
of being a security guarantor in the region and, thus, is prepared to 
accommodate Russia. Offering economic lifelines to Russia serves China in 
two key respects: first, it seeks to guarantee that Russia remains a strategic 
partner in its opposition to the U.S. on the global scene without jeopardizing 
China’s strategic interest in maintaining access to Western markets; and 
second, by bolstering the “economic belt” it further undermines the already 
challenged U.S. Silk Road initiative in Central Asia.
Conclusion
Our analysis shows how both the U.S. and China emphasize the 
establishment of resource and logistical connectivity in their respective 
strategies and how the suggested direction, scope and means of establishment 
are unique in each. By seeking to establish energy and logistics 
infrastructure, the U.S. Silk Road initiative amounts to a regional and
multilateral economic strategy along the vertical axis; it aims to connect 
resources that can be extracted from the Central Asian countries to emerging 
and energy-hungry markets in Pakistan and India, with Afghanistan as the 
critical gateway and benefactor in-between. The Chinese initiative again 
leverages primarily bilateral relations and state-funding to establish mutually 
beneficial, complex horizontal infrastructure connectivity not only in Chinese 
neighborhood, such as in Central Asia, but also beyond, all the way to 
Europe and Africa. So far, Afghanistan has been a relatively minor part of 
Chinese investments, but the withdrawal of the majority of U.S. forces and 
the continuously fragile security situation are likely to demand increased 
attention from China, too. Based on resource, security, and geopolitical 
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considerations, the Chinese strategic initiative is likely to be the more 
significant external driver of transformation in Central Asia in the near 
future. 
Although it remains uncertain whether the individual projects (and either 
of the initiatives as a whole) will meet all the expectations attached to them, 
the practical implications of these developments also have a more general 
significance. The Silk Road initiatives suggest that the contemporary 
geopolitical environment in Central Asia is increasingly organized, and 
defined, by the development of hard (and soft) infrastructure as well as the 
emerging and strengthening force of regional and global flows through them. 
This implies a strategic shift of balance away from traditional geopolitics 
emphasizing the significance of separate territorial entities and strict 
borders109 towards also taking into account the interconnections in energy 
and logistics networks, and with them new dependencies and 
interdependencies, within and across existing politico-juridical boundaries in 
the region. All sovereign actors discussed above rely on various strategic 
flows to a growing degree, even if that degree differs from case to case. At 
the same time, their abilities to establish, maintain and ultimately secure 
these networks of infrastructure and flows––precisely the kinds of abilities 
which are central to state power in today’s “geopolitics of flows”110––differ 
from each other and depend on their positions and resources within the 
network. The search for these positions, and the accumulation of resources 
by inviting external assistance and investment so as to open critical 
bottlenecks, is in full swing in Central Asia. Despite already existing in 
Western policies linked to Afghanistan, this wider reorganization of the 
whole region has gathered its own momentum and provided Afghanistan 
with an instrumental role as a geographic gateway and as a political cause in 
which to engage in developing the region. 
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Russia and Kazakhstan: Mutually Different Interests 
for Regional Leadership
Dmitry Malyshev and Elnara Bainazarova
This chapter concerns itself with the mutually different policies through 
which two countries that both pursue leadership in Central Asia, namely 
Russia and Kazakhstan, each respond to the security threats that they per-
ceive as arising from Afghanistan. The first section, written by Dmitry 
Malyshev, discusses two dimensions in Russian policies: the re-
establishment of bilateral relations with Kabul, and the specific emphases in 
policy in Russia’s relations with its close allies amongst the Central Asian 
republics—Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This examination shows 
how Russia is preparing itself to meet the security challenges in the region 
and the way in which the development of relations with Afghanistan is part 
of a wider belt of flexible security arrangements. The second section in the 
chapter, written by Elnara Bainazarova, deals with the development assis-
tance through which Kazakhstan sharpens its policy profile and contributes 
to the solution of the security problems in Afghanistan and the more impov-
erished Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan is one of Russia’s most im-
portant allies in the entire post-Soviet space, and although the interests of the 
two countries diverge on issues such as the future direction of Eurasian inte-
gration, they coincide on the threats that both perceive is presented for the 
entire Central Asian region due to the current condition of Afghanistan. 
However, the policies of the two countries arise from mutually different in-
terests: Russia seeks to maintain its influence in the region for reasons related 
to its economy and the security of its own zonal borders; whereas Kazakh-
stan is in the process of building not only a regional but also a more globally 
oriented profile by spearheading policies that generate prestige for it within 
the international community. While for Russia Afghanistan is a threat that 
should bring Central Asia together under its security leadership, for Kazakh-
stan it is not only a direct security threat but also presents a crucial question 
mark in relation to its possibilities to expand economically and, consequent-
ly, to expand the space for its independent policies.
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Russia: Preparing to Contain the Threats from 
Afghanistan 
Although the final move to completely withdraw the U.S. forces from Af-
ghanistan has been postponed several times due to the deteriorating security 
situation in the country, the change that is being brought about in the years 
2014–2016 is already drastic: For the first time since the U.S. intervention in 
Afghanistan in September 2001 and the establishment of the NATO-led in-
ternational coalition by a UN Security Council resolution in December 2001, 
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will take full responsibility for 
fighting the Taliban and other militant insurgent groups within the country.1
Simultaneously serious doubts persist about the effectiveness of the Afghan 
army and its ability to confront the Taliban, which insists on the uncondition-
al withdrawal of all foreign forces and promises to continue the armed strug-
gle “as long as the last foreign soldier does not leave Afghanistan.”2 Casual-
ties have risen dramatically since the handover of security responsibilities to 
Afghan forces.3 Experts have argued that even if the Taliban loses in popu-
larity among the population in Afghanistan, its military capability remains 
considerable with some 25,000–30,000 experienced insurgent combatants.4
According to the information that was released by the Afghanistan Contact 
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Group of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in July 2014, about 
40 percent of Afghanistan’s territory is controlled by the Taliban and some of 
its leaders are closely cooperating with al-Qaeda.5 One year later, various 
Taliban groups had pledged to associate with the Islamic State (IS) either 
openly or clandestinely, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) had 
announced its allegiance to the IS, and government officials in Afghanistan 
reported IS militant activity in the provinces of Ghazni, Kunduz and Faryab 
in central and northern Afghanistan.6 The International Crisis Group reported 
that as the international military effort winds down “a resilient insurgency 
demonstrates its clout countrywide, particularly in rural areas.”7 These con-
cerns also leave Russia and the Central Asian states facing new challenges: 
the possible collapse of the Kabul regime which the U.S. has helped to set up 
and the subsequent revenge meted out by the Taliban and radical Islamists—
a new chaos followed by a new round of armed confrontations. 
This section examines the emerging pattern of Russian policies as Mos-
cow prepares for increased uncertainty over the political future of Afghani-
stan. The focus is, first, Russia’s policies towards Afghanistan and, second, 
its policies in Central Asia, where three countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan—are Russia’s close military and political allies in the Collec-
tive Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the processes of economic 
integration within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This dis-
cussion delves into how a multidimensional arrangement of practices with 
multiple paths of cooperation is being developed in order to contain the in-
stability and violence in Afghanistan and to prevent its spillover into the 
Central Asian republics. Zones of fortified security are being created around 
Afghanistan, and especially on its northern border, by multilateral (CSTO, 
SCO) and bilateral security cooperation and also by the means provided 
through other international cooperation to counteract the multifaceted threats 
of terrorism, Islamic extremism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and un-
controlled migration. While Russia avoids direct military involvement in Af-
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ghanistan, it seeks to develop cooperation with the government in Kabul in 
security matters and supports the economic development of the country.
Russian Policies on Afghanistan: Objectives for the Immediate 
Future
Russia’s concerns about Afghanistan are reflected in its official Foreign Poli-
cy Concept that was approved in 2013:
“The ongoing crisis in Afghanistan and the forthcoming withdrawal of interna-
tional military contingents from the country pose a great security threat to Russia 
and other CIS members. The Russian Federation together with Afghanistan and 
concerned countries, the United Nations, the CIS, the CSTO, the SCO and other 
multilateral institutions including Russia-NATO projects, will make consistent 
efforts to find a just and lasting political solution to the problems faced by this 
country with due respect for the rights and interests of all its ethnic groups and 
achieve a post-conflict recovery of Afghanistan as a peace-loving sovereign neu-
tral state with stable economy. Comprehensive measures to reduce terrorist threat 
from Afghanistan and eliminate or reduce illicit drug production and traffic in a 
significant and measurable manner will be an integral part of those efforts. Rus-
sia is committed to further intensifying international efforts under the auspices of 
the UN aimed at helping Afghanistan and its neighboring states to meet these 
challenges.”8
An inclusive government system (“due respect for the rights and interests of 
all its ethnic groups”) and neutrality are Russia’s long-standing objectives in 
a number of post-Soviet conflicts which have become sites for the rival inter-
ests of Russia and the Western states, for example in Ukraine and Moldova. 
In relation to Afghanistan Russia has kept a low profile; the emphasis of its 
action lies on the other side of the Amu Darya and Panj Rivers—in the for-
mer Soviet republics where it seeks to contain the threats from Afghanistan 
and to also maintain a strategic balance towards the U.S. military influence in 
Afghanistan.
Simultaneously the present uncertainties about the future of Afghanistan 
are lowering the political borderline which was set upon the river in 1989 
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when the Soviet Union pulled back to this line and ended its then almost one-
decade-long effort to gain control of Afghanistan. Addressing a meeting of 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization in October 2014, President Vla-
dimir Putin stressed that Afghanistan “can count on Russia’s support after 
the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan.” “We understand that the 
withdrawal of the international military contingent will not make the situa-
tion easier,” Putin said and expressed Russia’s commitment in yet undefined, 
metaphoric terms: “[…] in case of necessity, we will be ready to lend our 
friends in Afghanistan a shoulder to lean on in order to keep the situation in 
this country stable and with perspectives of development.”9 From April 11, 
2013, Afghanistan has been an observer state to the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the CSTO.
Russia’s immediate priority is to prevent Islamist militants from infiltrat-
ing the Central Asian republics and to terminate the colossal drug trade from 
Afghanistan via the Central Asian republics to Russia.10 In this connection, 
the practical meaning of lending “a shoulder to lean on” seems clear: by 
strengthening defense in the proximity of the borders of Afghanistan, Russia 
helps to prevent the insurgents from seeking shelter in these regions where 
they could prepare new attacks on Afghan territory. While this is a task that 
Russia and its allies prepare for in all cases—irrespective of whether insur-
gents will cross borders because the government in Kabul remains in power 
or because it fails to do so—being ready to lend a shoulder tells about a new 
active approach to cooperation on these issues. 
A few months later, in February 2015, Ambassador Alexander Manty-
tskiy in a meeting with the second Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Af-
ghanistan Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq expressed the wish of Russia’s authori-
ties to enhance interaction with Afghanistan in order to stabilize the situation 
in the region. Russia offered to conclude an agreement with Afghanistan on 
cooperation in the field of security. Deputy Chief Executive Officer Mohaqiq 
welcomed the idea that Moscow could take measures against the threat of the 
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expanding influence of the Islamic State in the region.11 Even if Russia con-
tinues to reject ideas about being directly militarily involved in Afghanistan, 
such cooperation will open a new phase in its participation in the fight 
against international terrorism and extremism beyond the territories of the 
states that are its allies in Central Asia. In relations with Afghanistan, the 
Western withdrawal is giving a boost to the re-establishment of relations 
which has been taking place very slowly after a standstill of almost a quarter-
century.
Leaving Behind the Burden of the Past 
Russia’s approaches on Afghanistan have been heavily influenced by the 
negative experience of its own history: the Soviet-Afghan war (1979–1989) 
that resulted in the loss of 15,000 Soviet troops. The events of that war have 
not been forgotten by the Russian public, and Moscow’s decision-makers 
have been firm on the point that Russia’s military forces will not be involved 
in Afghanistan again. However, the fact that Moscow’s policies towards Af-
ghanistan have shown little willingness to take anything but a minimum of 
risks and to keep avoiding any direct intervention in Afghanistan’s affairs 
has not prevented Russia from cooperating with ISAF under the Russia-
NATO agreement ratified in May 2007. Most importantly, Russia has al-
lowed the coalition forces—the “Western military bloc” in Russian par-
lance—to use Russian territory to transfer their troops and cargo including 
heavy weaponry and combat aircraft.12 Russia has also directly assisted the 
government in Kabul by donating helicopters and other equipment for mili-
tary uses. Nevertheless, the determination not to send troops has remained 
consistent over the past twenty-five years; hence any speculation that Russia 
could advocate the idea that the Western coalition should be replaced by the 
forces of the CSTO or the SCO member states is merely hypothetical. 
The traumatic memory of the Soviet-Afghan war in Russian society and 
the lack of bilateral relations after the Soviet withdrawal has kept Moscow 
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and Kabul at a distance from each other. Omar Nessar, Director of the Rus-
sian Center for the Study of Modern Afghanistan and editor-in-Chief of the 
web-site “Afghanistan.ru,” explains: 
“Bilateral relations between Moscow and Kabul were under severe pressure from 
Russian domestic political factors. Over many years, the media and expert com-
munity produced a negative image of post-Communist Afghanistan, introducing 
it as an “American project” for Russian public opinion. Moreover, in Kabul anti-
Russian elements had frozen Russia’s initiatives to establish economic and hu-
manitarian ties with the country. The relevant government agencies of the Rus-
sian Federation clearly lacked the political will to develop bilateral relations. 
This was primarily because in Russia’s foreign policy direct bilateral relations 
with Afghanistan did not possess any kind of priority.”13
No signs of change could be seen until 2012, when a joint Russian-Afghan 
Commission on trade and economic cooperation was established that provid-
ed an institutional basis for the economic partnership of the two countries. As 
a result of this new opening, Russia has started a gradual “return to Afghani-
stan” and increased its economic cooperation and development assistance for 
infrastructural projects and humanitarian14 cooperation. In Afghanistan the 
improved relationship has brought back memories about previous coopera-
tion. Former President Hamid Karzai is amongst those who have commented 
positively on the Soviet model. “The Soviet money went to the right place 
and they were efficient in spending their resources through the Afghan 
government,” Karzai said in an interview to the Washington Post in March 
2014.15 During the International Conference on Afghanistan in London in 
2010, where the participating states were requested to contribute with 
development assistance to help stabilize Afghanistan, the Russian delegation 
                                                          
13 Omar Nessar, “Evoliutsiia Afganskoi politiki Moskvy,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, January 26, 
2015, 9 (translation by Dmitry Malyshev). 
14 In Russian linguistic practice, ”humanitarian” does not only refer to relief work; the word 
has the broader connotation of being focused on human beings instead of state structures 
and institutions.
15 Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Full Transcript of Presi-
dent Karzai’s Interview with Washington Post,” March 5, 2014,
http://president.gov.af/en/news/full-transcript-of-president-karzais-interview-with-
washington-post; Kevin Sieff, “Interview: Karzai Says 12-year Afghanistan War Has Left 
him Angry at U.S. Government,” Washington Post, March 2, 2014,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interview-karzai-says-12-year-afghanistan-war-
has-left-him-angry-at-us-government/2014/03/02/b831671c-a21a-11e3-b865-
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proposed to reconstruct or modernize more than 140 facilities that had been 
built as part of the Soviet Union’s development assistance and that had been 
destroyed in the civil war of the early 1990s.16 The Kabul House-Building 
Factory is one of these Soviet-era projects; another is the Russian Center of 
Science and Culture in Kabul, which was originally built in 1982.17
In addition to such “goodwill” projects that are visible to the public and 
are meant to improve the popular image of the donating country, Russia has 
contributed to Afghanistan’s economy by canceling more than $11 billion of 
Afghanistan’s sovereign debt during the decade that followed the ouster of 
the Taliban regime in autumn 2001.18 The legacy of Soviet-era development 
assistance—from the time when Russia was the most important donor coun-
try for Afghanistan—also plays a positive role in Russia’s readiness to partic-
ipate in the international donor community to support Afghanistan’s devel-
opment. At the International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn in 2011, 
foreign minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that Russia was “ready to make 
large investments” in major infrastructure projects in the region, such as the 
Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India pipeline project (TAPI) and the 
Central Asia–South Asia transmission line project (CASA-1000).19
These two projects are the key elements in implementing the U.S.-
initiated idea of “New Silk Roads” to enhance economic development in Af-
ghanistan (see the contribution by Mika Aaltola and Juha Käpylä in this 
book). Beyond this there are several other plans for infrastructure develop-
ment in South and Central Asia which specifically suit Russia’s interests in 
developing rail and transportation networks in the wider region. One is the 
1,340-kilometer-long road and rail line to connect Pakistan’s Chitral with 
Dushanbe, which would bring into the twenty-first century the idea of the old 
trade routes connecting the Muslims and Hindus of the Indian subcontinent 
with the Tajiks. Another is a road and rail link between Islamabad and the 
                                                          
16 Dmitri Trenin and Alexei Malashenko, “Afghanistan: A View from Moscow,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2010, 27,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/trenin_afghan_final.pdf.
17 The new building complex opened in fall 2014 at a reported cost of $20 million; it includes 
auditoriums, a library of Russian literature, a concert hall, a multi-media center, and sports 
and leisure facilities.
18 Nick Allen, “Russia, the USSR and Afghanistan, Yesterday and Today,” Russia Beyond the 
Headlines, 2014, http://rbth.com/longreads/afghanistan.
19 Andrei Dörre and Tobias Kraudzun, “Persistence and Change in Soviet and Russian Rela-
tions with Afghanistan,” Central Asian Survey 31, no. 4 (December 2012): 425. The article 
provides an extensive analysis of Soviet-era development assistance to Afghanistan.
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Ferghana Valley; this would provide Russia with access to Pakistani ports, 
and Pakistan with access to markets in Central Asia and Siberia. For Russia, 
just as for other major states, the international task of developing Afghani-
stan is intertwined with the interest for projects which are being developed 
independently of Afghanistan but gain significant normative legitimacy from 
it in international contexts. In bilateral relations with Afghanistan the gradual 
resumption of economic cooperation and Russia’s support of the efforts of 
the Western international community to create stability in Afghanistan 
through infrastructure development has paved the way for a type of security 
cooperation with strategic significance for the capability of Russia and its 
allied countries to maintain stability to the north of Afghanistan. 
Security Arrangements in Central Asia and Beyond 
Central Asia is a region which Russia, as phrased by Dmitri Trenin and 
Alexei Malashenko, “seeks to keep within its orbit.”20 However, the meta-
phor of the planet carving out its sphere of influence determined by the 
gravitational forces of power reveals very little about the ties that bind this 
space together. The argument frequently formulated in Russian policy-
making circles is that if Russia were to withdraw its military presence from 
Central Asia and cease being interested in maintaining its economic influence 
in this region, such a course of action would inevitably affect Russia itself 
because of the economic interconnectedness and structural interdependence 
built during the Soviet decades. It is generally observed that over the past ten 
years the economic importance of Central Asia has in fact increased because 
the region provides ample opportunities for Russian business and its military-
industrial complex. Central Asian supplies of uranium are needed to run Rus-
sia’s nuclear power stations, and Russia is interested in building closer coop-
eration with the region’s oil and gas exporters (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan). In addition to energy, investment priorities include commu-
nications and traditional industries such as cotton.21
While maintaining influence in the region is seen to serve Russia’s eco-
nomic capacity and, hence, its status as a great power, it is also understood as 
                                                          
20 Trenin and Malashenko, “Afghanistan,” 15.
21 Gennadii Chufrin, Rossiia v Tsentral’noi Azii (Almaty: Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic 
Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2010), 75–99.
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a necessity dictated by geography: due to Russia’s very long land borders 
and the specific threats emerging from this region, the Russian Federation’s 
national security  depends crucially on stability in Central Asia. Decision-
makers and politicians emphasize that because the traditional and non-
traditional security threats stemming from Central Asia affect Russia much 
more directly and acutely than they do any other state beyond the region, 
Russia cannot ignore them. The drug problem with its pronounced marks in 
the population is an example. Russian officials and politicians have repeated-
ly expressed their concerns over the immense increase of narcotics produc-
tion during the twelve years of ISAF’s presence in Afghanistan.22
Because geography is seen to tie the Central Asian states to the “Afghan 
issue,” these states are expected to cooperate in order to counter terrorism, 
extremism, organized crime and drug trafficking. Simultaneously it is recog-
nized that these states do not have a sufficient capacity to accomplish such 
tasks alone. Russia sees itself to be in the position to provide such assistance; 
it recognizes its responsibility in Central Asia and tries to operate ahead of 
developments by using the variety of policy tools made possible by the multi-
level structure of cooperation within the CSTO and the economic integration 
projects led by Russia in the region. It is emphasized that Russia’s special 
position and responsibilities in relation to Central Asia follow from the fact 
that Russia, unlike the other resource-rich states providing external assistance 
in the region, has a vital interest to stop the drug traffic and fight against ter-
rorism and religious extremism in the region. Russia’s interests in the stabil-
ity of Afghanistan are consequently interwoven with these regional interests; 
and this makes Russia’s participation in the development of Afghanistan 
much more than the symbolic act of a responsible member of the internation-
al community led by the Western states.23
Russia’s economic as well as security cooperation in Central Asia is a 
combination of bilateral and multilateral relations. Due to a combination of 
                                                          
22 Despite years of international efforts to restrain drug production in Afghanistan, the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in its report in 2014 finds that opium pro-
duction in Afghanistan “has increased dramatically.” “Gripped by electoral crisis, Afghani-
stan needs ‘statesmanship, not brinksmanship’—UN envoy,” UN News Centre, June 25, 
2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48130#.U60vHbGtxX0. During
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underlined that: “Narcotics production [has] increased 44 times in the 12 years that ISAF 
has been present in Afghanistan.” Allen, “Russia.”
23 President of Russia, “Meeting with members of political parties represented in the State 
Duma,” August 14, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46451.
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historical, political-diplomatic and strategic reasons, it is considered rational 
to develop multidimensional economic cooperation with the Central Asian 
states. While bilateral relations continue to have their own dynamic, particu-
lar attention is being paid to strengthening integration processes within the 
frame of the CIS, i.e. the formation of a single economic space by following 
the two tracks of a free economic zone and the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EEU, another common abbreviation is EAEU).24 Similarly, security cooper-
ation is a combination of multilateral policies in the frame of the CSTO and 
bilateral relations with Russia’s allies and partners. The result is a flexible 
system in which the two sets of relations can be mutually supportive; howev-
er, such a system also easily breeds controversies and generates confusion. 
This, in turn, highlights the importance of leadership and decision-making. 
According to its 2013 foreign policy concept, Russia’s major objectives 
in Asia include: “establishing itself as a key transit country between Europe 
and Asia,” “participating in and shaping regional integration processes,” and 
“improving the regional security environment.”25 It is easy to see that Ka-
zakhstan’s geographic position and active political role in the region make it 
a key partner for Russia as Moscow’s decision-makers seek to realize these 
objectives. Among all former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan stands out as a 
“success story.” In spite of its complex multiethnic composition it has pre-
served its political stability and become one of the leaders of economic 
growth. From a Russian perspective Kazakhstan’s geographic position makes 
it both a “buffer” and a “gateway” between Russia and the other countries in 
Central Asia. The large landmass of the country separates the territory of the 
Russian Federation from the “troublesome South.” In the geo-economic 
sense, this geographic position makes the country a nexus point for the trans-
it of energy and mineral resources to both western and eastern markets. 
Moreover, Kazakhstan’s resource potential is very large due to its access to 
the oil and gas deposits in the Caspian Sea. Additionally, it has large stock-
piles of uranium; and in Russia, their import is considered a strategic interest. 
In international political cooperation Kazakhstan is one of Russia’s most 
important economic partners amongst the CIS member states, and in Russia 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev is recognized to have played a vital role in 
the advancement of Eurasian integration with landmark decisions on the 
                                                          
24 Gennadii Chufrin, Ocherki evraziiskoi integratsii (Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2013), 128.
25 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Concept of the Foreign Policy.”
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EEU (2014) and, before this, on the Eurasian Customs Union (which has 
been established in several stages since 1995). Because Kazakhstan and Rus-
sia both are in the key position to stimulate this process, the effectiveness of 
policies requires that Russia increasingly coordinates initiatives with Ka-
zakhstan. Kazakhstan is close to Russia also because it has the second largest 
number of ethnic Russians amongst all post-Soviet republics: 23.7 percent of 
the total population (Ukraine ranks first with about 40 percent). This connec-
tion no longer exists in the case of the other Central Asian states. For all 
these reasons the maintenance of the political stability that has become part 
of Kazakhstan’s good reputation and diplomatic prestige among the Central 
Asian states is crucially important to Russia. 
Because Kazakhstan possesses considerable military potential, the two 
states’ cooperation in the efforts to secure Central Asia’s southern borders 
has great burden-sharing importance for Russia. Much important materiel 
created by Soviet military and industrial structures was produced in Kazakh-
stan, and Russia has much at stake in maintaining the connections developed 
over decades between the enterprises of the two countries. Russia has a sig-
nificant role in re-equipping Kazakhstan’s national defense force, and both 
countries are actively participating in the creation of an integrated multi-level 
security system in Central Asia. Although Kazakhstan, which is rich in oil 
and other natural resources, does not need external assistance, cooperating 
with Russia gives it the opportunity to play a crucial role in maintaining se-
curity in the neighboring states and, as a consequence, around its own bor-
ders. However, although both countries have grave concerns about the 
growth of potential threats to Central Asian security arising from Afghani-
stan, it is Russia which bears the main burden in assisting the countries di-
rectly bordering Afghanistan—Tajikistan in the first place—to repel the 
threats. 
Tajikistan’s president, Emomali Rakhmon, has repeatedly emphasized 
the need to raise wide-based international support for the protection of the 
border towards Afghanistan. Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov recon-
firmed Russian policy in July 2014 by stressing that Tajikistan and Russia 
“are going to take these measures as bilateral within the framework of the 
full implementation of the relevant decisions of the CSTO.”26 In the next 
                                                          
26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Statement for the mass media by 
the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, during the joint press conference summaris-
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spring Russia and Tajikistan carried out joint drills in the Badakhshan region, 
where the borderline runs through mountainous areas that greatly complicate 
border protection along Tajikistan’s 1,340-kilometer-long borderline with 
Afghanistan.27 Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov’s decision was 
firm after he visited Dushanbe in January 2015: Russia would assist Tajiki-
stan in modernizing and strengthening its armed forces and reinforce its 201st
military base in the country.28 While the Russian base already has branches 
near the Afghan border south of Dushanbe (in Khatlon and Qurghonteppa), 
the transborder Badakhshan region is the most under-populated and inhospi-
table region for enforcing border control; yet it is also a region in which Rus-
sia has long-term experience, unlike any other state contributing to border 
security in Tajikistan: in the Soviet period this was a border region not only 
with Afghanistan to the south but also with China to the east. In addition to 
military cooperation Russia has also assisted Tajikistan by re-equipping its 
border troops (on the issue of the return of Russian border guards to Tajiki-
stan’s southern border, see the contribution by Rytövuori-Apunen and Us-
monov in this book).
Nevertheless, it is Kyrgyzstan which is the largest recipient of Russian 
loans and grants. During President Putin’s visit to Bishkek in September 
2012, Russia wrote off Kyrgyzstan’s $500 million debt. This was part of a 
comprehensive agreement on the terms of strengthening Russia’s military 
presence in Kyrgyzstan. The deal includes the Kant airbase, the underwater 
weapons-testing site in Karakol, the military center in Kara-Balta, and the 
radio-seismic laboratory in Mailuu-Suu. Although Kyrgyzstan is not in the 
immediate geographic proximity of Afghanistan, Moscow’s decision-makers 
emphasize that this small republic is not capable of confronting the security 
challenges emerging from Afghanistan on its own and that its geographic 
position leaves it with no other sustainable solutions but to rely on Russia.
                                                                                                                            
ing the results of the negotiations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Tajikistan, Sirodjidin Aslov, Dushanbe, 30 July 2014,” July 30, 2014,
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27 “Na rossiiskoi 201-i baze v Tadzhikistane budut obuchat’ mestnykh voennykh,” Lenta.ru,
January 21, 2015, http://lenta.ru/news/2015/01/21/201_base. The military contingent of the 
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28 “Rossiia usilit voennuiu bazu v Tadzhikistane,” Lenta.ru, January 27, 2015, http://lenta.ru/
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Russia intensified its military and economic presence in the Kyrgyz Republic 
after major riots related to ethno-political conflict and power struggle once 
again (after the instability of the early 1990s) struck the country in spring 
2010 and continued to simmer in the years that followed. Russia’s economic 
presence is evident in the fact that Russian companies are the largest inves-
tors in the country’s energy sector. Development assistance plays a very mi-
nor role in Russian policies on Central Asia and is mainly to be found in debt 
relief for the two countries with fewest resources, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
In addition, there is the general form of humanitarian cooperation consisting 
of scholarships for youth from all over the region to study in Russian institu-
tions of higher education.29
The territory of the Kyrgyz Republic is a nodal point not only in the 
north-south axis—in relation to Afghanistan—but also towards the east, in 
order to control China’s expansion in the energy economy of the region. Ever 
since Russian policies started their “turn” towards Asia the paramount im-
portance of China has been steadily growing, both as a cooperation partner 
and as a rival in the infrastructure industry; and also India, Pakistan and Iran 
are becoming increasingly significant for the Russian economy and in terms 
of political cooperation. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the main 
regional frame for cooperating with China, and this organization is extending 
its geographic scope considerably with the membership of India and Pakistan 
(which both entered the formal membership process in July 2015) and also of 
Iran (once the UN sanctions relating to Iran’s nuclear program cease to ap-
ply). While the military cooperation of the CSTO in Central Asia has shrunk 
to only three states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), the SCO is 
gaining in importance as the far wider regional frame for developing cooper-
ation in non-traditional security threats—drug trafficking, terrorism and ex-
tremism. Although the backbone of Russia’s defense arrangements in Central 
Asia is still formed by the CSTO with its Russian military bases in Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan as well as Russia’s aim to establish joint regional air defense 
systems with all three countries, the SCO offers a much wider arena for 
specific forms of cooperation between groups of countries.
In Afghanistan Russia, like the Soviet Union previously, has emphasized 
cooperation in the northern areas of the country, where the ethnic composi-
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tion of the population is largely Tajik and Uzbek. Focusing on these northern 
areas means that Russia continues to build its future influence in Afghanistan 
on the close ties it developed with the Northern Alliance. These ties did not 
suddenly emerge from Russian opposition to the Taliban but have a history 
which goes back to the first decades of the Soviet Union (see the chapter by 
Rytövuori-Apunen and Usmonov in this book). In his aforementioned ad-
dress to the CSTO meeting in October 2014, President Putin specifically re-
ferred to “our friends” in Afghanistan. This undoubtedly refers to those who 
are able to establish contacts for mutual interest, but this historical context 
also must be taken into account in order to grasp the full meaning of Putin’s 
words. If we interpret the “shoulder to lean on” against the backdrop of the 
historically much wider zonal border represented by the historical ethnic 
connections that exist across the Panj and Amu Darya Rivers, it also entails 
support for a type of political development that secures the position of the
Tajik and Uzbek populations within Afghanistan’s system of  government.
As a consequence, Russia’s present policy objectives to develop wider 
regional cooperation include not only the Central Asian states; they also en-
vision India and Iran as allies in the efforts to support non-Pashtun ethnic 
groups to consolidate their representation in top-level power structures in 
Afghanistan and, thus, to contain the expansion of the Taliban in the north by 
political means. Relations with “friends” lead to the development of a zonal 
border extending across the formal border and help to solve security prob-
lems more effectively than could be accomplished by trying to create imper-
meable borderlines. Moreover, it is not only along Afghanistan’s border with 
Tajikistan that support provided to Tajiks and Uzbeks can be functional for 
Central Asian security. Currently Russia cannot envision the establishment of 
a military base in Uzbekistan, yet the security threats for which it must pre-
pare include the possibility that insurgents from Afghanistan, and especially 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, may try to break into Uzbekistan and 
threaten also Tajikistan from the territory of neighboring Uzbekistan. Ever 
since the IMU swore allegiance to the leadership of the Islamic State in 
summer 2015, it has come to make much sense in Moscow to extend defens-
es across the Panj and the Amu Darya and to do so by means that do not in-
volve military troops. Staying on this path requires sophisticated skills as 
well as well-functioning networks with other countries. Hence, it is no coin-
cidence that Russia is also in the process of developing security cooperation 
with Pakistan, as Tahir Amin explains elsewhere in this book. The key ques-
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tion for the success of these policies is how the conflicts between pairs of 
countries—starting with Afghanistan and Pakistan, Pakistan and India, and 
including also U.S.-Russia relations—can be managed or held in abeyance 
through the cooperation required by the emerging war front.
Kazakhstan: Policies for Regional Leadership in 
Development
This section explores the ways in which Kazakhstan is building a policy pro-
file of its own through its contributions to the international efforts to stabilize 
Afghanistan and to enhance development and cooperation in Central Asia.
Kazakhstan is one of only two Central Asian countries classified as an 
“upper-middle-income” economy by the World Bank (the other is energy-
rich and traditionally isolationist Turkmenistan), and it alone amongst the 
Central Asian states has been ranked by the UNDP as a country with “high 
human development” since 2013 (the four other Central Asian states are 
ranked as countries with “medium,” and Afghanistan with “low,” human 
development).30 The positive image gained by investing not only in 
economic growth but also in the education and health of its people has 
prompted Kazakhstani policy-makers to sharpen foreign policy with a 
distinct emphasis on “soft” power, that is, a values-driven leadership in the 
region that serves Kazakhstan’s own interests of modernization and 
economic integration and also defines how it contributes to international 
efforts that seek to create political stability in Afghanistan. The leap that 
Kazakhstan has taken during the 2010s from being a recipient of 
international development aid to becoming a donor country establishes a new 
basis for its international policies.
In the Third Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process on 
Afghanistan held in Almaty in April 2013, President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
stressed that “… the key for solution of Afghanistan [sic] issues is in the 
hands of the Afghan people and the government as the official representative 
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of the nation. The international community should foster development of the 
inter-Afghan dialogue. Those who demonstrate readiness for the 
establishment of peace and accord in Afghanistan must receive our 
support.”31 Kazakhstan also emphasizes that the full development of any 
inter-Afghan dialogue will be possible only if there is multilateral 
cooperation between regional players. Afghanistan should bring the wider 
region together instead of deepening the involvement of powerful external 
states in its problems. Afghanistan’s instability and development problems 
were considered within the context of regional security in 2010 by the Astana 
OSCE Summit, which declared the concept of “Eurasian security,” and later 
also by the APEC Summit in Vladivostok 2012, where President Putin 
introduced the idea of the flexible involvement of Eurasia in the Asia-Pacific 
region.
Regional cooperation was further boosted after the U.S. shifted its 
policies to emphasize the Asia-Pacific region within its “New Silk Road” 
initiative and China came forward with its concept of the “Silk Road 
Economic Belt.” However, the “New Silk Roads” ideas and the support 
thereof with reference to the need to develop Afghanistan are by no means 
novel; for many years experts in the region have discussed the prospects of 
involving Afghanistan in transport and logistics networks in South and 
Central Asia. Kazakhstan is intent on making the most of these new 
developments, which, in essence, are perfectly matched with its interests: 
should these new networks accelerate economic development in the region as 
envisioned, it will be possible for Kazakhstan to fully develop its potential as 
a transport-logistics hub not only between East and West but also South and 
North. Even in the face of growing competition between external powers, 
Kazakhstan would thus gain leverage to continue in its pursuit of its 
“multivector” foreign policy, which aims to develop close relations with 
multiple states and to expand the political and diplomatic space for its 
independent policies. Consequently, the question of how Afghanistan’s 
future will turn out is much more than merely an issue of regional security 
and stability; it is closely connected with Kazakhstan’s economic prospects 
and the future of its foreign policy. If the security situation deteriorates 
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drastically, Central Asia will be kept isolated and Kazakhstan will be 
prevented from gaining access to transport routes from the South. At the 
same time Kazakhstan will be spared from the more dire consequences of a 
process that is the inevitable consequence of the growth in trade cooperation: 
mass migration from Afghanistan, Pakistan and other populous South Asian 
states. However, as this challenge is not likely to diminish in the long term, 
Kazakhstan must prepare policies that ensure the stability of its borders. Its 
location at the heart of Central Asia makes it crucial that it not rely on fence-
building policies but instead maintain close relations with neighboring states 
in a whole range of issues, from economic and political development to the 
maintenance of regional security and stability and countering non-
conventional security threats. The frame for such policies has been prepared 
in the foreign policy concept defined for the years 2014–2020.
The Foreign Policy Concept and ODA Policy
The presidential decree “On the Concept of foreign policy of Kazakhstan for 
2014–2020” explains the strategy of what can be called Kazakhstan’s “soft” 
power. The foreign policy concept was developed in accordance with the 
instructions given in the Address of the President to the Nation “Kazakhstan-
2050 Strategy: New Political Course of the Established State.”32 It is a set of 
principles and approaches, goals and priorities as well as specific tasks of 
foreign activities.33 The key strategic directions of Kazakhstan’s long-term 
development include investment in human development, improvement of the 
institutional environment, development of a science-driven economy, and 
accelerated development of infrastructure. In this context the core idea of 
“soft power” is about investment in human resources: a population with 
knowledge and skills as well as sustained health is considered the best means 
to generate prosperity, the promise of which, again, is needed in order to 
maintain the consensual fabric of society required for peace and stability in 
the geographically largest country in Central Asia and in a state that contains 
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more than 130 different ethnic groups. Essentially, the foreign policy concept 
is designed to facilitate Kazakhstan’s integration into the international 
community by defining the objective for policies and developing appropriate 
conditions. The positive image that Kazakhstan has gained beyond its 
borders due to its social stability, development record and active diplomacy 
is an asset in promoting this process, especially when expectations about 
increasing prosperity weaken and collective mobilization becomes more 
difficult to maintain. 
Kazakhstani policy has shown itself skillful in combining that which is 
necessary from its own perspective with what is generally desirable and has 
normative value within the international community. It utilizes the good 
reputation which Kazakhstan has gained to increase the credibility of its 
economic capacity beyond its borders and to strengthen the diplomatic 
activity through which its regional leadership becomes manifest. The primary 
element of these policies is the official development assistance (ODA) policy 
established by a law in December 2014.34 The legal basis of the new policy 
envisages a full development assistance program focusing on Central Asia 
and Afghanistan. While the Concept adopted to instruct the activities of 
foreign policy during 2014–2020 makes “near neighborhood” a strategic 
priority, the ODA policy is meant to foster bilateral socio-economic 
cooperation and enhance a more prosperous neighborhood along 
Kazakhstan’s southern borders.35 During the 8th Astana Economic Forum, 
President Nazarbayev reiterated Kazakhstan’s intention to focus on regional 
security issues by addressing the socio-economic needs of countries. This 
profile-sharpening statement gave a boost to setting up the Kazakhstan 
Agency for International Development (KazAID) in order to implement the 
ODA policy. The ODA policy entails that the donor-country role under 
construction is in harmony with Kazakhstan’s national interests: Kazakhstan 
contributes to the stabilization of the socio-economic and political situation 
in its partner countries. Joint action prevents illegal migration flows, drug 
                                                          
34 Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan Ob ofitsial’noi pomoshchi razvitiiu [Law of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan On Official Development Assistance], December 10, 2014, published by
Kazakhstanskaia Pravda,
http://www.kazpravda.kz/uploads/redactors/files/548a64437d4621418355779.pdf.
35 Ukaz Prezidenta Kazakhstana ot 9 aprelia 2013 goda no. 538 Ob utverzhdenii Kontseptsii 
Respubliki Kazakhstan v sphere ofitsial’noi pomoshchi razvitiiu [Presidential Decree no. 
538 On Official Development Assistance Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan], April 9, 
2013, http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31374898.
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trafficking and other forms of crime, and it also improves the options 
available in the fight against terrorism and extremism. The role assumed by 
Kazakhstan through its aid policies serves to maintain a “secure 
neighborhood belt” whilst simultaneously strengthening the state’s
international position and its positive image.36
Kazakhstan’s vision for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the policy 
tools by which the interethnic struggle for power and the radicalization of 
religious groups can be mitigated emphasize investment in infrastructure 
projects and social policies that improve the quality of life. Since 2009 the 
government of Kazakhstan has allocated more than $52 million to the 
reconstruction of socially important facilities (schools, hospitals, roads and 
railway lines), the training of Afghan students, support for agricultural 
production, participation in the reconstruction and construction of new dams, 
and the modernization of power plants.37 Economic and humanitarian 
cooperation with Afghanistan is promoted through the Kazakh-Afghan 
intergovernmental commission; and it is achieved by facilitating Kazakh 
production and investment in the Afghan market, and by training Afghan 
experts in Kazakhstan in fields such as economy, industry, finance, transport 
and education. In the frame of a $50 million educational program, up to one 
thousand Afghans are being provided with higher education at Kazakh 
universities in the period of 2010–2020.38 In addition to Afghanistan, aid is 
allocated to improving the border infrastructure at Kyrgyzstan’s border with 
Kazakhstan. Although Kazakhstan’s development assistance focuses on 
Central Asia and Afghanistan, it can also be directed to other regions as part 
of international development assistance in order to attain maximum impact of 
the policy. Examples include the Caucasus, Africa, Latin America, Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS), least developed countries, and landlocked 
countries.
                                                          
36 Ukaz Prezidenta Kazakhstana ot 9 aprelia 2013 goda no. 538.
37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Pozitsiia Respubliki
Kazakhstan po Afganistanu,” December 4, 2014,
http://mfa.gov.kz/index.php/ru/vneshnyaya-politika/kazakhstan-i-voprosy-globalnoj-i-
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38 “Na obuchenie Afganskoi molodezhi v Kazakhstane vydeleno 50 millionov dollarov SshA
– K. Saudabaev,” Zakon.kz, July 20, 2010, http://www.zakon.kz/178852-na-obuchenie-
afganskojj-molodezhi-v.html.
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Towards the Smart Power of a Rising Economy 
The operating budget of the ODA technical assistance (that is, aid in tied-
grant form, both bilateral and allocated through multilateral channels) is 
expected to be 0.01 percent of GDP ($15–22 million) in 2012–2016. 
Kazakhstan has also announced the OECD target (which has been set at 0.7 
percent of the GNI) as its long-term perspective and, thus, joined the large 
group of developed countries which, since 1970, have given similar 
statements.39 For reasons relating to Kazakhstan’s own development needs 
and the fact that its ODA policy was formulated only in recent years, the 
contribution on a bilateral basis is still limited in terms of the volume, form 
and geographic scope of the aid. Kazakhstan’s experience of assistance on a 
multilateral basis conducted under the auspices of the UN is much more 
extensive and has included projects in the fields of environment, population, 
health, women’s rights, assistance for landlocked countries, measures to 
curtail the drug trade, etc. In 2012, the disbursements to international 
development assistance agencies amounted to almost $2.8 million. According 
to UN statistics, during 2006–2011 Kazakhstan allocated $53.7 million in 
humanitarian aid, of which $30 million was to Central Asia. With this 
number Kazakhstan ranks third in providing humanitarian aid in Central 
Asia. The sum total of Kazakhstan’s humanitarian assistance during 2006–
2011 is roughly $100 million.40 However, the absence of a systematic 
approach has resulted in low efficiency and poor project management and, 
therefore, has hardly served to lay a basis for the desired outcomes and donor 
image. 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy representatives and experts are aware that 
development assistance must avoid those mistakes that are commonly made 
when programs designed to improve public administration, build democracy, 
and create good governance are imposed on local populations in recipient 
countries whilst the needs and mentality of these people are left aside. At the 
same time as the operative principles of KazAID emphasize modern norms 
                                                          
39 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Osnovnye napravleniia gosu-
darstvennoi politiki Respubliki Kazakhstan v sfere ofitsial’noi pomoshchi razvitiiu na 
2016–2020 gody,” September 2, 2015, http://mfa.gov.kz/index.php/ru/informatsiya-o-
ministrestve/proekty-npa-dlya-obshchestvennykh-obsuzhdenij/12-material-orys/4667-
osnovnye-napravleniya-gosudarstvennoj-politiki-respubliki-kazakhstan-v-sfere-ofitsialnoj-
pomoshchi-razvitiyu-na-2016-2020-gody.
40 Ukaz Prezidenta Kazakhstana ot 9 aprelia 2013 goda no. 538.
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of transparency, accountability, and ecological and social impact assessment, 
relations with recipient countries are shaped by a traditional style of 
cooperation that present-day experts have gathered under the banner of 
“Asian regionalism.”41 This means that the organization of cooperation is 
seen as a flexible network instead of being fixed by statutes and formal 
agreements; the process itself is of greater importance than are pre-defined 
results. Universal principles are locally applied with decisions made in 
mutual consent, and the style of negotiation is non-confrontational. 
Importance is attached to personal ties rather than to institutional rules, and 
mutual respect is shown in conduct. Unlike the institutional procedures 
typical of Western democracies, these guidelines are considered to allow for 
situational considerations—including the possibility to join or opt out of 
specific projects (which often happens in multilateral contexts where the 
non-formal ties are less binding than in the case of just two parties). In 
countries like Afghanistan which seek to make advances by combining 
modern constitutionalism with the traditions of a tribal society, cooperation 
guided by such flexible and mutually respectful principles is expected to 
have an appeal that extra-regional actors lack. 
Following these guidelines the ODA policy conceptually entails that the 
activity must serve to sustain “good neighborhood” in the proximity of 
Kazakhstan’s borders. The key principles of this policy emphasize an 
individualized approach to each recipient state as well as horizontal 
cooperation models (that is, donor-recipient relations are conducted on an 
equal “win-win” basis). They prioritize technical assistance to transfer 
complex know-how in those areas in which Kazakhstan has a high level of 
competence and make it a requirement that the recipient country expresses its 
interest for a progressive development of such bilateral cooperation. 
However, from a long-term perspective Kazakhstan’s interests lie in region-
wide transport and logistics. In relation to Afghanistan, Astana’s proposal for 
arrangements to enable freight from Afghanistan to use the port of the city of 
Aktau on the Caspian Sea is a notable political gesture to help invigorate 
Afghanistan’s economy. Kazakhstan also has a strategic interest in the 
development of the TAPI pipeline, which provides South Asia with 
Turkmenistan’s natural gas and runs from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan and 
                                                          
41 Amitav Acharya, “Asia is Not One: Regionalism and the Ideas of Asia,” Institute of South 
East Asian Studies Working Papers on International Politics and Security Issues, no. 1 
(2011), http://www.asia-studies.com/asia/ISEAS/Asia-is-Not-One1.pdf.
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Pakistan and farther to India. The economic network in the region is 
envisioned to engage the countries of Central and South Asia and connect 
them in cooperation with all major economic powers on the Eurasian 
continent—Russia, China, India and Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstan-
Turkmenistan-Iran railway under construction in Kazakhstan since 2009 is 
designed to increase trade from Central Asia to the south tenfold and connect 
southwest Kazakhstan to the Persian Gulf.42 As these commercial interests 
grow stronger, the ODA policy, which in its initial period (2012–2016) 
emphasizes assistance in form of grants, is under pressure to become more 
business-oriented. Consequently, the next ODA period (2017–2020) may 
well emphasize concessional rather than grant aid and raise the share of loans 
(in form of tied credits at favorable conditions) from the 50 percent set for 
the initial period. The pressures for such changes indicate a gradual transition 
from the interpretation of ODA as a tool of “soft” power to seeing it as a tool 
of “smart” power that uses credit for tying together developmental, economic 
and political networks. 
Development assistance thus connects with more than merely the 
security of Kazakhstan’s borders (which is the kind of reasoning that the 
U.S. “Silk Roads” initiative entails); far beyond the monetary contribution 
made in its name, the concept is a vehicle for opening up ways for economic 
integration that strengthens Kazakhstan’s international position. The 
government in Kazakhstan considers soft-power tools such as the ODA 
policy to be efficient foreign policy approaches; and efficiency, again, is a 
way to evaluate and legitimize policies as a means to achieve pre-defined 
ends. Kazakhstan’s development assistance is “soft” power in the sense that 
it is categorically different from the “hard” power of the military cooperation 
that allies Kazakhstan with Russia. However, although such soft-power 
policies are meant to make Kazakhstan attractive in international 
connections, the main characteristic of these policies is not the kind of soft 
power that Joseph S. Nye has in mind when he speaks about a power that 
does not use coercion or payment to induce others to want the same things 
                                                          
42 President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Sovmestnaia press-konferentsiia Prezidenta 
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2014, 
http://www.akorda.kz/ru/events/akorda_news/press_conferences/page_217849_sovmestnay
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that the soft-power user wants43; instead, it is power to consolidate 
Kazakhstan itself, both internally as well as in its external policies. Thus, the 
ODA concept is not only greater than the monetary contribution which it 
legitimates but is also, in the context of foreign policy, greater than the field 
of activity that it specifically denotes. Policy concepts are important in 
Kazakhstani political context because they authoritatively instruct policies 
and action; and in the post-Soviet situation, where the presence and influence 
of the former power remains a problem, they are relevant in relation to 
especially Russia. At the same time as Kazakhstan is militarily allied with 
Russia in the CSTO and one of its strategic partners in initiating Eurasian 
economic integration, the question of the future direction that the EEU, 
which has been in force since January 2015, keeps it alert about Russia’s 
intentions. While Kazakhstan cannot stay out of the union that gives it 
considerable influence within the entire CIS area and facilitates its 
cooperation with the former Soviet subjects in its own neighborhood, it also 
resists seeing the EEU as a tool in geopolitical and geo-economical 
competition against the U.S. or China.
Asian Principles of Cooperation and European of Modernization 
In the years following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the “Eurasian” 
identity of the wider region became an issue debated not only in Russia but 
also in Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstani discussions focused on the historical 
nomadic features of the region and therefore took a direction different from 
Russia’s “Neo-Eurasian” discourses, which are focused on promoting a 
political identity that is opposed to Western liberal values. This background 
is essential in understanding the difference between Nazarbayev’s “open 
regionalism” and the perspectives on the region as mainly a geographic space 
for exclusive national-cultural projects or great-power aspirations. In 
particular in relation to the EEU, open regionalism envisions a liberal 
economic union that strengthens cooperation and thereby increases mutual 
benefits and also leaves space for developing partnerships and integration 
with other customs unions and organizations of economic cooperation.44
                                                          
43 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004), 7.
44 Vladimir Fedorenko, “Eurasian Integration: Effects on Central Asia,” Rethink Paper 23
(September 2015), http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
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Instead of aligning itself with any one party, Kazakhstan’s interest lies in 
opening its territory for transport routes in the spirit of its “multivectoral” 
external relations. Any other policy is considered to jeopardize a future that 
prognosticates the Asia-Pacific region as becoming a driving force for global 
economic growth. In order to be able to pursue this policy line Kazakhstan 
has repeatedly emphasized that it considers the Eurasian Union as a purely 
economic integration model.45
Kazakhstan’s approach to political cooperation on security issues 
similarly emphasizes openness and connectedness to counteract bloc-
formation. An important conclusion that it has drawn from its chairmanship 
of the OSCE in 2010 is that the participants in this organization recognize 
that eleven of its 57 members are in Asia and that, as a consequence, the 
“Euro-Asian” security dimension must complement the “Euro-Atlantic” 
dimension within the organization’s programs and activities. The idea of 
wide “continental” security had already motivated President Nazarbayev’s
initiative in 1992 in convening the Conference on Interaction and 
Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). This initiative was inspired 
by the “confidence-building” approach that had been elaborated to facilitate 
East-West cooperation in European political and arms control contexts 
during the 1970s and 1980s. The specific rationality of the approach then had 
been that the build-up of tensions could be proactively prevented by 
increasing transparency and communication through regular institutional 
interaction, and that this process would gain in momentum and become self-
sustaining. When Kazakhstan started its ambitious programs of social and 
economic modernization in the 2010s, the idea that tasks could be 
accomplished by generating processes through a set of rules was elaborated 
as a policy tool to define planned steps for implementing the programs. The 
top-down management tool drew its inspiration from the exact sciences and 
was termed “algorithm.” The basic idea has been to design ordered sets of 
steps by means of which Kazakhstan would become able to meet global 
challenges with the limited time and resources that are available. 
The idea of improving the accomplishment of tasks also inspires 
Kazakhstan’s views on multilateral organizations in the region. According to 
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President Nazarbayev, the efficiency of the activities of these organizations 
can be increased by implementing “the best international practices, both 
Asian and European.”46 The effectiveness of this “algorithm” is envisioned 
to show itself in the advances made in the mega-projects initiated in the areas 
of transport infrastructure and energy in a number of regional organizations 
and, especially, in the SCO advised by its “Shanghai Spirit.” The specific 
“Asian” principles of cooperation—that is, universally applicable principles 
of cooperation and a flexibility of organization that allows optional 
participation in specific areas of cooperation—are envisioned to enable 
working towards a cultural convergence of Europe and Asia in the frame of 
mutually beneficial projects. In the Eurasian identity project that is 
considered to unify “the country of the great steppe”47 nomadic historical 
culture entails a European background and represents the kind of mobility 
that modern connectivity requires. Because the steppe constitutes a large part 
of the Eurasian landmass it is seen as the natural interface of its two parts, 
Europe and Asia. Kazakhstan’s aspirations for development make it a 
cultural space for a normatively-oriented regional leadership, and these 
policies are sharpened with development assistance. As a consequence, 
Afghanistan plays a rather more significant role in Kazakhstani policies than 
might be expected if we consider only the more obvious concerns over
security and instability in its geographic proximity: it is the best example of 
how Kazakhstan’s policies in the regional context are globally oriented. This 
practice, as we have already explained, is helpful in expanding the political 
space for pursuing Kazakhstan’s interests. In Central Asia, specifically, it 
enables Astana to develop its own profile of policies.
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Conclusion: Collaboration to Achieve Mutually 
Complementary Goals 
Since the early 1990s Kazakhstan has assumed an active role in presenting 
initiatives for regional cooperation and settling violent conflicts among the 
former Soviet subjects (examples include Tajikistan’s civil war and Nagorno-
Karabakh), and the war that was ignited in Ukraine in spring 2014 later 
extended this role also to Europe. Instead of being merely formal in nature 
with an emphasis on good services in the traditional mode of diplomatic 
mediation, this role seeks to advance international practices that realize 
Kazakhstan’s interests. Thus, for example, when President Nazarbayev 
emphasizes to European audiences that politics must be separated from 
economics, his message is not merely that the EU should lift the economic 
sanctions it has imposed on Russia because of Russia’s involvement in 
eastern Ukraine. More fundamentally, it is to promote such practices that do 
not obstruct economic interaction for political reasons relating to either 
external alignment or specific policies.48 In fact, Astana’s determination to 
develop economic cooperation both within the EEU and with the EU is, in 
principle, the path that Moscow had recommended for Ukraine when that 
country’s free trade area and the political association agreement in the frame 
of the EU’s Eastern Partnership were being prepared between Kiev and 
Brussels in an accelerated time schedule in late autumn 2013 and early spring 
2014. 
But whereas Ukraine was initially too divided to become an economic 
interface between Russia and Europe, Kazakhstan’s future vision is to make 
its Eurasian space a bridge between the economically rising Far East and the 
West. The role in relation to Russia is merely the current context for 
promoting these general objectives; moreover, it is a context that gives 
Kazakhstan a diplomatic role in Europe. From Moscow’s perspective, the
active role assumed by Astana signals to the West that Moscow is supported 
by its allies; in addition, Kazakhstan’s diplomatic activity is clearing the way 
for the type of non-exclusive policies of economic cooperation which are 
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also in Russia’s interest—especially when its relations with the West have 
been gridlocked through its emphatically military responses (and the borders 
that have been raised through them) and it is itself unable to gain credibility 
for similar policies in the West. This symbiosis in specific issues requires 
that Russia supports stability in Kazakhstan and that issues regarding the 
Russian minority or the northern borders are not brought forth. Any threats to 
Kazakhstan’s stability would spell disaster for Russia not only in Central 
Asia but also for its prospect of improving relations with the Western states. 
Both countries regard the SCO as the main organizational frame for 
expanding their influence in global politics. The repeated mention of the 
organization’s resources as indicated by its vast landmass and the total 
number of the organization’s members and observers—covering about 50 
percent of the world’s population—reveals just how much this organization 
represents a potentiality.49 Although the expanded SCO will be very hetero-
geneous with its Chinese, Russian, Turkic, Persian, Hindu and Muslim cul-
tural influences, it does provide a political space for developing economic 
relations and specific forms of security cooperation in order to maintain re-
gional stability. In autumn 2015 Afghanistan joined Iran in applying for full 
membership, and the organization’s Secretary-General Dmitry Mezentsev 
has revealed that the country has a special place in the agenda due to its im-
portance for regional stability: “Cooperation with Afghanistan must be built 
not only on combating terrorism or drug trafficking but also in the economic, 
cultural and humanitarian spheres.”50 The aim is to help Afghanistan raise 
itself to the status of being a respectable state after two decades of chaos and 
to include it in the organization’s cooperation. This, in turn, will counteract 
Western political influence in the region even if Western military support 
remains necessary. 
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Limits of Force-based Strategies and Institution-
Building: a Focus on Border Spaces in the Security 
Puzzle  
Simbal Khan and Helena Rytövuori-Apunen 
In response to the events of 9/11, the U.S. and its international coalition used 
military force almost reflexively to dismantle al-Qaeda and remove the 
Taliban government and its associated networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
As the Taliban resurged in 2004–20061 from their sanctuaries in the border 
areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan, it was widely believed that it was 
the lack of regional governments’ capacity to launch effective 
counterterrorism operations and to police their borders which fueled 
transborder militancy.2 Afghanistan, along with its Central Asian neighbors, 
as well as Pakistan, received high levels of support to undertake large-scale 
security sector upgrades. 
This chapter argues that force-based strategies have achieved certain re-
sults during the last fourteen years: counterterror strategies such as kill-
capture campaigns have been successful in decimating foreign al-Qaeda-
related actors from South-Central Asia.3 However, the success of such opera-
tions is limited and short-term in their effect when applied against transbor-
der militants due to a failure to account for the dynamic nature of these ac-
tors. Unlike foreign al-Qaeda elements, these forces are linked to the ever-
changing socio-political and economic dynamics within the border spaces in
which they operate. Use of excessive military force against them within their
larger communities has accelerated societal change and concomitantly
changed the very nature of these groups. The Pakistani military’s initial de-
ployment to the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) region in
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2004, and the continuous military operations of the past ten years, has given
birth to the Pakistani Taliban, an umbrella group of more than thirty smaller
groups resisting the Pakistani state.4 Simultaneously the on-going war and
conflict in border spaces has limited the political and institutional outreach of
governments in these areas. Several border districts in Afghanistan have no
permanent civilian government presence due to poor security.5 In Pakistan,
military operations in border zones over the last ten years have weakened
established governing institutions and marginalized the role of the Political
Agent (PA), which previously headed the civilian administration in FATA.6
While the establishment of border crossing points provide legalized
channels to some of the people and goods that flow across the border, border
management alone cannot possibly significantly diminish the illegal flows
and control the movement of insurgent groups between Afghanistan and Pa-
kistan. Control of the approximately 2,600-kilometer-long border is a daunt-
ing task for a number of technical and political reasons, not least because the
administrative reforms and measures on the Afghan side are insufficient un-
less they are mirrored by similar structures on the Pakistani side. Even after
more than a decade of border management and security sector reform, Af-
ghan Taliban still manage to travel unimpeded through the border zone be-
tween Pakistan and Afghanistan.7 The Pakistani Taliban offshoot, Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has in fact grown to develop its own capacity for
transborder operations.8 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) remnants
have been able to shift between Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal
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Areas and northern Afghanistan and into Tajikistan,9 which has facilitated
their connections with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. While the border
spaces obviously are a test of the capability and willingness of neighboring
and regional states to cooperate with each other, they also are the ultimate
test of the sustainability and determination of the policies of the international
community to build up peace and stability in and around Afghanistan.   
International Security Assistance and the War on Terror
According to a Congressional Research Service report released in August 
2015, the U.S. has provided about $100 billion to Afghanistan since the 
change of the government in Kabul in autumn 2001, of which about 60 
percent has been for “train and equip” missions for the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF), including the ANA (Afghan National Army) and 
ANP (Afghan National Police).10 Since 2010, Afghanistan has seen an 
immense expansion of its military and police forces designed as substitutes 
for the anticipated departure of international troops. By September 2012, the 
ANSF had grown to 352,000 troops; and this number has become the rough 
standard for the post-withdrawal situation.11 At the Tokyo summit held in 
July 2012, the U.S., NATO, and other donors pledged $16 billion over four 
years, from 2012 to 2015, amounting to $4.1 billion per year in security 
sector support. Later, this support was extended to continue beyond 2015, 
initially for the next two years and subsequently until the end of 2020.12
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2014 (Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror 
Operations Since 9/11,” CRS Report, December 8, 2014, summary,
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Pakistan also began to receive unprecedented levels of security sector 
assistance from the U.S. after it joined the U.S.-led coalition as a “frontline 
ally” in 2001. For the period of 2002–2013, it received approximately $25 
billion, out of which around $17 billion was security assistance, including 
$10.7 billion packaged as Coalition Support Funds (CSF).13 The CSF 
funding reimburses Pakistan for costs incurred by the military during its 
counterterror and counter-insurgency operations on the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border. By June 2015, CSF funding amounted to $13 billion and the 
authorization for the next fiscal year (until end June 2016) was $1.5 billion.14
By comparison, U.S. security assistance to Central Asian states has been 
far smaller but has increased significantly since September 2001,15 despite 
congressional restrictions on U.S. security assistance to governments with 
human rights violations (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, for example).16 By the 
end of 2001, the U.S. had negotiated with the governments of Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan to station military troops on their territory and gained access 
to the Karshi-Khanabad base in Uzbekistan as well as the Manas airbase in 
Kyrgyzstan.17 Between 2001 and 2005 the United States Army, Air Force 
and Marine Corps maintained the military base in Karshi-Khanabad (also 
known as K2 and “Stronghold Freedom”) for support missions against al-
Qaeda in neighboring Afghanistan. Under a joint declaration titled “Strategic 
                                                                                                                            
Fantasy, and Failure,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 9, 2012, 
http://csis.org/publication/afghanistan-and-tokyo-conference-hope-fantasy-and-failure; also 
see Thomas Ruttig, “Jumble of Figures: How much money came out of Tokyo?,” 
Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 9, 2012, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/jumble-
of-figures-how-much-money-came-out-of-tokyo/; also see “Afghanistan Aid: Donors 
Pledge $16bn at Tokyo Meeting,” BBC, July 8, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-18758148. On December 1, 2015, the foreign ministers of the NATO member states
agreed on the need to secure funding for the ANSF until the end of 2020. North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_125364.htm.
13 K. Alan Kronstadt and Susan Epstein, “Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and
Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002–FY2014,” Congressional Research Service,
April 11, 2013, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/207789.pdf.
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$19bn,” Dawn, Karachi, July 28, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1196920/pakistan-gets-
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15 Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” 
Congressional Research Service, CRS Report, November 20, 2013, 50–51,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/218963.pdf.
16 Ibid, 53; also see Roger N. McDermott, Kazakhstan’s Defense Policy: An Assessment of the 
Trends, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 13, 17, 22.
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Partnership and Cooperation” (2002) the U.S. also assured Uzbekistan of its 
commitment to destroying IMU bases in northern Afghanistan.18 The U.S.-
Uzbekistan military and security partnership unraveled in autumn 2005, but 
as the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) was expanded half a decade 
later, the U.S. began re-engaging Uzbekistan by first providing modest non-
military security assistance (subsequent developments are discussed by 
Vadim Romashov in this book).19 The U.S. continued to use the Manas 
airbase in Kyrgyzstan for troop deployment and logistical purposes until late 
spring 2014. ISAF also established direct military cooperation with 
Tajikistan, which has included refueling operations for coalition aircraft, 
hosting a small contingent of French jets at Dushanbe airport, and allowing 
coalition aircraft to cross its territory. Additionally, the Central Asian states, 
and especially Tajikistan with its 1,340-kilometer-long border with 
Afghanistan, have received multilateral assistance to improve the security 
and management of their borders. Since 2003, the Central Asia Border 
Security Initiative (CABSI) has functioned as a coordinating forum that 
brings together the EU, U.S., Russia, China, Japan and Turkey as well as a 
wide range of global organizations to discuss border-related issues with the 
five Central Asian states and Afghanistan. The prime motor in this activity 
has been the Border Management in Central Asia (BOMCA) program which 
was initiated by the European Commission in 2003. BOMCA was allocated 
€36.5 million for the period of 2003–2014, out of which €33.6 million was 
provided directly by the European Commission. An additional €5 million has 
been allocated for the period 2014–2017.20 Such programs proclaim broad-
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based political support; however, the sums received by the individual Central 
Asian states are seven-digit in comparison with the billions allocated for 
Afghanistan. Among the largest items of non-military assistance is the U.S. 
support for improving the capabilities of the Drug Control Agency in 
Tajikistan, which amounted to several millions of dollars in 2015.21
Civilian Assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan 
In Afghanistan, the civilian assistance provided by the U.S. alone between 
2001–2014 has amounted to $37.4 billion, and a further, almost equivalent 
sum has come from other sources. Besides reconstruction of physical 
infrastructure, a substantial amount of this assistance has flowed into 
rebuilding Afghanistan’s governmental institutions, improving its rule of law 
and governance, and boosting its political structures, including its electoral 
system. Pakistan has also received enhanced assistance for its civilian sectors 
from the U.S. and other donors. Non-military assistance from the U.S. during 
2002–2014 totalled $9.3 billion.22 Civilian aid to Afghanistan accelerated 
during 2010–2014, generally doubling aid figures from the middle of the last 
decade. In Pakistan this peaked in 2010, after the U.S. Congress approved 
the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act in 2009, and then stabilized in 
modest declines for each subsequent year.23
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This enhancement in civilian assistance occurred in parallel to the on-
going war in Afghanistan and military operations in Pakistan’s border zones. 
The underlying political rationale of civilian assistance in this instance is that 
better governance, especially at the district and local levels, would increase 
state capacity in providing goods and services to the people and thereby 
reduce the popularity of groups such as the Taliban. In 2009–2010, more 
than 70 percent of USAID civilian assistance flowed into Taliban-dominated 
war zones in southern and eastern Afghanistan.24 However, initial optimism 
about the possibilities to build administrative, educational, and business 
infrastructure even in the remote areas began to fade over the course of the 
decade, partly for reasons commonly related to development assistance: the 
lack of local infrastructure fit for the allocation of funds as well as a socio-
cultural environment in which it was difficult to operate without engaging in 
practices such as those pertaining to bribery amongst law enforcement 
officials. However, there was also a more specific reason: large counter-
insurgency operations of “clear, hold and build”25 launched in southern and 
eastern Afghanistan in 2009 did not decimate the Taliban. Instead, they 
served to push fighters across the border into Pakistan’s tribal belt in order to 
regroup and reorganize. 
Multilateral Support Structures 
In international non-military cooperation on Afghanistan the concentration of 
efforts on rebuilding political institutions and governance structures with 
external assistance has obscured political and cultural dimensions and aspects 
of local politics that have sustained the support for the Taliban and its 
networks, especially within the border communities.26 The political approach 
to rebuilding the post-Taliban Afghan state has been two-pronged: the 
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international community has assisted in building political institutions as well 
as the massive reconstruction process within Afghanistan and Pakistan; and 
institution-building practices have been extended to the region as a whole in 
order to promote region-wide inter-state cooperation. Since 2001, this has 
been the focus of many noteworthy political initiatives. The Bonn 1 process 
in 200127 created optimism for the future of regional cooperation centered on 
Afghanistan. All of Afghanistan’s neighbors, as well as other regional actors 
such as India, Turkey, and the Arab Gulf states, cooperated with Afghan and 
international actors to produce the framework for the reformed Afghan state. 
With the beginning of President Obama’s first term in 2009, there was a 
renewed focus on reviving regional initiatives that created new diplomatic 
instruments, such as the “Contact Group” and a regional security and 
economic cooperation forum.28 International diplomacy focused on creating 
various trilateral and multilateral platforms within the region, with 
Afghanistan as a centerpiece. 
The most well-known initiative to revive regional cooperation is the 14-
member “Istanbul Process.”29 Also known as the “Heart of Asia,” it was
launched in Istanbul in November 2011. Initially, the Istanbul conference
was designed as a platform for developing regional arrangements to support
the security of Afghanistan after 2014. The Afghans, in particular, demanded
binding guarantees about mutual non-interference under the aegis of the
United Nations that would start the process of shutting down insurgent safe
havens beyond Afghan borders. Because the proposal was rejected during the
initial stages of negotiation, it remains unclear what precisely it was that the
Afghan delegation was proposing. While some sources suggest that the Af-
ghans were hoping to set up a structure similar to the OSCE (Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe), Pakistan, Iran and Uzbekistan re-
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279
jected the draft declaration even before the conference began.30 In rejecting
this new arrangement, which had originally been proposed by the U.S., other
Western countries and India, the government of Pakistan maintained that
regional security issues could be handled within existing regional frame-
works such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).31 At the Ufa
summit meeting held in July 2015, both India and Pakistan entered the pro-
cess to become full and permanent members of the SCO.32  
The founding members of the SCO (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) as well as the new members, India 
and Pakistan, all face varying challenges from militant organizations. 
Chinese authorities see Uighur militant groups such as ETIM in northern 
Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s tribal belt as a separatist threat in Xinjiang 
province, which links China with Central Asia and farther afield to Europe 
through geo-economic strategies under construction (see the contribution by 
Mika Aaltola and Juha Käpylä in this book). Muslim Uighurs originating 
from Xinjiang have found sanctuaries within co-ethnic communities in 
Central Asia and, increasingly, in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Central 
Asian states have all faced the threat of the transborder Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan and its offshoot, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and since 2014 
the support given by the Islamic State to this regional insurgency has been 
renewing fears that had been fading about the presence of al-Qaeda within 
the region. Russia has had a long history of conflict with Chechen and 
Dagestani rebels, who move around within the region seeking resources and 
support from other regional militants.33
However, the expectation that the SCO could develop region-wide 
cooperation in order to counter these threats is likely to remain only wishful 
speculation. This is because, firstly, inter-state disputes over conflicted 
borders and natural resources such as water still impact relations between the 
countries. Secondly, the politics of transborder militants is intertwined with 
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the histories of these borders and how state practices are developed to 
achieve state interests. From time to time such groups serve at least the 
tactical interests of regional states vis-à-vis neighboring states.34 Thirdly, the 
states cooperating in the frame of the SCO are generally reluctant to become 
engaged in developing multilateral cooperative structures that could restrict 
their sovereign decision-making. Therefore it cannot come as a surprise that 
the idea of creating a structure similar to the OSCE aroused the suspicions of 
Pakistan and other states. A region-wide security organization modelled on 
the OSCE remains unlikely in a region where countries resist maneuvering 
themselves into a restrictive framework akin to that experienced by 
Afghanistan. During the past ten years the OSCE had come under the 
criticism of Russia, Belarus and some other states, who had claimed that the 
organization’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) was promoting the political interests of the West through its 
election observance missions. The SCO, which was formed in 2001 by China 
and Russia on the basis of the Shanghai Five, was contrarily seen as a 
platform to develop policies in accordance with the governments’ 
preferences to confront threats such as radical Islam and transborder militant 
actors.35 The idea that institution-building practices could be extended to the 
region as a whole, and that such region-wide cooperation could open 
pathways in solving security problems, resonates with the Western 
experience of integration and can be easily presented as a design for 
politically appealing policy in international forums. However, the non-
institutional approach that is based on tradition and nowadays promoted as 
“Asian regionalism” within the region (see the contribution by Elnara 
Bainazarova in this book) may be a more realistic way to gain concrete 
results because it, in spite of perhaps being idealized for purposes of identity 
and prestige, is an already present, living tradition as well as a diplomatic 
practice to which the states are accustomed in their mutual cooperation. 
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Conclusion
Afghanistan since 2001 has made remarkable progress in institutional 
development in all primary state sectors, as a result of international support 
for the Afghan reconstruction and rehabilitation process. Its National 
Security Forces, in particular, are an important step in building Afghan 
sovereignty and state capacity in order to provide its population with a 
minimum degree of security once international forces withdraw. Yet, the 
international donor community has been slow to consider the consequences 
of the fact that the process of institution-building was undertaken almost 
entirely through the enormous infusion of external funds. In 2015, donor aid 
was estimated to account for more than 95 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP and 
at least two-thirds of its government expenditure.36 Therefore, the long-term 
sustainability of many of the institutions developed over the course of the last 
fourteen years in Afghanistan remains in question. 
While these issues cannot be avoided for as long as international funding 
continues, our focus has been a question that does not draw as much public 
attention. We argue that such institution-building has failed to address the 
problem of transborder militancy in the region, and that force-based 
approaches have in fact strengthened the dynamics causing the problem to 
worsen in the long term. In chapter 3 in this book, Simbal Khan discusses in 
detail the complex mechanism that has allowed transborder militant 
movements to survive within the conflict-laden spaces in South-Central and 
Central Asia. Both in Afghanistan and Pakistan these movements remain tied 
to the conflicted situation within border spaces. Furthermore, the presence of 
foreign troops has not made the central governments’ approaches to the 
populations in the border areas any gentler; contrarily, it has disrupted 
communities and served to prepare the ground for yet more conflict. 
Continued suppression, the experience of injustice, and economic plight 
prepare the ground in which local insurgency gathers strength and becomes 
receptive to regional and extra-regional jihadist connections. Although the 
public image of the coalition troops on the Afghan side differs greatly from 
the reports of the U.S. drone attacks on the Pakistani side, these are two sides 
of the same conflict. Broadcasts reveal little of the horrors of nocturnal raids 
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and the fear by which the ANSF, backed by foreign forces, rules these border 
areas. 
In the cases where it has been successful, the use of military force has 
been mostly limited to maintaining an uneasy status quo, evident for example 
in increased border fencing and the hardening of border controls by the 
Indian military to prevent infiltration by Kashmiri militants. Even here, 
however, the status quo seems to be uncertain, as border violations have 
increased since 2012.37 Our conclusion is, first, that while most interventions 
by international and regional actors in and around Afghanistan have relied on 
use of force strategies along with a focus on institution-building, this 
approach alone has failed to address persistent conflict involving border 
areas. Second, there is no other way but to contribute to economic and social 
development within conflicted and marginalized spaces around border areas. 
The main challenge here is less about resources than about gradual 
community development. These issues call for close cooperation between 
donor agencies and local communities as well as the use of regional 
governments’ own channels for development work, despite their propensity 
for corruption and other problems. Third, the long-term effects of policies of 
violence must be recognized. Whenever local populations’ sense of justice is 
violated by military operations in a situation where the possibility for 
retributive justice does not exist, these operations—the acts of the 
government-supported security forces, national and foreign—are likely to 
generate new cycles of violence. The dilemma is that where the rule of law 
does not exist and the state can violently disrupt the everyday lives of the 
people, the state itself—the concept of the unified national state, its army and 
other institutions—becomes part of the conflict and the source of violence. It 
remains impossible to establish rule of law and democracy—the Western 
concept of the state—by force in an environment where these ideas do not 
already exist and make a sensible difference in the lives of people but where, 
instead, experiences with the state are characterized by violence and 
repression. While this is a general problem that leads us to immanent 
criticism of Western approaches and juxtaposes idealist construction of 
society (ideas—reforms—are defined in one context and implemented in 
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another context)38 with pragmatist realism (ideas arise from the life-
experience to which they consequently apply), it is most acute in border 
spaces which draw in and shelter political dissent.  
To sum up, we find that a crucial piece of the puzzle in which 
development is thought to facilitate security will remain absent for as long as 
the international emphasis on greater regional cooperation as a means to 
build security in the post-withdrawal situation in and around Afghanistan 
continues to stall over the issue of transborder organization and its linkage to 
militant activity and jihadist causes. The agencies who participate in 
implementing the various region-wide designs for energy cooperation and 
other border-crossing projects, which are meant to enhance regional 
economic development, would do well to include direct benefits not only for 
population centers but also for border communities in their goals. A step 
forward would be that the donors—international development banks, 
organizations and countries—include the benefits generated for the border 
communities in the initial conditions of funding and require this item to be a 
part of impact assessment. This would also be a way to pressure regional 
governments to seriously consider the economic and social condition of their 
border communities. The challenge for the international community, then, is 
whether these issues can also open up space for wider forms of regional and 
international cooperation to alleviate the dire economic situation of border 
communities, and whether such cooperation can be sufficiently broad-based 
so as to also include the historical powers in the region, Russia among them. 
This is important in order to ensure that external actors will not support 
regional states along ethnic lines as has been the case in the past and, 
possibly, remains a tempting practice in conflict situations involving 
international rivalries. This, of course, brings the question of border spaces 
back to the political roots of the problem at hand, which is the question of 
ethnically and regionally inclusive government on different levels of 
administration. Border spaces are not just a “missing piece” that calls for our 
attention but a piece in a more comprehensive puzzle. 
                                                          
38 U.S. Foreign Assistance for Afghanistan Post Performance Management Plan-2011–2015, 
Volume I-Summary (August 28, 2010, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/1871/Approved%20PMP%20updated%2010-02-2010.pdf), is a typical
example of an idealist approach where development is about the implementation of western 
values of government. The goals in relation to the insurgent communities are mainly about 
delegitimizing their communications by means of media.

285
Epilogue: Charting Border Studies Beyond North 
American Grounds 
Helena Rytövuori-Apunen and Renée Marlin-Bennett
In the present book, the authors have sought to deepen our understanding of 
Central and South-Central Asia, of the complexities of life amidst multiple 
borders, of the varieties of states’ bordering practices, and of the challenges 
arising from both changes wrought by 9/11 as well as by the anticipated 
changes leading up to and following further reductions in the U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan after 2016. We have done so by drawing on a pragmatist sensi-
bility which explores reality as practice and approaches the “what”-question 
about things (the threat posed by Afghanistan, for example) by looking at the 
practical implications these things have, or may have, in the action of agents 
and the lives of people. It is like this that we are able to attain more nuanced 
understandings than if we had initiated our research with pre-defined con-
cepts and theoretical frameworks. In this Epilogue, we reflect on how our 
efforts here are situated within and beyond Border Studies, an interdiscipli-
nary field of study that is especially well suited to benefit from the richness 
of a pragmatist approach. We begin with a review of the phases in which 
Border Studies has unfolded, and we comment on Central and South Central 
Asia’s uneasy fit with the earlier problematique of Border Studies. We then 
return to explore how a pragmatist approach to Border Studies serves to gen-
erate fruitful insight. 
The Association of Borderlands Studies was founded in 1976, at a time 
when political issues of the U.S.-Mexican border, in particular migration, 
were of especial concern within the United States.1 Initially, “borderland”
studies referred specifically to the study of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, a 
place where differences of language, ethnicity, wealth, and political systems 
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made interaction complex. Stoddard’s (1986) retrospective of what was then 
an emerging area of study refers to these years as the culmination of the six-
decade-long period of “Interpretive Research” which, according to his meas-
ure, followed the “Early Empiricism” before World War I and persisted until 
the 1980s.2 Motivated by the study of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands—a zone 
on the Northern American map seen to evince “pathologies” in need of 
scholarly inquiry—the research of this period privileged themes of difference 
and penetration (migration, disease) and of conflict (interstate and inter-
group).3 Such a focus on interpreting the pathologies of border relations 
evolved into two distinct yet related themes during the 1970s and early 
1980s.  In the first theme, which Stoddard calls “Border Issues and Diplo-
matic Solutions,” border relations were studied by focusing on the processes, 
conditions and consequences of violence, criminality and other socially prob-
lematic forms of behavior. The main idea was that the “border [is understood 
as the] dividing line between nations” and the border itself allows researchers 
to look at two cultures comparatively and to examine the “pathological and 
undesirable behavior patterns” that remain “unresolved by international di-
plomacy.” “Border Division” perhaps is a better title than the one used by 
Stoddard to describe the idea. The second theme, “Border Integration,” 
moved away from the assumption that borders divide and, as a consequence,
evince pathological behavior. Attention turned to the question of how the 
                                                          
2 Ellwyn R. Stoddard, “Border studies as an emergent field of scientific inquiry: Scholarly 
contributions of U.S.-Mexico borderlands studies,” Journal of Borderlands Studies 1, no. 1 
(1986): 1–33.
3 Works in the genre include William H. Form and William V. D’Antonio, “Integration and 
Cleavage among Community Influentials in Two Border Cities,” American Sociological 
Review 24, no. 6 (1959): 804–14; Orrin E. Klapp and L. Vincent Padgett, “Power Structure 
and Decision-Making in a Mexican Border City,” American Journal of Sociology 65, no. 4 
(1960): 400–406. The U.S.-Canada border, in contrast, did not attract similar interdiscipli-
nary scholarly attention, and the attraction of policy-focused research was not paralleled by 
research institutions until 9/11 transformed all U.S. borders. A search for research articles 
about the U.S.-Canada border appearing in 1965 or earlier reveals little that can be called 
“borderland studies”; the closest we find is a collection of documents published in 1960 on 
the Windsor, Canada border crossing to the United States (Ernest J. Lajeunesse, The Wind-
sor Border Region, Canada’s Southernmost Frontier; A Collection of Documents [Toronto: 
The Champlain Society for the Government of Ontario and University of Toronto Press,
1960; repr. as e-book, Delhi: Vendeur Gyan Books, 2013]). The events of 9/11 provided a 
rationale for establishing the Border Policy Research Institute at the Western Washington 
University in 2005. This institute focuses on studying the U.S.-Canada border.
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border can join together rather than separate. “Borderlands [are understood] 
as [a] single symbiotic system separated by an arbitrary political line.”4
Are Stoddard’s themes of pathologies of border division and border inte-
gration useful for grasping the complexity of life in the borderlands of Cen-
tral and South-Central Asia? The reference to pathology reveals thematic 
negativity. In its Greek etymology, pathology is derived from pathos, a noun 
that denotes suffering and feeling, but also refers to the feelings aroused by 
such a condition (pity, sorrow, sympathy, compassion).5 The “pathologies” 
of border relations emerged as the new focus of research because U.S. re-
searchers approached the conditions on the U.S.-Mexico borderland as prob-
lems. The situation there was abnormal; it deviated from what was taken by 
them as being sound or proper. This assumption of pathology was applied in 
order to provide insight and perspectives for borderlands studies. In the pre-
sent day, at a time when border(lands) studies are expanding to become more 
global while researchers hope to retain a body that distinguishes it from other 
research areas and traditional disciplines, it is relevant to ask how this focus 
on pathology, an idea that was important at a formative moment in interdis-
ciplinary borderlands research, can be applied to the study of other geograph-
ic areas such as Central and South-Central Asia—regions which so far have 
featured very little in border(lands) studies.
First we turn to pathologies of border divisions. Although we do indeed 
see divisions along borders that evince suffering, the way these borders exist 
and are divided in Central and South-Central Asia is different from what we 
witness along the U.S.-Mexico border. The pathologies of rich-versus-poor 
along the U.S.-Mexico border and the situation in Central and South-Central 
Asia are a case in point. In contrast to the U.S.-Mexico border, the state bor-
ders between the former Soviet republics in Central Asia as well as the com-
plex zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan do not evince many of the pa-
thologies of the border that stem from sharp differences of development and 
culture between the regional states. Instead, the entire region is a wide zone 
where urban elites share the lifestyles of the transnational elites, and where 
the lives of these urban elites are distanced from those of the poor, and par-
ticularly from those of the rural poor. The gap within national economies, 
which also spills across borders here, marks the existence of a “developed” 
                                                          
4 Stoddard, “Border studies as an emergent field of scientific inquiry,” 5. 
5 Pathein, to suffer, to feel (Webster’s New World Dictionary, Third College Edition, Cleve-
land: Simon & Schuster, 1988).
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and an “underdeveloped” world. While Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (ac-
cording to the criteria of the World Bank IDA) are “upper-middle-income” 
economies and Afghanistan and Tajikistan “low-income” economies,6 this 
gap persists nevertheless. Institutional facts—the labels applied by the World 
Bank to countries because of statistical medians—have significance for fu-
ture prospects (e.g., attractiveness to investment) and sentiments of national 
pride rather than marking difference between entire populations. The borders 
between segments of populations are instead to be found between the elite-
urban-developed and the poor-underdeveloped. In essence, what might be 
called “development-culture borders” in the Central and South-Central Asia 
regions are not congruent with state borders. This is an important difference 
to characteristics identified along the U.S.-Mexico border. Unlike at the 
U.S.-Mexico state border, the global development difference is not symbol-
ized by any particular line on the map or by fences at the border; it is ubiqui-
tous throughout the region and surfaces at multiple junctions in the flexible 
networks of illegal economic activity.
Another major difference in Central and South-Central Asia is the “pa-
thology” generated by the emergence of a border that divides proponents of 
political Islam from proponents of secular ideas of social organization. Nei-
ther the U.S.-Mexico state border nor the North American region provides an 
equivalent example of this type of highly politicized religious-secular border. 
Differences in culture and religion do not make dividing lines in the way that 
political (and politicized) Islam does in Central and South-Central Asia. In 
the former Soviet republics political tensions frequently build up with the 
frustrations created by unsuccessful or absent power-sharing in the central 
government and on different administrative levels. Cultural and religious 
differences are fomented by the fear of violence and political takeover by 
insurgent groups, and these local threats are amplified by the global dis-
course on terrorism and political and religious extremism. While political 
Islam (in the form of social organization that includes suppressed political 
parties) is part of everyday life in a largely Muslim region, the radical forms 
of an Islamic state and society based on the religious law of prophetic reli-
gion (Sharia) is more of a threatening image than rooted in the heterogene-
ous terrain of an insurgency which has developed in country-specific and 
                                                          
6 The Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan and Pakistan are “lower middle-income” economies. The 
data pertain to the fiscal year 2015, see http://data.worldbank.org/country.
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regional conditions. However, the “pathology” is that militant radicalization 
can be accelerated and the threat be made more real by the mechanisms of 
power, which distribute human security unequally. The uncertainty over Af-
ghanistan nourishes these states’ competition for external resources in build-
ing statehood and strengthening the power of the central governments against 
their internal opposition. This increases political polarization and induces 
local and regional insurgents to join forces under the umbrella of a radical-
ized Islam with overseas connections and support. Local insurgency is “re-
gionalized” when groups seek shelter across state borders by using their 
transboundary networks and affiliations and adapt to the conditions which 
support them. With its external nourishment from the capitals of world pow-
ers and the madrassas (religious schools) in several Arab countries, it is this 
mechanism of power and security that is the main “pathology” characterizing 
the region. Local madrassas operate underground, and states accuse their 
neighbors of supporting the radicalization of their youth. Although the histor-
ical root causes vary throughout post-Soviet Central Asia and South-Central 
Asia, the general mechanism of deepening the conflict to a regrettable circle 
of “pathological” developments is similar in all these cases.
Nevertheless, there are notable similarities regarding the state borders of 
the Central and South-Central Asian region and the state border between the 
U.S. and Mexico. Of special concern are the pathologies related to labor-
related migration and illegal economic activity—the trafficking of human 
beings, the colossal trade in drugs and other common forms of contraband, 
and the corruption in administrative and law enforcement structures that sus-
tains these activities. Illegal activities have effects across the borders between 
the Central and South-Central Asian states that are similar to what we ob-
serve in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. While on the one hand such practices 
disrupt the functioning of what can be considered a sound society, they also 
provide the livelihoods of some local people, albeit livelihoods with simulta-
neously more risk and greater potential for large profits than do ordinary 
forms of livelihood. 
In Central and South-Central Asia, state borders—the lines on the map—
cannot be considered the only, or even the most important, borders that exist. 
Consequentially, it is sharply problematic to approach them as the dividing 
lines for comparisons between “two cultures.” Although states and border-
land populations often hold hostile (i.e., “pathological”) attitudes toward 
their neighbors, hostility is mainly the consequence of competing state-
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building projects among cultures otherwise not easily differentiated. Cultures 
on both sides of the formal border are intermingled and fused in the multi-
ethnic societies of these states. Hostilities tend to flare up when historical 
sensitivities and conflicts among the titular nations of former Soviet repub-
lics are reactivated in connection with contemporary controversies. The rela-
tions between the “Ferghana Three” (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) 
offer ample examples. Nevertheless, it also must be noted that Stoddard’s 
starting point of “two cultures” can be analytically fruitful in studying the 
encounters between extra-regional agents and agents within the region. Ex-
amples include social tensions over the region-wide energy development pro-
jects supported by the international community and between foreign military 
staff and local communities.7
The other theme identified by Stoddard, the pathologies of border inte-
gration, focuses on problems that arise from seeing borders as sites of joining 
rather than separating. In relation to Central and South-Central Asia, examin-
ing border integration leads to questioning, for example, how social habitats 
that have developed in the past are operative across the state borders and 
have meaning in borderland populations’ life-contexts. In post-Soviet Central 
Asia, where integration across administrative borderlines was a given before 
independence, new state architecture on borders has prompted negative and, 
as demonstrated by the communal conflicts in the Ferghana area, violent re-
actions from the population when previously routine mobility is prevented. 
Ferghana also illustrates how little the establishment of borders with flow-
regulating border crossing points can do to ease tensions when formal state 
boundaries do not coincide with people’s lives. Efforts to set up legal frames 
for the interaction of transborder communities also easily stumble into inter-
state conflict and rivalry fueled by history. The long-lasting disputes between 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over energy-supply arrangements during the Sovi-
et era is one such example. The strife over Tajikistan’s need for electricity 
from Uzbekistan and the Rogun hydropower plant cannot be explained with-
out considering its background in the structurally integrated Soviet economy. 
When the post-Soviet borders came to separate state authority, the joint use 
of resources became a source of conflict. Weak in their newly established 
national economies, states were unable to resolve the problems left by the 
                                                          
7 The events in connection with the Manas base in Kyrgyzstan are an example. See Bruce 
Pannier, “Good-Bye, Manas,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 2, 2014, 
www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyzstan-manas-base-us-afghanistan/25318711.html.
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Soviet division of economic resources across the then-administrative borders. 
Personalized relations between leaders and the reactivation of historical 
grievances over the “ownership” of sites and places for identity purposes 
served to accelerate mutual conflict and spurred hostilities which, due to their 
repetitive appearance, began to look “pathological.” The bitter disputes over 
Samarkand and Bukhara in Tajik-Uzbek relations are additional examples of 
this dynamic. Tajikistan “lost” these two ancient cities to Uzbekistan when it 
attained the status of full Soviet republic in 1929, yet continues to regard 
them as paramount symbols of its own historical Persian culture and pre-
Russian independence.8
This brief review demonstrates, we suggest, that an analysis will remain 
limited if we approach this analysis by looking for pathologies of border di-
vision and border integration. On the one hand, investigating the pathologies 
of borders and power is arguably a research task by which academic research 
can provide systematic knowledge for the design and assessment of policies. 
It can contribute to building border architecture which, in its efforts to direct 
transborder flows and interaction into legal and controlled formats (such as 
cross-border markets and free trade zones), needs to both restrict and facili-
tate cross-border mobility and interaction. On the other hand, however, when 
identifying mechanisms of the “pathologies” of borders and power typical for
different regions, we also must remain aware of the discursive boundaries of 
the concept as it is used in border(lands) studies. The limitations of discourse 
become discernible when we pause to reflect on the idea of the “sound” con-
dition, and in particular how this condition reveals morally dissatisfactory, 
“pathological” features in the behavior and states of affairs that we observe. 
If we start with a functionalist assumption, the discursive effect of such a 
choice is to consider borders as arbitrary obstacles to the natural interaction 
and mobility of borderland populations. Such an assumption predisposes us 
to think of social development in terms of an idea of nature according to 
which there is a predefined form to every living thing, like the seed to a
flower, that outlines its full potentiality and range of possible existence. The 
notion of borderlands as symbiotic systems in which transborder communi-
ties complement each other’s “natural” development conveys such a biologi-
cal metaphor of social development. 
                                                          
8 The defeat of the Amir of Bukhara by the tsar’s army in 1867 marks the subordination of 
southern Tajikistan to Russian rule. 
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Seeing “nature” (in the sense of the “natural” and therefore “sound”) as 
an ideal for society has a long and intricate lineage with numerous branches 
in Western culture. It is manifest in the belief in self-generating moderniza-
tion (functional differentiation on an ever larger scale) as well as in ideas 
about “alternative development” and “greening” as becoming closer to (the 
idea of) nature. It is also expressed by the modern idea of science as a means 
to disclose the “secrets” of nature. These ontological assumptions can be 
traced back to the question of esse/posse (actual being and potentiality, cen-
tered on God) in Western Christianity and the conception of nature which, in 
the pre-given “natural process,” claims a moral authority derived from divine 
telos.9 Whilst omnipresent in Western culture, the idea has specifically been 
cultivated as the ideational background against which the “New World” has 
built its identity vis-à-vis the “burden of history” and an imposed (corrupt, 
decaying) culture in the “Old World.” Arguments about healthy markets and 
self-correcting democracy are sustained by the discursive power of “nature.”
The idea that we trace here is more specific and shows its contours against 
the Romanticist elevation of ordinary life as the moral value vis-à-vis other 
values (such as religious and theoretical contemplation and the citizen’s par-
ticipation in a polity). The development of modern identity, including what 
Charles Taylor calls “the affirmation of ordinary life,” is a crucial discursive 
condition for the emergence of the “social problem” as a concern over sub-
standard living environments in Western societies.10 In Central Asia, histori-
cal conditions are entirely different, and the closest equivalent, perhaps, is 
the Soviet affirmation of the power of the state made explicit through the 
raised standards of living in ordinary life.11 Our point in touching upon this 
immensely wide and culturally weighty field is limited to the argument that it 
valorizes the background practices of the deep-seated historical, and thus 
                                                          
9 John Passmore notes that the Latin etymology of “nature” is nascere: to be born, to come 
into being. He emphasizes that while the signification of nature in the Old Testament is that 
nature exists to glorify God (“Life”), the New Testament expresses the conception that na-
ture is God’s creation for man’s uses and stewardship. See John Passmore, Man’s Re-
sponsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (London: 
Duckworth, 1974), 32.
10 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 1989), 211–302. 
11 While ordinary life is not the high value which it is in the liberal tradition, it takes extreme 
forms in consumption patterns which emulate the grandeur of the public sphere of power. 
See Arpad Szakolczai, “Citizenship and Home: Political Allegiance and Its Background,” 
International Political Anthropology 1, no. 1 (2008): 57–75.
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existential, experience from which the idea(l) of a sound and proper (border-
land) condition emerges and instructs observation of the actual developments 
in their malfunction and abnormal deviation. 
It is here that we arrive at the key point of our research: by drawing our 
attention to practices, pragmatism leads us to reflect on borders and border-
ing practices as well as on our own interpretive practices. In contrast to the 
biological metaphor that privileges its idea of “nature” as the ideal for devel-
oping society, reflective attitudes questioning the background practices of 
interpretations acknowledge the existential tension embedded in the relation 
of the interpreting subject and the world that is thus experienced. A critical 
sensitivity about projecting a unifying logos onto reality instructs us to adopt 
a path of inquiry about how borders between states or polities represent sym-
bols of rule and instances of geo-power which have been built, demolished, 
accumulated and annexed to previous constructs over longer periods of time. 
This analytical point of departure perhaps can be best illustrated by the iconic 
representations of constructed history in the architectonic symbols of rule 
and power in urban landscapes, such as the world’s tallest flagpole rising up 
165 meters in Dushanbe (second-tallest at the time of writing) and the colos-
sal National Library that has been erected not far from it; a building which 
literally awaits the width and depth of a national culture still under construc-
tion (rather than bursting out in its already existing potentiality, as the pre-
formist metaphor would argue) and that is to be displayed within its walls. 
These constructs of political landscape are symbols of the contemporary re-
gime’s ambitions and pieces of historical archeology akin to the Ak Orda 
Presidential Palace in Astana or the National September 11 Memorial in New 
York. When an unreflective Western eye leaps to judgments about Asian 
constructs as being an unnatural, and even a perverted, display of power due 
to their physical size, these constructs are being viewed from a perspective 
where the conditions for that which is morally satisfactory are different and 
have to do with what is considered “organic” in society and argued to have 
some immediate functionality in the everyday lives of the people. We do not 
argue that these views are right or wrong; instead, they tell us about qualita-
tive difference in the background practices of interpreting experience. “Two 
cultures,” then, can be one way of articulating the initial sensation of prag-
matist questioning; it is existential and does not impose the coherence of 
“cultures” upon reality. In other words, the recognition of the situatedness of 
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Stoddard’s “two cultures” of pathologies of border division and border inte-
gration is used as a starting point for further reflection. 
While the “preformist” logic of development may seek to conquer and 
settle borders with reasoning and justification by referring to the “nature of 
things”—such as the argument that ideas and needs do not have borders be-
cause the human being is universal—the recognition of segments of histori-
cal experience allows us to see many borders, none of which create absolute 
divisions. In Central and in South-Central Asia the experience of borders as 
externally imposed rules and administrative lines (set up primarily by British 
and Russian/Soviet rule) has left borders with two sides: those that are offi-
cial and rule-related, and those that relate to everyday practices.12 This 
recognition of difference does not lead us to apply common theoretical 
frameworks under which “cases” are subsumed for their mutual comparison 
in the tradition of comparative research (such as is done in comparative poli-
tics). Instead, the recognition of difference is the momentary experience 
(sensation) which instructs inquiry without assuming difference in the sense 
of distinct entities such as “two cultures,” a point of departure which also 
risks exoticizing reality by projecting immanent nature. 
In short, the sensibility of the research presented in this book as a whole 
starts with practices, draws meaning from those practices, and looks for use-
ful understandings that can prevent polarizing and deepening conflicts. This 
brings us back to the consideration of pragmatism as a productive approach 
to border studies. In his outline of the thematic development of border stud-
ies, Stoddard mentions the early 1980s as a turning point towards a more 
global perspective, and he sees “Comparative Border Studies” as an oppor-
tunity for opening up scholarship to the question of the “communality of 
border problems and functions throughout the world.”13 Border studies have 
since expanded to include approaches from critical geography, postcolonial 
studies, and other critical and reflexive starting points. The path we would 
like to propose at such junctions (which are constantly present in research) 
                                                          
12 This dualism was used by Stalinist state-building policies which made private “happiness” a 
symbol of state success. In Central Asia Soviet rule did not systematically destroy the fabric 
of everyday life like it did in Eastern Europe as a result of the failures of its social disciplin-
ing. In Central Asia the project of modernization was less sweeping in society and focused 
on mainly export-oriented agriculture (Szakolczai, “Citizenship and Home”).
13 It is from within this more global perspective that the Journal of Borderlands Studies, the 
scholarly journal of the Association of Borderlands Studies, began publication in 1986. 
Stoddard’s article on the phases of the research opened the first issue of Volume 1. 
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begins with an awareness of the difference of experience rather than the con-
ceptual a priori of theoretical frameworks and theory-building that disconnect
research from practice. In this way the problem formulation is not universal-
ist (or particularist, in the same vein of logic), and it also does not argue for 
the “uniqueness” of the subject in focus. Instead, it is relational and, by re-
flecting on difference, can extend interpretations to cover an ever more glob-
al domain while also reproducing the body of research in some respect, such 
as the thematic notion of “pathologies” of border relations. Thus the differ-
ence is not only about the experience of the region but also about study: it 
makes us aware of how our perspectives are culturally limited, and it turns 
these limitations into new openings for interpretations of experience. 
Because a pragmatist approach to such inquiry calls for modesty and 
humbleness, some reservations are called for in relation to the epistemic atti-
tudes suggested by Stoddard’s notions on the earliest phases of borderland 
studies. He traces these to what he terms “archival preservation and impres-
sionism” inspired by the documents and diaries of Columbus’s journey to the 
Americas (1492) and the subsequent journeys of Cortés, Coronado, and other 
early European explorers and conquerors. These “proto-borderland studies,”
in his measure, lasted until “Early Empiricism” emerged in the final decades 
of the nineteenth century. Tracing the path of research back to Columbus and 
the truly paradigmatic changes brought about in the following centuries in 
conceptions concerning man and nature arguably conveys the powerful met-
aphor of a bold determination to sail uncharted oceans. Pragmatist research 
shares such openness, and it does so by leaving behind not only the belief in 
scientific certainty (which pre-modern explorers also did not have). It also 
rejects the assumption that the mind-independent world in itself has coherent 
substance, which was suggested to Columbus and his followers by the divine 
spirit and the mundane authorities who claimed to be some part of it, and 
which has contemporary parallels in similar ontological assumptions about 
power, ethnicity, material determination, etc.
The paradigm-changing proposition of pragmatism vis-à-vis the conven-
tional idea of “the mind as the mirror of nature”14 is that the reality which 
human interpreters encounter as signs (interpreted reality) is practice. The 
idea of anything that “is” lies in its practical implications. The pragmatist 
                                                          
14 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979).
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explorative endeavor does not claim to conquer new territories, i.e. domains 
of study and approaches that define schools and disciplines. Instead, it pro-
poses to examine borderless (initially unframed) landscapes from perspec-
tives other than their established conventions. The present book started out 
by arguing that pragmatism offers a way to steer clear of the closed harbors 
of convention offered by the traditional concept of inter-national relations 
and that it, in the same vein of logic, enables us to connect this field with the 
young multi- and interdisciplinary field of border(lands) studies. This book 
concludes by articulating the practical meaning of the same critical logic of 
interpretation in relation to border(lands) studies. This argument, we hope, 
should find resonance in the places of anchorage which this research com-
munity, already past the phase of setting sail, is presently establishing in Eu-
rope, Latin America, Africa and, in East Asia, particularly in Japan. Thus, 
while our goal is to contribute to bringing Central and South-Central Asia 
onto the global map of border studies, the region is also something more: it is 
an example of the different experience that forms the ground for attaining 
more global knowledge in contexts which are inevitably local.
Our goals for this book have thus been two-fold. The studies provided by 
the contributors promise to contribute to scholarship on the complex border-
ing practices of Central and South-Central Asia. In this way we hope that this 
book will provide important empirical analyses of a region that is rife with 
conflict and potentials for conflict but also filled with opportunities for more 
peaceful and just outcomes. The pragmatist research to which this book is 
attuned, we further hope, provides inspiration for reflective research that be-
gins with the consideration of factual events and the multiple practices which 
can be interpretatively unraveled rather than with conceptual frameworks 
limited by their definitions. The work is not and cannot be definitive. Instead, 
we end with a question, which is essentially where we began: What are the 
borders here and how do they continue to matter in our dynamic world?
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